Freikorps and Estonia 1919

[Tapani K.]

Durand, we seem to agree very much on von der Goltz. I think it can be fairly safely said that his primary objective was establishing a semi-independent German state in what used to be ruled by German nobility for centuries. From there the Germans could together with the Russian Whites crush the Bolsheviks and establish a German-Russian alliance. But, in case the White Russians managed to crush the Bolsheviks on their own, they would not have recognized any change in the pre-war Russian borders, which was clearly stated on several occasions by the leading White generals. Therefore, von der Goltz needed to establish his own power base quickly and only then, on more or less equal basis, start co-operating with the Whites. This is, of course, partly speculation, but I think it fits well with what we know.

Also, I feel that von der Goltz appears as an increasingly central character in German machinations. But it is interesting to note that his brother in Berlin, Regierungsrat Graf von der Goltz lead the German colonization drive of the Baltics. It was he who had signed the petition for volunteers to "protect the German homeland and the Baltics" that is, the petition for volunteers to join the Iron Division. Looks like a family business.

What about Judenitch and Bermondt then? I think it highly likely that Judenitch would have been quite happy to have Bermondt's well-trained and well-equipped troops under his command so I think that if he had, indeed, rebuffed Bermondt's offer of his troops, it would have been only caused by Bermondt demanding terms that he knew Judenitch would not have accepted. Still, the end result was the same: Bermondt would not join his forces with Judenitch' command and in September 1919 Judenitch proclaimed that Bermondt was "a traitor to Russia". Bermondt was in contact with Denikin and Wrangel, too, but they saw him as an errand-boy for the Germans and refused to enter any serious negotiations.

In October the 3rd the German government called von der Goltz back to Germany and ordered General von Eberhard to take over in his place. It would be interesting to know more of the reasons behind this decision. Did the German government see the situation as untenable? Did they hope that it would appear that the Germans had nothing to do with the coming attack on Riga? What if the attack had succeeded? Maybe von der Goltz would have jumped back in the saddle and the world would have been presented with another German victory. After all, the majority of Bermondt's troops were German and they had been organized with German money and support.

Durand, you may have not noticed that I added a correction to one of my previous postings; the armoured train affair was on the 5th, not on the 19th; I was writing that bit at work and did not want to have the books too openly on sight and therefore went wrong. And I would very much appreciate if you would not tell my employer that I used their computer and time for this stuff

The Polish connection seems to be quite simple in the end. If we look at the Bolshevik positions in the Baltics area we have their western front in May roughly like this: In the north we have Russian Bolsheviks facing the Estonians ( and Judenitch' force), to their south the Latvian Bolsheviks under the Stucka goverment hold the parts of Latvia to the east and to the north of Riga. To the south of Red Latvians there are Polish troops facing teh Russian Bolsheviks to their east; the Vilna area was part of Poland between the world wars and Latvia was Poland's neighbour. Latvian Bolsheviks retreated eastwards beyond Jekabpils - Gulbene line. There they were used as base of the 15th army of the Red Army. It is quite likely that this force would not have been able to control the area and likewise it would have been only natural for the Poles to attempt to secure their left flank and advance north. Since the Ulmanis government later co-operated with the Poles, it is likely that the Polish advance to Latvian territory would have been at least tacitly approved by the Latvians. The contact was made on June the 6th about 15 kilometres south of Jekabpils in Birzi. Both sides were represented by cavalry patrols so it seems on both sides it was a matter of reconnaissance elements.

The Clemenceau quote seems a bit strange; maybe he meant that the Poles feared that the Landeswehr or the Iron Division would attack Polish troops in the south-eastern corner of Latvia. In that case Clemenceau would have actually meant to speak of Germans in Latvia instead of Germans in Estonia. This interpretation would make at least some sense since there seems to have been something of a no-man's-land in the Jekabpils area with the Germans, Estonians, Poles and Red Latvians all around the city in different directions but none of them with sufficient force to establish real control of the area. The Polish government would probably have been as mistrusting of the German intentions as their neighbours in the north and might have feared that the Germans turn towards them next. In light of what has been written in this thread, it seems that von der Goltz and his merry band would probably have turned their attention towards Poland only after the fall of Petrograd, if even then. Of course, the Poles did not know this at the time ( as a matter of fact, we do not actually know this either ).

regards,
Tapani K.

[Durand]

Hallo Tapani K.,

I had no idea that Goltz had a brother working in the government or that he also played a role in the Baltic adventure. Interesting stuff. I agree that Rüdiger von der Goltz was the puppet master. We have seen that he engaged in a bout of shuttle diplomacy running between the government in Berlin and his own troops and allies in Latvia. I think he told either side whatever it wanted to hear (within reason) to obtain whatever he thought he needed to keep the momentum going in the Baltic states. It may be that Goltz ultimately intended to turn on Berlin itself.

The question of what the German government was thinking in early October 1919 is an interesting one. I would also like to know more of what was taking place behind the scenes. On this topic, I have been able to piece together only a few fragments. From what I can make of it, the government was severely split during the summer and fall of 1919. With the exception of Noske, the defence minister who was a Socialist, the split seems to have divided along the lines of Left vs. Center/Right. I have seen reference to Chancellor Bauer and Foreign Minister Müller making efforts to prevent the alliance between Goltz and Bermondt during the summer and to meet Allied demands for the evacuation of the German volunteers from Latvia. Unfortunately, I have not found any information regarding the specific actions that they may have taken.

On the other hand, the German Army Command, at Goltz's urging, was helping to recruit new volunteers and agreed to pay them and the Russian soldiers under Bermondt's command. The money also came from private sources such as Krupp, Deutsche Schwere Industrie, and the Schilde Consortium. In July, a USPD delegate to the government assembly in Berlin stated:

The Baltic has not only not been evacuated; new troops are being sent there...The recruitment offices and the Volunteer Corps continue to function as before... If we do not want to have the charge made against us that we are playing a dishonorable game, then it is our duty to set aside the masquerade...Our army budget, as we heard yesterday, is just as high as it was during the war. No wonder! Look at how well the Volunteer Corps are supplied and paid. (Waite, p. 134)

It is my impression that in the German government of the day one hand (the Bauer cabinet ) did not know (or want to know or ignored) what the other hand (the military) was doing and vice versa. When one side or the other discovered something with which they disagreed, they tended to grumble a bit and then turn a blind eye. The government was weak. Neither side wanted to force an issue, cause a public scandal or create a crisis for fear of bringing down the government. Who knows what would have replaced it? After all, Bolsheviks were running about. I also think that the Berlin government and the German Supreme Army Command could really do very little to stop Goltz or force the return of the volunteers. They could hinder Goltz's plans, but if Goltz had stood up and publicly said that he and his troops would not obey and they would stay in place in Latvia come what may, the only result would have been a crisis, possibly fatal, for the government.

