Infanterie Regiment 63 at Tomaszow 1939.

[tigre]

Hello to all, greetings from Argentina. A story about the actions of one German infantry regiment in Poland 1939. From MILITARWISSENSCHAFTLICHE RUNDSCHAU. Dec 1939; published in the Foreign Military Digests, jun 1940.

Incidents of the Polish Campaign 1939: Engagement of the 3d battalion, 63d Infantry Regiment, 20 september at Tomaszow.

19 sep 39: on the evening the 3rd Battalion Infanterie Regiment 63 took up a position in the rear left flank of the regiment at Huta Dzierazynskie.
Troops of one of our light divisions were engaged with a strong hostile force located near Zamosc (about 12,5 miles to the north) and also in the vicinity of Tomaszow. Tarnawatka towards south was in flame. On hill 325,8 toward the southeast one engineer’s coy occupied a broad front facing southward. They have been summarily driven back toward the north during a polish attack but had retaken the above mentioned hill (sketch 1).
We could hear part of our own artillery firing toward south from their positions immediately southeast of Tarnawatka. Simultaneously the engineer coy called on the regiment for help. They claimed that due to the elongation of their outpost line had not been able to withstand the force of the polish attempt to break-through during the preceding night.
The divisional artillery commander also expresed concern for his batteries. The 3d Battalion, therefore, was ordered to occupy the hill 325.8 with a reinforced company.
Whereupon the battalion commander issued the following oral order:

“A strong hostile force fighting in the vicinity of Tomaszow is making vigorous and relentless attempts to effect penetrations in all directions. A fresh attempt to break-through toward the north and northeast, especially during the night, must also be reckoned with constantly. A company of engineers disposed on a broad front is holding the hill southeast of Tarnawatka (325.8). They have requested help. You can hear our own artillery firing toward the south from their positions at Tarnawatka. This artillery is also in danger of a hostile attack.
The 9th company, reinforced, will move immediately across the southeastern portion of Tarnawatka to the hill directly to the front thereof and prevent a hostile penetration on both sides of the main highway. The company will extend its defensive position to the right of the main highway up to the large lake. Combat posts along the Wieprzow creek. Combat intelligence to be pushed southward. The company of engineers deployed to the left of the road is placed under your command. Fires to be coordinated with our own artillery. Messages to battalion by motorcycle to the regimental command post. The rest of the 3d battalion will remain at the disposition of the regiment in the local bivouac at Huta Dzierazynskie.”
As the reinforced company moves up, the battalion commander gave them a few encouraging words and then he retired to the local bivouac.
About midnight the 9th company reported that it had occupied the defensive position as ordered and had established contact with the company of engineers and the artillery. There was evidence of fighting in the vicinity of Tomaszow, whence also came the sound of lively artillery fire.

Note: the 9th company was reinforced with one infantry mortar section and one portable radio detachment.

This follows ASAP. Regards. Tigre.

[tigre]

Hello to all, this is the second part.

20 Sep 39: About 02:00 AM (sketch 2) the 3d battalion was ordered forward to the hight ground south of Tarnawatka with orders that the entire battalion take over the mission of the 9th company. About 03:00 AM the 3d battalion (less the 9th company reinforced) with the infantry mortars divided between the 10th and 11th Companies, moves out of the bivouac on to the highway leading to Tarnawatka. Having arrived at the southeastern part of the town, which meanwhile had undergoing considerable burning. I halted the battalion, had the light machine gun dismounted and ordered ammunition, hand grenades, pyrotechnics, etc, to be issued. I took advantage of the time afforded thereby to contact the 9th Company and the artillery. At the recommendation of the company commander of the 9th Company, I moved forward with the battalion to the Command Post of the 9th Company, located about 550 yards southeast of East Tarnawatka. I also commited another rifle company during the night as well as the infantry cannon platoon and parts of the machine gun Company. The 10th Company I placed in position to the right rear and then contacted the artillery battalion commander. According to the Company commander of the 9th Company and the artillery commander, some enemy (estimated one Polish cavalry and infantry regiment) were hidden in the wood west of Pankow, and a strong hostile force in the wood north of Tomaszow. About 04:30 AM intensely heavy artillery fire and the sound of lively fighting reopened, estimated as coming from the vicinity south of Tomaszow-Lubelski.

We believed the enemy was attempting to effect a break-through toward the south. I reported my convictions to the regiment by telephone and in writing and proposed to carry out our mission by attacking in the direction of Tomaszow. I made preparations so that my battalion could attack at once, with its left flank along the main highway, and coordinated my plans with the artillery commander.

At 06:30 AM the regimental commander issued the following order:
“Regiment attacks 07:00 AM with the 3rd battalion on the west of, 1st on the east of the highway. Objective the high ground south of the large wood northwest of Tomaszow. The area in which there are a number of ponds, located about 1.100 yards south of the Dabrowa forestry, was assigned as the objective of the 3rd battalion.

