Joachim Peiper's tactics

[Harro]

Who, me?

[j keenan]

no not you Harro

[Dutto1]

Hi Rob-wssob2,


The III gep SS-panzgren rgt2 upgraded to a SPW unit in the fall of 1942; it seems that the the blow torch nickname was first coined in early 1943 during the battles for Kharkov ill quote Peiper himself from the book Jochen Peiper by Patrick Agte
"This SPW Batallion had made a name for itself in the night fighting in Russia and in the divisional and corps area the Battalion was know as the Blow torch Battalion or Blow torch sqaudron.The SPW Battalion used to attack Russian villages like a cavalry unit from all sides at full speed firing everything we had.The thatch roofed houses always caught fire and
added to the panic."
With regards to his men idolising him their are many post war accounts one of his former officers SS Obersturmfuhrer Erhard Guhrs wrote the foreword in Agte s book on Peiper and was full of praise but after all i could nt see him laying into him.After the war Peipers blind radio operator Fritz Kosmehl and Otto Dinse amonst others would visit Peiper regulary in France,as for wartime praise ill look into that.With the word complex i meant their was different sides to Peiper,the soldier the man,the warcrimes the word criminal comes into as he was Himmlers Adjutant and privy to various plans regarding the holocaust and the camps in fact i beleive he visited one with Himmler. I think one of the things he was guilty of was "My country right or wrong" Regards Dutto1

[Dutto1]

Hi Jamie

Regarding the Leitmeritz file im starting the translating tomorrow night im going to open a thread for it its very interesting
one of the names Mentioned is Gruppenfuhrer dr Ing Kammler keep an eye out for the post if you are interested.

Regards dutto1

[phillip burke]

in reply to earlier question about point of thread, it seems we have two points of view, on the one side we have the people who believe that no atrocities were comitted by the waffen ss and that they were that centurys ultimate soldiers and the other view which accepts that atrocites were comitted and have a more critical view of there abilities and tactics. i personely believe that one view comes from info gatherd during the cold war by vets and historians of that time and the more critical view has only emerged during the last ten years with a more unbiased eye.also could someone tell me what the latin bit of the reply to my last post means as ima bit thick

[Dutto1]

Hi Rob-wsso2,

I missed a bit out in my last post.The Blowtorch nickname was used because Peipers men used them to set light to Russian houses with thatched roofs,they were supposed to be used for warming up engines on the SPW.

[Michate]

in reply to earlier question about point of thread, it seems we have two points of view, on the one side we have the people who believe that no atrocities were comitted by the waffen ss and that they were that centurys ultimate soldiers and the other view which accepts that atrocites were comitted and have a more critical view of there abilities and tactics. i personely believe that one view comes from info gatherd during the cold war by vets and historians of that time and the more critical view has only emerged during the last ten years with a more unbiased eye.

No the fronts seem to be a brave soldier, but with implications in the general SS complex, against an all incompetent all criminal butchering enemies or his own men, just whoever was available.

also could someone tell me what the latin bit of the reply to my last post means as ima bit thick

War is sweet to those who have not experienced it.

[Harro]

Seems there's also a "front" for a very competent and brave SPW battalion commander who failed miserably when he was assigned as as tank regiment commander, who butchered his tankers and earned his later awards as pet soldier of his godfather Himmler. The same friendship with Himmler and his position as adjutant of the Reichsführer SS deeply implicated him in the crimes of the Reich.

[j keenan]

yea i see there's two side's to this,but the argument's been used can apply
to both the allies and axies as both commited atrocities and crimminal acts.
Harro as hit the nail on the head

Seems there's also a "front" for a very competent and brave SPW battalion commander who failed miserably when he was assigned as as tank regiment commander, who butchered his tankers and earned his later awards as pet soldier of his godfather Himmler. The same friendship with Himmler and his position as adjutant of the Reichsführer SS deeply implicated him in the crimes of the Reich.