I think the German government's decision of October 3 was in earnest. After a summer of negotiations, complaints, and generally empty threats, the Allies proposed two measures in September which convinced the German government that the time for games was at an end. One measure was the proposed blockade of foodstuffs and raw materials going to Germany. Prior to this time, blockades had been threatened against the sea lanes between Germany and the volunteers in the Baltic states. This time it was to be Germany itself and at the onset of winter. The memories and fears of the Spartacist revolt of the previous winter were still fresh in the minds of government officials. The other measure was one developed by Lloyd George. He proposed to the Allied Supreme Council that the half million men of the Polish army be sent into the Baltic states to forcibly remove the German volunteers. The measure was supported by the French representatives, but rejected by the American representatives. However, the plan was not finally shelved in London until November.

The government may have taken it's decision seriously, but there were still elements that refused to comply. The German army officially closed Germany's frontiers to reinforcements and supplies headed for the Baltic states. However, men and material continued to flow to the Western Russian Army in October and November. For example, when Freikorps Rossbach reached the frontier on the way to rescue the Iron Division in November, the Reichswehr general was sent to stop them from crossing. The general ordered Rossbach to turnabout and then simply let Rossbach and his men pass.

I also ran across a reference for a scheme that was building among the German volunteers and German military circles in October and November 1919. Apparently, there was some planning to create a new province or country called Ostdeutschland out of eastern Prussia, Lithuania, and Latvia. The controlling elements would rebuild a German army and create an industrial base to arm it. It would then move on to form a Greater Germany which was to consist of Ostdeutschland, Germany, and Austria. Kind of a reverse of what was to happen a few years down the road. I do not have names tied to this scheme, but almost certainly Goltz, if not a part of it, had to have known about it. Have you heard of this scheme?

-- Do you have any more information on Rüdiger's brother in the German government?

-- I seem to recall reading that Goltz of the Baltic adventure was also involved in the Kapp Putsch. Do you know what role, if any, that he played?

Best Regards,

Durand

P.S. Your secret is safe with me.

[Tapani K.]

Hello Durand (and others who may be reading this)

I went to the library and was finally able to take home the two-volume study I mentioned. It was originally published in 1937 by the Freedom War History Commission (Vabadussõja ajaloo komitee) and reprinted in 1996 in a slightly edited form. It is called Eesti vabadussõda 1918-1920 and I will use EV when referring to this work from now on. Since most of the Estonian sources seem to be based on this work, I do not think the big picture we have been trying to paint will be altered from what we have now, but there are quite a lot of details to be added. There are 75 pages on the Landeswehr war alone.

Another source I have used but forgot to mention is a Swedish-language history of Latvia by Agnis Balodis, a Latvian who as a young boy in 1944 fled form his homeland with his parents and eventually settled in Sweden. It is from here that I found e.g. the figure 30 000 for Bermondt's force and that only ca 6000 of them were Russians.

Unfortunately, I have no details on the role of Graf von der Goltz (I have not even found his first name) but it seems that he was not active here in his role as a government official. Here is a quote from a letter he wrote to his brother: "I am sure you understand how worried I am of the plans German government of soon drawing Reichsdeutsche forces back from Latvia" He continues to describe how he needs support from the Baltic Germans and how it would be necessary to recruit Reichsdeutsche first as soldiers and then as colonizers to give the existing Baltic German community economical and political support.

The Anwerbungstelle Baltenland, I assume lead by Graf von der Goltz had their main office in Berlin. I assume it was sometime during the first half of 1919 that they issued a proclamation for recruits with the following text:

Zum Schutze der Deutschen Heimat und des Baltenlandes vor den vordringenden russischen Bolschewistentruppen werden Freiwilligenverbände in Deutschland gebildet. Es können sowohl bereits entlassene, wie noch bei den Fahnen befindliche Mannschaften angeworben werden.

After that are the terms set for the recruits and the addresses for the recruiting offices in Berlin, Hamm, Hannover, Stettin, Göttingen, Hamburg, Karlsruhe and Cassel. Heidelberg and Dresden are also listed, but no address for the office is given. All this is signed by Graf v. d. Goltz and in the bottom there is space for the recruits' name, rank, former military unit, date of birth and where he was recruited for the Landeswehr.

I have wondered about the ethnic composition of the Landeswehr. According to EV there was a Latvian contingent that was officially a part of the Landeswehr, at first battalion-sized and later expanded to a brigade. This force was commended by Colonel Balodis, seems to have been quite inactive and did not take part in the actual battles in Riga in May but entered the town after the German units conquered it. This Latvian brigade joined the fight against the Germans in October when the fate of the Landeswehr had already been settled. This leads me to believe that the ca 3500 men of the Landeswehr in the Cesis area were almost totally Germans, either Baltendeutsche or Reichsdeutsche. One squadron of Latvian cavalry went over to the Estonian side in may the 28th and probably joined the two-battalion Latvian brigade formed in Estonia. The commander of this brigade was Colonel Zemitans.

In addition to Vanapagan there were actually two more armoured cars, Estonia and Toonela involved in the Landeswehr War. These were active in the Stalbe - Straupe direction. Since these two cars were not specifically mentioned in what sources I had earlier and they were not actually in Cesis, I mistakenly thought that the Vanapagan was the only armoured car used against the Germans.

Couple of words about the organization of Estonian armoured train and armoured car units: By the end of May 1919 Estonians had 9 armoured trains (of which four were narrow-gauge trains). The trains were administratively subordinated to the Armoured Trains Division (Soomusrongide divisjon) created in February. Operatively the trains were always subordinated to the division that conducted operations in the area where the trains were placed. Estonians had seven armoured cars. Six of them formed the Armoured Car Column which was a part of the Armoured Trains Division. The seventh car was Vanapagan which, as I have earlier mentioned, belonged to the 6th Regiment.

There is a timeline of events in EV and the clearing of northern Latvia from Latvian Reds is given as follows:
May
24th: Beginning of the attack to liberate northern Latvia
25th: Town and railway station of Strenci occupied
26th: Valmiera occupied
27th: Limbazi occupied. Beginning of attack towards Aluksne and Jekabpils.
28th: Aluksne occupied.
29th: Smiltene occupied.
31st: Cesis and Gulbene occupied
June
5th: Krustpils and Jekabpils occupied. The war against the Landeswehr begins.

Sorry, I have not had time to write anything of the Kuperjanov battalion; digesting the information in EV is taking quiite a lot of the time and energy I might otherwise have directed to writing something about Julius Kuperjanov and his men.

