Why the Waffen-SS

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You're on your own with that..

[j keenan]

Hi jkeenan,

You write, "There where was nothing wrong with the Waffen-SS divisions that were stood up at the beginning of the war."

Strictly speaking, not only were there no Waffen-SS divisions at the beginning of the war, there was no Waffen-SS either!

Cheers,

Sid.

I didn't write anything as the bottom of the paragraph quite clearly shows, again you posts are a complete and utter waste of space

[j keenan]

You're on your own with that..

Your on your own with it all, you don't even under stand what the word elite means

[j keenan]

and neither were the SS mechanized units, which were comparable to their Heer counterparts and were in no way better (and your quotes about Balck's book don't say anything else).

Balck has an interesting way of evaluating formations, there is also a paper where he writes about his ideal of the division which matches his interview.

Overall, I don't know if that the "quality" was better, it may have been worse than the best army panzer divisions.

In reading the operations of 43-45 (including counterattacks in the East), haven't you noticed that the significantly larger size of 1-3.SS,G.D. divisions gave them more staying power than neighboring formations that were involved in the same operation? The most obvious being 2 x extra infantry battalions and generally higher armor strength. Also, their frequent assignment for the main effort of the operations that they took part in.

The recently published book on the Konrad operations, "Sword and the Shield" is clear about this.

Balck clearly states these units were too big and should have been halved and makes no mention of them been elite

[Cult Icon]

are you going to post anything interesting J keenan?

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi CNE503,

I would suggest that the Grossdeutschland was always intended as an elite. It was originally the Army's guard for the head of state, in much the same way as the Leibstandarte was the W-SS's guard for head of the Nazi Paty, both of whom were Hitler. It was also recruited differently from the rest of the German Army in that (like the Leibstandarte) it took volunteers from all over the Reich. Army infantry divisions recruited conscripts only from a single Wehrkreis and panzer divisions, while recruiting across the Reich, were mostly of conscripts.

The Grossdeutschland apparently suffered even more casualties than the most hard hit W-SS division, the Totenkopf. The difference was that the Grossdeutschland was only a regiment until 1942, whereas the Totenkopf was a full division from 1940. Thus the level of sacrifice was apparently significantly higher in the Grossdeutschland than in any of the W-SS divisions. (Not that casualties are necessarily a measure of military effectiveness!).

What is more, almost all the Grossdeutschland's losses were on the Eastern Front against the great ideological enemy, Bolshevism, whereas by the end of 1944 the Waffen-SS's equivalent senior Reich-raised divisions had suffered a higher proportion of their casualties against the Western Allies.

I would suggest that, as bodyguard units, both Leibstandarte and Grossdeutschland were structured to be "elite" from the start. However, ultimately it is battlefield performance that ultimately decides eliteness. If I remember rightly, in 10 years the 16th Infantry division was promoted first to a motorized division, then into a panzer grenadier division and finally into 116th Panzer Division. It elbowed its way to the fore without any original intention that it should be in the panzerwaffe at all! It was born without the silver spoon in its mouth possessed by both Leibstandarte and Grossdeutschland and yet still reached equivalent status as a panzer division. Its particular distinction was that its units advanced further east than any other German ground forces, getting to within 20 miles of Astrakhan in 1942.

Cheers,

Sid

[CNE503]

