Hallo to All,
T.K., I am willing to bet the von der Goltz family that owned the village in East Prussia and the family of Rüdiger are one and the same. Rüdiger was born at Züllichau, Prussia. I have also been searching for his memoirs. The German title is "Meine Sendung in Finland und im Baltikum" which was published in 1920. I have sent a request for it through the local library some time ago and I am still waiting. He also wrote a second book with the title "Als politischer General im Osten, 1918-1920" which was published in 1936. I do not know if the second book was merely a revised edition of the first or if he truly had more to say or reveal.
Balodis is an interesting figure who the various histories seem to have relegated to a secondary role in the affairs of this period. As you pointed out, he must have handled his troops, the politics with the Germans, and himself rather well to have survived 1919 and to later attain a position of power in the Latvian Government. You wrote earlier that the Latvians under his command took part in the battles against the Western Russian Army in October 1919. Do we have any idea of what Colonel (later General) Balodis did during the period from May 30, 1919, to October, 1919? May 30 is the date on which the North Latvian Brigade under Zemitans made contact with Balodis' South Latvian Brigade. It seems that the Germans were unhappy with this development. I have also read in one or two places that "General Balodis" in command of the northern Latvian force took part in or lead the attack on the German forces in the Landeswehr war. I had assumed that these references had mixed up the names Balodis and Zemitans. Now I am wondering, did at least part of Balodis' force turn against Goltz's army and fight against the Germans in the last days of the Landeswehr war. What do you think?
Thank you for the clarification of the numbers. That increase in numbers near the end of the conflict is interesting. From June 21 until after peace was established on July 3, the Armee Oberkommando Grenzschutz Nord (OKN -- the special command set up in East Prussia by the German high command to oversee the campaign in the Baltics) rushed a massive number of reinforcements to Latvia in an effort to prevent the defeat of Goltz's army. The troops arrived too late to be of any use in the Landeswehr war and they continued to arrive for approximately two weeks after the fighting ended in the suburbs of Riga.
Those troops were too late for the events of June, but they remained in Latvia and played a major role in the events of October and November. In early July, Goltz and Major Bischoff held a meeting regarding the future of their army. They decided to rid the army of the weak/half-hearted troops, whom Goltz and Bischoff blamed for the defeat at Cesis. These troops were sent home and the remaining depleted units were replaced with fresh and eager new recruits. The decision benefited Goltz's army in two ways. One, it appeased the Allied powers who were calling for German forces to withdraw from Latvia. Two, it generally increased the reliability and effectiveness of the German forces in Latvia.
With regard to the possibility of an informer on Goltz's staff, I agree with your theory.
The story of the documents relating to Baltic German intentions is an interesting one. It seems that a Baron von Stryck was arrested by Latvian authorities in February 1919 shortly after arriving in Latvia from Sweden aboard the ship Runeborg. Latvian authorities found a parcel belonging to von Stryck on the ship. The parcel contained documents pertaining to the plans of the Baltic Germans. Von Stryck had been in Sweden laying the groundwork to transfer the Landeswehr to Sweden. In Sweden the force was to be reorganized, refitted, and heavily reinforced. It was then to be used to conquer all of Latvia and Estonia. Upon the successful conclusion of the campaign, a neutral Baltic state was to be set up. It was to be ruled by the Baltic-German aristocracy and it was hoped that Sweden could be convinced to act as a protector of this new state. Von Stryck was freed from captivity by Baron Hans von Manteuffel and the soldiers of his Landeswehr unit on February 19. Baron von Manteuffel, it will be recalled, is the same person who later led the coup against the Ulmanis government in April. The Latvian Government provided the Allied governments with the information contained in von Stryck's documents.
The plans outlined in von Stryck's documents had developed as result of the Kaiser's abdication. The story is fairly complicated and reinforces the excellent background information already provided by T.K. in an earlier post. Shortly after the German army occupied the province of Kurland during World War I, the local Balt-German nobility formed the Baltischer Vertrauensrat, which was basically a council of trustees. In July 1915, the council sent a request to the German Government asking for military protection, permission to elect the Kaiser as Duke of Kurland, and annexation of all Baltic lands by the Reich. The council also suggested that the land would be open to settlement by over 1.5 million German demobilised soldiers after the conclusion of the war. The German Government does not appear to have seized this opportunity.
In December 1917 the council made an additional proposal. It was suggested that the big landowners in Kurland would offer one-third of their cultivated lands to German colonists if the German Government would annex Kurland and appoint members of the Balt-German nobility as the administrators of the land reform. A similar proposal had been offered by the nobles in the newly liberated province of Vidzeme. Days after the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the nobles of Kurland again appealed to the Kaiser. On March 19, 1918, Germany officially recognized the autonomy of Kurland, but reserved any other decisions until a later date.
In early April, 1918, the occupying authorities permitted the formation of a Baltic Landesrat to be formed in Riga. It was composed of 34 Balt-German nobles from Livland (Videzeme) and Estonia, German representatives of the Lutheran Church, Latvian and Estonian peasants, and some Elders of rural villages. The Balt-German faction controlled the Landesrat and it appealed to the Kaiser to recognize Livland and Estonia as a single Baltic state with the Landesrat as it's legal governing body.
In June 1918, the German military administration in Kurland announced a colonization plan to be coordinated by the Landesgesellschaft Kurlands. The LK was composed of reliable Kuronian and German nobles, other influential persons from Germany with interests in the region, and representatives from the big corporations such as Fr. Krupp A.G. Kuronian nobles were to sell one-third of their land at 1914 prices to the LK. The land was to be used to create new German farms. The LK also had the right to intervene in all land sales by the Kuronian nobility until colonization was completed in 1948.
The German Government also continued it's efforts to annex the remainder of Latvia and Estonia. During the summer of 1918, the Germans threatened to occupy Petrograd if the Soviets refused to agree to sign a supplement to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The supplementary treaty was signed in Berlin on August 27, 1918. Under the treaty, the Soviets agreed to renounce all claims on Estonia and Livland. The Latvian province of Latgale would remain under Soviet control. In September, the Kaiser recognized the independence of Livland and Estonia as a new state. The Baltic Landesrat was also recognized as the governing body. The Landesrat prepared the new state for annexation by Germany and it invited Kurland to join in a Baltic constitutional Grand-Duchy under the hereditary rule of the Kaiser.
The Landesrat also elected a board, the Board of the Baltic State (BBS), to form a constitution and a temporary government. The Vertrauensrat of Kurland sent representatives to the BBS. On November 7, 1918, the BBS created a Council of Regency. The Council of Regency was authorized to offer the Kaiser the Grand Ducal Crown of the new Baltic state. The Kaiser abdicated two days later. In the wake of the abdication, the Council of Regency was replaced by the National Board of German-Balts. It's purpose was to preserve the power of the aristorcracy and the big landowners in the new state. Baron von Stryck , a representative of the National Board, went to Sweden to with goal of obtaining Sweden's protection for the German dominated Baltic state.
It should be noted that the Landesrat, it's subordinate committees, and the Vertrauensrat, were operating independently and in competition with the Latvian Provisional National Council and a similar Estonian national council which had become recognized by indigenous ethnic Latvians and Estonians as the legitimate new governments of Latvia and Estonia. These national councils came into being in the wake of the Bolshevik revolution and the collapse of Russian control in Latvia and Estonia in November 1917. The information related here comes primarily from "A History of Latvia" by Alfreds Bilmanis.
A long story, but it gives one a good idea of the opportunistic nature of some of the players and political forces that were at work in the region during this period.
That is all for now.
Best Regards,
Durand
Freikorps and Estonia 1919
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Gwynn Compton
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Hallo Gwynn,
I do not know about Sweden's politics, foreign policy, or military capabilities at the time, but if I had to guess, I would say that there was little or no chance of Sweden becoming the protector of the new Baltic state.
By the time of von Stryck's arrest the great powers of the time were already engaged in what was becoming quite a thorny international problem. In addition, British attempts to get the Scandinavian countries directly involved were unsuccessful. Also, despite it's defeat and the abdication of the Kaiser, Germany still seemed to be able to protect it's interests in the region with apparent Allied support. I think that von Stryck and his colleagues were desperate men who were hoping for a fanciful (perhaps farcical?) solution to their problem.
Regards,
Durand
I do not know about Sweden's politics, foreign policy, or military capabilities at the time, but if I had to guess, I would say that there was little or no chance of Sweden becoming the protector of the new Baltic state.
By the time of von Stryck's arrest the great powers of the time were already engaged in what was becoming quite a thorny international problem. In addition, British attempts to get the Scandinavian countries directly involved were unsuccessful. Also, despite it's defeat and the abdication of the Kaiser, Germany still seemed to be able to protect it's interests in the region with apparent Allied support. I think that von Stryck and his colleagues were desperate men who were hoping for a fanciful (perhaps farcical?) solution to their problem.
Regards,
Durand
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Gwynn Compton
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- Posts: 2840
- Joined: 10 Mar 2002, 23:46
- Location: United Kingdom
Hello Gwynn, Durand and others, too, if there are any 
Von Stryk had connections with a group of Swedish officers acting, I believe, on their own and without any support from the Swedish government. This group, lead by Lieutenant Colonel Nils Edlund, did not even seek any direct support from the Swedish government but rather from the Finnish one. Finnish government was not interested, although General Mannerheim promised, if needed, to sell arms for the Swedish force. Of course, the Swedish government might have jumped in if the conspiracy had succeeded since Estonia and parts of Latvia had once belonged to the Swedish Kingdom so there might have been some nostalgic Swedes seeing this as a chance of regaining at least some of their former greatness. The conspirators planned of recruiting a Swedish volunteer force of 4000 men to be sent over the sea, probably as a sort of guarantee for the Germans; if the new state was defended by a Swedish–German force instead of a pure German army, the Entente would probably have hesitated longer before any direct action against it. As a further guarantee they planned on hiring the Latvian railway net to a British company and selling the rights of using Latvian forests to Swedish industry. When the Latvian customs officials found the documents, the conspirators were forced to give up their plan although without any support from Swedish or Finnish governments they had never had any real hope of success.
But wouldn't the idea of a buffer state against the Soviet Russia have appealed to the Entente? Well, yes, but there was already a buffer zone in existence and with some help from the Entente, they were doing a quite good job. By the buffer zone I mean the newly independent countries who had their own national governments, much more to the liking of the Allies than a German puppet state.
It seems to me that the Baltic German nobility was desperately trying to cling to vestiges of their former power and had not realized that they were no longer needed to rule the lands they saw as their own heritage. But the lands that the German nobility had ruled, were now governed by Estonians and Latvians. What a bitter moment for the Barons: they had not realized that their former illiterate serfs had learned to read and write and were no longer their obedient underlings. Of course, to the credit of Baltic Germans it must be noted that after the war a large part of them accepted the new states and continued their lives as citizens of the new states. The land reforms in both Latvia and Estonia meant the end of a German upper class in these countries but the Baltic Deutschtum flourished until 1939 when the Baltic Germans moved to Germany in accordance to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.
But Gwynn, a short answer to your question is, I think, this: The only thing that would have persuaded the Entente to accept the plan would have been the existence of a power vacuum. But the vacuum had already been filled and the very fact that they needed to plan a coup to make their dream come true, shows that they would not have been accepted.
