Why the Waffen-SS

Discussions on all (non-biographical) aspects of the Freikorps, Reichswehr, Austrian Bundesheer, Heer, Waffen-SS, Volkssturm and Fallschirmjäger and the other Luftwaffe ground forces. Hosted by Christoph Awender.
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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#2656

Post by Cult Icon » 19 Jun 2018, 16:28

of interest is Hermann Balck's memoir "Order in Chaos". He comments favorably the 1.SSLAH AND 1.Pz as being an "elite force" in late 1943, per his mindset/criteria, which can be explored in his postwar US army interviews. Also, he comments that the 19.Pz and 7.Pz were very effective formations. What he does not comment on was how weak and physically worn out the latter two formations were- yet they too were used for the counterstrikes west of Kiev.

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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#2657

Post by CNE503 » 19 Jun 2018, 16:38

The mechanized units were certainly more effective in mobile warfare and sheer firepower than any other units of the German army.
Though, even if 7. Panzer-Division had a very good combat record, you should notice that it was the very first German armored division to be repelled with heavy losses while on the attack of WWII (except some Polish tactical successes in September 1939). Late July 1941, while counterattacking a Soviet penetration in VIII. Armeekorps front (one of the so-called Timoshenko's counteroffensive or Dukovschshina counteroffensive), it felt in an antitank trap and suffered tremendous losses without being able to achieve anything. As I said before, "elite" is a very misleading term, because it is a relative notion that changes through a conflict. As such, "Das Reich" effectiveness was quite outstanding until early 1944 but due to heavy losses replaced by young soldiers without proper training and motivation, its level in summer 1944 was far less impressive. As a mechanized unit, it could still perform well on the battlefield, though.

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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#2658

Post by Cult Icon » 19 Jun 2018, 16:42

In sum, 1-3 SS, GD. commanded more personnel and more material than any other Panzer division in 1943-1945 which suited their roles repeatedly assigned by operational commanders. Their divisional histories show more reinforcement than the regular panzer divisions. 12.SS, arguably in 44/45.

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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#2659

Post by CNE503 » 19 Jun 2018, 16:48

You have to add the division "Hermann Göring" to this list, and from time to time some regular Panzer-Divisionen (1. Panzer-Division for instance, IIRC 5. Panzer-Division, maybe 13. Panzer-Division "Feldherrnhalle" and probably others that must be tracked down).

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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#2660

Post by Cult Icon » 19 Jun 2018, 16:50

CNE503 wrote:The mechanized units were certainly more effective in mobile warfare and sheer firepower than any other units of the German army.
Though, even if 7. Panzer-Division had a very good combat record, you should notice that it was the very first German armored division to be repelled with heavy losses while on the attack of WWII. Late July 1941, while counterattacking a Soviet penetration in VIII. Armeekorps front (one of the so-called Timoshenko's counteroffensive or Dukovschshina counteroffensive), it felt in an antitank trap and suffered tremendous losses without being able to achieve anything. As I said before, "elite" is a very misleading term, because it is a relative notion that changes through a conflict. As such, "Das Reich" effectiveness was quite outstanding until early 1944 but due to heavy losses replaced by young soldiers without proper training and motivation, its level in summer 1944 was far less impressive. As a mechanized unit, it could still perform well on the battlefield, though.
I remember that "trap" of 7.Pz from reading "Barbarossa Derailed". A good parameter I believe is to see what the wartime operational commanders thought of the unit and how they assigned them to operations. Balck, as operational commander, reveals that they judged units subjectively as an art.

You seem to be applying your own set of criteria in these evaluations, like most people who analyze operations. As far as victory or failure, 43-45 the german army was generally a loser so analyzing becomes muddled and comparative.

It seems to me that "Das Reich" fought well in the summer 1944 in a comparative sense and without taking extraordinary losses. It was the 7th Army reserve and kept the frontline facing US 1st Army from falling apart and extending the battle of the Bocage overall. Elements were shifted to various divisions. I do realize that the personnel quality and the vehicle situation was substandard but it retained the tried and tested german leadership corps from the Eastern front.

Das Reich also fought well in the Ardennes given its initial limitations (I SS PzK dominating the supply roads, limited mobility and low ammo/fuel supply), and then most obviously in the defense against US VII Corps.

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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#2661

Post by CNE503 » 19 Jun 2018, 18:02

I based my opinion on an objective criteria: most of the replacements that were provided to the "Das Reich" in spring 1944 were young untrained soldiers, including a big contingent of "against our will" (Malgré-nous) from Alsace and Lorraine (hence born French and with a questionable will to fight). The division performed quite well in Normandy (and unfamously before, mass-murdering nearly 900 French civilians on June 9th and 10th, 1944) - it was unable to effectively counterattack during "Lüttich" because of lack of fuel though. But an "elite" can't be a division made up from scratch. Or maybe you consider that Fallschirmjäger-Division "Erdmann" was elite, as well was Panzer-Division "Müncheberg"?

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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#2662

Post by j keenan » 19 Jun 2018, 18:57

Cult Icon wrote:of interest is Hermann Balck's memoir "Order in Chaos". He comments favorably the 1.SSLAH AND 1.Pz as being an "elite force" in late 1943, per his mindset/criteria, which can be explored in his postwar US army interviews. Also, he comments that the 19.Pz and 7.Pz were very effective formations. What he does not comment on was how weak and physically worn out the latter two formations were- yet they too were used for the counterstrikes west of Kiev.
On what page does he claim these to be elite divisions ? He also goes on to slate the SS divisions so have you read the book ?

