Why the Waffen-SS

[ljadw]

Number of German Pz and StuG in the East on May 31 1944
First operational tanks StuG,than those in repair, third those assigned/en route .
HG SU

Pz : 186/ 37 /138
StuG : 194/62/278
HGNU :
Pz : 830/133 /229
StuG : 480/87/185
HGMitte
Pz :85/14/37
StuG :404/76/68
HGN
Pz :91/53 /30
StuG : 241/53 /69
Thus, it is an exaggeration to say that HGM was the poor relation :it had 489 operational Pz and StuG,less than AG who had 1310 Pz and StuG, but more than HG SU (380 ) and HGN (332 )
Source : The Dupuy Institute Forum (German Order of Battle June 1944 in the East) ;figures by Richard Anderson .

[Cult Icon]

posts about Bagration and nuclear weapons, not the Waffen SS.....

[sandeepmukherjee196]

I imagine lots of things-like how long you will last as a member this time around.

Tick-tock, tick-tock, tic...

They never learn.

I wish folks would cut some slack to fellow members on this issue of banning etc..I too used to imagine till a year back that members get into trouble ONLY for neo-nazi propaganda or uncivil behaviour. But I learned otherwise to my personal cost and knee jerk humiliation. So..

Cheers
Sandeep

[offizier1916]

Number of German Pz and StuG in the East on May 31 1944
First operational tanks StuG,than those in repair, third those assigned/en route .
HG SU

Pz : 186/ 37 /138
StuG : 194/62/278
HGNU :
Pz : 830/133 /229
StuG : 480/87/185
HGMitte
Pz :85/14/37
StuG :404/76/68
HGN
Pz :91/53 /30
StuG : 241/53 /69
Thus, it is an exaggeration to say that HGM was the poor relation :it had 489 operational Pz and StuG,less than AG who had 1310 Pz and StuG, but more than HG SU (380 ) and HGN (332 )
Source : The Dupuy Institute Forum (German Order of Battle June 1944 in the East) ;figures by Richard Anderson .

Are you kidding? so round about 85 tanks and 400 stugs for a whole heeresgruppe defending 1100km is not bad? can you list the russian forces in the area of heeresgruppe Mitte? because what i have is the following:

1,4 Millionen Men,
31000 Geschütze und Granatwerfer,
5200 Panzer und Selbstfahrlafetten
5000 Kampfflugzeuge

what about the motorization as a whole when comparing german and russian divisions?



did you know that ca 150.000 partisans were operating behind the front of the Heeresgruppe Mitte? destroying bridges, railroads, trains etc on a daily basis.

so the "Feste-Plätze-Doctrine" was a good plan? haha, ok!

btw:What are you trying to proof?

[benwi]

Number of German Pz and StuG in the East on May 31 1944
First operational tanks StuG,than those in repair, third those assigned/en route .
HG SU

Pz : 186/ 37 /138
StuG : 194/62/278
HGNU :
Pz : 830/133 /229
StuG : 480/87/185
HGMitte
Pz :85/14/37
StuG :404/76/68
HGN
Pz :91/53 /30
StuG : 241/53 /69
Thus, it is an exaggeration to say that HGM was the poor relation :it had 489 operational Pz and StuG,less than AG who had 1310 Pz and StuG, but more than HG SU (380 ) and HGN (332 )
Source : The Dupuy Institute Forum (German Order of Battle June 1944 in the East) ;figures by Richard Anderson .

For the front it was holding,Heeresgruppe Mitte was the very poor relation.It had a long frontline with no depth and few reserves. A recipe for disaster.

[benwi]

I imagine lots of things-like how long you will last as a member this time around.

Tick-tock, tick-tock, tic...

They never learn.

I wish folks would cut some slack to fellow members on this issue of banning etc..I too used to imagine till a year back that members get into trouble ONLY for neo-nazi propaganda or uncivil behaviour. But I learned otherwise to my personal cost and knee jerk humiliation. So..

Cheers
Sandeep

There are a few users here clearly not interested in discussion. It would be funny imagining them in politics in the real world.There you need to face contradiction and ruthless factchecking whether you like it or not.

[benwi]

posts about Bagration and nuclear weapons, not the Waffen SS.....

Nothing against that.

[Cult Icon]

per the earlier discussion, the Panzer divisions were heavily reorganized and adjusted following Poland 1939 as real world experience had much to teach.

-There is discussion of this in Panzertruppen I, Jentz and History of the 10th Panzer Division and maybe Armored Bears I (?)

-The broader view (Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed and other works) show SSLAH, DR, and Totenkopf were among the units at the forefront in Barbarossa and Typhoon. SS Reich fought closely with G.D. and 10th Panzer Division. They ironed out their issues and clearly proved their worth starting from 1941. With 1940 it is more debatable.