Back to Balodis: The more I read of him, the more interesting his part seems to me. When he got the command after the death of Colonel Kalpaks, Ulmanis was in power and there was a treaty between the Ulmanis government and the Germans that the Latvian force woud be a part of the Landeswehr and that the Landeswehr would be, the basis for a Latvian army. But since von der Goltz was in command and would not accept any orders from the Latvian government, Balodis was in a position of divided loyalties and seems to have adopted a policy of neutrality: he did not accept the post of Defence Minister in the Niedra government but did not take any active steps to defend the Ulmanis government. After the Niedra coup he was forced to work with the Niedra government. This could very well be seen as recognizing the Niedra government de facto, if not de jure. Also, Balodis would have had a chance of taking his force by sea to the north and there unite his force with those of Zemitans. This would have weakened the front in the osuth and would have left the Courland front without any Latvian military force but on the other hand would have resolved the problem of loyalty. After the coup there were some clashes between Latvian and German units and supporters of Ulmanis were actively preparing a takeover and some kind of attempt was scheduled for May the 21st but this had to be dropped because the attack on Riga was under way. It could well be that Balodis was aware of these plans and maybe had even been part of them. Balodis was very much criticized in the years after the war although he had many vocal supporters, too.
Durand, I have not found any mention of other than some officers from the Balodis force joining the North Latvian Brigade in addition to the battalion I mentioned in one of my earlier postings. The Balodis Brigade seems to have returned to Riga ( I have not any exact dates) after being posted on the east front against the Bolsheviks, although Balodis asked to be able to join forces with Zemitans. This was not acceptable to his German superiors and since his force depended almost totally on the Germans for supplies, he had to comply. Also, disobeying would have lead to a conflict with von der Goltz and it seems to me that Balodis did his best to avoid any open conflict. I am fairly certain that any mention of Balodis taking part in any actions with the North Latvian Brigade is based on misunderstanding. The Latvian military and political field was in effect divided into factions: Ulmanis and his cabinet on board the Saratov were in contact with the British and Americans and relied heavily on them. The Balodis force, although nominally supporting Ulmanis, could or would not take any direct action against the Germans. The North Latvian Brigade relied on Estonian help and was, for obvious reasons, more hostile to the Baltic Germans than the others. It is interesting to note that in the Strazdu muiza (Srasdenhof) negotiations the North Latvian representatives were not invited to take part although the Balodis brigade and even Prince Lieven's force were represented. I think this might mean that Ulmanis was trying to take some distance from Estonians now that he could afford it. I have not found out what happened to Zemitans afterwards. Perhaps he just continued his career as a soldier.
Now, some random notes in no particular order:
When the Landeswehr advanced towards Estonia, it seems that they were trying a similar takeover that had succeeded in Riga. But here they made a mistake. They did not know that the Estonians had mobilized their forces quite effectively and could now field an army able to match the Landeswehr and at the same time defend their land against the Bolsheviks. Quite recently there had been the Red Latvians between tha Germans and Estonians so no information would have been received by land. In addition, the Estonian officials had taken all communication channels to Germans under very strict control. In EV there is quote from von der Goltz' memoirs where he admits that they underrated the Estonians' strength.
The land question and what was promised to German volunters: In December 1918 The Ulmanis government and the German representative Winnig signed a treaty promising Latvian citizenship to any foreign national involved in fighting against the Bolsheviks in Latvia for four weeks. Since the Latvian government planned a land reform and had promised land at a modest price for any Latvians taking part in the war, Winnig assumed, without checking from the Latvians, that these terms would apply to those Reichsdeutshe who would join the fight. In Germany the terms were interpreted even more liberally. In recruiting points officers would give direct promises of land for free. The German press spread these false rumours. In Latvia the treaty received heavy criticism from the beginning with one of the most vocal critics being one Andrievs Niedra. The numbers of the German volunteers increased and the Latvians got quite worried. Also, the German force in Courland consisted mainly of Etappensoldaten with only roughly an eighth part of the overall numbers actual front-line units. Would the cooks, too, be given the citizenship, asked Niedra. In the end the government claimed that the treaty was not valid since it had not been ratified.
The April 1918 meeting where the Landesrat was formed: The Estonian vallavanemad*ordered to take part in the meeting protested in writing against the decision to form a single Baltic state led byt the Landesrat. This protest had four articles which in brief were as follows.
1: The vallavanemad had no legal authority to take part in the decision made in the meeting.
2: The northern part of the former province Livonia and the province of Estonia have been united to a single political entity in a lawful manner and the vallavanemad believe that it would be against the wishes of both estonians and Latvians to re-unite them under same government.
3: The Estonian Assembly is the only legal governmnet acceptable in Estonia.
4: Estonians wish to live in peace with all their neighbours.
*vallavanemad were and are still heads of rural administrative areas. Village Elder is perhaps not the best translation although I cannot offer any better
I visited the Helsinki University library again and found an interesting book called Von den baltischen Provinzen zu den baltischen Staaten 1918-1920. It is a collection of articles written by several authors. I took it home and have been reading some of the articles. Very interesting and lots of details. Durand, you really must try to find this book.
And I found some details on the February coup attempt in a book from my own bookshelf: Svenska frivilliga by Lars Ericsson. This book describes the actions of Swedish soldiers abroad in the 19th ant 20th centuries. What I wrote above on the Stryk affair is based mainly on this book.
I think I'd better stop here this time.
regards,
Tapani K.
Von Stryk had connections with a group of Swedish officers acting, I believe, on their own and without any support from the Swedish government. This group, lead by Lieutenant Colonel Nils Edlund, did not even seek any direct support from the Swedish government but rather from the Finnish one. Finnish government was not interested, although General Mannerheim promised, if needed, to sell arms for the Swedish force. Of course, the Swedish government might have jumped in if the conspiracy had succeeded since Estonia and parts of Latvia had once belonged to the Swedish Kingdom so there might have been some nostalgic Swedes seeing this as a chance of regaining at least some of their former greatness. The conspirators planned of recruiting a Swedish volunteer force of 4000 men to be sent over the sea, probably as a sort of guarantee for the Germans; if the new state was defended by a Swedish–German force instead of a pure German army, the Entente would probably have hesitated longer before any direct action against it. As a further guarantee they planned on hiring the Latvian railway net to a British company and selling the rights of using Latvian forests to Swedish industry. When the Latvian customs officials found the documents, the conspirators were forced to give up their plan although without any support from Swedish or Finnish governments they had never had any real hope of success.
But wouldn't the idea of a buffer state against the Soviet Russia have appealed to the Entente? Well, yes, but there was already a buffer zone in existence and with some help from the Entente, they were doing a quite good job. By the buffer zone I mean the newly independent countries who had their own national governments, much more to the liking of the Allies than a German puppet state.
It seems to me that the Baltic German nobility was desperately trying to cling to vestiges of their former power and had not realized that they were no longer needed to rule the lands they saw as their own heritage. But the lands that the German nobility had ruled, were now governed by Estonians and Latvians. What a bitter moment for the Barons: they had not realized that their former illiterate serfs had learned to read and write and were no longer their obedient underlings. Of course, to the credit of Baltic Germans it must be noted that after the war a large part of them accepted the new states and continued their lives as citizens of the new states. The land reforms in both Latvia and Estonia meant the end of a German upper class in these countries but the Baltic Deutschtum flourished until 1939 when the Baltic Germans moved to Germany in accordance to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.
But Gwynn, a short answer to your question is, I think, this: The only thing that would have persuaded the Entente to accept the plan would have been the existence of a power vacuum. But the vacuum had already been filled and the very fact that they needed to plan a coup to make their dream come true, shows that they would not have been accepted.
Back to Balodis: The more I read of him, the more interesting his part seems to me. When he got the command after the death of Colonel Kalpaks, Ulmanis was in power and there was a treaty between the Ulmanis government and the Germans that the Latvian force woud be a part of the Landeswehr and that the Landeswehr would be, the basis for a Latvian army. But since von der Goltz was in command and would not accept any orders from the Latvian government, Balodis was in a position of divided loyalties and seems to have adopted a policy of neutrality: he did not accept the post of Defence Minister in the Niedra government but did not take any active steps to defend the Ulmanis government. After the Niedra coup he was forced to work with the Niedra government. This could very well be seen as recognizing the Niedra government de facto, if not de jure. Also, Balodis would have had a chance of taking his force by sea to the north and there unite his force with those of Zemitans. This would have weakened the front in the osuth and would have left the Courland front without any Latvian military force but on the other hand would have resolved the problem of loyalty. After the coup there were some clashes between Latvian and German units and supporters of Ulmanis were actively preparing a takeover and some kind of attempt was scheduled for May the 21st but this had to be dropped because the attack on Riga was under way. It could well be that Balodis was aware of these plans and maybe had even been part of them. Balodis was very much criticized in the years after the war although he had many vocal supporters, too.
Durand, I have not found any mention of other than some officers from the Balodis force joining the North Latvian Brigade in addition to the battalion I mentioned in one of my earlier postings. The Balodis Brigade seems to have returned to Riga ( I have not any exact dates) after being posted on the east front against the Bolsheviks, although Balodis asked to be able to join forces with Zemitans. This was not acceptable to his German superiors and since his force depended almost totally on the Germans for supplies, he had to comply. Also, disobeying would have lead to a conflict with von der Goltz and it seems to me that Balodis did his best to avoid any open conflict. I am fairly certain that any mention of Balodis taking part in any actions with the North Latvian Brigade is based on misunderstanding. The Latvian military and political field was in effect divided into factions: Ulmanis and his cabinet on board the Saratov were in contact with the British and Americans and relied heavily on them. The Balodis force, although nominally supporting Ulmanis, could or would not take any direct action against the Germans. The North Latvian Brigade relied on Estonian help and was, for obvious reasons, more hostile to the Baltic Germans than the others. It is interesting to note that in the Strazdu muiza (Srasdenhof) negotiations the North Latvian representatives were not invited to take part although the Balodis brigade and even Prince Lieven's force were represented. I think this might mean that Ulmanis was trying to take some distance from Estonians now that he could afford it. I have not found out what happened to Zemitans afterwards. Perhaps he just continued his career as a soldier.
Now, some random notes in no particular order:
When the Landeswehr advanced towards Estonia, it seems that they were trying a similar takeover that had succeeded in Riga. But here they made a mistake. They did not know that the Estonians had mobilized their forces quite effectively and could now field an army able to match the Landeswehr and at the same time defend their land against the Bolsheviks. Quite recently there had been the Red Latvians between tha Germans and Estonians so no information would have been received by land. In addition, the Estonian officials had taken all communication channels to Germans under very strict control. In EV there is quote from von der Goltz' memoirs where he admits that they underrated the Estonians' strength.
The land question and what was promised to German volunters: In December 1918 The Ulmanis government and the German representative Winnig signed a treaty promising Latvian citizenship to any foreign national involved in fighting against the Bolsheviks in Latvia for four weeks. Since the Latvian government planned a land reform and had promised land at a modest price for any Latvians taking part in the war, Winnig assumed, without checking from the Latvians, that these terms would apply to those Reichsdeutshe who would join the fight. In Germany the terms were interpreted even more liberally. In recruiting points officers would give direct promises of land for free. The German press spread these false rumours. In Latvia the treaty received heavy criticism from the beginning with one of the most vocal critics being one Andrievs Niedra. The numbers of the German volunteers increased and the Latvians got quite worried. Also, the German force in Courland consisted mainly of Etappensoldaten with only roughly an eighth part of the overall numbers actual front-line units. Would the cooks, too, be given the citizenship, asked Niedra. In the end the government claimed that the treaty was not valid since it had not been ratified.
The April 1918 meeting where the Landesrat was formed: The Estonian vallavanemad*ordered to take part in the meeting protested in writing against the decision to form a single Baltic state led byt the Landesrat. This protest had four articles which in brief were as follows.
1: The vallavanemad had no legal authority to take part in the decision made in the meeting.
2: The northern part of the former province Livonia and the province of Estonia have been united to a single political entity in a lawful manner and the vallavanemad believe that it would be against the wishes of both estonians and Latvians to re-unite them under same government.
3: The Estonian Assembly is the only legal governmnet acceptable in Estonia.
4: Estonians wish to live in peace with all their neighbours.