More follows ASAP. Regards. Tigre.

[tigre]

Hello to all, here goes the third part.

Thereupon on the high ground 1.650 yards north of Kozia Wolka in the presence of the assembled company commanders, the leader of the attached infantry cannon platoon and the artillery commander, I issued the following oral order for the attack (skecht 3):

“The enemy appears to be attacking Tomaszow from the north and south in order to force a break-through. Friendly reconnaissance patrols report Pankow unoccupied, but as yet have been not able to ascertain wheter the enemy is still hidden in the wood west of Pankow or in the wood northeast of Tomaszow. We must considerer both possibilities.

The 63 Infantry Regiment, with the 3rd battalion on the right of, and the 1st battalion on the left of, the main highway, will attack in the direction of Tomaszow, in order to effect the complete desintegration of the hostile resistence. Objective of the regiment the high ground north of Tomaszow, objective of the 3rd battalion the high ground immediately south of the Dabrowa forestry.

First objective of the battalion the ridge 2.700 yards to our front, including the individual farms.
Time of attack: 07:00 AM.
Formation of attack: in the assault the 11th Company on the left to include the highway; frontage 550 yards. The 10th Company will follows at a distance of 330 yards, echeloned to the right rear, deployed for the attack.

The 9th Company in reserve will follow at a distance of 550 yards in rear of the center of the battalion until it reach the small woodlot beyond the swamp (875 yards south of Kozia Wolka).
The heavy infantry mortars will remain attached to the rifle companies.
A machine gun section, from position on this hill, will support the advance of the battalion across the marsh and will prevent any hostile flanking movement from the wood east of Pankow. It will follow the advance as soon as possible. The bulk of the heavy machine guns will accompany the assault companies and render immediate support to the attack whenever resistence is encountered. I believe that the attack can be advance very quickly once we have reached our first objective.

The infantry cannon platoon, attached to the 11th Company, will accompany an assault group that will push froward along the road. Its mission is to crush the resistence of the nemy with direct fire and disorganize him.
The artillery battalion to cover the advance of the battalion across the marsh by firing on any enemy appeared on that hill or along the edge of the wood and to support the attack.
The artillery liaison officer to accompany me. Any hostile action from the vicinity of Pankow, directed against the right flank of the battalion must be crushed by switching a part of the fire.
I will follow the right flank of the 11th Company at a distance of 330 yards. The next battalion command post will probably be either that house over there (Kozia Wolka) or the few, somewhat separated high fir trees in the wooded area west of the main highway.
Messages via radio of the 10th and 11th companies.”

While the company commanders were issuing orders, a few noncommissioned officers with motorcycles were reconnoitering the main highway leading to Tomaszow.
At 07:00 AM the battalion attacked. While approaching and crossing the marshy ground near Kozia Wolka, We encountered no hostile fire. While following the right flank of the 11th Company and crossing the marshy Wiewrzok Brook, the noncommissioned officer sent out by the 11th Company, returned with the following message: “strong enemy forces along the entire highway, There should be shout 20 to 30 pieces of artillery there. We surprised about 50 Poles. They are being taken to Tarnawatka by a member of my patrol. According to one of the prisoners the enemy have artillery in position along the edge of the wood over there for the purpose of mowing us down when we arrive within 50 yards of the position, I realized that we could expect strong resistence along and to the right of the main highway, and that the attack would prove more successful if it were extended along a broader front.

I therefore ordered the 10th Company to contact the 11th Company with its left flank and to advance the attack on a frontage of 550 yards. About 07:45 AM the 10th and 11th companies reached the first objective, an elongated hill covered with underbrush and scattered groups of buildings, about 1.650 yards south of Kozia Wola (Skecht 3). The battalion staff arrived at the battalion Command Post, the previously designated group of trees about 330 yards north of the right flank of the 11th Company . The 9th company that had been required to follow immediately in rear of the battalion staff as reserve, followed at a distance of about 1.100 yards, as the reassembling of the widely separated elements along the broad front had caused some delays. At this time a prisoner was brought to me. He also claimed that strong artillery and several companies of infantry were hidden in the wood, and that parts of the enemy artillery were in position along the edge of the wood in front of our position for the purpose of firing on us when we arrived within close range. This information led me to believe that the wood was occupied by the enemy and secured by rifle and machine gun fire (possibly firing from trees). Two enemy machine gun had been detected mounted on a woodshed. As I desired particularly to have the 9th Company continue the attack, I decided to press forward after first subjecting the enemy in the wood and along its edge to a fitting artillery preparation. Through the artillery liaison officer and by telephone to the regiment I requested an artillery preparation be laid down in the edge of the wood. I also requested that the artillery battalion, cooperating with our battalion displaced one artillery battery forward to a position immediately in rear of the battalion command post in order it might be available for immediate action against the sporadic cropping up of centers the resistance. Regiment agreed to have our light, and one heavy artillery battalion laid down a preparation between 08:30 and 08:45 AM. The forward displacement of one battery was likewise carried out.

