German Tank Losses In Normandy

[Andy H]

For what it's worth

Carlo D'Este, gives 1300 Tanks & 500 Assault guns. The figures are 'rounded' and gives no definition of what a loss actually is.

Max Hastings, gives 1500 Tanks lost and the following extract from AG 'B' on it's present armoured strength as at August 22/23 1944:
2Pz:0,
21Pz:10
116Pz:12
1st SS:0
2nd SS:15
9th SS:20-25
10th SS:0
12th SS:10

R.Weigley states that within the Falaise Pocket alone some 220 Tanks & 160 Assault guns were counted.

From the Shire

[Darrin]

For what it's worth

Carlo D'Este, gives 1300 Tanks & 500 Assault guns. The figures are 'rounded' and gives no definition of what a loss actually is.

Max Hastings, gives 1500 Tanks lost and the following extract from AG 'B' on it's present armoured strength as at August 22/23 1944:
2Pz:0,
21Pz:10
116Pz:12
1st SS:0
2nd SS:15
9th SS:20-25
10th SS:0
12th SS:10

R.Weigley states that within the Falaise Pocket alone some 220 Tanks & 160 Assault guns were counted.

From the Shire

Thanks for the info.

The number of tanks per div on 22 aug above is pretty close to what Zetterling has in his book too. But it states operational tanks not including short term repair which just has a ? and was certainly unknown. Nor does it include long term repair or tanks sent back to to the factory. Your op tank numbers don't include three PD/PG that were involved during Normandy. The panzer Lehr div reports 20 tanks on 22 aug I assume operational but it doesn't say. The 17th PG div losses seem to have been high as well but no op AG numbers are given. The other div is the 9th PD which no operational numbers of tanks are given.

The tot number of operational tanks and AGs amough these 11 div is proably over 100 by the 22 aug. But that does not count the many indep bats or organic units of the inf divs some of whom were absorbed by the ger panzer units during and just after normandy. Up to the 22 aug zetterling estimates 2250 tanks and AGs were committed in units or as replacments in his normandy area. But this does not include captured french tanks, panzer IIIs, Short barelled IVs nor maraders it seems. Nor does it include command and recovery tanks normaly.

2250-1500 would equal approximatly 750 tanks etc that survved Normandy up to 22 Aug. These lossses occured in the normandy region only. Other loses outside of normandy are not included nor are further loses during the last week of aug. If the gers have 750 tanks etc but only 100+ operational the losses outside of the normandy up to 22/23 aug could also have caused the lower operational numbers. As well as other possible explanations above such as back to factory for repairs. The number of losses of 1500 tanks etc des in normandy up to 22 aug seems very reasonable.

It is obvoius the ger panzer forces were shattered (esp tanks) during Normandy.

Darrin

[Qvist]

some points:

Cheshire Yeomanry:

Max Hastings, gives 1500 Tanks lost and the following extract from AG 'B' on it's present armoured strength as at August 22/23 1944:
2Pz:0,
21Pz:10
116Pz:12
1st SS:0
2nd SS:15
9th SS:20-25
10th SS:0
12th SS:10

Firstly, as I recall, Zetterling heavily criticises Hastings for improper understanding of the documents he employ here, and the numbers do not match Zetterlings. In any case, the number of operational tanks provides scant guidance to losses, as the number of tanks in short term repair under such circumstances could well significantly exceed this.

"Notice his total of des ger tanks only includeds tanks des up to 22 aug in his 'normandy' area. It seems he already includes unreported ger tanks destroyed even in june and july and not just aug. "

No, they also include tanks found west of the Seine, and the figure refers to the whole campaign. Losses (write-offs) up to 31 July were 481. 46 were found at Mortain, 320 in the Falaise area and a further 150 west of the Seine. He adds to this "possibly another 500 lost in Normandy in August", which gives the round figure of about 1500, which he seems to regard as basically an educated guess. Refer to page 82-83.

" Normandy
6 jun-7 aug 67 panthers des of know causes (13 unkown) 9 (abn+des by crew) Only 15% of all known tanks! "

Well, this certainly isn't from Zetterling, who refers to 131 Panthers lost until 27 July, referenced to HGr B Ia Anlagen, BA-MA RH 19 IX/46.

"You can see where his 50% number comes from. "

I would rather think that it (and it is a very rough approximation rather than a number) come from the large number of tanks/StuGs found at Falaise/west of the Seine. The Falaise number specifically refers to "tanks and Assault guns", not just Panthers.