As to von der Goltz and the Kapp putsch; I think you are right but at the moment I am unable to confirm it.


regards,
Tapani K.

[Tapani K.]

I made some Google searches and found some sites that might be of interest:

http://www.vm.ee/eng/kat_174/990.html
Interesting to note here that how the battle of Cesis (Võnnu) is described here. The dates fit quite nicely but I think that the reader is here lead to think that the battle on the 23rd was a decisive one whereas other sources, e.g. EV describe it as a minor clearing operation and that the German main force had already retreated during the night.

http://www.latvia-usa.org/hisoflatbrie.html
As seen from the Latvian point of view.

http://fr.encyclopedia.yahoo.com/articl ... 17_p0.html
The only site I found that directly claims von der Goltz took part in the Kapp Putsch.

http://www.reitergenosten.de/freikorps/freikorps.htm
Quite interesting, but the fighting in June is mentioned only briefly. This is quite easy to understan; the text is based on German sources and I suspect that the German participants would like to downplay their role as enemies to Latvians and Estonians

And Durand, I saw the answers you received in Henrik Krog's forum. As soon as I saw mr L.L.'s answer I remembered that I had printed the article by Arvo Vercamer with the answers by Erik Linnasmägi. I hope you found them. Quite interesting stuff.


regards,
Tapani K.

[Gwynn Compton]

As always, this thread continues to capture my interest.

It's an interesting point you make concerning the crisis that would have faced the German Government as to how to deal with Goltz. I agree with you that the German Government wanted to avoid a crisis as much as possible. The threat that another Sparticus uprising could arise at any moment would have surely seemed to have been a daily threat, while they also would have wanted to ensure that the Baltic states were not Bolshevik run countries.

Goltz was obviously important to the Reichswehr (was it called that in 1919?) especially given the support lent to him by the army. It's also apparant that the army did not want to appear to be lending "official" support to Goltz, but instead wished to keep him well supplied, much in the same was as modern day superpowers quietly back one side of the other in conflicts.

Unfortunately, Goltz appears to have been more than both the army, and Government expected. And given the likely differences in expectations as to what Goltz was meant to achieve, it is little wonder that the Government didn't want to push the matter. To aggrevate Goltz could have lead the army to turn on the Government, and with Goltz's support, establish a conservative dictatorship. On the other hand, to simply ignore Goltz, the Government would surely have only inspired another attempting Bolshevik take over due to the cutting of raw material's and foodstuffs that an allied blockade would lead to.

Goltz himself, from what you've written, seems to have been playing his own game with both the Government and Army, possibly hoping to be left as the last man standing after any crisis resulting from his continued actions in the Baltic states.

Here's a question to you both, what did the Pole's think of the British idea to send Polish troops to clear out Goltz? I imagine that Poles would have been of two minds about the matter. While the Pole's had, and would prove themselves prepared to try and establish themselves in eastern europe, I imagine that they would also be watching about what their traditional enemies the Russians would do. Despite the civil war, I imagine that the Russian's would not have liked to have seen the Polish moving into the Baltic.

Gwynn

[Tapani K.]

Gwynn, a short answer from me. My primary interest here is Estonian situation so German government politics and the Polish situation are somewhat unknown to me and what I write now is based on memory. Still, I think that the Polish army would have had their hands full with the enemies they had. There were Russian Bolsheviks in the east, of course. They were also in dispute with Lithuania over the Vilna region. The Poles had chased Bolsheviks away from the area in April (?) 1919 and continued the occupation in spite of Lithuanian demands. To the south they were in unfriendly terms with Czechoslovakia after the quarrel over the Cieszyn area (Tesin in Czech, Teschen in German). In the west they had still a partly unresolved situation as to where the German-Polish border should be. So no, I do not think that the Poles would have been inclined to move to the Baltics.

regards,
Tapani K.

[Durand]

Hallo Tapani K. (and all those who are reading),

Once again, Sir, I tip my hat to you. The information you are finding combined with your analysis is really exciting. Thank you for the tips on the websites. I was already aware of one or two, but the rest look very promising also. I envy your ability to read through Eesti vabadussõda 1918-1920. If only I had studied Estonian at university those many years ago. Sigh.

Latvian Contingent: As I understand it, a Colonel O. Kolpak (also spelled Kalpak. I do not know more than the first initial of his first name) commanded a collection of ethnic Latvian militias brought together to counter the Bolsheviks in November 1918. The unit was brought together at the same time as the Baltische Landeswehr (BL) was being formed. It is my impression that Kolpak's unit was not formally a part of the BL or that it had originally been considered as part of the BL but was quickly designated as a separate entity.

At the time of Goltz's offensive in February/March 1919 it appears to have been considered a separate unit. On March 6, 1919, Kolpak was killed by a German bullet (?) when friendly Latvian and German forces accidentally clashed. There does not appear to be any real evidence, but a rumour current at the time reflected that Kolpak's death due to German fire was not an accident. It seems that Kolpak was the senior Latvian officer in the Latvian army and his death fitted well with Goltz's policy of reducing Latvian influence in what was ostensibly the Latvian military .

Balodis succeeded to the command of the Latvian contingent. At the time, it consisted of approximately 3,500 men. From what I have read, it seems that the Balodis Brigade, Prince Levien's Russian Division, the Iron Division, and the BL took part in the attack on Riga. The BL, acting as stormtroops, took the bridges over the Daugava and the other troops moved into the city.

Numbers: The figures regarding the number of troops belonging to the various units is becoming problematical. For example, I have seen figures for Bermondt's army (including the German volunteers) ranging from 30,000 to 50,000. I think the lower end is more likely, but I wish we could find a definitive source.

Recruiting Proclamation: As I wrote above, the information that you are finding is exciting. It appears that you have found at least part of the text of the volunteer recruiting proclamation. By chance, do you have the entire text? If so, and if it is not too long, could you please post it? I would like to get to the bottom of what was actually promised to the volunteers versus what the recruiters in Germany were promising. As I understand it, in order to get desperately needed troops, the Ulmanis government agreed in November 1918 that the German volunteers were offered only Latvian citizenship in return for their participation in the war against the Bolsheviks. The German recruiters, without authorization from the Latvian government, added that each recruit would also receive a parcel of land after only 4 weeks of fighting. I am wondering what other promises were made.

Reading what you wrote about Graf v.d Goltz's signature on the proclamation sparked a faint memory for me. I seem to recall reading somewhere that it was Rüdiger's signature on that document. I am probably misremembering or else the source may have confused the two v.d. Goltz's. I will try to find the reference that is tickling the back of my brain.