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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#2663

Post by Pena V » 19 Jun 2018, 19:01

Almost exactly 2 years ago (June 18, 2016) I wrote this:
[/quote]
It's easy to define elite. Only 2 steps are needed:
1. Make a list of all the divisions starting from the best.
2. Decide the cut off point.
All divisions above the cut off point are elite.
The difficulty is that we can never agree on these two points because they are matters of opinion. If 100 experts are asked to draw a list I'm sure that the result will be 100 different lists. We will just have to accept this.
[/quote]
Let's go one step further. How many categories are needed to define elite?
2? (better than average and worse than average). Not enough. Better than average is not yet elite.
3? (better than average, average and worse than average). Not enough. Better than average is not yet elite.
4? (good, better than average, worse than average and bad). Not enough. Good is not yet elite.
5? (good, better than average, average, worse than average and bad). Not enough. Good is not yet elite.
6? (elite, good, better than average, worse than average, bad and waiste).
7? (elite, good, better than average, average, worse than average, bad and waiste). I think that we need a minimum of 6 or 7 categories and the majority of all divisions would fall in the middle a la Gauss.
Any other views?

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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#2664

Post by Cult Icon » 19 Jun 2018, 19:30

CNE503 wrote:I based my opinion on an objective criteria: most of the replacements that were provided to the "Das Reich" in spring 1944 were young untrained soldiers, including a big contingent of "against our will" (Malgré-nous) from Alsace and Lorraine (hence born French and with a questionable will to fight). The division performed quite well in Normandy (and unfamously before, mass-murdering nearly 900 French civilians on June 9th and 10th, 1944) - it was unable to effectively counterattack during "Lüttich" because of lack of fuel though. But an "elite" can't be a division made up from scratch.
No, your analysises of 'good' or 'bad' in this battles are subjective, as it should be.

The results of the Das Reich division hinged on its leadership corps- the panzer divisions 44-45 were typically hastily refilled across the board with the exception of outliers.

"Quality" is highly subjective, overall combat power is still, but rather less so as the loss rate, enemies destroyed and opposition faced can be counted.

Were not certain select SS divisions among the units with the highest combat power immediately available in Kursk, Mius, Kharkov March/August, Dnepr, Normandy, Ardennes, Hungary, Vienna?

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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#2665

Post by CNE503 » 19 Jun 2018, 19:36

Young untrained recruits partly made with unmotivated soldiers originated from occupied France territories drafted by compulsory service were objectively not good recruits. It shows quite well what was the state of the affairs of Germany in spring 1944, when even its mechanized divisions should rely upon such a poor manpower. They might have been disciplined and effective soldiers in the field if properly led by experienced NCOs and officers - and it surely happened. But they definitely and objectively didn't deserve to be considered as "elite". At all.

Actually, all this "elite" thing is nonsense, and I'm pretty sure that no one in the German army at this time did consider them this way (nor the Heer or Luftwaffe mechanized units).

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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#2666

Post by PatrickBateman » 19 Jun 2018, 20:51

This may sound stupid, and I have to say I don't know a lot about the difference of the USMC & US Army, but can we compare in a way the Waffen-SS and the Wehrmacht with the US Marine Corps and the US Army? Both are like different military branches, but the USMC sounds more "elite" (sorry for using that word again, haha), but technically, both are 'almost' the same and almost achieved the same victories in war.

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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#2667

Post by CNE503 » 19 Jun 2018, 22:47

No, because the Corps is specialized in amphibious warfare and expeditionary operations, while Waffen-SS had no speciality of their own at all. There were just politically more reliable for the Nazi regime.
Every single minor detachment (comparing to the majority) appears to be "elite". It's natural and it's encouraged by the emulation. It can be true but it is not always, not even often, the case. For the Waffen-SS, it was not.

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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#2668

Post by Cult Icon » 20 Jun 2018, 00:51

CNE503 wrote:
Actually, all this "elite" thing is nonsense, and I'm pretty sure that no one in the German army at this time did consider them this way (nor the Heer or Luftwaffe mechanized units).
except that they did...

The thing here is that you are considering the substandard replacements as being critical for your criteria for elite. I am focusing on the unit as a whole, compared to the others of the class.

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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#2669

Post by Sid Guttridge » 20 Jun 2018, 11:05

Hi CNE503,

I agree regarding the US Marine Corps. It is nothing like the Waffen-SS in specialization or institutional character.

Quite apart from the fact that the W-SS had no military specializations not already developed by the German Army, it was loyal to only one political party, the NSDAP. By contrast, the US Marine Corps has a clear military specialization in amphibious warfare not shared by the US Army, and it is beholden to the US state, not to any particular political party, and will serve Democrat, Republican, Federalist or any other legitimately elected US Government without discrimination.

Cheers,

Sid.

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Re: Why the Waffen-SS

#2670

Post by Sid Guttridge » 20 Jun 2018, 11:16

Hi nCult Icon,

You write, ".......except they did".

You will have to clarify with a bit of evidence.

Clearly, any German infantryman would be delighted to have armoured support, but did he really care whether it came from an Army or Waffen-SS panzer division?

There was one arguable advantage in being supported by a W-SS rather than Army panzer division, and it is not military. The activities of Waffen-SS divisions probably attracted more attention from Hitler than those of Army panzer divisions, which meant that those in their vicinity were presumably more likely to benefit from the political spotlight.

Cheers,

Sid.

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