"The situation in falise may not be representative of the other 65% of tanks lost in france in aug. "

No, of course they aren't, but I hardly think this is an assumption of the book. But the number of abandoned vehicles at Falaise and Wof the Seine alone constitutes about 3-400. That a further 300 or so should have been lost to such causes at Mortain, during the Breakout phase and during the course of the first two months of allied advances seems rather reasonable. If Falaise had been representative, then 80% of German tank losses would have been due to abandonment, not 50%.


cheers

[Timo]

Its very annoying to see that everything I wrote as a reply to Darrins calculations is ignored by both Darrin and the others, just because I made a simple mistake with the edit and quote buttons. Mistakes which I explained, which were not intended to happen, yet caused an immature, childish reaction from Darrin.

[Darrin]

some points:

Cheshire Yeomanry:

Max Hastings, gives 1500 Tanks lost and the following extract from AG 'B' on it's present armoured strength as at August 22/23 1944:
2Pz:0,
21Pz:10
116Pz:12
1st SS:0
2nd SS:15
9th SS:20-25
10th SS:0
12th SS:10

Firstly, as I recall, Zetterling heavily criticises Hastings for improper understanding of the documents he employ here, and the numbers do not match Zetterlings. In any case, the number of operational tanks provides scant guidance to losses, as the number of tanks in short term repair under such circumstances could well significantly exceed this.

" Normandy
6 jun-7 aug 67 panthers des of know causes (13 unkown) 9 (abn+des by crew) Only 15% of all known tanks! "

Well, this certainly isn't from Zetterling, who refers to 131 Panthers lost until 27 July, referenced to HGr B Ia Anlagen, BA-MA RH 19 IX/46.

"You can see where his 50% number comes from. "

I would rather think that it (and it is a very rough approximation rather than a number) come from the large number of tanks/StuGs found at Falaise/west of the Seine. The Falaise number specifically refers to "tanks and Assault guns", not just Panthers.

"The situation in falise may not be representative of the other 65% of tanks lost in france in aug. "

No, of course they aren't, but I hardly think this is an assumption of the book. But the number of abandoned vehicles at Falaise and Wof the Seine alone constitutes about 3-400. That a further 300 or so should have been lost to such causes at Mortain, during the Breakout phase and during the course of the first two months of allied advances seems rather reasonable. If Falaise had been representative, then 80% of German tank losses would have been due to abandonment, not 50%.


cheers

While he may critise max hastings I believe it was more about per numbers and cas than overall tank cas since they match closly with his own.

15% of panther tanks des by crew or abn according to table 5.2 p 41. From 6 june to 7 aug accoring to the number of panthers examined by allied reserch crews. Not the number of panthers reported des by ger during this time which is what you have quoted above.

Whatever units lost before encriclemet at least had a chance to get fuel parts and get maintence performed. So The high abn/des by crew % of 80% at falise is no where near rep of most tanks des up to aug 22 in his normandy area. Esp considering all those other problems
using panther data I mentioned above. Up to 7 AUGUST only 15% of panthers were lost to abn/des by crew! That seems more represenative of what happened to the ger army in normandy. When getting even limited fuel, parts and maintence according to zetterling himself.

To me 33% seems liike a much more resonable estimate. It also does not seem unusal to me for the ger or anyone else to lose 33% of thier tanks to these reasons during a battle where they lose so much ground. Which was definatly the case in August of 1944.

[Darrin]

I should say that the western allied numbers include light tanks the struarts in numbers and losses. But the ger's don't include anything less than a Stug III and PzIV Long in thier totals and losses (at least not in normandy 44). The ger apeear to preform better than they really did because of this. They acutally used more tanks which ended up increasing the the number des as well.

I'm not really sure I buy into his poor logisctics defated ger argument. At least in normandy look at the % of panther lost to abn/des by crew it is 15% for the first two months after DDay up to 7 aug 44. Doesn't sound like many logistical problems were present Plus he mentions the avg daily us forces comsuming 4 times as much arty by weight than ger in july. He doesn't include the CW but that would push it up to at least 6 times which sounds like a whole lot. But the allied forces in france at the end of july out number the ger by almost 4-1 in men, prob less in guns. It seems that allies only consumed more ammo becasue they had a larger army with more guns. The allies were on the off as well which requires more ammo to conduct including larger heavier sheels to break ger fortifications.

I have a couple of other points I may get around to posting after I get the info togeather. Log was important but I don't think logistics was as important as some would believe.

[Andy H]

As I originally stated "For what it's worth", I posted the only info I had and make no comment on there validity or accuracy. Normandy isn't a particular interest of mine as such.

From the Shire

[admfisher]

I should say that the western allied numbers include light tanks the struarts in numbers and losses. But the ger's don't include anything less than a Stug III and PzIV Long in thier totals and losses (at least not in normandy 44). The ger apeear to preform better than they really did because of this. They acutally used more tanks which ended up increasing the the number des as well.