*vallavanemad were and are still heads of rural administrative areas. Village Elder is perhaps not the best translation although I cannot offer any better
I visited the Helsinki University library again and found an interesting book called Von den baltischen Provinzen zu den baltischen Staaten 1918-1920. It is a collection of articles written by several authors. I took it home and have been reading some of the articles. Very interesting and lots of details. Durand, you really must try to find this book.
And I found some details on the February coup attempt in a book from my own bookshelf: Svenska frivilliga by Lars Ericsson. This book describes the actions of Swedish soldiers abroad in the 19th ant 20th centuries. What I wrote above on the Stryk affair is based mainly on this book.
I think I'd better stop here this time.
regards,
Tapani K.
Hallo to All,
That was a very interesting post T.K. When I wrote about the Von Stryk affair I was hoping you would be able to add more detail regarding the Swedish side of things. And you did. Thank you.
We must have been on the same wave length the past few days because I have also been thinking about the question of land and what the Latvians promised. I finally found an English-language translation of the treaty. Since a number of authors make the claim that Latvia agreed in the treaty of 29 December, 1918, to provide the volunteers with land, I thought it might be useful to provide it here:
Agreement Between the Plenipotentiaries of the German Reich and the Provisional Latvian Government
Riga, December 29, 1918
1. The Provisional Latvian Government declares its willingness to grant Latvian citizenship, upon their request, to all voluntarily enlisted alien members of the Latvian defense forces after they have participated in the struggle for the liberation of the territory of the Latvian State from the Bolsheviks for at least four weeks.
2. German-Balt citizens of the Latvian State enjoy the right to join the volunteer associations of the German Reich. Conversely, for the duration of the military campaign, there is no objection to the transfer of commissioned and non-commissioned officers of the army of the German Reich to the German-Balt Landeswehr as instructors.
3. The right granted to the German-Balts in the Agreement of December 7th to form seven national companies and two batteries in association with the Defense Forces of Latvia is expressly guaranteed by the Latvian Provisional Government, even though Article 2 of the present Agreement should result in the temporary abolition of the German-Balt associations. If the number of Latvian companies in the Latvian Defense Forces should be increased, a proportionate increase shall be made in the number of German companies.
4. In fulfilling Article 1 the necessary lists of deserving volunteers shall be transmitted to the Latvian Provisional Government at least once a week. It shall be established between the contracting parties on the basis of these lists which German citizens shall gain citizenship in accordance with Article 1.
(signed) August Winning, German Minister
Karlis Ulmanis, Prime Minister
P. Paegle, Minister of Trade and Industry
J. Salits, Minister of War
I have not found a translation of the December 7th agreement between Ulmanis and Winnig, but I have learned that it provided for the following:
1. A Latvian Defense Force was to be organized under German command;
2. This force was to consist of the German-Balt Landeswehr, the Russian formation commanded by Prince Lieven, and Latvian volunteer detachments not to exceed in number the combined forces of the German-Balt and Russian volunteers.
3. The Germans promised to provide arms and other supplies to the Latvian Defense Force.
As one can clearly see, there was no specific promise in the treaty on the part of the Latvian Government to provide land for the German volunteers. I think the concept of land for service was something already imbedded in the minds of Winnig, and other German officials, from the days when the German-Balt nobles offered one-third of their lands for colonization purposes to the Kaiser's Government. As I reported in the earlier post on the issue, the German military occupation authorities in Kurland authorized and supported such a scheme (of which Winnig had been a part). The Germans viewed the region as their domain and the local governments as only temporary nuisances which would be dealt with accordingly. In making the promises to the volunteers, the Germans were simply going forward with their original policies and plans.
It also seems that the Latvian Government legally, though perhaps inadvertently, aided the Germans on the issue. T.K. mentioned that the Latvian Government enacted a measure to provide land to Latvian soldiers who were landless. It is easy to see how Winnig, and the Germans, could interpret such a program as providing land to the volunteers. After all, according to the agreement, the German volunteers could become Latvian citizens and landless Latvian citizens who served as soldiers were eligible to receive land.
As I understand it, the Latvian Government implemented the measure in reaction to the guarantees offered by the German Government to the German volunteers. The idea was to give as much land as possible to native Latvians to give them a greater stake in Latvia and the Latvian Government and to reduce the amount of available lands to which the German government might make claims on behalf of the volunteers. The parcels of land were to be provided by the State Land Fund which included state domains and those of the German-Balt estates that had been owned by or mortgaged to the former Russian Peasant Agrarian Bank. If the measure was enacted to counter the Germans one would think that the Latvian Government would have stipulated limitations and rules of eligibility to exclude the newly created German-Latvian citizenry.
On the other hand, the Ulmanis Government was desperate during this period. It needed soldiers. The Germans offered soldiers for a price. T.K mentioned that the December 29 treaty was extremely unpopular. One would think that the Government would have been aware of this beforehand. Perhaps the mention of only citizenship in the treaty of December 29 and then later offering land to citizen soldiers was a deliberate and considered effort to appease the sensitivities (or sensibilities) of the native Latvians and to secure German military aid. I would like to see a translation of the "land for citizens" decree/measure and to know when it was planned and implemented. The information could give us a better sense as to the true intent of the Ulmanis Government.
As a side note, it is my understanding that in July 1919 the reinstated Ulmanis Government declared that the Versailles Treaty nullified the December 29 Treaty. Goltz, who had no intention of leaving, used this as one of the excuses for not disbanding his army. The argument of the volunteers being that Latvian Government broke the agreement and so the army would have to stay in place until the Government could be persuaded to honor it's agreement with the volunteers.
Balodis is very interesting. One would think that Zemitans, rather than Balodis, would have risen to a position of power and influence in later years. Given what we know of Balodis' actions during the spring of 1919, we can suppose he was able to claim that he defended Latvia against the Bolsheviks and that he fought only the Bolsheviks. I have seen no information to suggest any animosity between the North Latvian and the South Latvian Brigades. A day or two after the Treaty of Strazdmuiza was signed, units from both brigades appeared in Riga apparently without any problems. Are there any biographies of Balodis written in English or German?
Another scrap of information: As mentioned in earlier posts, during the ceasefire established by Col. Greene during June, Goltz's deliberately acted contrary to the wishes of the Estonian and Allied Governments by delivering a demand for the Estonians to withdraw. I always thought that this was a gutsy move considering General Gough's direct input on the issue. It seems that Goltz thought that events could even the odds in his favor. Apparently, the Bolsheviks had launched a major offensive in Latgale on June 14 and the Estonians were hard pressed in their efforts to defend against it. With the Bolsheviks on the offensive, the Estonians engaged in the fighting against them, and British fears of Bolshevik success, one can see that Goltz may have thought himself to have been in a good position to achieve his objective through bargaining or fighting.
Village Elder: I think the term is accurate. Bilmanis also uses it to refer to the leaders from the rural communities who were members of the Landesrat. What I find interesting is that they were ordered, rather than volunteering or being asked, to be members of the Landesrat.
Thank you for the information on the book. I will certainly request it through the local library. I found a copy for sale on-line, but Euro 75 seems rather expensive. Besides, the local librarians seem to enjoy the challenges that I present them with.
That is all for now.
Best Regards,
Durand
That was a very interesting post T.K. When I wrote about the Von Stryk affair I was hoping you would be able to add more detail regarding the Swedish side of things. And you did. Thank you.
We must have been on the same wave length the past few days because I have also been thinking about the question of land and what the Latvians promised. I finally found an English-language translation of the treaty. Since a number of authors make the claim that Latvia agreed in the treaty of 29 December, 1918, to provide the volunteers with land, I thought it might be useful to provide it here:
Agreement Between the Plenipotentiaries of the German Reich and the Provisional Latvian Government
Riga, December 29, 1918
1. The Provisional Latvian Government declares its willingness to grant Latvian citizenship, upon their request, to all voluntarily enlisted alien members of the Latvian defense forces after they have participated in the struggle for the liberation of the territory of the Latvian State from the Bolsheviks for at least four weeks.
2. German-Balt citizens of the Latvian State enjoy the right to join the volunteer associations of the German Reich. Conversely, for the duration of the military campaign, there is no objection to the transfer of commissioned and non-commissioned officers of the army of the German Reich to the German-Balt Landeswehr as instructors.
3. The right granted to the German-Balts in the Agreement of December 7th to form seven national companies and two batteries in association with the Defense Forces of Latvia is expressly guaranteed by the Latvian Provisional Government, even though Article 2 of the present Agreement should result in the temporary abolition of the German-Balt associations. If the number of Latvian companies in the Latvian Defense Forces should be increased, a proportionate increase shall be made in the number of German companies.
4. In fulfilling Article 1 the necessary lists of deserving volunteers shall be transmitted to the Latvian Provisional Government at least once a week. It shall be established between the contracting parties on the basis of these lists which German citizens shall gain citizenship in accordance with Article 1.
(signed) August Winning, German Minister
Karlis Ulmanis, Prime Minister
P. Paegle, Minister of Trade and Industry
J. Salits, Minister of War
I have not found a translation of the December 7th agreement between Ulmanis and Winnig, but I have learned that it provided for the following:
1. A Latvian Defense Force was to be organized under German command;
2. This force was to consist of the German-Balt Landeswehr, the Russian formation commanded by Prince Lieven, and Latvian volunteer detachments not to exceed in number the combined forces of the German-Balt and Russian volunteers.
3. The Germans promised to provide arms and other supplies to the Latvian Defense Force.
As one can clearly see, there was no specific promise in the treaty on the part of the Latvian Government to provide land for the German volunteers. I think the concept of land for service was something already imbedded in the minds of Winnig, and other German officials, from the days when the German-Balt nobles offered one-third of their lands for colonization purposes to the Kaiser's Government. As I reported in the earlier post on the issue, the German military occupation authorities in Kurland authorized and supported such a scheme (of which Winnig had been a part). The Germans viewed the region as their domain and the local governments as only temporary nuisances which would be dealt with accordingly. In making the promises to the volunteers, the Germans were simply going forward with their original policies and plans.
It also seems that the Latvian Government legally, though perhaps inadvertently, aided the Germans on the issue. T.K. mentioned that the Latvian Government enacted a measure to provide land to Latvian soldiers who were landless. It is easy to see how Winnig, and the Germans, could interpret such a program as providing land to the volunteers. After all, according to the agreement, the German volunteers could become Latvian citizens and landless Latvian citizens who served as soldiers were eligible to receive land.
As I understand it, the Latvian Government implemented the measure in reaction to the guarantees offered by the German Government to the German volunteers. The idea was to give as much land as possible to native Latvians to give them a greater stake in Latvia and the Latvian Government and to reduce the amount of available lands to which the German government might make claims on behalf of the volunteers. The parcels of land were to be provided by the State Land Fund which included state domains and those of the German-Balt estates that had been owned by or mortgaged to the former Russian Peasant Agrarian Bank. If the measure was enacted to counter the Germans one would think that the Latvian Government would have stipulated limitations and rules of eligibility to exclude the newly created German-Latvian citizenry.
On the other hand, the Ulmanis Government was desperate during this period. It needed soldiers. The Germans offered soldiers for a price. T.K mentioned that the December 29 treaty was extremely unpopular. One would think that the Government would have been aware of this beforehand. Perhaps the mention of only citizenship in the treaty of December 29 and then later offering land to citizen soldiers was a deliberate and considered effort to appease the sensitivities (or sensibilities) of the native Latvians and to secure German military aid. I would like to see a translation of the "land for citizens" decree/measure and to know when it was planned and implemented. The information could give us a better sense as to the true intent of the Ulmanis Government.
As a side note, it is my understanding that in July 1919 the reinstated Ulmanis Government declared that the Versailles Treaty nullified the December 29 Treaty. Goltz, who had no intention of leaving, used this as one of the excuses for not disbanding his army. The argument of the volunteers being that Latvian Government broke the agreement and so the army would have to stay in place until the Government could be persuaded to honor it's agreement with the volunteers.