Meanwhile the battalion was ordered to continue the attack and all heavy weapons were moved forward. From the vicinity of the main highway we could hear heavy machine gun and rifle fire from the edge of the wood in front of us came intermitent machine gun and heavy rifle fire (firing from trees) directed against anything that moved.
About 08:40 AM the regimental commander informed me that negotiations for surrendered were being considered. I informeed him that I would contunue the attack as soon as the artillery preparation was lifted and the battery which had been so ordered moved forward. About 09:00 AM it was reported to me that this battery would shortly be prepared to open fire. The 10th Company reported to me that an enemy battery had withdrawn from the edge of the wood toward the west and that they had fired on this battery with infantry mortars and heavy machine guns. Observers from the battalion staff and from the 11th Company reported to me that they had seen individual enemy troops running back and forth along the edge of the wood, and that it appeared as though the enemy were about to abandon their positions. I decided immediately to take up the pursuit.

More follows ASAP. Regards. Tigre.

[tigre]

Hello to all, fourth part.

Shortly after 9:00 AM the 10th and 11th Companies attacked the edge of the wood. Weak rifle fire was directed against the left flank of the 11th Company and some machine gun fire against other of our troops. The enemy machine guns on the edge of the wood were covered by fire from the forward battery. The 10th Company and the right flank oft he 11th Company advanced hesitatingly toward the edge of the wood. Before the left flank of the 10th Company, the fire of the forward battery or one farther to the rear was falling on the edge ef the wood. In spite of repeated shooting of green signal lights (it was understood that a green signal light would indicate a request to increase the range of artillery fire 2,200 yards). the fire of this battery could not be interrupted. In order to avoid delay, and to deny the enemy any time in which to organize his resistance. I ordered the left flank of the 10th Company to continue the pursuit and encumvent our own artillery fire.

During the advance of the battalion through the wood, our staff came suddenly upon a gap in the wood between the assaults waves of the 10th and the 11th Companies. The sound of fighting on the main highway had stopped; in the wood we could still hear considerable rifle firing. In order to maintain direction I ordered: “March toward the sun.”

About 880 yards north of the southern edge of the wood I sent forward a battalion staff sergeant along a road in the wood in order to ascertain whether this road lead southward. Whereupon the staff sergeant came upon a mass of Poles and knocked their officer down. The Polish soldires then threw down their arms and surrendered. The staff sergeant returned with about 40 prisoners. In order to secure the advance of the battalion staff I ordered a patrol, selected from the 9th Company, which was following immediately in our rear, to precede the battalion staff and mop up the wood on both sides of the road. Without encountering further resistance, a number of Polish soldires had thrown away their arms and surrendered, the battalion staff arrived at the southern edge of the wood simultaneously with the advanced elements of the 9th Company. We could see nothing of the 11th Company on our left. It was still hidden in the wood. To the right front were parts of the 10th Company that had reached their objective, whence the attack was to be continued after the necessary suporting fires had been provided for. From the position of the battalion staff we could see that the high ground was occupied by a great number of enemy riflemen and machine guns engaged in firing on the 10th Company. Many enemy riflemen and machine guns directly of the battalion staff were delivering flanking fire against the left flank of the parts of the 10th Company that had pushed forward. Their entire flank was exposed. In order to relieve the 10th Company and to seize the hill directly south of the edge of the wood, a position which appeared to present a commanding situation with respect to Tomaszow (mainly there are no ponds as shown in the skecht, the area consisting largely of dried up, partially marshy, deeply cut troughs and depressions). I decided at once to commit the 9th Company to fill the gap between the 10th and the 11th Companies.

The last part follows. Regards. Tigre.

[tigre]

Hello folks this is the last part.

The 9th Company deploying as it came out of the wood completely surprised the Poles with flanking rifle and machine gun fire and within a few minutes had captured the dominant high ground, thereby causing the rapid collapse of the hostile resistance confronting, the 10th Company.

Same stormed a strongly occupied hill close to the edge of the wood, a hostile battery that during the attack had been firing on the 11th Company but was now half limbered was captured; then they pushed on to another hill which dominated the Tomaszow valley.

Shortly before 10:00 AM the entire battalion had arrived on the dominant heights north of Tomaszow, the objective as ordered by the regiment, and was prepared to continue the pursuit. The enemy fleeing toward Tomaszow and the east were taken under annihilating light and heavy of machine gun fire.