@Dutto1 thanks
Best Jamie

[Dutto1]

Hi Harro,

I respect your opinions on Peiper,their are a lot of Peiper "Fanboys" who wont look at Peipers career with a view to a picture of the whole story ,i think they have read to many Leo Kessler Charles Whiting books.I have read a couple of reviews of Jens Westemeiers book which have been negative about it.I almost bought his book this week but got Bloody streets instead,but i will by it now to get a picture of Jens s research into the Himmler factor and his command of the tank regiment.I must admit that it was a strange move on the part of Teddy Wisch to give him the command.I also look forward to Danny S Parkers book when is it coming out.I was wondering have you ever attempted to contact Patrick Agte in the course of your research into SS AA 1.There was a man in SS AA 1 called Untersturmfuhrer Steiwe he is photogaphed in a sequene of photos in J P Pallud s The Battle Of The Bulge Then And Now what happend to him did he survive the war.

Regards Dutto1

[Harro]

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 8&t=131990

Siegfried Stiewe wurde am 13 Januar 1924 in Damerkow bei Jannekow geboren. Am 1 Mai 1942 meldete er sich zur Waffen-SS und kam zur neu aufgestellten 3. (le.SPW.-) Kompanie der Aufklärungsabteilung der Leibstandarte. Am 1 Januar 1943 erfolgt seine Beförderung zum Sturmmann. Mit der 3. (le.SPW.-) Kompanie machte er die Schlacht um Charkow mit. Als Abiturient war er für die Offizierslaufbahn geeignet und wurde Oktober 1943 für den 13. Kriegs-Junker-Lehrgang an der Junkerschule Braunschweig vorgeschlagen, der am 24. Januar 1944 begann. Er schloss den Lehrgang am 24. Juni 1944 ab und kehrte als Standartenoberjunker zur Aufklärungsabteilung der Leibstandarte zurück. Beförderung zum Untersturmführer folgte am 1. Oktober 1944 und er wurde Adjutant des Kommandeurs Sturmbannführer Gustav Knittel. In dieser Funktion diente er während der Kämpfe in den Ardennen und Ungarn.

27. März 1945 – Bis zum 27. März hat sich die Division über den Marcal Kanal zwischen Marcalto und Janoshaza in den Raum von Celldomolk Kenyeri zurückgezogen, wird jedoch bald durch sowjetische Angriffe noch weiter zurück auf den Fluss Raab zurückgeworfen. Die kleine von Untersturmführer Stiewe geführte Spähgruppe versucht noch immer zur Abteilung zurückzukehren. In der Nacht trifft Siegfried Stiewe sein Schicksal. Walter H berichtet:

"Nachdem wir eine ganze Strecke gelaufen waren kamen wir auf eine Straße zu. Von rechts kamen auf der anderen Straßenseite 2 Russen. Wir gingen in Deckung und ließen sie ungestört laufen. Wir sind dann im Sprung auch marsch, marsch über die Straße. Durch die dadurch entstehen Geräusche wurden die beiden Russen aufmerksam und schossen auf uns. Ausgerechnet der vorher in seinem Deckungsloch eingeschlafene Sturmmann Fischer erhielt dabei einen Knie-Steckschuß. Er mußte nun natürlich von uns mitgeschleppt werden. Stiewe und ich nahmen ihn zwischen uns. Bei seiner Größe von ca. 1,80 m und meiner Kürze von nur 1,64 m hatte er ihn am Hals hängen und ich den Druck zu tragen. Das hielt ich nicht lange durch und wurde dann von Unterscharführer Hermann Warnke abgelöst. Sie waren etwa gleich groß, sodaß der Verwundete mit seinem gesunden Fuß auftreten konnte und mithumpelte. Wir liefen auf einen Wald zu und glaubten uns damit in einiger Sicherheit. Kurz vor dem Wald wurden wir mit Eu Stotterkoj angerufen. Stiewe antwortete: Verwundete. Auf der anderen Seite war die Reaktion: Nemetzkis, Nemetzkis. Dann begann ein Feuerzauber wie ich ihn nie vorher und nie wieder später erlebt habe. Wie alle Kameraden lag ich natürlich sofort flach. Auf dem Kasernenhof hatten wir unter viel Drill beigebracht bekommen wie man auf dem Koppelschloß kehrt macht. Ich bin dann wegerobbt. Beim gelegentlichen hochsehen sah ich die Kameraden laufen. Ich bin dann auf aufgesprungen und folgte ihnen. Als ich hier ein Gewehr, da ein MG oder einen Mantel liegen sah, wußte ich warum die Kameraden schneller waren als ich. Im Laufen warf ich meine Meldetasche weg, zog den Mantel aus und war nun auch schneller. In einer kleinen Bodensenke lagen die Kameraden. Wir waren alle völlig ausgepumpt. Glücklicherweise kamen die Russen nicht hinter und her. Stiewe und Warnke waren nicht da, aber der Verwundete. Ich sagte ihm, dass die ihn doch getragen hätten. Sie seien nach den ersten Schüssen zusammengebrochen, er habe sich umgedreht und sei gelaufen bis ihn einer mitgezogen habe. Das war Rottenführer Prosdewitz. Der hatte von den beiden aber auch nichts gesehen. Nun war Unterscharführer Erwin Viergutz gefordert. […] Er meinte ich solle die Führung übernehmen.“