A lot of infantry divisions became armored ones aside the 16. Infanterie-Division: 4. Infanterie-Division (14. Panzer-Division), 19. Infanterie-Division (19. Panzer-Division), 27. Infanterie-Division (17. Panzer-Division), 33. Infanterie-Division (15. Panzer-Division), the first 16. Infanterie-Division (16. Panzer-Division). Actually, 5 out of 38 of the active infantry divisions became armored ones and 11 out of 36 motorized ones (2. Infanterie-Division [motorisiert] later transformed in 12. Panzer-Division, 13. Infanterie-Division [motorisiert) later transformed in 13. Panzer-Division, 20. Infanterie-Division [motorisiert] later transformed in 20. Panzer-Division, 16. Infanterie-Division [motorisiert] later transformed in 16. Panzer-Division and 16. Panzergrenadier-Division expanded later in 116. Panzer-Division, 3., 10., 14., 18., 25., 29., 36. Infanterie-Divisionen [motorisierte]).
You're right concerning the battle records for 16. Infanterie-Division (motorisiert)/Panzergrenadier-Division/116. Panzer-Division though, which are quite impressive.
But most of active units gained quite impressive battle records in USSR: 1., 11. and 21. Infanterie-Divisionen were instrumental in northern Russia, 5., 8. and 28. became very effective light then Jäger-Divisionen, 6. Infanterie-Division elements acted decisively during the battle for Rzhev salient in November-December 1942, 7. Infanterie-Division was one of the toughest divisions in the central sector, 9. was very active in Caucasus, 12. led the crucial operation to relieve II. Armeekorps encircled in Demyansk, 22. was the first airlanding unit of the Wehrmacht, 44. was one of the best units available in Heeresgruppe Süd until Stalingrad... I know less about 9., 15., 17., 24., 26., 31., 32., 34., 35., 36. and 45. Infanterie-Divisionen but I'm pretty sure they performed well too.
Infanterie-Regiment 14 of the pre-war 5. Infanterie-Division joined the 78. Infanterie-Division late 1941. This division was heavily involved in the defensive battles for Rzhev salient throughout 1942 during which it performed with excellence and was transformed later in 78. Sturm-Division (a test for new organizations and tactics that didn't work as well as intended but was still instrumental in the central front in 1943 and 1944).
The only unfamous one is the 46. Infanterie-Division which was accused to have acted cowardly in Crimea (but it appears to have been more a political matter than a reality).
So active units seemed to have been considered as better than average even when not transformed in mechanized units.

Concerning "Grossdeutschland", be an elite for parades and "show of" is a thing, be an elite on the battlefields is another one. I would agree on one point: as the former "Lehr" units of the imperial army, the core for Infanterie-Regiment "Grossdeutschland" was training units from Döberitz and Jüterbog. So it was very well trained and very good equipped units. Later, Infanterie-Division "Grossdeutschland" received as an engineer battalion the vaunted Sturmpionier-Bataillon 43 which was instrumental in breaching the Meuse river French defensive line in 1940. As it was made up with such excellent units, maybe this one may be considered as a truly elite unit. This is not the same at all for LSSAH.

CNE503

[j keenan]

With the SS Officer schools ( there were 2 x pre-war, and then 3 more during the war), their selection criteria in the per-war was based literally on non-military "poster boy" potential (nordic features, height, looks as representative of the nazi ideal) . The educational standards were lower than in the Army, so people who were excluded due to their socioeconomic background were admitted.

Officers were selected from a pool of people much more from rural and working class backgrounds. The education was modeled after the Army's Officer schools in Munich with a curriculum more generalized than specialized. (to fulfill the needs of the SS- about half of pre-war officers in Bad Tolz were allocated to the Waffen SS and the rest went to the General SS, Totenkopf, and Police.). The technical content of the training was pedestrian. The main difference was an emphasis on political indoctrination (about 10% of the education) and a very big emphasis on sports & fitness. SS officers spend 1/3rd of their free time (outside of 47 hours of training a week) learning and playing various sports.

Of note is that German army officers that transferred to the SS were instantly commissioned and did not have to attend their OCS.

This post contradicts your myth of the SS been elite, and also is factually incorrect

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Read Spaeter PzK G.D. and Jung's PR-GD. G.D. was the German army's elite formation and it was linked to an array of specialized training resources. It also trained for "Operation Sealion" before its use as a heavily armed reinforced regiment in the Soviet Union. Then its later expansion to an especially large (mot. ID) and then a similar structure to the SS PzG division. In late 1944 the PzK G.D. was developed as an economy measure (G.D troops formed the cadre for Fuhrer Begleit B/D, Fuhrer Grenadier B/D, PzG Kurmark, and it absorbed the Brandenburg regiments into their own division, Pzg Brandenburg.

G.D. was volunteer until the end of the war and its members had higher ranks than other formations. The leadership group was recruited from proven men from other formations, particular the panzer divisions. The only issue, which was raised by Spaeter was that it spent too much time fighting on the Eastern Front and could not do more large scaled maneuvers.

The SSLAH/SS-VT and then SS-Reich was considered a political 'fighting elite' of the Nazi party. These two were also composed largely of volunteers and were extensively trained in 1942-early 1943 as a SS PzG division (a heavy armored division) SS-Totenkopf was composed of volunteers and some draftees from the independent Death's Head regiments. It was also extensively (but not fully) rebuilt in 1942 as a SS PzG division.

