Why the Waffen-SS

[BillHermann]

Of course Himmler wasn't loyal in the end but that wasn't my point he was given the command because at that time there was the assumption he would be. But this is off topic

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Pena,

The Allies had numerous non-existent "divisions" as part of their deception operations, but they are always referred to in that context.

It would be helpful if, as far as possible, the true context be applied to W-SS, and other, formations.

In the case of the W-SS there is a great deal of fantasy about its "elite" military status and supposedly superior performance. It would be helpful if this were not added to by inflating the organization's real OB without due qualification.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Pena V]

Hi Sid,

It would be helpful if this were not added to by inflating the organization's real OB without due qualification.

You didn't answer my question:

who defines which units shoud be called divisions? Jamie? Sid? Somebody else (who)?

Regards,

Pena V

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Pena,

Not "who?", but "what"!

What should inform such descriptions? I would suggest historical accuracy.

If you look at AHF's W-SS descriptions, they are usually helpful in this regard. For instance, for 38th W-SS Division it gives such context as, "Although it was called a division it never had more than a brigade's strength (roughly around 6000 men)." In other cases, their OB (perhaps four infabtry battalions and an artillery battalion, give the game away.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Gorque]

I wonder how much of the decision to call woefully undermanned units "divisions" was driven by political decisions from very high-ups for more division-sized units and the toadies that delivered these so-called divisions in order to save their jobs and their skins in order to satisfy a outrageous request when manpower in the field and factory was flagging.

[Stiltzkin]

In the case of the W-SS there is a great deal of fantasy about its "elite" military status and supposedly superior performance.

Indeed, the SS units did not fare better, (on average) they did even worse, except having a greater AFV/AT potential. They seemed to have better tank crews. I assume this was for propaganda purposes "the elite tank crews", the poster boys of the Reich.

24 Corps engagements at Kursk:

Advance Rates (in km): Wehrmacht: 80.5 vs SS: 63.3
casualty rates Wehrmacht: 7,491 vs SS: 7,899
Soviet casualty rates vs Wehrmacht: 35,702 vs SS: 29,311
armor loss rates, Wehrmacht: 470 vs SS: 403
Soviet armor loss rates vs Wehrmacht: 621 vs SS: 964

[offizier1916]

In the case of the W-SS there is a great deal of fantasy about its "elite" military status and supposedly superior performance.

Indeed, the SS units did not fare better, (on average) they did even worse, except having a greater AFV/AT potential. They seemed to have better tank crews. I assume this was for propaganda purposes "the elite tank crews", the poster boys of the Reich.

24 Corps engagements at Kursk:

Advance Rates (in km): Wehrmacht: 80.5 vs SS: 63.3
casualty rates Wehrmacht: 7,491 vs SS: 7,899
Soviet casualty rates vs Wehrmacht: 35,702 vs SS: 29,311
armor loss rates, Wehrmacht: 470 vs SS: 403
Soviet armor loss rates vs Wehrmacht: 621 vs SS: 964

what does this mean?

operation zitadelle, strength and losses between 5-16 july 1943

soviet strength:
1.910.361 soldiers
4.938 tanks and assault guns
3.648 planes
ca. 31.415 artellary

wehrmacht strength:
778.907 Soldiers
2.465 tanks and assault guns
1.372 planes
ca. 7.417 artellary


soviet losses
177.847 soldiers[2]
1.614[3]–1.956[3] tanks and assault guns (destroyed) and way more damaged
459[3]–1.961[3] planes
3.929 artellary

german losses:
54.182 soldiers[4]
252[5]–323[6] tanks and assault guns, ca 1.600 damaged
159 planes
~ 500 artellary

this is a horrible soviet loss ratio if you consider the fact, that a) they were in defense, b) they had way more soldiers, material and reserves and c) knew for months where the german would attack and as a result had dozens KM of deep defense structures


and the kill/loss ratio of ALL schwere Panzerabteilungen (doesnt matter if SS or Wehrmacht) were very very good.
i have the feeling that for some members here, every german success, every individual exploit is based on luck, a myth, propaganda or whatever. but every soviet or allied success is glorious.

[Stiltzkin]

what does this mean?

It is a comparison of the performance of SS and wehrmacht units on the corps level. You do not have to quote Kursk losses I am acquainted with those.

and the kill/loss ratio of ALL schwere Panzerabteilungen (doesnt matter if SS or Wehrmacht) were very very good.

It is not about a comparison of German and Soviet units per se but German Wehrmacht and SS units...

[offizier1916]

Even people like Freiherr von Boeselager, Graf Kielmansegg or von Loringhoven did say that they were "happy" or at least had a better feeling, when SS division were nearby their own division

[Stiltzkin]

Even people like Freiherr von Boeselager, Graf Kielmansegg or von Loringhoven did say that they were "happy" or at least had a better feeling, when SS division were nearby their own division

Well, the point here is that I am not interested in anecdotal evidence. Perhaps they were happy because the SS Divisions were the ones sent into difficult situations. Point is that besides having better "elite" tank crews, the SS units did not fare better than their Wehrmacht counterparts which can be seen from the corps engagement data. Whether this was the case for other years/fronts needs to be analysed as well but at Kursk it seems that the Wehrmacht did generally better.