Balodis is very interesting. One would think that Zemitans, rather than Balodis, would have risen to a position of power and influence in later years. Given what we know of Balodis' actions during the spring of 1919, we can suppose he was able to claim that he defended Latvia against the Bolsheviks and that he fought only the Bolsheviks. I have seen no information to suggest any animosity between the North Latvian and the South Latvian Brigades. A day or two after the Treaty of Strazdmuiza was signed, units from both brigades appeared in Riga apparently without any problems. Are there any biographies of Balodis written in English or German?
Another scrap of information: As mentioned in earlier posts, during the ceasefire established by Col. Greene during June, Goltz's deliberately acted contrary to the wishes of the Estonian and Allied Governments by delivering a demand for the Estonians to withdraw. I always thought that this was a gutsy move considering General Gough's direct input on the issue. It seems that Goltz thought that events could even the odds in his favor. Apparently, the Bolsheviks had launched a major offensive in Latgale on June 14 and the Estonians were hard pressed in their efforts to defend against it. With the Bolsheviks on the offensive, the Estonians engaged in the fighting against them, and British fears of Bolshevik success, one can see that Goltz may have thought himself to have been in a good position to achieve his objective through bargaining or fighting.
Village Elder: I think the term is accurate. Bilmanis also uses it to refer to the leaders from the rural communities who were members of the Landesrat. What I find interesting is that they were ordered, rather than volunteering or being asked, to be members of the Landesrat.
Thank you for the information on the book. I will certainly request it through the local library. I found a copy for sale on-line, but Euro 75 seems rather expensive. Besides, the local librarians seem to enjoy the challenges that I present them with.
That is all for now.
Best Regards,
Durand
-
walterkaschner
- In memoriam
- Posts: 1588
- Joined: 13 Mar 2002, 02:17
- Location: Houston, Texas
Congratulations
Hello Durand and Tapani K. I just want you to know that your posts on this topic are among the very best that I have seen over the past two years or so that I've been a member of this forum. IMO they epitomize the forum's potential as a source of serious historical information and scholarship, and I applaud you both for your knowledge and industry. You have made a very substantial contribution to my understanding of an area in which my interest far exceeds my knowledge, and I heartily thank you for it.
Best regards, Kaschner
Best regards, Kaschner
-
walterkaschner
- In memoriam
- Posts: 1588
- Joined: 13 Mar 2002, 02:17
- Location: Houston, Texas
Familien von der Goltz
Hello all! To add a few crumbs to this excellent thread:
1. I believe that Colmar von der Goltz (Feldmarschall Wilhelm Leopold Colmar, Freiherr von der Goltz) was a very, very, very distant relation of General Gustav Adolph Joachim Rüdiger, Graf von der Goltz, of Baltic fame. The von der Goltz family seems to have branched off very early on into the Freiherr (Baron) line and the Gräflichen (Graf or Count) Line. There are 32 von der Goltz listed in the "Lexicon der Deutschen Generale" dating back to the 18th Century, of which 19 are from the Freiherr Line and 13 from the Gräflichen Linie. And my recollection is that the name features prominently in military affairs back in the 17th Century and perhaps earlier. Obviously both branches were polyphiloprogenitive.
2. Colmar von der Goltz was born in East Prussia in 1843. He entered the Prussian Army, saw extensive combat in the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian wars, in 1883 was sent as a Major to be military adviser to the Turkish Army and returned to Germany in 1897 as a Lt. General. He was made Feldmarschall in 1911 and was appointed military governor of Belgium in August 1914, a post for which he apparently had no appetite whatsoever, as he was transferred back to Turkey that November as military advisor, and then appointed commander of the 6th Turkish Army in October, 1915. He defeated Sir Charles Townsend's Anglo-Turkish Army at Ctesiphon, which retreated and was surrounded at Kut and surrendered on April 29, 1916 - which was then thought to be the greatest British defeat of the Century. Von der Goltz, however, did not live to see his victory; he apparently died of Typhus 10 days earlier, although there were rumors that he was poisoned by the Young Turks, who did not relish the German influence in Turkey.
3. I do not know if Rüdiger, Graf von der Goltz had a brother or not but if he did it would not surprise me. The family seems to have been quite prolific. And in any event the two brothers would in all probability have each been entitled to carry the title "Graf". I am certainly not an expert in the titles of German nobility, but my late German father-in-law purported to be one and explained to me in painful detail all the multifold complications of titles and ranking of the German nobility, which I have neither the desire nor the time to go into here except to say that generally speaking the German system of title inheritance was quite different from the British, where under a rule of primogeniture only the eldest living son acquires the title. In Germany, as I understand it, except for a few titles conferred toward the end of the Empire (which was not the case of either of the von der Goltz lines) ALL sons inherited the title at birth, so if Rüdiger indeed had a brother they both would have been entitled to the title of "Graf". And if there was a daughter on that line she would (until she married) be entitled to be called "Gräfin" - or if of the other line, "Freiin".
Hope this is of some small help, although quite peripheral to the main topic. Regards, Kaschner
1. I believe that Colmar von der Goltz (Feldmarschall Wilhelm Leopold Colmar, Freiherr von der Goltz) was a very, very, very distant relation of General Gustav Adolph Joachim Rüdiger, Graf von der Goltz, of Baltic fame. The von der Goltz family seems to have branched off very early on into the Freiherr (Baron) line and the Gräflichen (Graf or Count) Line. There are 32 von der Goltz listed in the "Lexicon der Deutschen Generale" dating back to the 18th Century, of which 19 are from the Freiherr Line and 13 from the Gräflichen Linie. And my recollection is that the name features prominently in military affairs back in the 17th Century and perhaps earlier. Obviously both branches were polyphiloprogenitive.
2. Colmar von der Goltz was born in East Prussia in 1843. He entered the Prussian Army, saw extensive combat in the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian wars, in 1883 was sent as a Major to be military adviser to the Turkish Army and returned to Germany in 1897 as a Lt. General. He was made Feldmarschall in 1911 and was appointed military governor of Belgium in August 1914, a post for which he apparently had no appetite whatsoever, as he was transferred back to Turkey that November as military advisor, and then appointed commander of the 6th Turkish Army in October, 1915. He defeated Sir Charles Townsend's Anglo-Turkish Army at Ctesiphon, which retreated and was surrounded at Kut and surrendered on April 29, 1916 - which was then thought to be the greatest British defeat of the Century. Von der Goltz, however, did not live to see his victory; he apparently died of Typhus 10 days earlier, although there were rumors that he was poisoned by the Young Turks, who did not relish the German influence in Turkey.
3. I do not know if Rüdiger, Graf von der Goltz had a brother or not but if he did it would not surprise me. The family seems to have been quite prolific. And in any event the two brothers would in all probability have each been entitled to carry the title "Graf". I am certainly not an expert in the titles of German nobility, but my late German father-in-law purported to be one and explained to me in painful detail all the multifold complications of titles and ranking of the German nobility, which I have neither the desire nor the time to go into here except to say that generally speaking the German system of title inheritance was quite different from the British, where under a rule of primogeniture only the eldest living son acquires the title. In Germany, as I understand it, except for a few titles conferred toward the end of the Empire (which was not the case of either of the von der Goltz lines) ALL sons inherited the title at birth, so if Rüdiger indeed had a brother they both would have been entitled to the title of "Graf". And if there was a daughter on that line she would (until she married) be entitled to be called "Gräfin" - or if of the other line, "Freiin".
Hope this is of some small help, although quite peripheral to the main topic. Regards, Kaschner
Hallo Kaschner,
Thank you so much for your kind words and I am glad that you are enjoying the thread. It has certainly grown beyond my hopes and expectations from the first post. Through Tapani K.'s good graces, generosity, and intellect, I know that I am certainly learning more about this fascinating conflict, and period in general, than would otherwise have been possible for me. I am thankful to him for sharing his knowledge with us and to Marcus W. for giving us the opportunity to present this information for all who are interested.
I appreciate your input regarding the von der Goltz family and the German nobility. It is interesting and seems to clear up a bit of a mystery for us.
BTW, a while ago you indicated that you had ordered or were going to order a copy of von Salomon's "Das Buch vom deutschen Freikorpskämpfer". Have you received it, and, if so, is there any information regarding the Landeswehr war or the Baltikum campaign?
Best Regards,
Durand
Thank you so much for your kind words and I am glad that you are enjoying the thread. It has certainly grown beyond my hopes and expectations from the first post. Through Tapani K.'s good graces, generosity, and intellect, I know that I am certainly learning more about this fascinating conflict, and period in general, than would otherwise have been possible for me. I am thankful to him for sharing his knowledge with us and to Marcus W. for giving us the opportunity to present this information for all who are interested.
I appreciate your input regarding the von der Goltz family and the German nobility. It is interesting and seems to clear up a bit of a mystery for us.
BTW, a while ago you indicated that you had ordered or were going to order a copy of von Salomon's "Das Buch vom deutschen Freikorpskämpfer". Have you received it, and, if so, is there any information regarding the Landeswehr war or the Baltikum campaign?
Best Regards,
Durand
Hello all.
Kaschner, thank you for the kind words and for the additional info on the von der Goltz family. And it is nice to know that somebody is reading this thread But Durand, you know what you said about me is not true. This thread is definitely a joint effort and, in my opinion, a good example of what can be achieved with boards like this when two or more people join forces and put together what they know about a subject. I know I have learned very much in the course of this discussion. And what is best, this is great fun. 
But enough of this, back to business:
The land question is, in fact, quite interesting. I think it is quite clear that the Ulmanis government was desperate when they made made the deal with Winnig but not desperate enough to make make any clear promises of land for German volunteers. Still, it is hard to see how the new citizens could have been excluded from the land reform. Be that as it may, the land question may have been given more weight than appropriate. The fact that Niedra had opposed the promises made by Ulmanis did not make it impossible for Germans to nominate him to lead ”their” Latvian government. On the other hand, Niedra did honor the treaty signed by Ulmanis and would have granted citizenships to willing German volunteers. Lists of the qualified and willing volunteers were to be delivered by the Germans once a week, but only five Germans applied for the citizenship from the Niedra government and two of these had lived in Latvia for quite some time so probably could have been granted the citizenship in any case. Therefore it has been suggested that the land was not the primary reason for recruiting but that the higher pay (Baltikumzulage) promised for those volunteering for the Baltics would have been more important.
When von der Goltz stayed in Latvia he claimed that it was merely to ensure that Latvian government would honor the treaty. In light of what I wrote above, I think it might be possible that the General was using any excuse available. I should also think that the fact that the Germans themselves staged a coup against the Ulmanis government could be seen as voiding any treaties made between them. And finally, the articles 292 and 293 of the Versailles treaty invalidated the treaty:
Durand, I do not think that the land reform was planned as a countermeasure against what the Germans had promised for their own. ”Land for the landless” had been one of the main issues of the attempted revolution in 1905 and again in 1917. Similar land reforms were implemented by the Finnish and Estonian governments. All of these countries were at the time mainly agrarian and the fact that most of the land was owned by a small number of large land-owners lead to many social and political problems. It was assumed (correctly, as it turned out) that giving land for the landless would make bolshevism look less appealing. In Estonia and Latvia there was the additional fact that the majority of the land-owners belonged to German nobility hostile to the goals of the majority populations of these new republics. From the Baltic German point of view there was little difference betweenthe bourgeois governemnts and the Bolsheviks: they both wanted to take their lands. In Latvia the government added a clause stipulating that those who had fought against the Latvian government would receive no compensation for the lands they were to give away. In the 1920s the Germans appealed to the League of Nations claiming that taking their lands was an act of ethnic persecution but since all land-owners, no matter what ethnicity, were treated alike, the appeal was rejected.