Prior to OP Citadel, the 3 classic SS divisions and G.D. did extensive training in the Spring to prepare for the offensive.

These were wartime luxuries generally not as available to most regular panzer divisions. The combat histories of 1-3.SS and G.D. are between 1.5- 2 times more extensive than those the regular panzer divisions I've read.

HOWEVER, the Classic SS divisions got watered-down after March 1943 with draftees and also elements peeled off to duplicate the SS, such as making the 12.SS PzD. G.D. did not have this happen until late 1944.

After Citadel, the 1.SSLAH was sent to Italy (largely for political reasons) and it came back to Russia around the same time as 1.Pz. 1.SSLAH was the strongest panzer division on the Eastern Front, with around ~240 Tanks and AG. 1.Pz was the second strongest, with about 200 IIRC. Around this time, there were other panzer divisions that arrived like the 16.Pz, 14.Pz, 24.Pz that were rebuilt to a significantly lower structural level.

The 1.PZ and 1.SSLAH would play a leading role in the counterattacks West of Kiev, defense against the Zhitomir-Berdichev offensive, and then the counterstrikes against 1TA. (meanwhile, the 3.SS TK was a major fighter among the panzer formations in the southern wing of the Eastern Front in the fall-winter of 1943)

Also, you mention the mobile defense in Hungary (fall 1944). Most of those Panzer units that fought were typical of the regular panzer division- fighting the majority of the war as a regimental battlegroup before the rare large scale re-fill. The Soviets forces themselves were somewhat tired and not at full strength either.

[CNE503]

Similar to Infanterie-Regiment "Grossdeutschland" was Lehr-Brigade (motorisiert) 900. They shared the same roots (Infanterieschule Döberitz). And I repeat myself: "I would agree on one point: as the former "Lehr" units of the imperial army, the core for Infanterie-Regiment "Grossdeutschland" was training units from Döberitz and Jüterbog. So it was very well trained and very good equipped units. Later, Infanterie-Division "Grossdeutschland" received as an engineer battalion the vaunted Sturmpionier-Bataillon 43 which was instrumental in breaching the Meuse river French defensive line in 1940. As it was made up with such excellent units, maybe this one may be considered as a truly elite unit. This is not the same at all for LSSAH".

I'm still not convinced at all about the SS units: not an elite, just major assets as mechanized units (as every single Heer or Luftwaffe units which was mechanized).

CNE503

[Michael Kenny]

After Citadel, the 1.SSLAH was sent to Italy (largely for political reasons) and it came back to Russia around the same time as 1.Pz. 1.SSLAH was the strongest panzer division on the Eastern Front, with around ~240 Tanks and AG. 1.Pz was the second strongest, with about 200 IIRC. Around this time, there were other panzer divisions that arrived like the 16.Pz, 14.Pz, 24.Pz that were rebuilt to a significantly lower structural level.

If you pick a date when a Panzer Division has just been issued with new vehicles it will always look 'strong'. Within a fortnight (20/11/43) the original 227 tanks had been reduced to 60 runners and by 10/12/43 to a mere 29. That low level or readiness was the norm until the Division bottomed out at 2 Pz IV was transferred to Normandy in April 1944.

[Michael Kenny]

Around this time, there were other panzer divisions that arrived like the 16.Pz, 14.Pz, 24.Pz that were rebuilt to a significantly lower structural level.

1st SS were issued 95 Pz IV and 96 Panthers.

16 Pz Div were issued 98 Pz IV and 76 Panthers

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The SS leadership corps in theory were race warriors most loyal to Hitler and the goals of the SS/Nazis "My Honor is Loyalty" and were supposed to be the most fanatical & embodying the spirit of the Freikorps/gung-hoism. This was believed by Hitler himself and he expected reliable obedience to orders.

The pre-war SS guard was Hitler's security force against both external and internal enemies. The expansion of the armed elements of the SS in the 30s (Using schools, most prominently the 2 x SS officer academies, and then 3 more) into the war was an exponential expansion in purpose and scope.

Intangible aspects like fighting spirit /morale/motivation/mindset was not a woo woo concept among german commanders (Balck's interviews/writings shows that as well) and the nazis, particularly the SS.

[CNE503]

Yes, it was considered as a political elite, selected on specific purpose (reliability, political loyalty). But on a military point of view, it never was one.

CNE503

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Moral is not separate from the material

These SS troops saw themselves as part of an elite division, as did others.