German mobilizaton for Russian campaign

[Kelvin]

Hi, During the initial period of the Russian campaign, Halder , Chief of OKH said he estimated that Russian had 200 divisions and later found that she had 360. When German reached the outskirt of Moscow, those 360 had been shattered but Russian raised another army. Russia seemed to possess unlimited manpower with unlimited arms supply. She had 200 million population but When German poured into Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Baltic States, these manpower were excluded and even these people joined the Red army, their reliability is doubtful. So Russia only had around 150 million people for war or around 100 million real Russian for her motherland.
On the other side of hill, the Third Reich possessed 100 million people, 80 million of whom were German. Their manpower level was not much different to Russian. Germany and its predesscer had a long traditional history of mobilitzing a large quantity of troop for war. So I knew German know how to mobilitze her manpower to very limit.
Regarding weapon, In battle of France, German had 2.7 million man in war and suffered slight casualites in manpower and weapon especially small arms. And then she gained a bloodless victory over French and her allies ( Not really bloodless, but German suffered only 60,000 casualties) Over 3.5 million arms for allied forces ( British, French , Belgian and Dutch) fell into German hand.We also calulated over million arms taken from Greek and Yugoslav forces. So German army had arms for equipping 7 million men. But why German cannot act like her Russian counterpart to raise another 150 divisions for campaign in Moscow. If German had enough manpower for war in winter of 1941, she could shatter Russian offensive in Moscow and Rostov. Some may argue that German logistics could not support this manpower but Russian can do this. Why ? German cannot raise 300 or over divisions for Russian campaign in 1941 and bring the successful conclusion for this campaign ?

[Qvist]

Hi Kelvin

She had 200 million population but When German poured into Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Baltic States, these manpower were excluded and even these people joined the Red army, their reliability is doubtful. So Russia only had around 150 million people for war or around 100 million real Russian for her motherland.

1. Many men were called up and taken on strength before these areas were lost, or evacuated and subsequently called up, so it is not the case that this manpower was excluded.Rather, it was limited.
2. Of those who weren't and who remained in situ when same areas were liberated in 1943/44 were then called up. They were not lost to the Soviet war effort.
3. I can't say I have seen anything that would support the notion that Belorussian and Ukrainian soldiers were generally speaking unreliable?
4. It is nonsense to suggest that the Red Army's war potential was limited to "around 100 million real russians". The Germans mobilised roughly 20 million men for their war effort. The Soviet Union mobilised some 33 million, if I remember correctly.

On the other side of hill, the Third Reich possessed 100 million people, 80 million of whom were German. Their manpower level was not much different to Russian. Germany and its predesscer had a long traditional history of mobilitzing a large quantity of troop for war. So I knew German know how to mobilitze her manpower to very limit.

Germany DID mobilize manpower to the very limit. That's why they were fielding young boys and old men in 1945. The military forces they were fielding during the second world war were consistently considerably larger than the ones they had fielded during World War I, from a similarly sized population.

Regarding weapon, In battle of France, German had 2.7 million man in war and suffered slight casualites in manpower and weapon especially small arms. And then she gained a bloodless victory over French and her allies ( Not really bloodless, but German suffered only 60,000 casualties

No, they suffered roughly 150,000 casualties. Actually, the reason why the Western campaign was as cheap as that was that it was quickly decided. The casualty intensiveness was roughly the same during the first 6 weeks of the war in the East.

) Over 3.5 million arms for allied forces ( British, French , Belgian and Dutch) fell into German hand.We also calulated over million arms taken from Greek and Yugoslav forces. So German army had arms for equipping 7 million men.

This is a reckless calculation, to say the least. Even if you presuppose that the Germans were prepared to field a wide array of weapons of all kinds in their field forces, which they were not.

But why German cannot act like her Russian counterpart to raise another 150 divisions for campaign in Moscow. If German had enough manpower for war in winter of 1941, she could shatter Russian offensive in Moscow and Rostov. Some may argue that German logistics could not support this manpower but Russian can do this. Why ? German cannot raise 300 or over divisions for Russian campaign in 1941 and bring the successful conclusion for this campaign ?

Do you have a clear idea what "another 150 divisions" actually means? There were less than 150 German divisions in action on the entire Eastern Front and only around 200 in the entire Field Army, so you are in reality calling for a doubling of the Ostheer!