A couple of words of the Baltenregiment of the Estonian Army. We discussed some postings ago the claims that this unit would have been disarmed. This is incorrect but I should have added ( I forgot ) that most of the time this unit was operationally subordinated to General Judenitsch. This was because it was deemed politically more acceptable for the Baltic Germans and more comfortable for all. Also, I have been trying to find any info on Estonians arresting Baltic Germans but have not been able to find any mention so I believe that there were no widespread action directed against them.
I found some additional info on the Polish force that would have been used in the Baltics. There were two instances when the Polish participation was discussed. The first one was in April 1919 with General Haller’s Polish troops returning from France. It was suggested by the Entente that these troops would return via ports in Latvia and Lithuania, but these 100 000 Poles were unacceptable for the Baltic governments at the time. The second time was in September when the Polish Prime Minister Paderewski offered 545 000 troops to be used as an Entente force against the von der Goltz-Bermondt army. This was rejected, I think on the advice of the Americans, who feared that the Poles would use this as an excuse for occupying Latvia and Lithuania. These two events show quite clearly how deep was the mutual distrust among neighbouring countries.
And one small point: An orthography reform was adopted in the Latvian language soon after Latvia gained her independence. The old spelling had been based on German, but the new one was better suited to Latvian. One example is the name Niedra. In the older spelling it was Needra. I wanted to point this out because the older spelling can sometimes be seen in the sources I have used and Durand, you may have seen this usage, too.
regards,
Tapani K.
Kaschner, thank you for the kind words and for the additional info on the von der Goltz family. And it is nice to know that somebody is reading this thread
But Durand, you know what you said about me is not true. This thread is definitely a joint effort and, in my opinion, a good example of what can be achieved with boards like this when two or more people join forces and put together what they know about a subject. I know I have learned very much in the course of this discussion. And what is best, this is great fun. But enough of this, back to business:The land question is, in fact, quite interesting. I think it is quite clear that the Ulmanis government was desperate when they made made the deal with Winnig but not desperate enough to make make any clear promises of land for German volunteers. Still, it is hard to see how the new citizens could have been excluded from the land reform. Be that as it may, the land question may have been given more weight than appropriate. The fact that Niedra had opposed the promises made by Ulmanis did not make it impossible for Germans to nominate him to lead ”their” Latvian government. On the other hand, Niedra did honor the treaty signed by Ulmanis and would have granted citizenships to willing German volunteers. Lists of the qualified and willing volunteers were to be delivered by the Germans once a week, but only five Germans applied for the citizenship from the Niedra government and two of these had lived in Latvia for quite some time so probably could have been granted the citizenship in any case. Therefore it has been suggested that the land was not the primary reason for recruiting but that the higher pay (Baltikumzulage) promised for those volunteering for the Baltics would have been more important.
When von der Goltz stayed in Latvia he claimed that it was merely to ensure that Latvian government would honor the treaty. In light of what I wrote above, I think it might be possible that the General was using any excuse available. I should also think that the fact that the Germans themselves staged a coup against the Ulmanis government could be seen as voiding any treaties made between them. And finally, the articles 292 and 293 of the Versailles treaty invalidated the treaty:
These articles must have been welcomed by the Latvians. I might add here that also the Finnish government had made concessions for the Germans to receive help but the German defeat let us off the hook, too.
ARTICLE 292.
Germany recognises that all treaties, conventions or arrangements which she concluded with Russia, or with any State or Government of which the territory previously formed a part of Russia, or with Roumania, before August 1, 1914, or after that date until coming into force of the present Treaty, are and remain abrogated.
ARTICLE 293.
Should an Allied or Associated Power, Russia, or a State or Government of which the territory formerly constituted a part of Russia, have been forced since August 1, 1914, by reason of military occupation or by any other means or for any other cause, to grant or to allow to be granted by the act of any public authority, concessions, privileges and favours of any kind to Germany or to a German national, such concessions, privileges and favours are ipso facto annulled by the present Treaty.
No claims or indemnities which may result from this annulment shall be charged against the Allied or Associated Powers or the Powers, States, Governments or public authorities which are released from their engagements by the present Article.
Durand, I do not think that the land reform was planned as a countermeasure against what the Germans had promised for their own. ”Land for the landless” had been one of the main issues of the attempted revolution in 1905 and again in 1917. Similar land reforms were implemented by the Finnish and Estonian governments. All of these countries were at the time mainly agrarian and the fact that most of the land was owned by a small number of large land-owners lead to many social and political problems. It was assumed (correctly, as it turned out) that giving land for the landless would make bolshevism look less appealing. In Estonia and Latvia there was the additional fact that the majority of the land-owners belonged to German nobility hostile to the goals of the majority populations of these new republics. From the Baltic German point of view there was little difference betweenthe bourgeois governemnts and the Bolsheviks: they both wanted to take their lands. In Latvia the government added a clause stipulating that those who had fought against the Latvian government would receive no compensation for the lands they were to give away. In the 1920s the Germans appealed to the League of Nations claiming that taking their lands was an act of ethnic persecution but since all land-owners, no matter what ethnicity, were treated alike, the appeal was rejected.
A couple of words of the Baltenregiment of the Estonian Army. We discussed some postings ago the claims that this unit would have been disarmed. This is incorrect but I should have added ( I forgot ) that most of the time this unit was operationally subordinated to General Judenitsch. This was because it was deemed politically more acceptable for the Baltic Germans and more comfortable for all. Also, I have been trying to find any info on Estonians arresting Baltic Germans but have not been able to find any mention so I believe that there were no widespread action directed against them.
I found some additional info on the Polish force that would have been used in the Baltics. There were two instances when the Polish participation was discussed. The first one was in April 1919 with General Haller’s Polish troops returning from France. It was suggested by the Entente that these troops would return via ports in Latvia and Lithuania, but these 100 000 Poles were unacceptable for the Baltic governments at the time. The second time was in September when the Polish Prime Minister Paderewski offered 545 000 troops to be used as an Entente force against the von der Goltz-Bermondt army. This was rejected, I think on the advice of the Americans, who feared that the Poles would use this as an excuse for occupying Latvia and Lithuania. These two events show quite clearly how deep was the mutual distrust among neighbouring countries.
And one small point: An orthography reform was adopted in the Latvian language soon after Latvia gained her independence. The old spelling had been based on German, but the new one was better suited to Latvian. One example is the name Niedra. In the older spelling it was Needra. I wanted to point this out because the older spelling can sometimes be seen in the sources I have used and Durand, you may have seen this usage, too.
regards,
Tapani K.
-
walterkaschner
- In memoriam
- Posts: 1588
- Joined: 13 Mar 2002, 02:17
- Location: Houston, Texas
Hi Durand!
Yes I did buy a copy of a reprint of von Salomon's "Das Buch von Deutschen Freikorpskämpfer" and received it several weeks ago from the German bookseller. But I have since been so occupied with other matters that I have little more than the opportunity to skim through it. It has a wealth of excellent pictures and insignia details, etc., and also quite a bit of material - mostly in the form of personal reminiscenses - on the Balticum campaign which I have not yet had the time to read through. It is not partricularly well organized from my point of view, as the campaign is included under the rubric "Wall gegen das Kommunismus", which includes several other campaigns. Moreover, the text is in fractur print, which slows me down a bit, but inspired by the example of you and Tapani K. I will try to concentrate more of my attention on it in the near future and provide any additional information that I can find to the excellent material you both have supplied on this thread.
With best regards, Kaschner
Yes I did buy a copy of a reprint of von Salomon's "Das Buch von Deutschen Freikorpskämpfer" and received it several weeks ago from the German bookseller. But I have since been so occupied with other matters that I have little more than the opportunity to skim through it. It has a wealth of excellent pictures and insignia details, etc., and also quite a bit of material - mostly in the form of personal reminiscenses - on the Balticum campaign which I have not yet had the time to read through. It is not partricularly well organized from my point of view, as the campaign is included under the rubric "Wall gegen das Kommunismus", which includes several other campaigns. Moreover, the text is in fractur print, which slows me down a bit, but inspired by the example of you and Tapani K. I will try to concentrate more of my attention on it in the near future and provide any additional information that I can find to the excellent material you both have supplied on this thread.
With best regards, Kaschner
Hallo Everyone,
Given all the talk about land for the volunteers, it staggers the imagination that only five men out of thousands actually requested citizenship. I agree that the offer of Latvian citizenship was in and of itself was not a great incentive for the men to volunteer in comparison with the Baltikumzulage and the possibility of land ownership that was touted by recruiters. However, because the number is so low, I am not really certain how to read the figure and I wonder what other factors were also at play. For example, is it possible that the majority of volunteers or their officers simply did not understand that the requests had to be made and a list forwarded each week. Maybe the volunteers believed they could get land without citizenship. Perhaps they assumed they would automatically be granted citizenship. Or they could have reckoned that once the Bolsheviks were defeated the German volunteer army would control the country and the volunteers would then make claims through the de facto German ruling authority. Another possibility is that the German officers fail to pass lists on for fear of dividing the loyalty of the volunteers between Goltz's army and the Latvian Government. T.K., by chance, do you have any figures for the number of petitions for citizenship made prior to the Libau coup?
Whatever the reason, once Goltz's army had met with defeat, the numbers of volunteers who wanted citizenship dramatically increased. At a meeting in July 1919, the representatives for 10,000 volunteers asked the German Legation to press their claims for Latvian citizenship with the newly re-installed Ulmanis Government. As I understand it, they had few options at this time. The radical trade unions in Germany viewed the volunteers as reactionaries and generally refused to provide former volunteers with employment. The German army could not afford to absorb them into the Provisional Reichswehr and the German Government, fearing the unruly and brutal reputation of the Baltikumer, was apprehensive about allowing a large group of these men to return to Germany.
Other odds and ends:
-- Colonel Kalpaks was killed during the fighting for Jelgava. Still trying to discover the circumstances behind this friendly fire incident.
-- Balodis became the commander of the Latvian Army at the end of July 1919.
-- On November 11, 1918, the commander-in-chief of the VIII. army granted permission for the formation of the Baltische Landeswehr. It was to consist of 20,000 territorials which were to be divided into two groups, Latvian and Estonian. Major Sheibert, a German, was to command the Latvian group and Colonel von Weiss, later commander of the Baltenregiment, was to command the Estonian group. I am wondering if some personal ties developed among two or more officers in the initial command structure which could account for the "representative" of the Estonians that Spekke claims was on Goltz's staff during the spring of 1919.
I find your account of the Poles to be fascinating. Most interesting is that your source indicates that the Poles made the suggestion to send 500,000 men into Latvia and Lithuania whereas my source indicated it was an idea originating in London. Given that the Poles were aggressively expansionist during this period, I tend to think that your information is most likely the correct version. Such an offer fits in with Polish aims at the time. It also makes sense that the Americans rejected this offer. As I understand, Poland's representatives to the Peace Conference and Warsaw's military actions throughout the spring of 1919 made the Wilson government very wary of the Poles.
Thank you for mentioning the spelling differences. It is not so bad with personal names, but where it really becomes a problem is with place names -- Cesis/Wenden, Liepaja/Libau, Klaipeda/Memel. Along the same lines, I know that the Russians used a different calendar up to 1917. Did the Latvians and Estonians use the same calendar as Western Europe? If not, this could help account for the discrepancies in some of the dates we have found. Just a thought.
Walter, thank you for your response. I look forward to seeing what lies hidden between the covers of Herr von Salomon's book.
That is all I have for now.
Best Regards,
Durand
Given all the talk about land for the volunteers, it staggers the imagination that only five men out of thousands actually requested citizenship. I agree that the offer of Latvian citizenship was in and of itself was not a great incentive for the men to volunteer in comparison with the Baltikumzulage and the possibility of land ownership that was touted by recruiters. However, because the number is so low, I am not really certain how to read the figure and I wonder what other factors were also at play. For example, is it possible that the majority of volunteers or their officers simply did not understand that the requests had to be made and a list forwarded each week. Maybe the volunteers believed they could get land without citizenship. Perhaps they assumed they would automatically be granted citizenship. Or they could have reckoned that once the Bolsheviks were defeated the German volunteer army would control the country and the volunteers would then make claims through the de facto German ruling authority. Another possibility is that the German officers fail to pass lists on for fear of dividing the loyalty of the volunteers between Goltz's army and the Latvian Government. T.K., by chance, do you have any figures for the number of petitions for citizenship made prior to the Libau coup?