While issuing brief orders to provide for the forward movement of the infantry cannon platoon and the forward displacement of the artillery, I received orders from regiment that negotiations for surrender were in progress, that the fire was to be adjusted and the present line held.

A few hours later it was announced that the enemy had agreed to surrender. The prisoners taken were 7 officers and 572 men. We captured 16 guns including some pieces of heavy caliber, 9 antitank guns; a vast number of light and heavy machine guuns, rifles, trucks, horses and other materiel.

Greiner picture taken from: http://www.ritterkreuztraeger-1939-45.de/

Cheers. Tigre.

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

A story about the actions of one German infantry regiment in Poland 1939. From MILITARWISSENSCHAFTLICHE RUNDSCHAU. Dec 1939; published in the Foreign Military Digests, jun 1940.

Incidents of the Polish Campaign 1939: Engagement of the 3d battalion, 63d Infantry Regiment, 20 september at Tomaszow.

Hello Raul! Excellent article as always!

I found out that the same action (of III./IR.63) is also described in H. Greiner's & E. Ebeling's "Kriegeslehren in taktischen Beispielen aus dem Weltkrieg 1914/1918 und aus dem Polen-Feldzug 1939", Berlin 1941.

Actions from this work were presented as shining examples of tactical solutions during officer training courses.

There is also Polish translation available in the Regional Museum in Tomaszów Lubelski.

Heinz Greiner as Lt Col was the commanding officer of the 3d Battalion 63d Infantry Regiment at that time.

At the time of publishing "Kriegeslehren..." together with E. Ebeling, he was already an Oberst.

Eberhard Ebeling at that time was an Oberstleutnant.

[tigre]

Hello Peter ; thanks for that tip.........................

Here goes something about Eberhard Ebeling:

During the actions of this first day (06 Apr 1941) the Regimental Commander, Oberstleutnant Ebeling (GJR 141) was killed in combat by shrapnel from artillery shells. He was replaced by Oberst Friedrich-Jobst Volckamer von Kirchensittenbach and since 19 April 1941 onwards took over Oberst Maximilian Jais.

Source: Gebirgsjäger zwischen Kreta und Murmansk. Die 6. Gebirgs-Division im Einsatz - Karl Ruef, Leopold Stocker Verlag, Graz-Stuttgart.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; brief framework of the situation..................................

The first battle of Tomaszów Lubelski (September 17-20, 1939).

Surrounded to the southwest of Tomaszów Lubelski, the small remnants of the Army of "Krakow", together with General Antoni Szyling, were incorporated into the Army of "Lublin" commanded by General Ludwik Piskor. The new grouping included the 6th Infantry Division, the 23rd Infantry Division, the 55th Infantry Division and part of the 21st Infantry Division, as well as the Krakow Cavalry Brigade and the Warsaw Motorized Armored Brigade. of Colonel Stefan Rowecki. General Ludwik Piskor, in command of this group, received an order from the Commander-in-Chief to cross Tomaszów to Bełżec, Rawa Ruska, Lviv and from there to the border with Romania. For this he had to attack the positions of the XXII. German Armored Corps (Commander - General Ewald von Kleist) in the area of ​​Tomaszów Lubelski-Bełżec-Narol.

This attack (September 17), like the next two, carried out on September 18 and the night of September 19-20, ended in failure. Due to heavy losses, lack of means of combat and the increasing advantage of the enemy, on September 20 at 10:00 am the Polish troops capitulated.

On the morning of September 17, in the vicinity of Rudka, near Zwierzyniec, the Army of "Krakow" and the WBPM (Warszawska Brygada Pancerno - Motorowa - Warsaw Motorized Armored Brigade) liquidated most of their cars, destroying a total of 300 vehicles, and the fuel saved in this way was poured into tanks and armored vehicles. On the same day, the WBPM found itself near Tomaszów, reconnaissance through combat at night, calculating that the amount of gasoline should be enough for the tanks to reach Lviv by the shortest route.

Already on September 17, it was very difficult to deploy the Polish troops confined to the cauldron near Tomaszów. From the direction of Biłgoraj, the Polish group was pressured by the German 27 and 68 Infantry Divisions / VII Corps, from the south - the 8 and 28 Infantry Divisions / of the VIII Corps /, and the pursuing regiment of the 28 Division of Infantry blocked the direction to Rawa Ruska - Lviv. Tomaszów Lubelski, occupied by the Germans on September 13, was defended by units of the XXII Armored Corps against the attacks of the Poles, based on field fortifications prepared and reinforced since September 18 by the forces of the 4. Light Division, which closed access to the city from the west and south.

Sources: http://www.1939.pl/bitwy/niemcy/bitwa-p ... index.html
https://twojahistoria.pl/encyklopedia/l ... snia-1939/

Cheers. Raúl M .