Why didn't they raise them? For starters, because they didn't have the manpower. Already the much more modest expansion that took place between the campaign in the West and Barbarossa (while no losses had to be replaced) was carried through with great difficulty for this reason. Manpower had to be shared with the armaments industry, and there was never enough of it to go around - already in 1939/40 the situation was regarded as one of crisis. The men fed into the Wehrmacht from late 1941 to the end of the war were a) the new year-groups which reached military age and b) men who could be drawn from industry because they were being replaced in the economy by literally millions of prisoners of war and foreign workers. These men were not available in the fall of 1941. Even if they had been, where would the officers to lead them have come from? Even if they could be found, how would the Ersatzheer have quickly produced a vast number of new functional formations with their existing training establishment? Even if they could have, from where would the equipment for them have come? From the industry that was simultaneously being drained of huge amounts of workers? And if we take the hypothetical trip into the parallell dimension in which another 150 German divisions is suddenly appearing in Central Europe, how do they get to Moscow? They did not even have the capacity to adequately supply the forces that were already there. The by comparison totally insignificant number of replacements that were flowing east were being unloaded at Smolensk, from which they were walking or being picked up by whatever transport assets their own units could scrape together for the purpose. So unless you know of a way to immediately increase the capacity of the railway network in the Western USSR by several hundred per cent...

In addition to which you are failing to take into consideration two general factors that impinge on this. One is that while the Wehrmacht had already been at war for two years and were mobilised to the hilt, the Red Army was still in essentially a peacetime posture. General mobilisation had not been carried out. Hence, in terms of immediate force mobilisation potential, the two were not in a remotely comparable situation, and it is self-evident that the Soviet force generation over these months neccessarily would dwarf the German. Secondly, the Germans were not fighting a one front war and, unlike their adversary, could not and did not direct their full military potential to the Eastern Front.

cheers

[mescal]

Over 3.5 million arms for allied forces ( British, French , Belgian and Dutch) fell into German hand.We also calulated over million arms taken from Greek and Yugoslav forces. So German army had arms for equipping 7 million men.

That would only end in logistics & maintenance nightmare.
Cf. the experience of the Wehrmacht in the Atlantic Wall for illustration of gunnery problems it raises.
In fact, the Wehrmacht used a lot of French captured trucks (mainly Renault) at the beginning of Barbarossa, but those were extremely quickly cannibalized due to the lack of spare parts, and only a very small percentage survived in 1942.

But why German cannot act like her Russian counterpart to raise another 150 divisions for campaign in Moscow. If German had enough manpower for war in winter of 1941, she could shatter Russian offensive in Moscow and Rostov. Some may argue that German logistics could not support this manpower but Russian can do this. Why ?

In June 41, the Russian were in a build-up process (the "creeping up to war" in Glantz's words), so that they already had a basic framework to create or recreate divisions and armies (and even with such a framework, it was very chaotic), and resources scheduled to be tapped.
Germany was one step further, without much of untapped manpower resources (or at least not much resources withoutt having to pay costs the Nazi did not want to pay).

Glantz' Stumbling Colossus and Colossus Reborn are good starting points to have a better understanding of Russia force generation.

[Kelvin]

Hi Qvist, I am wrong in number of divisions in 1941 , not 150 but 141 divisions only (97 infantry, 19 Panzer, 15 Motorized, 5 Gebirgs, 4 light infantry and one cavalry ) But Hitler himself would think the invasion of France and the Low Countries involved 136 divisions and the vast area of Russia only five divisions more than in French campaign. He was really overconfident and extremely underestimated the strength of Russian. But in July 1943, German did have 200 divisions in the Eastern Front ( 129 infantry, 17 Panzer, 11 Panzergrenadier, 7 Gebirgs, 12 Luftwaffe Field, 10 Sicherungs, 5 Field Training , 4 reserve and 5 Jager divisions)

[ranoncles]

I think Qvist is perhaps a bit too abrupt in dismissing the notion of a substantially larger Wehrmacht in 1941.

Yes, more troops would have necessitated more supplies but that never stopped any army, not even the German army at a later date.