Whatever the reason, once Goltz's army had met with defeat, the numbers of volunteers who wanted citizenship dramatically increased. At a meeting in July 1919, the representatives for 10,000 volunteers asked the German Legation to press their claims for Latvian citizenship with the newly re-installed Ulmanis Government. As I understand it, they had few options at this time. The radical trade unions in Germany viewed the volunteers as reactionaries and generally refused to provide former volunteers with employment. The German army could not afford to absorb them into the Provisional Reichswehr and the German Government, fearing the unruly and brutal reputation of the Baltikumer, was apprehensive about allowing a large group of these men to return to Germany.
Other odds and ends:
-- Colonel Kalpaks was killed during the fighting for Jelgava. Still trying to discover the circumstances behind this friendly fire incident.
-- Balodis became the commander of the Latvian Army at the end of July 1919.
-- On November 11, 1918, the commander-in-chief of the VIII. army granted permission for the formation of the Baltische Landeswehr. It was to consist of 20,000 territorials which were to be divided into two groups, Latvian and Estonian. Major Sheibert, a German, was to command the Latvian group and Colonel von Weiss, later commander of the Baltenregiment, was to command the Estonian group. I am wondering if some personal ties developed among two or more officers in the initial command structure which could account for the "representative" of the Estonians that Spekke claims was on Goltz's staff during the spring of 1919.
I find your account of the Poles to be fascinating. Most interesting is that your source indicates that the Poles made the suggestion to send 500,000 men into Latvia and Lithuania whereas my source indicated it was an idea originating in London. Given that the Poles were aggressively expansionist during this period, I tend to think that your information is most likely the correct version. Such an offer fits in with Polish aims at the time. It also makes sense that the Americans rejected this offer. As I understand, Poland's representatives to the Peace Conference and Warsaw's military actions throughout the spring of 1919 made the Wilson government very wary of the Poles.
Thank you for mentioning the spelling differences. It is not so bad with personal names, but where it really becomes a problem is with place names -- Cesis/Wenden, Liepaja/Libau, Klaipeda/Memel. Along the same lines, I know that the Russians used a different calendar up to 1917. Did the Latvians and Estonians use the same calendar as Western Europe? If not, this could help account for the discrepancies in some of the dates we have found. Just a thought.
Walter, thank you for your response. I look forward to seeing what lies hidden between the covers of Herr von Salomon's book.
That is all I have for now.
Best Regards,
Durand
Hello again.
Durand, I was amazed, too, that there were only five requests for citizenship. I am fairly certain that many German volunteers would have waited until the fighting was over and only then would have presented their claim. On the other hand, the number you mentioned, 10 000, seems very high. I just can't believe that there would have been so many German volunteers willing to take Latvian citizenship in July 1919 and I feel that this number would have been used for political reasons by the Germans. And no, I have not found any figures for the number of petitions prior to the April coup.
The Polish offer of help seems rather generous. I have not found exact figures but I think that the figure of 545 000 would be close to the total manpower of the Polish army in September 1919. Maybe there is a misunderstanding in my sources and Paderewski would have said something like: We have an army of 545 000 and can send men to the Baltics.
About the calendar: The Julian calendar was in use throughgout the Russian empire including Latvia and Estonia. The only exception I am aware of was Finland, which was a part of Sweden until 1809 and in Sweden the new calendar had been adopted in 1753. When Russia occupied Finland, we were granted a rather far-reaching autonomy. In fact, Finland was never a part of Russia proper, but a Grand-Duchy and as such in a personal union with Russia; the Russian Emperor was the Grand-Duke of Finland. Latvia and Estonia had been annexed in 1721 from Sweden and therefore used the old calendar until February 1918 when Russia adopted the Gregorian calendar. At this stage the difference between the two calendars was 13 days which means that after January 31st the next day was February 14th.
I have now the book by von der Goltz from a library. It is Swedish-language translation of the book published in 1920. It is an amazing read. Compared to all the other sources I have used the General has a very different view on what happened and, like in autobiographical works often, he shows himself in a rather good light. His writing is very anti-British and he sees Ulmanis as a puppet of the perfidious Albion. There is a lot of info to be found in this book but I think a very careful reading and comparing with other sources is needed.
I found a Latvian-language www-page with a short biography of Colonel Zemitans. I do not really know Latvian but with the help of a dictionary this is what I found: In July 15th 1919 Zemitans was given command of the 2nd Livonian Division of the Latvian army and placed as commander of the southern front. During the Bermondt offensive (August 12th) he was relieved of his command and replaced by Colonel Penikis. In January 1920 he was appointed to the committee of military legislation and regulations. In 1921 he was ordered into Commander-in-Chief's reserve and finally relieved of his duties in 1922 during cutbacks in the army. Zemitans died in 1928 and was buried in Riga's Brethren Cemetary for freedom fighters.
Reading between the lines of this www-page and some other sources it looks like Zemitans was held responsible for the initial success of the Bermondt offensive and therefore relieved of his position. On the other hand, I cannot help thinking that there was politics involved, too. Von der Goltz describes Zemitans as a radical and it seems that there was some kind of friction inside the Latvian army with Balodis emerging as winner. One small, but I think telling, point is that Zemitans received the cross of the Order of Bear-Slayer, the only military award for bravery in Latvia. There were three classes of this award and Zemitans received the 3rd class award with the number 1678.
The above may be an indication of the friction between Estonian and Latvian governments. After the April coup Ulmanis and his government were invited to Estonia but Ulmanis preferred to stay on board the Saratov but sent his representatives to Estonia. On the ship he had a direct contact ( by a cable) with the British and the French but in Estonia he would probably have felt his freedom af action restricted by the fact that he would have been a guest of the Estonian government. What is more, the border line between Estonia and Latvia had not been established so he probably wanted to keep some kind of distance and avoid getting too much in debt of the Estonians. The fate of Zemitans might be connected with the underlying differences between the two governments if Zemitans would have been seen as Estonians' man. On the other hand, Zemitans being the commander of the North Latvian Brigade meant only an administrative appointment, since the two regiments of this Brigade never fought together but as separate regiments under different Estonian divisions. Zemitans' abilities being more of administrative kind might also be implied by the fact that he was in 1920 appointed for the legislation committee. Speculations, of course; again I wish we had some Latvians here. I am sure they would know many of the answers to these open questions.
A word or two on Balodis and his command: My sources all agree that the Balodis Brigade entered Riga on June 23rd after the Germans had captured the city on the previous day. After that the Brigade was sent to hold the front against the Red Latvians. But they had been on the eastern front earlier, sometime in the end of May or beginning of June when the battalion from Balodis' force joined the Zemitans Brigade. It was probably at this stage that the contacts between Zemitans and Balodis took place.
And Durand, my sources do not have any mention of a biography of Balodis in any language.
regards,
Tapani K.
Durand, I was amazed, too, that there were only five requests for citizenship. I am fairly certain that many German volunteers would have waited until the fighting was over and only then would have presented their claim. On the other hand, the number you mentioned, 10 000, seems very high. I just can't believe that there would have been so many German volunteers willing to take Latvian citizenship in July 1919 and I feel that this number would have been used for political reasons by the Germans. And no, I have not found any figures for the number of petitions prior to the April coup.
The Polish offer of help seems rather generous. I have not found exact figures but I think that the figure of 545 000 would be close to the total manpower of the Polish army in September 1919. Maybe there is a misunderstanding in my sources and Paderewski would have said something like: We have an army of 545 000 and can send men to the Baltics.
About the calendar: The Julian calendar was in use throughgout the Russian empire including Latvia and Estonia. The only exception I am aware of was Finland, which was a part of Sweden until 1809 and in Sweden the new calendar had been adopted in 1753. When Russia occupied Finland, we were granted a rather far-reaching autonomy. In fact, Finland was never a part of Russia proper, but a Grand-Duchy and as such in a personal union with Russia; the Russian Emperor was the Grand-Duke of Finland. Latvia and Estonia had been annexed in 1721 from Sweden and therefore used the old calendar until February 1918 when Russia adopted the Gregorian calendar. At this stage the difference between the two calendars was 13 days which means that after January 31st the next day was February 14th.
I have now the book by von der Goltz from a library. It is Swedish-language translation of the book published in 1920. It is an amazing read. Compared to all the other sources I have used the General has a very different view on what happened and, like in autobiographical works often, he shows himself in a rather good light. His writing is very anti-British and he sees Ulmanis as a puppet of the perfidious Albion. There is a lot of info to be found in this book but I think a very careful reading and comparing with other sources is needed.
I found a Latvian-language www-page with a short biography of Colonel Zemitans. I do not really know Latvian but with the help of a dictionary this is what I found: In July 15th 1919 Zemitans was given command of the 2nd Livonian Division of the Latvian army and placed as commander of the southern front. During the Bermondt offensive (August 12th) he was relieved of his command and replaced by Colonel Penikis. In January 1920 he was appointed to the committee of military legislation and regulations. In 1921 he was ordered into Commander-in-Chief's reserve and finally relieved of his duties in 1922 during cutbacks in the army. Zemitans died in 1928 and was buried in Riga's Brethren Cemetary for freedom fighters.
Reading between the lines of this www-page and some other sources it looks like Zemitans was held responsible for the initial success of the Bermondt offensive and therefore relieved of his position. On the other hand, I cannot help thinking that there was politics involved, too. Von der Goltz describes Zemitans as a radical and it seems that there was some kind of friction inside the Latvian army with Balodis emerging as winner. One small, but I think telling, point is that Zemitans received the cross of the Order of Bear-Slayer, the only military award for bravery in Latvia. There were three classes of this award and Zemitans received the 3rd class award with the number 1678.
The above may be an indication of the friction between Estonian and Latvian governments. After the April coup Ulmanis and his government were invited to Estonia but Ulmanis preferred to stay on board the Saratov but sent his representatives to Estonia. On the ship he had a direct contact ( by a cable) with the British and the French but in Estonia he would probably have felt his freedom af action restricted by the fact that he would have been a guest of the Estonian government. What is more, the border line between Estonia and Latvia had not been established so he probably wanted to keep some kind of distance and avoid getting too much in debt of the Estonians. The fate of Zemitans might be connected with the underlying differences between the two governments if Zemitans would have been seen as Estonians' man. On the other hand, Zemitans being the commander of the North Latvian Brigade meant only an administrative appointment, since the two regiments of this Brigade never fought together but as separate regiments under different Estonian divisions. Zemitans' abilities being more of administrative kind might also be implied by the fact that he was in 1920 appointed for the legislation committee. Speculations, of course; again I wish we had some Latvians here. I am sure they would know many of the answers to these open questions.
A word or two on Balodis and his command: My sources all agree that the Balodis Brigade entered Riga on June 23rd after the Germans had captured the city on the previous day. After that the Brigade was sent to hold the front against the Red Latvians. But they had been on the eastern front earlier, sometime in the end of May or beginning of June when the battalion from Balodis' force joined the Zemitans Brigade. It was probably at this stage that the contacts between Zemitans and Balodis took place.
And Durand, my sources do not have any mention of a biography of Balodis in any language.
regards,
Tapani K.