[offizier1916]

Well, the point here is that I am not interested in anecdotal evidence. Perhaps they were happy because the SS Divisions were the ones sent into difficult situations. Point is that besides having better "elite" tank crews, the SS units did not fare better than their Wehrmacht counterparts which can be seen from the corps engagement data. Whether this was the case for other years/fronts needs to be analysed as well but at Kursk it seems that the Wehrmacht did generally better.

did you take this into consideration regarding your Kursk data?

[Stiltzkin]

did you take this into consideration regarding your Kursk data?

Well, I have more info if you are interested. Here is an excerpt from Shawn Woodfords (TDI) correspondence on H-Net on the Italian campaign. http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse. ... &user=&pw=

"According to Dupuy’s criteria, the unit that scored the highest was the 11th Panzer Division, a regular German Army formation. The second highest scoring unit was the Herman Goering Panzer Division, which nevertheless was outfought on occasion by the U.S. 88th Infantry Division, which had the highest score of the Allied formations. And interestingly enough, the German unit with the third highest average score effectiveness was the 94th Infantry Division, which was also an average, non-mobile, German Army unit. The 3rd and 15th Panzer Grenadier divisions tied for the fourth highest ratings, and were represented in the most engagements on the German side. The 4th Parachute Division, the only other unit that might be considered "elite," was the 7th highest rated German unit, and rated below both the U.S. 88th Infantry Division and the U.S. XII Corps."

Personally I do believe that some units had to face more difficult situations and were placed in unfavourable positions (also the larger the formations, the less casualties they are going to suffer). Though judging that many Wehrmacht units were usually able to achieve higher scores means that SS units did not fare better at all (except their AFVs, I assume the best crews were selected for the SS mechanized corps). Wehrmacht units enjoyed better leadership.

[offizier1916]

interesting. but except for some weeks, the waffens-ss did not operate in italy. the 16th SS arrived in June 44, but this was a unit that was formed hastily out of the ss sturmbrigade, consisting for a big part of Volksdeutsche: ". Die Ausstattung mit schweren Waffen war immer noch äußerst mangelhaft, SPW, Krad und Kettenschlepper "Maultier" waren gar keine vorhanden, von 73 Sturmgeschützen waren nur 12 vorhanden. Am 16. April 1944 erhielt die Division den Befehl, 4.500 Mannschaften an die 3. SS-Panzer-Division "Totenkopf" abzugeben. Hierfür wurden ihr 2.500 Mann Volksdeutsche aus Ungarn zugewiesen"
(source. Lexikon der Wehrmacht)

And i dont understand how a Fallschirmjägerdivision can be labeld as "elite". I uess this Fallschirmjäger Division didnt have massive tanks or at least assault guns nor was it fully motorized like the Panzergrenadier Divisions.

[Stiltzkin]

And i dont understand how a Fallschirmjägerdivision can be labeld as "elite". I uess this Fallschirmjäger Division didnt have massive tanks or at least assault guns nor was it fully motorized like the Panzergrenadier Divisions.

Para units are always elite, they receive better training but yes they have less (heavy) firepower, so they are utilized in special engagements/roles (such as urban conditions for example).

Am 16. April 1944 erhielt die Division den Befehl, 4.500 Mannschaften an die 3. SS-Panzer-Division "Totenkopf" abzugeben. Hierfür wurden ihr 2.500 Mann Volksdeutsche aus Ungarn zugewiesen"

Yes, the quality of the SS units degraded overtime and were filled with "volunteers", but this was not so much the case during mid 1943.

[Pena V]

Sid,

If you look at AHF's W-SS descriptions, they are usually helpful in this regard. For instance, for 38th W-SS Division it gives such context as, "Although it was called a division it never had more than a brigade's strength (roughly around 6000 men)." In other cases, their OB (perhaps four infabtry battalions and an artillery battalion, give the game away.

Pena V wrote:the late SS-Divisions were weak This is not an issue. The issue here is that if someone calls them divisions is it right to say that he j keenan wrote: is living in Fantasy land

As I have said before I have no problems admitting that the 38th never had more than a brigades strenght but if you call the 38th a division are you living in a fantasy land? AHF has chosen to call the 38th a division although it never had more than a brigade's strength.

If you would call the 38th a brigade instead of a division it wouldn't be historically correct. As a side effect it could improve the image of Waffen-SS like this:
A says: The 38th SS Division didn't do so well in 1945.
B says: The 38th was actually a Brigade.
A says: If it was only a brigade then the performance was OK.

Regards,

Pena V