Germany did not mobilize all its manpower sources, certainly not between 1939 and 1943. Perhaps not until the very end. The relative small size of the Wehrmacht in 1941 was a strategic decision. The Nazis did not want to fight a total war with the inherent disruption of ‘normal’ life that entails. They wanted quick victories, at minimal cost and disruption and did not believe the Russians or the British would prove very difficult to defeat with the army they did have.

That is why the Germans left huge numbers of males in the work force and did not employ females to substitute for the men, as done in practically every allied nation. They also did not opt for maximum war production. When the British declared war, they immediately prepared for a long war and prepared for maximum production. By 1940, they were outproducing the Nazis in every category. The Russians always produced more war material, even in 1941-1942 when most of their factories were either overrun or were moved to safer regions. The great leap in war material for the Germans only happened after Stalingrad and the realization that the war would not be won anytime soon.

Had the Nazis also planned for a long war and switched to a war economy in 1939, the Wehrmacht could easily have numbered 200-250 divisions (and full strength, fully equipped divisions at that) in 1941, with the necessary supplies (although fuel would remain an issue). They never achieved this after 1941 except on paper because they lost too many men by 1943 and were always trying to catch up with equipment losses in the field.

[Qvist]

Yes, more troops would have necessitated more supplies but that never stopped any army, not even the German army at a later date.

As if that was my argument.

Germany did not mobilize all its manpower sources, certainly not between 1939 and 1943. Perhaps not until the very end.

Oh, really? I can't wait to see the revolutionary analysis underlying that conclusion, that will overturn everything the primary documentation and the more serious analysts like Kroener has shown so far.

The relative small size of the Wehrmacht in 1941 was a strategic decision.

"Relatively small size of the Wehrmacht"? Relative to what?

The Nazis did not want to fight a total war with the inherent disruption of ‘normal’ life that entails. They wanted quick victories, at minimal cost and disruption and did not believe the Russians or the British would prove very difficult to defeat with the army they did have.

Oh, please. This - and the rest of the post - is Milward and the blitzkrieg economy bullshit that nobody has taken seriously for 25 years. I would seriously suggest updating yourself to the point where you can make an argument that is worth engaging.

The problem with it you see is that it is simply not correct. They did not try to wage war on the cheap, but on the contrary made every attempt to gear the economy maximally to war, from well before the war started. Women made up a greater percentage of the German workforce than was ever the case in the US economy, and also compares favorably with the British. And if you think that they could easily have whipped up another 50 divisions if only they had chosen to take the challenge seriously, you are simply ignorant of the real constraints facing the German manpower situation. Volumes 5/1 and 5/2 of MGFA's "Germany and the Second World War" will set you straight, as will Tooze, Harrison or even Overy. To say nothing of the relevant documentation.

Had the Nazis also planned for a long war and switched to a war economy in 1939, the Wehrmacht could easily have numbered 200-250 divisions (and full strength, fully equipped divisions at that) in 1941, with the necessary supplies (although fuel would remain an issue). They never achieved this after 1941 except on paper because they lost too many men by 1943 and were always trying to catch up with equipment losses in the field.

The Nazis, essentially, switched to a war economy in 1933, and six years of intense war preparation prior to the outbreak enabled them - barely - to field a Wehrmacht as large as it was, only at a cost of severe manpower problems in the armaments sector and numerous qualitative compromises in the forces fielded. The men they were putting into the field in the later years of the war were available (except insofar as they were the new year groups reaching military age) only as a result of the massive influx into the economy of foreign labor, forced and voluntary. If they had drawn out the same manpower in 1940/41, when this labor was not yet available, it would have caused a collapse in armaments production. EVERYTHING we have of documentary sources from the early years of the war speaks unequivocally about a permanent state of manpower crisis during this period. The Wehrmacht, far from being "relatively small" was very, very large - as already mentioned, well in excess of the forces Germany fielded during World War I. It was also in many important respects larger than what German industry was capable of supporting with equipment in an adequate way.