Hallo to All,
I have been curious about the relationship between Bermondt and the other Russian commanders since Tapani K. touched upon the issue a while ago. Not heeding the old adage, "Curiosity killed the cat" here is what I have been able to piece together:
In early 1919 a group of White Russian volunteers was trying to join with an anti-Bolshevik army. They moved from Germany through Poland. This small band made it to Riga, but was forced to fall back to Liepaja/Libau when the Bolsheviks captured Riga in January 1919. This small band was composed mainly of officers and it came under the command of Prince Anatol Lieven, who was a Russian of Balt origin. This force grew throughout the spring of 1919 mainly from Russians who were former POWs in German camps.
Lieven formed a plan to push through Daugavpils/Dünaburg and then Pskov to reach the Bologoye rail station. The station sat on the rail line between Moscow and Petrograd. If his force could take the station it would cut the major link between the Bolsheviks in Moscow and Petrograd. When Goltz began his offensive to clear Latvia in February 1919, Lieven joined forces with him. Lieven viewed Latvia as the ideal base from which he could eventually put his plan into action. Lieven was in contact with General Yudenich, the commander of the anti-Bolshevik North West Army. Lieven considered Yudenich to be his immediate superior, but the relationship was not made official until June 1919. Yudenich was in agreement with Lieven's plans and his alliance with Goltz.
This alliance of convenience lasted until the fall of Riga to Goltz's army in May 1919. Goltz and Major Fletcher wanted Lieven and his force to move north beyond Riga with them. He refused. Lieven believed that the strike northward would cause great hatred between the Balts and nationalist Latvians and Estonians thereby complicating efforts to defeat the Bolsheviks. He was also concerned that if his Russian forces moved in concert with Goltz's army against Estonia, then the Estonian government would withdraw it's support of Yudenich's army. Lieven, who had been severely wounded in the attack at Riga, went to Jelgava/Mitau to recover. He was the Chief of Russian forces in Courland.
In May and June 1919 two other Russian volunteer forces were formed in Kurland. They were under the command of Colonel Bermondt and a Colonel Virgolich. At the time they were small and poorly equipped. In June 1919 they placed themselves under Lieven's command. Later in June, Yudenich ordered Lieven and his force to Narva. He was also told to purge the force of any very pro-German members. As I understand it, both Yudenitch and Lieven were reluctant to have the latter's force move to Narva. Yudenich gave the orders based on the insistence of the British government. In addition, Yudenich and Lieven did not want to lose the opportunity for putting Lieven's plan to cut the Moscow-Petrograd rail link. Courland had also proved to be an excellent base for recruiting Russian volunteers. Moreover, both leaders, despite their differences with the Germans, were not keen to sever their connection with the Germans. From their perspective, the Germans had been on the ground fighting the Bolsheviks, whereas the British had provided some supplies, naval support , and mostly advice/orders. In the short term, the Germans could cause some problems and could eventually make claims on territory. However, the Russians took the pragmatic long-term approach that they needed to defeat the Bolsheviks in order to create a White Russian government. Once the new Russian government was established, the territorial disputes with the Germans could be worked and the borders finalized.
Bermondt's force was included in Yudenich's order to move to Narva. However, Bermondt refused to go. He claimed that his units were not yet ready for action. Neither Yudenich or Lieven were concerned with this apparent act of "disobedience." It coincided with their plans to launch an attack through Daugavpils. Lieven designated Bermondt as his successor and Yudenich confirmed Bermondt as the new commander of Russian forces in Courland. Before leaving Jelgava, Lieven advised Bermondt that his best course of action would be to move east against the Bolsheviks in the direction of Pskov. Lieven also advised that a move against Riga would be a disaster for the White Russian cause. Bermondt is said to have agreed to move East.
With Lieven gone, Bermondt seems to have let the idea of command go to his head and to have come under the sway of Goltz. Bermondt's force grew throughout the summer. By the end of September it would reach a complement of approximately 15,000 men. The Entente was extremely concerned at the large concentration of conservative Russians and the larger concentration of conservative Germans who insisted on remaining in Latvia. The Allies continually urged Yudenich to order Bermondt to move to join with Yudenich's army. Yudenich issued such orders on several occasions, but Bermondt continued to refuse. The French reported that Yudenich allowed Bermondt to refuse and, furthermore, Yudenich let Bermondt know that it did not matter to him if Bermondt stayed or joined Yudenich's army in Estonia. Bermondt eventually followed his own adventurous nature and Goltz's direction which led to the defeat of Goltz's army and contributed to the collapse of the White Russian cause.
Bermondt was quite a character, but it is said that his men were quite devoted to him. The same can not be said for the Germans. Goltz seems not to have had a great deal of respect for his military abilities since he made strong efforts to put a German officer advisor on Bermondt's staff. Fletcher refused to Goltz's order to join Bermondt's army. Fletcher stated that Bermondt was a military incompetent. (Waite, p. 123)
Bermondt's reputation among the powers of the Entente was also low. A French officer observed that Bermondt was "the colonel of operettas and the prince of comedies." (Waite, p 123) British military observers joked that Bermondt had been "the conductor of a Russian orchestra or bandmaster of a Caucasian regiment." (Luckett, p. 315) There was no love lost between Bermondt and the British. Bermondt received representatives of the British military mission while lying down on his bed and smoking or eating an apple. On at least one occasion, Bermondt became so angry with the British during a meeting that he emptied his revolver into the ceiling after the officers had left.
5 Citizens and 10.000 would-be Citizens: I agree with you, T.K. I find it hard to believe that 10.000 men suddenly and sincerely wanted citizenship when the offer had been open for several months. It seems more likely that the number was inflated by the Germans in order to gain political leverage. However, given the situation back in Germany I would not be surprised if a substantial number of men did press for citizenship.
Information on Zemitans and Balodis: Thank you very much, T.K. It is very interesting and insightful information. Did both regiments in the North Latvian Brigade participate in the Landeswehr war? I am disappointed to read that there have been no full-scale biographies written on Balodis. Given his prominence during the interwar period, one would think that somebody would have written a book about him. Hey, T.K., do you have any free time?
What you wrote about the uneasy nature of the alliance between the Ulmanis government and the Estonian government explains something that I had intended to ask you about, but forgot. A week or two ago, I read somewhere (I forget where at the moment) that after the Battle of Cesis Ulmanis was very insistent that the victorious Estonian army not move too much farther into Latvia. When the Estonian army reached the suburbs of Riga, Ulmanis became even more insistent that the Estonians stay out of Riga. Thanks to you, I now understand this a bit better.
That is all I have for now.
Best Regards,
Durand
I have been curious about the relationship between Bermondt and the other Russian commanders since Tapani K. touched upon the issue a while ago. Not heeding the old adage, "Curiosity killed the cat" here is what I have been able to piece together:
In early 1919 a group of White Russian volunteers was trying to join with an anti-Bolshevik army. They moved from Germany through Poland. This small band made it to Riga, but was forced to fall back to Liepaja/Libau when the Bolsheviks captured Riga in January 1919. This small band was composed mainly of officers and it came under the command of Prince Anatol Lieven, who was a Russian of Balt origin. This force grew throughout the spring of 1919 mainly from Russians who were former POWs in German camps.
Lieven formed a plan to push through Daugavpils/Dünaburg and then Pskov to reach the Bologoye rail station. The station sat on the rail line between Moscow and Petrograd. If his force could take the station it would cut the major link between the Bolsheviks in Moscow and Petrograd. When Goltz began his offensive to clear Latvia in February 1919, Lieven joined forces with him. Lieven viewed Latvia as the ideal base from which he could eventually put his plan into action. Lieven was in contact with General Yudenich, the commander of the anti-Bolshevik North West Army. Lieven considered Yudenich to be his immediate superior, but the relationship was not made official until June 1919. Yudenich was in agreement with Lieven's plans and his alliance with Goltz.
This alliance of convenience lasted until the fall of Riga to Goltz's army in May 1919. Goltz and Major Fletcher wanted Lieven and his force to move north beyond Riga with them. He refused. Lieven believed that the strike northward would cause great hatred between the Balts and nationalist Latvians and Estonians thereby complicating efforts to defeat the Bolsheviks. He was also concerned that if his Russian forces moved in concert with Goltz's army against Estonia, then the Estonian government would withdraw it's support of Yudenich's army. Lieven, who had been severely wounded in the attack at Riga, went to Jelgava/Mitau to recover. He was the Chief of Russian forces in Courland.
In May and June 1919 two other Russian volunteer forces were formed in Kurland. They were under the command of Colonel Bermondt and a Colonel Virgolich. At the time they were small and poorly equipped. In June 1919 they placed themselves under Lieven's command. Later in June, Yudenich ordered Lieven and his force to Narva. He was also told to purge the force of any very pro-German members. As I understand it, both Yudenitch and Lieven were reluctant to have the latter's force move to Narva. Yudenich gave the orders based on the insistence of the British government. In addition, Yudenich and Lieven did not want to lose the opportunity for putting Lieven's plan to cut the Moscow-Petrograd rail link. Courland had also proved to be an excellent base for recruiting Russian volunteers. Moreover, both leaders, despite their differences with the Germans, were not keen to sever their connection with the Germans. From their perspective, the Germans had been on the ground fighting the Bolsheviks, whereas the British had provided some supplies, naval support , and mostly advice/orders. In the short term, the Germans could cause some problems and could eventually make claims on territory. However, the Russians took the pragmatic long-term approach that they needed to defeat the Bolsheviks in order to create a White Russian government. Once the new Russian government was established, the territorial disputes with the Germans could be worked and the borders finalized.
Bermondt's force was included in Yudenich's order to move to Narva. However, Bermondt refused to go. He claimed that his units were not yet ready for action. Neither Yudenich or Lieven were concerned with this apparent act of "disobedience." It coincided with their plans to launch an attack through Daugavpils. Lieven designated Bermondt as his successor and Yudenich confirmed Bermondt as the new commander of Russian forces in Courland. Before leaving Jelgava, Lieven advised Bermondt that his best course of action would be to move east against the Bolsheviks in the direction of Pskov. Lieven also advised that a move against Riga would be a disaster for the White Russian cause. Bermondt is said to have agreed to move East.
With Lieven gone, Bermondt seems to have let the idea of command go to his head and to have come under the sway of Goltz. Bermondt's force grew throughout the summer. By the end of September it would reach a complement of approximately 15,000 men. The Entente was extremely concerned at the large concentration of conservative Russians and the larger concentration of conservative Germans who insisted on remaining in Latvia. The Allies continually urged Yudenich to order Bermondt to move to join with Yudenich's army. Yudenich issued such orders on several occasions, but Bermondt continued to refuse. The French reported that Yudenich allowed Bermondt to refuse and, furthermore, Yudenich let Bermondt know that it did not matter to him if Bermondt stayed or joined Yudenich's army in Estonia. Bermondt eventually followed his own adventurous nature and Goltz's direction which led to the defeat of Goltz's army and contributed to the collapse of the White Russian cause.
Bermondt was quite a character, but it is said that his men were quite devoted to him. The same can not be said for the Germans. Goltz seems not to have had a great deal of respect for his military abilities since he made strong efforts to put a German officer advisor on Bermondt's staff. Fletcher refused to Goltz's order to join Bermondt's army. Fletcher stated that Bermondt was a military incompetent. (Waite, p. 123)
Bermondt's reputation among the powers of the Entente was also low. A French officer observed that Bermondt was "the colonel of operettas and the prince of comedies." (Waite, p 123) British military observers joked that Bermondt had been "the conductor of a Russian orchestra or bandmaster of a Caucasian regiment." (Luckett, p. 315) There was no love lost between Bermondt and the British. Bermondt received representatives of the British military mission while lying down on his bed and smoking or eating an apple. On at least one occasion, Bermondt became so angry with the British during a meeting that he emptied his revolver into the ceiling after the officers had left.
5 Citizens and 10.000 would-be Citizens: I agree with you, T.K. I find it hard to believe that 10.000 men suddenly and sincerely wanted citizenship when the offer had been open for several months. It seems more likely that the number was inflated by the Germans in order to gain political leverage. However, given the situation back in Germany I would not be surprised if a substantial number of men did press for citizenship.
