All Heeresgruppen had a long frontline with no depth and few reserves .benwi wrote: ↑15 Aug 2018, 09:15For the front it was holding,Heeresgruppe Mitte was the very poor relation.It had a long frontline with no depth and few reserves. A recipe for disaster.ljadw wrote: ↑14 Aug 2018, 21:57Number of German Pz and StuG in the East on May 31 1944
First operational tanks StuG,than those in repair, third those assigned/en route .
HG SU
Pz : 186/ 37 /138
StuG : 194/62/278
HGNU :
Pz : 830/133 /229
StuG : 480/87/185
HGMitte
Pz :85/14/37
StuG :404/76/68
HGN
Pz :91/53 /30
StuG : 241/53 /69
Thus, it is an exaggeration to say that HGM was the poor relation :it had 489 operational Pz and StuG,less than AG who had 1310 Pz and StuG, but more than HG SU (380 ) and HGN (332 )
Source : The Dupuy Institute Forum (German Order of Battle June 1944 in the East) ;figures by Richard Anderson .
Why the Waffen-SS
Re: Why the Waffen-SS
Re: Why the Waffen-SS
Blatantly untrue.Its frontline was overlong and many of its mechanised reserves had to be given to HGNU.It could easily have been withdrawn on a shorter,more defensible frontline but that was refused.Add to that no freedom of movement and disaster is Inevitable.ljadw wrote: ↑16 Aug 2018, 07:55All Heeresgruppen had a long frontline with no depth and few reserves .benwi wrote: ↑15 Aug 2018, 09:15For the front it was holding,Heeresgruppe Mitte was the very poor relation.It had a long frontline with no depth and few reserves. A recipe for disaster.ljadw wrote: ↑14 Aug 2018, 21:57Number of German Pz and StuG in the East on May 31 1944
First operational tanks StuG,than those in repair, third those assigned/en route .
HG SU
Pz : 186/ 37 /138
StuG : 194/62/278
HGNU :
Pz : 830/133 /229
StuG : 480/87/185
HGMitte
Pz :85/14/37
StuG :404/76/68
HGN
Pz :91/53 /30
StuG : 241/53 /69
Thus, it is an exaggeration to say that HGM was the poor relation :it had 489 operational Pz and StuG,less than AG who had 1310 Pz and StuG, but more than HG SU (380 ) and HGN (332 )
Source : The Dupuy Institute Forum (German Order of Battle June 1944 in the East) ;figures by Richard Anderson .
Re: Why the Waffen-SS
Must have been personal as Krüger stayed and was later promoted.offizier1916 wrote: ↑15 Aug 2018, 20:30@benwi: in another document, Wöhler protested against Krügers decision to fly to the FHQ at Rastenburg to receive his Oakleaves without warning Wöhler, although the Division was directly subordinate to the 8. Armee of Wöhler. Harmel took comand of the "Das Reich" Division during Krügers absence.
it seems that Wöhler and Krüger had some issues. maybe personal, maybe due to Krügers leadership qualities. But what we can discern of these reports is the fact, that Wöhler had a very high regard of the 2nd SS Das Reich
Re: Why the Waffen-SS
On the terrain you cannot see the corps underperforming.During the fighting in Hungary it did very well,particularly in Konrad III.There were certainly personal issues between Gille and Balck.Cult Icon wrote: ↑15 Aug 2018, 20:42IV SS PzK was not respected by the AGS chief or Armeegruppe Balck. In "Under Himmler's Command", the author (top staff officer for Army Group Vistula) states that only Hausser and Steiner were good "higher level" commanders of the Waffen SS. Himmler and his staff, chief, Lammerding of DR were considered incompetent. This may indicate a common opinion among Army staff officers at the time.
It kind of makes sense that IV SS PzK was not seen with high regard; it was IIRC improvised in the summer of 1944 and its counterattacks, particularly against 2TA did not produce much results. However, it defended the front stubbornly against very heavy pressure throughout summer/fall like III SS PzK earlier on in the year.
.." "
During the red army offensive in march 1945 Balck completely lost his head and tried to blame everybody except himself.Therefore one has to take what he says with a grain of salt.