[Kelvin]

Hi, German did employ a lot of woman in war production to make up for manpower for war. I think German war economy was doomed to failure. German never fully motorized her army. In modern mechanized war , she never had a chance to compete with USA. Hitler world vision was too limited and they they were powerful. Russian army also not fully motorized but highly improved with the supply of 427000 motor vehicles by US at the end of war. 3 million US and British troop in France against most of horse drawn German forces. Hitler was very focus on motorized army when he came to power but he lack power or will to motorized army and entered the war and won in the initial period with luck. In 1941, 141 German divison engaged in Russia, only 34 motorized division. In June 1944, out of 294 German division , only 51 motorized divisions ( 32 panzer, 14 panzergrenadier and 5 fallschirmjager).

[Qvist]

It seems that we have to pass by every old and useless myth in the book in this thread.

On the one hand you think the Germans should have drawn 3 million men from the economy to raise another 150 divisions and on the other you want them to build hundreds of thousands of trucks to motorise the Wehrmacht and vastly expand their synthetic fuel production to the point where they can provide gas for those trucks, using the same insufficient coal supply that was already acting as an industrial bottleneck?

Motorisation of the German army is science fiction. There was simply no auto industry that could have achieved such an aim (unless you want to convert the one producing planes and tanks), and even if there had been there would not have been the fuel for it to run on. Full motorisation was, in other words, not an option and is, like most other things brought up in this thread, only an issue as long as you're prepared to approach it from a vantage point of ignorance. I would, with the best of meaning, recommend you to read more (and above all, better) books and spend less time asking questions on the internet.

cheers

[ranoncles]

Jeez, what a sad and bitter man you are. If dissenting opinions and questions annoy you so much, there is a simple solution.

You can just ignore the thread or better yet; stay offline. That way you can just talk to yourself without anyone disagreeing.

Because nobody is forcing you to post here, Qvist.

Regarding your assertions, just because you’ve read some books doesn’t make them (or you) necessarily right. Trot out 2 experts on any subject and you will have two different opinions.

Germany indeed spent considerable sums on rearmament in the 1930s; 108 billion dollars in 1994 value between 1935-1938. Considerably more than her likely opponents. Yet, she also produced luxury goods. And continued to do so even after war began. Unlike the other warring nations, Germany tried to maintain ‘normalcy’ and that was reflected by the luxury goods produced and the insufficient amount of war materials produced between 1939 and 1942, which were barely enough to keep abreast of losses. Or the fact that rationing was comparably very light and did not become restrictive until much later in the war. Which meant that that more German men were employed in agriculture and industry than strictly necessary during those early years.

By 1941, Great Britain was spending more on war materials than Germany, despite less resources. Only in 1943 did Germany start outspending Great Britain again. Very much too little, too late.

Your assertion that Germany geared its economy maximally to war by 1939 is so laughable, it puts anything you say in doubt. How then, do you explain that Britain and France (with a smaller economy) were suddenly outproducing Germany when war began? Or that France could afford both the Maginot Line and more (and better) tanks than Germany? Or that England could produce more aircraft during the Battle of Britain than Germany? Germany built its army without resorting to a proper war economy. That is what led to their comparable ‘lack’ of equipment and the need to plunder enemy arsenals. Once it did shift to a proper war economy, Germany was capable of producing significantly more tanks, aircraft and vehicles than before.

Naturally, there are limits on a war economy. Limits of manufacturing capacity, manpower and funds. Yet even the flimsiest of research will show that Germany was capable of producing considerably more than it did but failed to do so. The reasons most people agree on are because it underestimated its opposition and planned short campaigns, probably because the Nazis were afraid their popularity might decline.

[Qvist]

Yours is not a "dissenting opinion", it is a collection of outdated theories and assumptions. I can only repeat my advice to read something that is sufficiently up to date to be worth commenting on. You are essentially just echoing old explanations that have been firmly put to rest a long time ago. As far as I am aware, no serious researcher who has published on this subject for the past 30 years or so have employed the depiction of reality you are espousing. In other words, your "opinion" is based on a lack of familiarity with the current state of research.

Jeez, what a sad and bitter man you are. If dissenting opinions and questions annoy you so much, there is a simple solution.

You can just ignore the thread or better yet; stay offline. That way you can just talk to yourself without anyone disagreeing.

Because nobody is forcing you to post here, Qvist.

An excellent suggestion that I will gladly follow - I have much better uses for my time than trying to persuade you to catch up with decades of scholarship. Good luck, and have fun sorting out the German manpower situation in a knowledge-free vacuum.