"Ende November 1945 bin ich aus amerikanischer Gefangenschaft getürmt. Etwa 1954/55 besuchte mich der Vater von Stiewe [Oberstleutnant Josef Stiewe]. Ich hatte in den Vermißtenlisten Stiewes Namen und auch Warnkes gelesen und die entsprechenden Vermissten-Erklärungen abgegeben. Dadurch hatte der Vater meine Adresse. Ich habe ihm schonend beigebracht, daß er wohl nicht mehr mit der Heimkehr seines Sohnes rechnen könne.“

[WEISWEILER]

Let's try to look at the facts. Analising Peiper's tactics is indeed also analising the use of terror as a part of tactics, but it wouldn't be right to claim that only terror explains his victories. For the Battle of the Bulge I believe Peiper was the only one who, despite delays, really succeeded in gaining terrain. His spearpoint exceeded the others by far, by using an unscrupulous and very aggresive manner which could be summerized as 'destroy and/or drive over'. The warcrimes committed againts American POW's in Malmédy, however, couldn't be seen as a part of tactics or a reason why he succeeded (up to that time) in his operation. The brutal killing of dozens of soldiers standing in a row more looked like a deed of hate, according to some originating in the bombing of Dresden where many German soldiers lost relatives. If you analise the tactics used in the Ardennes, it looks like Pieper was able to 'energise' not only his own men, but also other units, and before all, he was a leader by exemple. He dared to take risks nobody else would. So he was praised by his peers because of his approach and bravery, and after the war 'burned down' because of his recklesness and brutalities.

[Harro]

For the Battle of the Bulge I believe Peiper was the only one who, despite delays, really succeeded in gaining terrain. His spearpoint exceeded the others by far

Did you ever look at the achievements of the 2. Panzer-Division (Heer) during the battle of the Bulge? Also, what use was the distance covered by Peiper? His heavy armored spearhead smashed trough some surprised and inexperienced American infantry units, made the fundamental mistake of pushing on without securing his supply route, lost Stavelot and was forced to wait for the division to retake that town, then got crushed by experienced American troops and was forced to retreat leaving all his equipment behind. Does it really matter how much terrain Peipers Kampfgruppe gained?

[WEISWEILER]

For the Battle of the Bulge I believe Peiper was the only one who, despite delays, really succeeded in gaining terrain. His spearpoint exceeded the others by far

Did you ever look at the achievements of the 2. Panzer-Division (Heer) during the battle of the Bulge? Also, what use was the distance covered by Peiper? His heavy armored spearhead smashed trough some surprised and inexperienced American infantry units, made the fundamental mistake of pushing on without securing his supply route, lost Stavelot and was forced to wait for the division to retake that town, then got crushed by experienced American troops and was forced to retreat leaving all his equipment behind. Does it really matter how much terrain Peipers Kampfgruppe gained?

Crushed by American troops? You forget about the sudden impact of Allied airforce. As we all know the operation was called Herbstnebel because of the fact that the Germans wanted to break into the Ardennes as far as possible covered by foggy conditions. These conditions turned eventually (all German armies suffered delays on schedule). When weather got clear enough, Typhoons showed up and (of course together with ground pressure) just finished off the German raid.

/Kurt

[Harro]

Strange way to minimalize the roles of the 3rd US Armored, 30th US Inf and 82nd Airborne