Information on Zemitans and Balodis: Thank you very much, T.K. It is very interesting and insightful information. Did both regiments in the North Latvian Brigade participate in the Landeswehr war? I am disappointed to read that there have been no full-scale biographies written on Balodis. Given his prominence during the interwar period, one would think that somebody would have written a book about him. Hey, T.K., do you have any free time?
What you wrote about the uneasy nature of the alliance between the Ulmanis government and the Estonian government explains something that I had intended to ask you about, but forgot. A week or two ago, I read somewhere (I forget where at the moment) that after the Battle of Cesis Ulmanis was very insistent that the victorious Estonian army not move too much farther into Latvia. When the Estonian army reached the suburbs of Riga, Ulmanis became even more insistent that the Estonians stay out of Riga. Thanks to you, I now understand this a bit better.
That is all I have for now.
Best Regards,
Durand
Hello
Durand, that was an interesting piece on Lieven and Bermondt. As you know, I have been reading the von der Goltz book and it seems to that your sources might be based on the Graf's memoirs. For example, Von der Goltz claims that Yudenich ordering Lieven's force would have been insisted by the British. Nowhere else have I seen claimed that Yudenich in fact did not want Lieven in Narva. This sounds a bit odd to me, since I should imagine that Yudenich would have been more than happy to have a well-trained and equipped force to augment his Corps. Or maybe they thought that since it was the Germans who were financing the Russians in the Courland, it would be a good move to use the German support as long it was availalble. Another thing that might be originally from von der Goltz is Bermondt's men being devoted to their leader. Von der Goltz also maintains that since Bermondt, although a good soldier, had no command experience he (von der Goltz) had to organize a competent staff for the Colonel. Needless to say this staff cosisted of German officers. Von der Goltz does not mention the fact that by assigning German officers to form Bermondt's staff it would be certain that the Germans, i.e. von der Goltz would control the Bermondt force.
Do we know anything of Bermondt's military career befor his Latvian adventure?
I understand that the 1936 book is basically an edited version of the one printed in 1920 and in the newer version von der Goltz speaks more openly of his political goals and ambitions. I will certainly try to find it.
Speaking of von der Goltz and his book, here is a comment of his on the October attack on Riga:
)
Some other points:
Balodis was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Latvian army on October 16th. Until this the office was held by General Simonsons, an elder officer who had been appointed as a compromise candidate so that neither of the existing brigades (later divisions) would be favoured. With Zemitans replaced four days earlier and with the new Commander-in Chief it has been claimed that the fight against the Bermondt force was conducted more vigorously. But maybe Zemitans was not the only one to blame for the initial retreat of the Latvian forces. Apparently the military leadership ans especially the government did not think an attack on Riga likely and that is why they placed the Livonian Division to defend the capital. This division consisted largely of fresh conscripts and some of the conscripts were former members of the Red Latvian units. The core of the division were men from the North Latvian Brigade, but it must be remembered that the brigade was initially raised fron volunteers with no experience. This leads to a situation were we have reliable volunteers with little experience and former Red Riflemen with experience but with unproven loyalty. And of course, there were some conscripts who had been drafted after the Cesis battle and who had no military experience whatsoever.
As a matter of fact, this is quite an interesting situation. At the time there were two divisions in the Latvian army: one of them had in its ranks former Reds and therefore it was safer to avoid using them against the Reds. The nucleus of the other division had been, at least on paper, a part of the Landeswehr and therefore it was logical to place them against the Reds so that no-one was in danger of meeting their former comrades-in-arms and at the same time both of the divisions were fighting the enemy they had fought earlier.
Durand, it was only the Cesis Regiment of the North Latvian Brigade that took part in the Landeswehr War, the other regiment was deployed east of Cesis against the Reds and, I believe, saw little action.
Estonian-Latvian alliance: the alliance was indeed very brittle. It has been claimed that the Estonians wanted to annex parts of the former province of Livonia inhabited by Latvians. I have found no evidence of this but it is easy to believe that Ulmanis would have felt somewhat uneasy. I maybe on thin ice here, but I think that there has been some sort of rivalry between the Latvians and Estonians for centuries. It may have its roots on the tribal wars of the pre-Christian era and when the German crusaders entered the area the Latvian tribes were converted to the new faith earlier and the Germans them employed as auxiliaries against the Estonians. I am not sure if that had any bearing on anything so back to real life: The border between Latvia and Estonia was undefined since the former Russian provincial borders did not coincide with the language border which had been agreed as a basis for the new international border. The border was settled mostly in good order but the town of Valka/Valga (Latvian/Estonian) presented a problem since both of the countries wanted to have it. The town itself was not important other than locally, but there were major roads crossing thereand a railway station. In the end an Entente Commission had to brought in to arbitrate and they drew the border right in the middle of the town. A wise compromise, one might think, but the town being now divided in two and neither of the parts was able to continue the locally important role of the undivided town. It seems that the feelings had run rather high over Valka/Valga but General Laidoner is reported to have said that he would not start a war for Valga.
The Polish offer of help: I read my sources more carefully and in fact there is no mention of whose original idea it was. It may well have been that the initial proposal came from London.
I found a place called Lievenhof from a map in von den Baltischen provinzen.... It is situated on the east shore of the Daugava (Düna) south of Jekabpils (Jakobstadt) and the present-day name is Livani. I wonder if this where Prince Lieven came from.
Balodis: The fact that there seems to be no biography of him might be explained byt the fact that he was still active in politics when the Soviets took over in 1940 so that the time to remember him had not yet come and in the Soviet era a biography of Balodis would have been unthinkable. Still, I assume there would have been magazine and newspaper articles on him and his life in the 20s and 30s. I do not think a proper biography could be written without Latvian language sources and since I know only some words of Latvian, I am afraid that, Durand, you will have to find another biographer.
I'll end this time with numbers of Germans in Latvia and Estonia.
1914: Latvia - 127 000, Estonia - 35 000
1921: Latvia - 71 000, Estonia 18 000
Thank you for reading this
Tapani K.
Durand, that was an interesting piece on Lieven and Bermondt. As you know, I have been reading the von der Goltz book and it seems to that your sources might be based on the Graf's memoirs. For example, Von der Goltz claims that Yudenich ordering Lieven's force would have been insisted by the British. Nowhere else have I seen claimed that Yudenich in fact did not want Lieven in Narva. This sounds a bit odd to me, since I should imagine that Yudenich would have been more than happy to have a well-trained and equipped force to augment his Corps. Or maybe they thought that since it was the Germans who were financing the Russians in the Courland, it would be a good move to use the German support as long it was availalble. Another thing that might be originally from von der Goltz is Bermondt's men being devoted to their leader. Von der Goltz also maintains that since Bermondt, although a good soldier, had no command experience he (von der Goltz) had to organize a competent staff for the Colonel. Needless to say this staff cosisted of German officers. Von der Goltz does not mention the fact that by assigning German officers to form Bermondt's staff it would be certain that the Germans, i.e. von der Goltz would control the Bermondt force.
Do we know anything of Bermondt's military career befor his Latvian adventure?
I understand that the 1936 book is basically an edited version of the one printed in 1920 and in the newer version von der Goltz speaks more openly of his political goals and ambitions. I will certainly try to find it.
Speaking of von der Goltz and his book, here is a comment of his on the October attack on Riga:
I thought at first that I would not comment on this, but I cannot help myself; what the Graf says here is quite amazing. He says this when Estonian and Latvian forces had been actually fighting against the Bolsheviks instead of talking about it like Bermondt. And as a matter of fact, the Bermondt force never fought the Bolsheviks. Of course, there were individual soldiers, German and Russian, who had fought, but not the Bermondt force as such. (The above quote is my translation from the Swedish translation of the original German language text so please try to understandThe open enmity of England, Latvia and Estonia left us with no choice. The matters had to be cleared with them before the attack on Soviet Russia was possible. This could be done since these border countries and England had let themselves to be allied to Bolsheviks through hindering the Russian West army's figth against the Bolsheviks in their own land.
The fight against the vassals of England was equal to the fight agaisnt Bolshevism.
)Some other points:
Balodis was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Latvian army on October 16th. Until this the office was held by General Simonsons, an elder officer who had been appointed as a compromise candidate so that neither of the existing brigades (later divisions) would be favoured. With Zemitans replaced four days earlier and with the new Commander-in Chief it has been claimed that the fight against the Bermondt force was conducted more vigorously. But maybe Zemitans was not the only one to blame for the initial retreat of the Latvian forces. Apparently the military leadership ans especially the government did not think an attack on Riga likely and that is why they placed the Livonian Division to defend the capital. This division consisted largely of fresh conscripts and some of the conscripts were former members of the Red Latvian units. The core of the division were men from the North Latvian Brigade, but it must be remembered that the brigade was initially raised fron volunteers with no experience. This leads to a situation were we have reliable volunteers with little experience and former Red Riflemen with experience but with unproven loyalty. And of course, there were some conscripts who had been drafted after the Cesis battle and who had no military experience whatsoever.
As a matter of fact, this is quite an interesting situation. At the time there were two divisions in the Latvian army: one of them had in its ranks former Reds and therefore it was safer to avoid using them against the Reds. The nucleus of the other division had been, at least on paper, a part of the Landeswehr and therefore it was logical to place them against the Reds so that no-one was in danger of meeting their former comrades-in-arms and at the same time both of the divisions were fighting the enemy they had fought earlier.
Durand, it was only the Cesis Regiment of the North Latvian Brigade that took part in the Landeswehr War, the other regiment was deployed east of Cesis against the Reds and, I believe, saw little action.
Estonian-Latvian alliance: the alliance was indeed very brittle. It has been claimed that the Estonians wanted to annex parts of the former province of Livonia inhabited by Latvians. I have found no evidence of this but it is easy to believe that Ulmanis would have felt somewhat uneasy. I maybe on thin ice here, but I think that there has been some sort of rivalry between the Latvians and Estonians for centuries. It may have its roots on the tribal wars of the pre-Christian era and when the German crusaders entered the area the Latvian tribes were converted to the new faith earlier and the Germans them employed as auxiliaries against the Estonians. I am not sure if that had any bearing on anything so back to real life: The border between Latvia and Estonia was undefined since the former Russian provincial borders did not coincide with the language border which had been agreed as a basis for the new international border. The border was settled mostly in good order but the town of Valka/Valga (Latvian/Estonian) presented a problem since both of the countries wanted to have it. The town itself was not important other than locally, but there were major roads crossing thereand a railway station. In the end an Entente Commission had to brought in to arbitrate and they drew the border right in the middle of the town. A wise compromise, one might think, but the town being now divided in two and neither of the parts was able to continue the locally important role of the undivided town. It seems that the feelings had run rather high over Valka/Valga but General Laidoner is reported to have said that he would not start a war for Valga.
The Polish offer of help: I read my sources more carefully and in fact there is no mention of whose original idea it was. It may well have been that the initial proposal came from London.
I found a place called Lievenhof from a map in von den Baltischen provinzen.... It is situated on the east shore of the Daugava (Düna) south of Jekabpils (Jakobstadt) and the present-day name is Livani. I wonder if this where Prince Lieven came from.
Balodis: The fact that there seems to be no biography of him might be explained byt the fact that he was still active in politics when the Soviets took over in 1940 so that the time to remember him had not yet come and in the Soviet era a biography of Balodis would have been unthinkable. Still, I assume there would have been magazine and newspaper articles on him and his life in the 20s and 30s. I do not think a proper biography could be written without Latvian language sources and since I know only some words of Latvian, I am afraid that, Durand, you will have to find another biographer
.I'll end this time with numbers of Germans in Latvia and Estonia.
1914: Latvia - 127 000, Estonia - 35 000
1921: Latvia - 71 000, Estonia 18 000
Thank you for reading this
Tapani K.