Since when did the Germans start getting so picky about which piece of armor was destroyed.
If your source is only talking of a 1000 destroyed PzIV (lang) and StuG or higher rated tanks then the germans were much better equipped than even you say.
When the germans were giving totals for losses they broke them down by tank type, then the other armor classes.

By the way where the heck are you going with this post? German tank losses not reported right.
Hmmm,, seems to me that the number of lost documents at the end of the war would probably have the documents you are looking for.

For example the history of the GrossDuetchland Division was totally destroyed.

If you have four or five well know posters here telling you something and they are giving sources and asking of yours then answer in full. If you happen to be working from one book you are, "Just Another Victim".

To get a clear picture of Normandy you should try some Jentz's, Doyles, Max Hannes, and others. Then come back.
We could have a fine set of posts then.

[Darrin]

Well since Zetterlings normandy book is 462 pages long and has thousands of notes/sources I belive him. It has lot of those litlle BA-MA letters that others consider so important as well as other other archive info. His book is almost entirly about the ger army in normandy. If you find the definitive book use it. Those who critize me for ulitizing a book written by the EXPERT on the ger army in normandy have obviously never read it. But even Zetterling would welcome some argument over his points as well since so littlle concrete is know for sure about the battle.

If somebody here has WRITTEN a book about the ger army in Normandy that they think is better than Zetterlings tell me and I will rush out and buy it. Otherwise I will use what I consider to be the best source in front of me. And far better than a few amateurs who lurk around here will ever produce. If they do indeed produce anything except toilet paper.

PS. The only person who is not currently getting any answers is Timo. I aswered his first post 2 times then say it change twice more and just got frustrated with him on that day. Plus not a great sign of debate to come when he keeps pointing out spelling mistakes. I'm certainly not the one writting any books around here. In reality his questions can all be aswered if he read my posts and answers to him and others or at worst the book. He is now getting frustrated.

[Timo]

Darrin, you will probabely be the first to buy our books as soon as they're published.

The topic: Leibstandarte in the Ardennes
The contents: hundreds of new pics, veterans accounts, info from new documents, correct order of battles, day-to-day, hour-to-hour descriptions of the preparations, all the fighting anf the aftermath.
The size: 3 volumes, 500 pages each.

The little BA-Ma letters: Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, the German National Military Archives. We talk again after you've spend some time searching their files, looking at all available sources, talked to veterans and visited the battlefields.

I am not saying that Zetterling is wrong, because he did a great job and his book is well researched. But you did not manage yet to consult any primairy source. Yet you ignore or ridicule people with excellent knowledge on the subject and bore us with non-scientific calculations.

Again: it is impossible to calulate losses by simply saying that 50 lost tanks in two weeks means 150 in six, or that 100 tanks lost by 1 division means 900 lost by nine divisions. I know I've put it too simple this way, but basically it is what you're saying.

Timo

[Timo]

If somebody here has WRITTEN a book about the ger army in Normandy that they think is better than Zetterlings tell me and I will rush out and buy it. Otherwise I will use what I consider to be the best source in front of me. And far better than a few amateurs who lurk around here will ever produce. If they do indeed produce anything except toilet paper.

...I see. So we can gather all original documents, visit archives and talk to veterans. If we tell you our findings here instead of writing a book, you just say "whatever".

PS. The only person who is not currently getting any answers is Timo. I aswered his first post 2 times then say it change twice more and just got frustrated with him on that day. Plus not a great sign of debate to come when he keeps pointing out spelling mistakes. I'm certainly not the one writting any books around here. In reality his questions can all be aswered if he read my posts and answers to him and others or at worst the book. He is now getting frustrated.

How much nonsense can you write?

I explained in clear English what went wrong with those posts and I told you that it was a mistake that I did not make on purpose.

You actually say that all I did was pointing out spelling mistakes? Tell me, where "in reality" did you point out why your calculation methods are an acceptable way to calculate? Where? Thats right, you didn't explain that. Why is that? Probabely because you know no serious researcher would use such calulations and get away with it.

You're the stereo type of the guy most researchers dislike. The guy who reads a book and thinks now he knows everything.

Timo

[admfisher]

Darren
My point was simple.
Do not base all of your 'own', interpetation of the past on one source.
Take a look a religon.
Follow the bible and a Muslim will follow his, why its because they never read each others scripts.

Look at gun performance, there is no one set of numbers for the 88mm L/71. It comes down to who you trust unless you can get the actual documents from the goverment or maker.

Grant

[Darrin]

I can certainly comment on many things that Zetterling did well in his Nortmandy book. And also comment on some thing that I believe he is a bit wrong on. Anybody who writes a book can make mistakes and should expect comment and critism from the public. I'm sure Zetterling would proably agree with every one of my minor quibbles here.