By the way, how did succession work with regard to the German aristocracy? If Rüdiger's brother was a Graf, would that make the brother the oldest son? Could the brothers both be Graf at the same time? Was Rüdiger a Graf at the time of the Baltic Campaign? I ask because I have seen reference to Rüdiger as a Graf. Now that I think on it, it may be where I am getting that faint memory mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

Since writing last, I found two references to Goltz's participation in the Kapp putsch. According to Harold Gordon in "The Reichswehr and the German Republic, 1919-1926", Goltz was appointed as the new army chief of staff by the leaders of the putsch. However, Waite implies that Goltz did not take part. Goltz was approached with the idea of taking part in the putsch, "but Count Goltz, made cautious by the recent Baltic fiasco, felt that 'the time is not yet ripe'" Apparently yet another contradiction!!! I note, however, the caution and the plausible deniability angle all fit in with the way Goltz operated in the Baltic campaign. I suspect that he was involved up to his eyeballs behind the scenes in the Kapp putsch.

North Latvia Timeline: Great information. In my first post on the thread, I wrote that the Estonian force began moving on May 13, 1919. You wrote later that you saw a reference reflecting May 16. Now we see that the beginning of the attack to liberate northern Latvia was on May 24. What do you make of the May 13/16 dates in light of the latest information? Did the Estonians begin planning or mobilizing for the move on May 13/16? When did the Ulmanis government "invite" the Estonians into northern Latvia?


For Gwynn: Yours is a good question for which I do not have an answer. I do not know much about the Polish government of the time (or of any other time, come to think of it) or of it's concerns other than the German border dispute. I have only seen the one reference to the consideration of sending Polish troops against the Germans in the Baltic states. Overall, I tend to agree with T.K.'s assessment of the situation.

You questioned whether the Reichswehr existed at the time. I think that at the time it was technically known as the "Provisional Reichswehr". It came into being by law in March 1919. The title "Reichswehr" replaced "Provisional Reichswehr" by law in March 1921, at which time it became the famous 100,000 man force.

That is all I have for now.

Best Regards,

Durand

(Edited 31.01.03 to reflect correct spelling of Baltische Landeswehr.)

[Tapani K.]

Durand, thank you for the kind words. EV seems to cover the subject matter quite nicely from the Estonian point of view. It was written in 1937 and in the afterword written for the modern edition the President of the Estonian Academic History Society, Hannes Walter says that some good German studies were published soon after. EV would probably have benefited from those works if the 1930s commission could have used them as source material. One thing more is that the work was written in an era when the flag-waving kind of patriotism was very much in fashion all over Europe and this is visible in the style of the work: there are several prases like "our determined attack", "our skillfully conducted operation" and such; these are not direct quotes, but examples of the style used. As far as I can tell, the facts are correctly presented, but I think there might be some simplifications regarding motives of the Estonians' adversaries and the general atmosphere of the text seems rather black-and-white.

Also, I am beginning to wonder about the Regierungsrat von der Goltz. You do not know of him and and I have not been able to find anything but this small mention in EV. Still, EV quotes a letter from the Regierungsrat to his brother the General. Maybe there was some sort of error here and there was actually only one von der Goltz involved with the Baltics adventure. And I, too, have seen Rüdiger called a Graf. The Finnish texts that I have seen, however, seem to call him Graf only sometime after the war. Maybe the elder brother died and Rüdiger inherited the title; at this stage I really do not know.

A picture of the recruiting poster is printed in EV but it is not easy to decipher the text; it is written in the old German script (Fraktur) and appear quite small in the picture although mostly legible. I might experiment with a scanner and see if I could provide something useful (to avoid the trouble of writing all of the text myself ). We'll see. Anyway, there are eight numbered articles under the header Bedingungen. Number five begins like this:

Nach Abshluss der Kämpfe ist für die bis zum Ende an den Kämpfen teilnehmenden Militärpersonen günstige Ansiedlungsmöglichkeit im Baltenlande gegeben

This article continues for a couple of sentences promising the same terms for those wounded or ill during the campaign. Also the families of the fallen are granted the same terms. But no details are given here as to what günstig would mean in practical terms.

The South Latvian Brigade or the Balodis Brigade: I am a bit unclear on this but the Ulmanis government and the Germans had a treaty from December 1918 stipulating that under the Latvian government there would be a multi-ethnic armed force with Latvian, German and Russian units. It was agreed that the Latvian contingency would be twice the size of the German force ( sorry, no idea what was agreed on the size of the Russian force). The growing numbers of German volunteers was apparently against the treaty. The Latvian ( and I assume the Russian ) troops would be subordinated to the Landeswehr leadership and supplied by the VI German Reserve Corps. I think this is how the subordination was on paper, at least, until the German coup. The Germans asked Balodis to join them in the coup but he refused to help them. On the other hand, it seems that he did not take any action in defence of the Ulmanis government, either. Of course, he was vastly outnumbered at this stage so there was probably little that he could have done.

The name of Colonel Kolpak/Kalpak/Kaplak (all of these forms appear) was actually Oskars Kalpaks. Latvian male names have nearly always the s in the end. Actually, a female person of the Kalpaks family would be called miss or mrs Kalpaka; but now I am again drifting off-topic, so back to business: Colonel Kalpaks first formed one of the Latvian militia units you mention: the Students' Company. From this and other units was formed the Latvian battalion and Colonel Kalpaks is even today honoured in Latvia as the first Commader of the Latvian armed forces. I made a Google search with Oskars Kalpaks and found some pages, mainly in Latvian. I know only very little Latvian but I looked at some of the pages and (with the help of a dictionary) I could not find any reference to other than accidental shooting of the Colonel by the Germans. I suppose having Kalpaks replaced with Balodis would have suited the Germans; seems that Kalpaks might have adopted a more active position in the dispute with the Germans. Here is one site with German text. Click on Aus alten Zeiten...
http://www.saldus.lv/De/Pilspag/pils_pa ... zsendienam

Bermondt: Yes, the figures seem to differ. Somewhere I saw the figure 50 000 with 40 000 of them being Germans. And I found a Finnish page informing us that he was adopted in November 1919 by a Georgian prince Avalov, and this is why he later called himself Prince Bermondt-Avalov.