-With Balck, he was an admirer of SSLAH and 7th Panzer in the Ukraine 43-44 but had bad blood with the Waffen SS starting from Festerplatz Tarnopol (9th SS Division) that escalated with his relations with IV SS Panzer Korps (he tried to get Gille relieved), peaked with Operation Spring awakening, of which he was the chief planner. The controversy is discussed his memoir, in "Drama between Budapest and Vienna" and "Firestorm in the last years of the war". He blamed the WSS for being incompetent while the Waffen SS accused him of being a political manipulator and overoptimistic.

[benwi]

-With Balck, he was an admirer of SSLAH and 7th Panzer in the Ukraine 43-44 but had bad blood with the Waffen SS starting from Festerplatz Tarnopol (9th SS Division) that escalated with his relations with IV SS Panzer Korps (he tried to get Gille relieved), peaked with Operation Spring awakening, of which he was the chief planner. The controversy is discussed his memoir, in "Drama between Budapest and Vienna" and "Firestorm in the last years of the war". He blamed the WSS for being incompetent while the Waffen SS accused him of being a political manipulator and overoptimistic.

Balck was an outstanding divisional and corps commander who unfortunately besmirched his reputation by the way he lied to Hitler about the 6 SS Panzer army in Hungary at the end of the war.

[benwi]

Well, with Totenkopf it was used critically in the north in 1941 by Manstein's army (he considered it the best SS division- and he commanded many of them) I can't comment on the loss rates in 1941. By 1943-1945 I didn't find anything that showed that it took excessive losses compared to the other heavy armored divisions.

Manstein was effectively very complimentary about the Totenkopf division in general except that its officer corps was not experienced enough yet in the summer of 1941 and had still to learn things the hard way which,according to him,led to avoidable losses.Certainly his honest opinion as he never showed extreme bias against the waffen ss.

[offizier1916]

Here an evaluation from one of the best german strategists, General Wöhler about 2nd SS Das Reich:




source: AHF

Wöhler requested that Gruppenfürher Walter Krüger and his Ia Obersturmbannführer Sommer (transferred by the Heer to he Waffen-SS), should be used in other positions than commanding the Das Reich Division/being Ia of the Das Reich. He accused them of being unsuitable.
Wöhler stated, that Krüger is way to "sluggish" and "spritless" for such a first-class/superb fighting force as the Waffen-SS. He stated that the Ia of the Division, Obersturmbannführer Sommer, was just a below-average Chief of Staff and not suitable for such a high-class division like the "Das Reich

[benwi]

Here an evaluation from one of the best german strategists, General Wöhler about 2nd SS Das Reich:




source: AHF

Wöhler requested that Gruppenfürher Walter Krüger and his Ia Obersturmbannführer Sommer (transferred by the Heer to he Waffen-SS), should be used in other positions than commanding the Das Reich Division/being Ia of the Das Reich. He accused them of being unsuitable.
Wöhler stated, that Krüger is way to "sluggish" and "spritless" for such a first-class/superb fighting force as the Waffen-SS. He stated that the Ia of the Division, Obersturmbannführer Sommer, was just a below-average Chief of Staff and not suitable for such a high-class division like the "Das Reich

He failed in his undertaking as Krüger stayed and got the oak leaves not long afterwards.

[offizier1916]

@benwi: in another document, Wöhler protested against Krügers decision to fly to the FHQ at Rastenburg to receive his Oakleaves without warning Wöhler, although the Division was directly subordinate to the 8. Armee of Wöhler. Harmel took comand of the "Das Reich" Division during Krügers absence.

it seems that Wöhler and Krüger had some issues. maybe personal, maybe due to Krügers leadership qualities. But what we can discern of these reports is the fact, that Wöhler had a very high regard of the 2nd SS Das Reich

[Cult Icon]

IV SS PzK was not respected by the AGS chief or Armeegruppe Balck. In "Under Himmler's Command", the author (top staff officer for Army Group Vistula) states that only Hausser and Steiner were good "higher level" commanders of the Waffen SS. Himmler and his staff, chief, Lammerding of DR were considered incompetent. This may indicate a common opinion among Army staff officers at the time.

It kind of makes sense that IV SS PzK was not seen with high regard; it was IIRC improvised in the summer of 1944 and its counterattacks, particularly against 2TA did not produce much results. However, it defended the front stubbornly against very heavy pressure throughout summer/fall like III SS PzK earlier on in the year.

From "Drama between Budapest and Vienna":

viewtopic.php?f=55&t=78937&hilit=+operation+konrad

" General Woehler, Heersgruppe Sud commander about reporting in the 4 SS Panzer Corps:

General Impression: SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Gille is not corps commander material. However, since he is very brave and is always on the move every dau for hours on end, I would rather not recommend that he be relieved of command. His Chief-of-Staff SS-Obersturmbannfurer Schoenfelder, is not suitable for his position. Staff work at the corps headquarters is poor. The reporting and command and control structure are not sufficient for moderate demands. For that reason, I must recommend that Schoenfelder be relieved of his duties, as the upcoming missions are entirely too important..." "

[offizier1916]

@Cult Icon: very interesting. I read the same about Lammerdinger. A good Regiment Commander, but too unexpierenced in leading a Division.