-ger may have lost more tanks than reported even in june/july. I'm not saying it was more than the number he listed per see but that some of his number might not be just in aug as he says.

-Logistics to/at the front esp in june and july were probably not as bad as he might think.

-the number of ger tanks etc abn or des by crew was proably not as high as he suggest. And the reason may have more to do with the general retreat and pockets in aug then any major logistics failings.

-in comparing tank numbers and des ger omit 'obsolete' ones in 44 from comparison but the US includes light stuarts in thiers. Probably gives an overly efficent view of the ger tank forces.

I LOVE his books because they present tons of data for the reader to look at. Instead of just saying something he actually uses numbers to try and prove it. A simple but seldom used principle amoug most historians.

[Qvist]

Just clearing up what Zetterling's book actually says:

"I'm not really sure I buy into his poor logisctics defated ger argument"

Who are you arguing against here? As far as I can understand, Zetterling does not make that argument. Sure, he points out the deficiencies of the German logistical system, which is well known and naturally of importance, but that this was the main cause for the German defeat is not a thesis of that book.

"Plus he mentions the avg daily us forces comsuming 4 times as much arty by weight than ger in july. He doesn't include the CW but that would push it up to at least 6 times which sounds like a whole lot. But the allied forces in france at the end of july out number the ger by almost 4-1 in men, prob less in guns. It seems that allies only consumed more ammo becasue they had a larger army with more guns. "

Incorrect, and this is made clear in the text, where the number of guns on each side is listed. The number of US guns was not significantly higher than German guns, and yet they consumed 4 times as much ammunition. So your conclusion appears unfounded AFAICS.

So, I have to say that some of your points seem to be based on an imprecise understanding of what the book in question actually says. Also, I have to agree with Timo that countering research with what basically amounts to speculation doesn't really cut it - stuff like this:

"-ger may have lost more tanks than reported even in june/july. I'm not saying it was more than the number he listed per see but that some of his number might not be just in aug as he says. "

- based on what?

" Logistics to/at the front esp in june and july were probably not as bad as he might think. "

What enables you to raw that conclusion?

" the number of ger tanks etc abn or des by crew was proably not as high as he suggest. And the reason may have more to do with the general retreat and pockets in aug then any major logistics failings."

Based on what exactly? And obviously this has has to do at least as much with the general retreat and pockets (including their impact on logistics) as with the logistical system in general, and Zetterling does not claim otherwise.

" in comparing tank numbers and des ger omit 'obsolete' ones in 44 from comparison but the US includes light stuarts in thiers. Probably gives an overly efficent view of the ger tank forces"

Firstly, I don't see that Zetterling does something as simplistic as drawing conclusions on efficiency based simply on the correlation of tank losses. Secondly, it is clear that the book does not attempt to draw any firm conclusions on the number of German tanks lost - for this there are insufiicient data. Thirdly, The percentage of obsolete tanks in the German arsenal was too small to significantly affect the picture, included or not. Their contribution to German combat power were even less. Fourthly, the stuart's German counterpart would mainly be wheeled Recon AFVs, which aren't included either.

cheers

[Darrin]

Logistics again according to some number in normandys book

480 tons of ammo on avg sent daily by gers

7000+ tons on stockpiles in normandy

11,500+ tons stockpiled in britany

500 tons of ammo avg daily 6 june-15 june.

At this rate the normandy stockpile would last for 2 weeks. Getting the britany stockpile to normandy would be difficult to say the least. I would imagine much of the stockpiles were being saved for defence of the ports. Some of which ger still held up to the end of the war.

Zetterling says that one trian could carry 500 tons of ammo. Getting one train to normandy each day seems like a rather easy propositon. This would supply all needs during june and july for all ammo.

He also goes on to say that AGC in 1941 in rus required about 24 supply trains a day of all types. But AGC was at least 3 times larger the 7th army in normandy. So we could call it 8 supply trains a day. Except the AGC spent most of thier time moving and attacking consuming large ammounts of ammo and fuel. 7th army was on the def and required much smaller quaites of both esp fuel. So much less than 8 trains of all supplies food, fuel, hay, ammo a day.

There were stockpiles of 4000m3 or 4 million L of fuel in normandy. It seems like a lot but each panther can hold 700L and this might only take it 100km. But once tanks were filled up they could go days without refueling in the slow def battles during june and july. Plus there were only around 1000 tanks around each day especially if you only count operational ones. This 4 million L gas stockpile would weigh around 4000 tons and would take 8 trains to totally replace this.

The ger on the att in rus were masters of repairing or buiding tempory bridges for thier trucks and trains. In 44 little of this seems to have happened. As far as they seemed to go was building temporary ferrys.