The Finnish site I mentioned above claims that the Germans would have attempted a coup in Tallinn, at the same time with the Riga coup. The date was set for 23rd and 24th but the Germans were forced to act earlier in Riga with a British warship arriving in the Riga harbour. The Estonians would have been informed of this resulting in increased mistrust towards Germans. This is the site:
http://www.helsinki.fi/~jjeerola/engltxt.htm#osa3.3

Northern Latvia: My sources claim that the order was given on May the 16th, the attack began on the following day. At first, the Latvian Reds offered resistance and the Estonian attacks were repulsed. It seems that it was only when the Reds lost Riga that they broke and escaped eastwards. Apparently it was a classic case of a two-front war: the Latvian Reds of Stucka government could not hold back attacks from south and north at the same time. It seems that many of the Latvian Red Riflemen deserted and simply went home. I do not think that the Ulmanis government actually invited the Estonians there. It was more like the representatives of Ulmanis in Tallinn agreeing that the Estonians could and should continue the fight in Latvian territory against the common enemy or enemies. Also, it seems to me that with Balodis acting rather undecisively in Riga, the Northern Latvian Brigade would have been the only military force completely and assuredly loyal to Ulmanis.

It would be very interesting to have a Latvian point of view on these events. The sources we have used often show the Latvians in a very passive role. With a small army of their own their role was somewhat limited, but I have found very little on what Ulmanis and his government actually planned and did at the time. What about Niedra then; he seems to have been a right-wing Germanophile who saw both the Ulmanis and Stucka governments as Bolsheviks and therefore he allied with the Germans.

One more thing for Gwynn: From what I have read I think there was a real danger of Poland getting to war with Czechoslovakia and Lithuania but I am not quite sure if these crisis were at their most dangerous phase during the timeline we are talking about in this thread.

regards,
Tapani K.

[Gwynn Compton]

If Poland was faced with a crisis to it's south, it would be unlikely that they would agree to a British proposal to use their troops to remove German soldiers from the Baltic states, especially if such an action might anger the Lithuanians.

Gwynn

[Durand]

Hallo T.K., Gwynn, and Everyone,

I am afraid I do not have much to add this time round, but here are a couple of tidbits that may clear up an issue or two (until another source pops up!). First off, between what T.K. has found and what I read today, I am now fairly certain that the source that gave May 13 as the date for the beginning move of the Estonian army south into Latvia is in error. In "The White Generals" by Richard Luckett it is mentioned that the Northern Corps and the Estonian Army began an offensive on May 13 against the Soviet Seventh Army which was responsible for the defense Petrograd and the north-west.

The other piece of information concerns the number of Russians in Bermondt's army. In "Der deutsche Bürgerkrieg" by Hannsjoachim W. Koch, it is stated that Bermondt had 15,000 men until September 1919. The information is credited to Bermondt's published memoirs. In "The Outlaws" by Ernst von Salomon, von Salomon states that the number of troops under Bermondt increased to approximately 50,000 when the German volunteers formally joined the Western Russian Army, which was on September 21. If the numbers are correct, then 15,000 Russians and 35,000 Germans. Still seems kind of high to me, but there you have it. By the way, the German units included the remnants of the Iron Division renamed the "German Legion", Freikorps Weickermann and Freikorps Plehwe.

Thank you T.K. for printing the excerpt from the Baltic proclamation. It appears that officially the recruiters referred only to the possibility of land for the volunteers rather than a firm promise or commitment. Of course, in the hands of unscrupulous recruiters and gullible or wishful thinking recruits it is easy to see how the misguided notion that the volunteers were promised land in exchange for fighting came into being. In light of your explanation regarding the picture and it's old German script, please disregard my request to print it. It is too much work. Besides, I find that after 10 minutes of trying to read that script I need a new prescription for my glasses, a bottle of ibuprofen , and a bottle of something more spirited.

Was the official name for the Kalpaks/Balodis brigade the "South Latvian Brigade"? I do not know what to think on the matter of whether the Germans intentionally killed Kalpaks. It is certainly possible. I would like to know how this case of friendly fire between Kalpak's force and the German force came about.

More thoughts on Gwynn's question: I am intrigued by Gwynn's question and as a result I did some cursory research in an effort to pacify (rather than satisfy) my curiosity. By "cursory" I mean in this instance to be understood that I checked through material that I have around the house. The only thing that I came up with was the book "The Kings Depart" by Richard M. Watt. What I found in it's pages leads me to believe that the Poles, if they had been asked, might have agreed to move against the Western Russian Army.

As I understand it (and Watt does not give a specific timeline for the events), Poland in the spring of 1919 was flush with the excitement of it's newly found independence and was a rather aggressive expansionist power. It appears that Poland fought against Lithuania, Czechoslovakia, and the Ukrainians at the same time. In each instance, Poland was the aggressor invading foreign territory. Mixed in with that was the armed conflict between Germany and Poland around Posen. After things calmed down, the Poles fought against the Ruthenians and Ukrainians in May 1919. To do so, they cut their way through eastern Czechoslovakia.

The Poles also seemed to believe that they could depend on the Allies to help them, particularly France. The army of General Jozef Haller was practically created in Paris (it was used in the attack of May 1919). Pilsudski's Chief of Staff was French General Paul Henrys. When the German Freikorps was successful in pushing the Poles from Posen and it looked as though the Polish forces would crushed, the Poles asked for Allied help and the Allies successfully pressured the German government to halt the attack.

One other interesting point made by Watt is that "many of her [Lithuania's] citizens, particularly the nobility, had traditionally preferred to regard themselves as Poles. Indeed Pilsudski himself was technically a Lithuanian." (p. 354)

With these things in mind, a Polish incursion against the German volunteers in the Baltic states does not seem so farfetched. The Poles do not seem to have been averse to fighting on several fronts or making additional enemies along the way. Moreover, Lithuania may not have been particularly difficult to deal with at the time. The Lithuanians had their own problems with elements of the Western Russian Army occupying northern portions of their country which would affect their ability to resist a Polish force and it seems that Lithuania's citizens may have been favorably disposed toward the Poles. A move against the German volunteers also makes some sense. The border between Germany and Poland had yet to be firmly established. There had already been serious fighting over the issue and it was pretty clear that more was to come. The Poles could not have been comfortable with the idea of being caught between Germany on the western border and a clearly expansionist German volunteer army (Latvia, portions of Lithuania, attempts against Estonia) to the east/northeast. Finally, the Poles would be acting with the permission of the Allies and, presumably, Allied protection in case something went wrong. Since the plebiscites had not yet been held on the question of the Polish/German border, the Poles could also have calculated that helping the Allies might result in their favoring Poland on the question of the border.

Admittedly, this is all speculation based on one source of information. By no means am I wedded to this theory. I am sure that there are all sorts of flaws and nuances that I have missed. I simply present this information as a possible counterpoint. Someone will probably come along, denounce the theory as fluff, and proceed to demolish it. That is the beauty of forums such as this. I think Gwynn's question could make a very interesting new thread.

Best Regards,

Durand

P.S. Tapani K. I hope you do not mind the T.K.

[Tapani K.]

This is what I promised some time ago: a short account of Julius Kuperjanov and the unit named after him.

