Also, I feel that von der Goltz appears as an increasingly central character in German machinations. But it is interesting to note that his brother in Berlin, Regierungsrat Graf von der Goltz lead the German colonization drive of the Baltics. It was he who had signed the petition for volunteers to "protect the German homeland and the Baltics" that is, the petition for volunteers to join the Iron Division. Looks like a family business.
What about Judenitch and Bermondt then? I think it highly likely that Judenitch would have been quite happy to have Bermondt's well-trained and well-equipped troops under his command so I think that if he had, indeed, rebuffed Bermondt's offer of his troops, it would have been only caused by Bermondt demanding terms that he knew Judenitch would not have accepted. Still, the end result was the same: Bermondt would not join his forces with Judenitch' command and in September 1919 Judenitch proclaimed that Bermondt was "a traitor to Russia". Bermondt was in contact with Denikin and Wrangel, too, but they saw him as an errand-boy for the Germans and refused to enter any serious negotiations.
In October the 3rd the German government called von der Goltz back to Germany and ordered General von Eberhard to take over in his place. It would be interesting to know more of the reasons behind this decision. Did the German government see the situation as untenable? Did they hope that it would appear that the Germans had nothing to do with the coming attack on Riga? What if the attack had succeeded? Maybe von der Goltz would have jumped back in the saddle and the world would have been presented with another German victory. After all, the majority of Bermondt's troops were German and they had been organized with German money and support.
Durand, you may have not noticed that I added a correction to one of my previous postings; the armoured train affair was on the 5th, not on the 19th; I was writing that bit at work and did not want to have the books too openly on sight and therefore went wrong. And I would very much appreciate if you would not tell my employer that I used their computer and time for this stuff
The Polish connection seems to be quite simple in the end. If we look at the Bolshevik positions in the Baltics area we have their western front in May roughly like this: In the north we have Russian Bolsheviks facing the Estonians ( and Judenitch' force), to their south the Latvian Bolsheviks under the Stucka goverment hold the parts of Latvia to the east and to the north of Riga. To the south of Red Latvians there are Polish troops facing teh Russian Bolsheviks to their east; the Vilna area was part of Poland between the world wars and Latvia was Poland's neighbour. Latvian Bolsheviks retreated eastwards beyond Jekabpils - Gulbene line. There they were used as base of the 15th army of the Red Army. It is quite likely that this force would not have been able to control the area and likewise it would have been only natural for the Poles to attempt to secure their left flank and advance north. Since the Ulmanis government later co-operated with the Poles, it is likely that the Polish advance to Latvian territory would have been at least tacitly approved by the Latvians. The contact was made on June the 6th about 15 kilometres south of Jekabpils in Birzi. Both sides were represented by cavalry patrols so it seems on both sides it was a matter of reconnaissance elements.
The Clemenceau quote seems a bit strange; maybe he meant that the Poles feared that the Landeswehr or the Iron Division would attack Polish troops in the south-eastern corner of Latvia. In that case Clemenceau would have actually meant to speak of Germans in Latvia instead of Germans in Estonia. This interpretation would make at least some sense since there seems to have been something of a no-man's-land in the Jekabpils area with the Germans, Estonians, Poles and Red Latvians all around the city in different directions but none of them with sufficient force to establish real control of the area. The Polish government would probably have been as mistrusting of the German intentions as their neighbours in the north and might have feared that the Germans turn towards them next. In light of what has been written in this thread, it seems that von der Goltz and his merry band would probably have turned their attention towards Poland only after the fall of Petrograd, if even then. Of course, the Poles did not know this at the time ( as a matter of fact, we do not actually know this either ).
regards,
Tapani K.