[Denim Demon]

Hei Quist
I hope you arnt serious about leaving the forum, I for one have allways enjoyed reading your posts as I find them very interesting and packed with knowlege. Too bad for those who cant see that and dont have the ability to accept that they possibly are in the wrong.

However I do believe it is a fact that the german armaments production rose dramatically after the total war speach in 1943 and Speer was given the authority reorganize the german war econemy. But if it was impossible to have done this earlier Im not so sure.
I would be very interested to hear your thoughts on this Quist.

Regards
DD

[Attrition]

Giving due weight to the transatlantic arms race ...in 1941...helps...explain....[that] the Ostheer of 1941 was considerably more powerful than that which invaded France....The idea that armaments production in Germany lagged in 1940-41...is...a statistical illusion....Germany's industrial resources could never be fully concentrated on the Soviet Union, because at the same time enormous preparations needed to be set in train for the coming air war with Britain and America....the assumption...of swift...victory over the Red Army....was not to cushion the civilian population. Its purpose was to fight two wars at once.

Tooze, 'The Wages of Destruction' pp. 666-667.

[Qvist]

Hi DD, thanks, but I did not mean to express an intention of leaving the forum. I just didn't see any point in carrying on with that particular exchange. To answer your question, one of the most important findings Tooze achieved was to show that the statistics Speer used to underpin the image of the armaments miracle are more than a little questionable. Also, it overlooks (identified already by Overy) that a very large part of the German economy up to 1943 was tied down in huge infrastructure and plant construction programs. When these were finished and the new plant capacity put to work, production figures naturally rose. With tanks, the increased figures are more than anything else the result quite simply of tanks being much more highly prioritised, creating a production surge that Speer inherited. Also, since tanks constituted a very small part of German armaments output during the first 3 years of the war, it was comparatively easy to achieve very dramatic increases just by shifting resources. This was not just a product of increased productivity in the tank sector, as indicated by the fact that the output increase was accompanied by an increase in the percentage tanks made up of the total armaments output.

As for aircraft, Tooze shows that the supposed catastrophic drop in productivity in the aircraft sector in 1942 is essentially a statistical illusion, and also that the surge in aircraft output from late 42 can clearly be attributed to heavy investment in production facilities and larger allocations of manpower and raw materials to the aircraft sector. Speer's production miracle and the attendant depiction of the preceding years is more than anything else a PR stunt that cemented Speer's position in the nazi hierarchy, and also his postwar reputation. But it's not really so much a question of disproving Speer - it is quite simply completely possible to satisfactorily explain the development of the German war economy without recourse to any fundamental qualitative leap in organisation and productivity, and also to show that it is simply wrong to assume that the economy underperformed prior to 1943, or that Germany attempted to wage war without mobilising their resources fully. See also Attrition's excellent summation.

cheers

[Der Alte Fritz]

Manpower Distribution in the Wehrmacht
Good points about Tooze's book which I have just re-read for the third time as each time it is read I discover something new.
However it is hard to follow the size of the Wehrmacht from his narrative because of his (understandable) concentration on the economic field. I have some figures from Connor "Analysis of the Deep Attack Operations - Operation Bagration" CSI for June 1944:
Germany
Heer: 4,550,000 (of which 3,130,000 were in the Ostheer 1,420,000 on other fronts)
Kreigmarine: 80,000
Luftwaffe: 1,800,000
Replacement Army: 2,000,000
total: 8,430,000

Russia:
Army: 6,077,000
Air Forces (Army and Strategic) 447,000
Navy: 357,000
Airborne forces: 58,000
total: 6,939,000


First point to make is that this information is 1987, so are there better figures that are more recent?
Are there figures for 1941-1943 to chart the change over time?
What issues arise from this information?

For instance, looking at these figures, there are clearly issues in the way the force was deployed. The size of the Luftwaffe seems disproportionate as it only fielded about 6,000 combat aircraft at the time and although a lot of men were used in the air defence of the Reich, this accounts for the formation of Luftwaffe ground forces.

[Attrition]

Good points about Tooze's book which I have just re-read for the third time as each time it is read I discover something new.

It's awkward that his bibliography isn't in the book but the references I've followed from the one on the interweb have been equally enlightening. Mierzejewski next.