Julius Kuperjanov had served in the Russian army as a commander of a reconnaissance unit and was therefore interested in actions behind enemy lines. In 1918 he was the commander of Tartumaa Kaitseliit, a militia-type volunteer organisation. He formed his unit in Puurman manor close to Tartu in December 1918. Initially he had only 37 men but he started recruiting reliable men from those who either lived in the area or had escaped the Reds from Tartu. Many of the volunteers were school-boys, primarily from Tartu. Kuperjanov's aim was an elite unit suitable for what he called partisan warfare but what I would rather call long range patrols in the enemy rear. Officially the unit was called at first Tartumaa kaitsepataljon (Tartumaa defence battalion; Tartumaa being the Tartu province) and later Tartu partisanipataljon but from the beginning it was called Kuperjanov's battalion.

Kuperjanov was a very dedicated commander and with his hand-picked men he was able soon launch operations in the enemy rear. One example of these actions was a hit to Tabivere railway station when lieutenant Unt with an 8 man group killed many of the Red unit stationed there and forcet the rest to escape in panic. Other typical actions were intelligence-gathering patrols and destruction of important targets like bridges.

They took part in liberation of Tartu together with armoured trains. Before the actual operation towards Tartu the battalion performed aggressive missions in the enemy rear forcing them to retreat slowly towards Tartu. In the actual battle for Tartu the battalion acted together with the infantry units from armoured trains numer 1 and 3. This was the beginning of what lead to the creation of the Armored Trains Division; a formation consisting of armoured trains and infantry battalions.

After the battle of Tartu the battalion advanced south towards Valka. On January the 30rd the battalion met heavy resistance by the Paju manor. Kuperjanov was severely wounded and died of his wounds on February the 2nd. Lieutenant Unt took command and it was at this stage that the battalion was officially named the Kuperjanov Partisan Battalion ( Kuperjanovi partisanide pataljon).

In May 1919 the battalion took part in the attack towards Pskov in Russian side of the Estonian-Russian border. The battalion was instrumental in achieving the breakthrough that lead to capture of the town.

In the summer of 1919 the battalion was involved in the Landeswehr war from Cesis to Riga. it is said that the battalion cut of the water supply to Riga in protest for not being allowed to march into the city.

After the Landeswehr war the battalion was again sent to fight the Bolsheviks in the eastern front and in November 1919 it was reformed as a regiment.

It seems to me that after the battle of Tartu the unit was a partisan battalion only in name and was in fact a light infantry battalion and employed as one. he re it might be noted that some Estonians claim that it was the Estonians who invented the concept of armoured division; the Armoured Trains Division was a division that had armoured units with more or less integral infantry support in the form of the infantry battalions.

When Estonia regained her independence an infantry battalion of the army was named Kuperjanovi üksik jalaväepataljon (literally: Kuperjanov's independent infantry battalion). This battalion is considered an elite battalion of the reconstituted Estonian army.

That was a very short account of Kuperjanov and his men. Now to other things.

Poland: Latvia and Poland made an agreement in December 1919 whereby the Poles sent three divisions to eastern parts of Latvia that were still under communist occupation. At this stage the Bolsheviks had drawn Latvian Red troops from this area and replaced them with others in fear of Latvians prefering to stay in their homeland and not continue the fight for the Revolution. This operation was over in January 1920.

Latvian forces: EV uses the names South Latvian Brigade and North Latvian Brigade as unit names so I assume that in Estonian usage these would have been at least semi-official names

And now some numbers picked from EV:

The Northern Latvian Brigade when transfering from Estonian army to Latvian army had 223 officers, 26 military officials, 335 NCOs and 9803 men.

In the beginning of July 1919 there were the following numbers involved in the Landeswehr war:
Estonia: 7900 men of infantry, 600 of cavalry.
Germany: 9000 infantry, 750 cavalry.

Losses in the Landeswehr War from July 9th to 23rd:
Estonia 1436 men, 310 of whom KIA.
Germany ca 1500 men, 400 of whom KIA

Bermondt's force: Iron Division 18 000 men; the German Legion (of former Landeswehr men and Reichsdeutsche units) 12 000. These numbers formed 3/5 of Bermondt's force.
Note that this means EV agrees with the 50 000 figure for Bermondt's force.


I think that is all I have for now.
regards,
Tapani K.

[Tapani K.]

When speaking of the Landeswehr War we have seen that it was the Estonians who assisted their neighbour in the south by first clearing northern Latvia of Bolsheviks and then stopping the German advance. Of course, the latter can and perhaps should be seen as part of defence of Estonia, but nevertheless in the interests of the recognized Latvian governmenmt, too. The Ulmanis government was at this stage, in May-June 1919, unable to defend itself since it had under its direct control only a small amount of armed men and the Estonian army had grown into a formidable force when compared to other armies in the area. But Estonia had a population of roughly one million in 1914 and Latvia nearly 2,5 million; should it not have been the other way round? Latvians the stronger and Estonians the weaker? I will try to answer this question by showing some of the factors that lead to the situation as it existed in the summer of 1919.

In 1914 both Latvia and Estonia were parts of the Russian empire. Both countries were lead by members of the traditional German aristocracy. These Germans were originally descended from the German crusaders who entered the area during the Baltic crusades.

Latvia was more industrialized with Riga a center of industry and commerce. Tallinn and Riga were both to a large extent German cities, although in the 19th century the Germans had been losing ground in the cities. This was in part due to growing industry needing more and more labour which again lead to some of these labourers to rise socially. Earlier these newly wealthy Latvians or Estonians would probably have changed their language to the language of the upper classes, of cities, of money: German. In the latter half of the 19th century, however, the rise of national consciousness all over Europe lead to the birth of Estonian and Latvian speaking middle and to some extent, upper class. So, in the beginning of the 20th century we have a situation where middle and upper classes were divided along language lines whereas a hundred years earlier anyone who spoke Estonian or Latvian would immediately been thought of as an uncultured peasant. The situation was not unlike to that of Ireland or Finland with the socially more acceptable languages respectively Eglish and Swedish.

When the First World War began, Latvia soon became a battlefield. Russians evacuated hundreds of thousands people from the area occupied by German army.

Estonians fought in the Russian army on equal terms with other subjects of the empire, there were no Estonian units. The Latvians, with most of their country occupied by the Germans in 1915, were permitted to form their own units since it was assumed that with all-Latvian units they would fight more effectively against the German occupier. These units were formed by concentrating Latvian soldiers to these units and by recruiting among the population evacuated from Latvia. The Russians proved to be right and the Latvians soon earned fame as the Latvian Riflemen who formed some of the most effective infantry divisions of the Russian army. This elite status had a negative effect in heavy losses suffered by the Latvians.

