Sid Guttridge wrote:Hi Cult Icon,
Looks as though the author has bought the BS about the W-SS and Peiper personally, hook line and sinker!
This can't possibly be for a Master's Thesis. It has no footnoting, no primary research and a short, non-academic, bibliography that even includes a title by Rupert Butler, God Help Us!
The author claims the W-SS officer corps had the following principles not shared by the Army:
1. Enforce loyalty and obedience and be self obedient.
2. Earn respect from subordinates, based on equality between all ranks.
3. Lead with a high ‘internal’ code of honor.
4. Be willing to sacrifice one’s own life.
Does anyone believe that the German Army was led by men who did not enforce loyalty and obedience and were not obedient themselves, did not work to earn respect from subordinates, did not lead with a high ‘internal’ code of honour, and who were unwilling to sacrifice their own lives if necessary?
Was there perhaps some limitation in the W-SS officer corps that meant what was taken for granted in the German Army officer corps had to be spelled out explicitly for their W-SS equivalents?
The author also asserts that W-SS officers had a higher casualty rate than their Army equivalents. Leaving aside for the moment whether a higher casualty rate is desirable in itself or representative of quality, is it true? It certainly doesn't seem to be true of the Waffen-SS as a whole compared with equivalent Army combat units, but is it true specifically of their officers when compared with their direct Army equivalents?
We surely have enough authors of W-SS officer lists present on this forum to answer that question?
Cheers,
Sid.
Sid,
It is a masters thesis a student paper presented in 2004 - you can find it on CARL
http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/sing ... /181/rec/2
Bouwmeester was a Dutch exchange student.
I don't think it is very good paper. There is quite a bit wrong with the history. Given that the author was holding up Peiper as an excellent commander, he seems to have ignored some critical points about Peipers tactical decisions.
#1 There is some evidence that the losses at Lossheimgraben were probably German anti tank mines rather American and Peiper also seems to have bulldozed Heer artillery transport off the road in his impatience.
#2 The author has ignored the massacre at Liegneville. The crew of the broken down Sherman and the recovery vehicle with them were executed after digging their own graves - possible in sight of where Peiper was entertaining his divisional commander in one of the better restaurants in the ardennes.
#3 There is an unexplained halt between the action at Liegneville (late afternoon 17th) and the attack on Stavalot - first light 18th Dec less than 10 km away. KG Peiper seems to have been stationary for much of the night 17-18th Dec, held up by a section of American engineers. They could see the headlights of American vehicles in the valley. This was the key moment in the battle. Had Peiper pressed on overnight it is possible he would have reached much further than he did - possible as far as the Meuse. At the critical moment Peiper seems to have been having supper with his boss. Not quite the single minded pursuit of the aim.
Peiper does not bear comparison with Rommel as a tactical commander. He was one of a number of competent SS tactical commanders.
Commanding a regiment at 29 was young, but not particularly so. He was born the same year as Brigadier Michael Carver, who had commanded the British 4th Armoured Brigade since June 1944. At the same age Bernard Freyburg had already commanded brigades in battle for over a year.