It should be noted here that the Estonians and Latvians at this time enjoyed a higher average rate of literacy than the Russian empire at large. This lead to relatively high number of Estonians and Latvians being promoted to officers and NCOs. The Baltic Germans, on the other hand, had a long tratition of providing career military officers and civilian officials for the Russian empire.

Then, in 1917, the Czar was overthrown in the revolution and the bourgeois provisional government took over. This new government continues the war despite the fact that the war has become increasingly unpopular due to heavy losses and suffering caused by the fighting.

Estonia seemed to gain from the change. It was administratively united as a single province with some autonomy and the process of concentrating Estonian soldiers to Estonian units was started. In time, many of these units were brought home to Estonia. This was the beginning of the Estonian army.

For Latvians the revolution brought small relief: their country was still occupied by the Germans who behaved like occupying powers have always done. The Latvian riflemen continued to absorb heavy losses.

But then, a new twist: the Bolshevik coup d'etat in November 1917, also known as the October Revolution. The first part of the name derived from the fact that November the 7th was in October according to the Julian Calendar still in use in Russia at the time and it was called a Revolution because the Bolsheviks won and were able to name it what they wished ( Damn, I am rambling and getting off-topic again, so back to business:).

At first the situation was much the same as earlier but with the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty Russia ceded the Baltic countries and the Ukraine to Germany. For Latvia there was no change but now that Russian forces were withdrwan from Estonia the Germans marched in. The Estonian units were disbanded by the Germans but the Estonian national leadership continued the work clandestinely. There was, for example, a German militia-type unit, the Bürgerwehr and many Estonian took part in this in order to receive arms and training from the Germans later to be used against the Germans, Bolsheviks or whoever would be the enemy.

Next change came in November 1918 when the First World War ended and the Germans were forced to withdraw. In Estonia the Germans complied and the Estonians were able take de facto control of much of their country although Bolshevik elemets contested the situation. A rival government, the Working People's Commune (Töörahva kommuuna) was established with Russian Bolshevik support. This Estonian communist government was in fact a Russian puppet and with the help of the Russian armies they started an advance towards Tallinn. Meanwhile, the Estonian government had managed to create an army of their own using the Estonian units of the former Russian army as a basis. The fact that most of the country was in the hands of the Government also made it possible to mobilize manpower and to create a proper national army. Many trained officers and NCOs from the Russian army were a great help in this. With these forces the Bolshevik attack was stopped east of Tallinn and the Estonian force were able to mount a series of attack that lead to all of Estonia being cleared of Bolshevik troops in May 1919. At this stage the Estonian army had 3 divisions of infantry, an Armoured Trains Division (probably a brigade-size formation) and specialist troops.

In Latvia the situation differed radically. When the Germans retreated the vacuum was filled by Latvian Bolsheviks who formed a government under Peteris Stucka. Stucka was able to rely on the Latvian Riflemen from the Russian army. The Riflemen had been increasingly disillisoned with the Russian Czarist and Bourgeois government and had therefore been eager to join the Bolshevik cause. After all, it was the Bolsheviks who had brought the peace. Also, in the industrialized city of Riga there where workers who were the natural recruiting base for Bolsheviks everywhere. Also, the relations between the Germans and the native population had apparently been even more strained in Latvia than in Estonia. All these considered we can say the Stucka had in Latvia a power-base that his Bolshevik counterparts in Estonia did not have.

With agreement from the Allies the German forces remained in Courland to the west of Riga to counter the Bolshevik influence. A bourgeois and nationalist government under Karlis Ulmanis was formed in the German-occupied territory. Although the Germans agreed on creation of Latvian military units, in practice they hindered this work so that Ulmanis was left with only handful of soldiers. But even this was too much for the Germans and they decided to get rid of Ulmanis, staged a coup and placed their own man, a Lutheran pastor Niedra to lead a puppet government.

That was a very brief outline in an attempt to describe the situation. Perhaps it should be noted that after the Landeswehr war and the Bermondt attack towards Riga with control of most of Latvia in their hands the Ulmanis government was able to create an effective national army like their neighbours in the north. This army was then used, together with Polish units, to drive away the remaining Bolsheviks from Latgale, the eastern part of Latvia.

A note: I wrote this away from home so I could not add any dates, names, units, numbers and such but I think they are not necessary here since my purpose was to create an outline and not a detailed study. Anyway, since the Landeswehr War took place in Latvian territory, I feel that this is essential to undertanding the situation. Hope you agree and that some if this not already common knowledge.


regards,
Tapani K.

[Gwynn Compton]

That was highly appreciated. Not knowing much about what happened in the region following Germany's surrender, its good to get a good outline like that

Gwynn

[Durand]

Hallo again,

Thank you Tapani K. for the excellent overview of events preceding the Landeswehr war. It is very enlightening. You are quite correct that such information is not commonly known. I also enjoyed your piece on Kuperjanov and the battalion named after him. Thank you for that also.

I have been doing some digging and found a few things that may be of interest:

Günther von der Goltz: The name of Rüdiger's brother is Günther. I found a single sentence reference to him, "In Germany Silvio Broederich and von der Goltz's brother, Günther, continued to raise volunteers for the Baltikum and the VI-RK." (Charles Sullivan in The Baltic States in Peace and War, p.33) The time period appears to be July 1919. Do you, by chance, know what relation Rüdiger was to Graf Colmar von der Goltz? I am thinking father or uncle, but I do not know.

Balodis: In the wake of the April 16 coup, the German-Balts formed an interim governing body called the Sicherheitausschuss. This body would eventually appoint Niedra as prime minister. After the coup, but before Niedra became PM, the Sicherheitausschuss invited Colonel Balodis and Prince Levien to join in the newly forming government. Both Balodis and Levien refused. Balodis did so in writing, indicating that he and his army were responsible to the Latvian Provisional Government (Ulmanis).

Niedra and his cabinet were installed on May 10. Two days later, a group of Latvian officers kidnapped Niedra and forced him to sign a resignation. He later escaped and appeared in Riga the day it was captured by the Landeswehr.

Balodis and his force did participate in the capture of Riga. They supported the left-wing of the attack. It's objective was to secure the mouth of the Daugava river and then move in an arc north of Riga to surround the Bolshevik forces. Balodis and his force entered Riga on the night of May 22 to a warm reception, but he was almost immediately ordered to the southeast front (Krustpils-Daugavapils line) to fend off the Bolsheviks. Thus, the Latvian force within von der Goltz's command was placed out of the way and kept occupied in preparation for von der Goltz's attack on the Estonian-Latvian force to the north. German suspicions regarding the loyalty of Balodis and his troops were further stoked by direct contact/communication between Colonel Zemitan's force and Balodis' force on May 30. There is some indication that von der Goltz intended to take on Balodis after the projected defeated of the mixed Estonian-Latvian force to the north.

I do not know why Balodis and the force under his command continued to serve in Goltz's army in April and May. He may simply have been an opportunist. Alternatively, it is possible he may have thought that he could act as a counterweight to Goltz's army while fighting the Bolsheviks and thereby keep the hope of true Latvian independence alive.

Estonian Reactions: I also found an interesting (though perhaps somewhat confusing passage):

[O]n 2 June, the news reached Cesis of the approach of the Landeswehr. Its movements caused profound suspicion, since it was directed to the rear of the Estonian-Latvian front. The Estonian Government had on the occasion of the attempted Putsch of 16 April reacted in a very energetic manner. They disarmed the Estonian units of the Landeswehr and arrested some of the German nobility of Estonia. On this occasion the Estonians were fully informed of the real purpose of the German Landeswehr, as they had a representative on General von der Goltz's staff. (Arnolds Spekke, History of Latvia, p. 352.)

Unfortunately, there is no further clarification to the above and I am left with some questions. Spekke indicates that after the April coup the Estonians disarmed the "Estonian units of the Landeswehr". I have not heard of any Estonians serving in the Landeswehr, so I think that Spekke may be referring to the Baltic Battalion of the Estonian army. Have you heard or read of anything along these lines?

I am also puzzled as to which occasion Spekke is referring when he writes, "On this occasion the Estonians were fully informed of the real purpose of the German Landeswehr..." I can read this as the occasion of the April coup or the events of June 2. What do you think? Do you know of any Estonian representatives on Goltz' staff? How about any references to Estonian spies on Goltz's staff?

Numbers from EV:

The numbers T.K. posted are a great find. They also seem to be quite revealing. I mentioned in an earlier post that the Estonians lost approximately 19,000 wounded and killed during the War of Independence from November 1918 to January 1919. That averages out to 633 men every two weeks. Your figures are 1746 Estonians wounded and killed for the two week period June 9-June 23. I am not a good mathematician or statistician, but the numbers do seem to indicate that the Landeswehr war was a rather intense conflict.

I also have some questions regarding the numbers. The North Latvian Brigade had approximately 10,000 men. When did the North Latvian Brigade transfer to the Latvian army?

When considering the period and participants of the Landeswehr war, may one say that the combined total of men on the Estonian-Latvian side was approximately 19,000 men compared to approximately 10,000 men on the German side?

When you wrote "In the beginning of July 1919 there were the following numbers involved in the Landeswehr war:" did you mean to write June 1919?

That is all I have for now.

Best Regards,

Durand

[Tapani K.]

Hello again

Durand, finding a name for the elusive brother of Rüdiger was extremely interesting. As I mentioned earlier, I had almost started to doubt that he existed. I made some internet searches while trying to find the name and found out that at in the 18th century there was a village in East Prussia that was owned by the von der Goltz family. If this was the same family, it would be easy to understand the interest the brothers had in the area. BTW Rüdiger wrote his memoirs sometime after the WWI where he recounts his part in the events we talk about in this thread. The book has been translated into Finnish and the title is in English something like "My actions in Finland and in the Baltics". I have not been able to locate the book and do not have the exact title at the moment. I hope to find the book sometime soon. And no, I have no idea how Colmar was related to the brothers; his age seems to indicate towards what you said but other than that, no idea.

Perhaps it should be noted here that Rüdiger von der Goltz was a very popular figure in Finland in the 20s and 30s. After all, he had lead the German force who came to assist the White Finnish army in the battle against the Reds. One of the ironies of history is that this aid was requested by Finnish government in spite of advice from General Mannerheim, a known anglophile and francophile who had fought the Germans in the First World War. What's more, in 1941 Mannerheim was again forced to accept the Germans as allies.

What about Balodis then. His career does not seem to have suffered from any indecision, real or imaginary, during these events. He held high posts (Prime Minister, Defence Minister) in Latvia and to do that, it is impossible that Ulmanis would have seen much to complain in his actions. In 1936 when Ulmanis seized power, Balodis was one of his closest men, although it seems that Balodis and Ulmanis later disagreed on how they would return to democratic government. Balodis was the one in favour of constitutional reforms.

Durand, you say that Balodis' brigade was supporting the left wing of the attack on Riga with the objective of securing the mouth of the Daugava. I think this fits quite well with the notion of him and his brigade not taking part in the actual taking of Riga but that they were kept out of way by von der Goltz.

It could well be that Balodis was actually doing a good job of preserving his forces with an objective of keeping a Latvian military presence in existence without getting into an open conflict with von der Goltz.

The quote in Spekke's book: "The Estonian units of the Landeswehr" must be wrong and he probably means the Baltic battalion although the Baltic Battalion was not disarmed at any satge but fought well against the Russian Bolsheviks all the time. I have not found any mention of Germans of Estonia arrested but it could be true. Also, I have not found any mention of an Estonian informant in the staff of von der Goltz. Sounds a bit far-fetched, if you ask me, but stranger things have been known to happen. But, in the course of the attempted coup in February Latvians confiscated documents of what the Baltic Germans had planned including the Grossherzogtumand the Estonians were informed of these plans. I understand this was the first time these plans were revealed. Maybe this could lead to a rumour of Estonians having an informer with the Germans. I do not know, but this is the best explanation I could think of.

And now back to the numbers. I see now that I was a bit unclear with them. Let's see if I can do better:

The Northern Latvian Brigade when transfering from Estonian army to Latvian army had 223 officers, 26 military officials, 335 NCOs and 9803 men. This happened in July the 5th in 1919. The number includes ca 2000 former Red Latvians and several thousand of Latvians mobilized from the area liberated by the Estonian-Latvian force. Also, only one of the two regiments of the Brigade had been deployed against the Germans. This means that a majority of these Latvians did not see any action in the Landeswehr war.

In June 19th the Estonian manpower, including the Latvians was 6357 men and the Germans had 5250.

In the beginning of July 1919 there were the following numbers involved in the Landeswehr war:
Estonia: 7900 men of infantry, 600 of cavalry. This number includes the Latvian regiment.
Germany: 9000 infantry, 750 cavalry.

It should be noted here that both sides suffered losses and received reinforcements during the fighting so that the latter numbers include the losses, reinforcements and replacements. It is a bit unclear if these numbers include the total number of soldiers including support troops or are meant to show the numbers of troops directly involved in the fighting. The numbers are given in a somewhat confusing and contradictory way.


regards,
Tapani K.