Re: Why the Waffen-SS
A shorter frontline would also benefit the Soviets, and ,freedom of movements means : retreat .benwi wrote: ↑16 Aug 2018, 08:31Blatantly untrue.Its frontline was overlong and many of its mechanised reserves had to be given to HGNU.It could easily have been withdrawn on a shorter,more defensible frontline but that was refused.Add to that no freedom of movement and disaster is Inevitable.ljadw wrote: ↑16 Aug 2018, 07:55All Heeresgruppen had a long frontline with no depth and few reserves .benwi wrote: ↑15 Aug 2018, 09:15For the front it was holding,Heeresgruppe Mitte was the very poor relation.It had a long frontline with no depth and few reserves. A recipe for disaster.ljadw wrote: ↑14 Aug 2018, 21:57Number of German Pz and StuG in the East on May 31 1944
First operational tanks StuG,than those in repair, third those assigned/en route .
HG SU
Pz : 186/ 37 /138
StuG : 194/62/278
HGNU :
Pz : 830/133 /229
StuG : 480/87/185
HGMitte
Pz :85/14/37
StuG :404/76/68
HGN
Pz :91/53 /30
StuG : 241/53 /69
Thus, it is an exaggeration to say that HGM was the poor relation :it had 489 operational Pz and StuG,less than AG who had 1310 Pz and StuG, but more than HG SU (380 ) and HGN (332 )
Source : The Dupuy Institute Forum (German Order of Battle June 1944 in the East) ;figures by Richard Anderson .
Re: Why the Waffen-SS
The IV SS PzK didn't really achieve much in their attacks East of Warsaw and in the Konrads. The former attacks, with XXXIX Panzer Korps, stopped the advance of 2TA but didn't achieve the real encirclement they were hoping for.benwi wrote: ↑16 Aug 2018, 10:57On the terrain you cannot see the corps underperforming.During the fighting in Hungary it did very well,particularly in Konrad III.There were certainly personal issues between Gille and Balck.
During the red army offensive in march 1945 Balck completely lost his head and tried to blame everybody except himself.Therefore one has to take what he says with a grain of salt.
The Konrad attacks were somewhat uncoordinated and had many pauses- inflicted significant casualties but they had heavy losses too. The defenders of Budapest fell. No big laurels here. There were many experienced Panzer Korps commanders that could have potentially controlled 3.SS, 5.SS and other formations other than Gille.
Granted, this is last year of the war, where the competitiveness of german panzer units were at a sharp low point. They couldn't match the soviets on the field. I do agree that Balck deserves a lot of responsibility for Spring Awakening as he was the chief planner. The view of Wohler and Balck that the IV SS Panzer Korps was inaccurate with its reporting and somewhat insubordinate does hold weight. Balck comments that the SS were on direct call with Himmler as Himmler was trying to make them the savior of Budapest.
Re: Why the Waffen-SS
With Balck, he was considered a success while commanding Army Group G in the West- so this is lead to his appointment in a key spot in Hungary.
Gille was a crack panzer division commander that probably got his leading role due to the exponential rise of the SS in the last year of the war. A lot of superfluous SS Corps staffs were produced by Himmler's SS and this only increased as he made a land grab after the July plot. I don't think that the IV SS PzK was even necessary, they could have gotten the vastly experienced 3.PzK, 48.PzK, 56.PzK, etc. staff and perhaps replaced Brieth with Balck or some other firebrand.
Gille was a crack panzer division commander that probably got his leading role due to the exponential rise of the SS in the last year of the war. A lot of superfluous SS Corps staffs were produced by Himmler's SS and this only increased as he made a land grab after the July plot. I don't think that the IV SS PzK was even necessary, they could have gotten the vastly experienced 3.PzK, 48.PzK, 56.PzK, etc. staff and perhaps replaced Brieth with Balck or some other firebrand.
Re: Why the Waffen-SS
Das Reich reported around 2,000 tank kills in 1943- perhaps the #1 record in WW2- and already accumulated a lot by the end of the 4th battle of Kharkov (Belogorod-Kharkov operation in Soviet terms). This should have softened the impression of Kruger's claimed mediocrity.offizier1916 wrote: ↑15 Aug 2018, 20:30
it seems that Wöhler and Krüger had some issues. maybe personal, maybe due to Krügers leadership qualities. But what we can discern of these reports is the fact, that Wöhler had a very high regard of the 2nd SS Das Reich
So apparently Kruger was indeed replaced- with Lammerding.
In the prior year, Balck won some acclaim for his 1,000th tank kill while leading 11. Panzer-division. IIRC the 1,000th kill was during Operation Winter-storm. The document, where he reports on his "secret methods- or lack thereoff" is reprinted in Panzertruppen I,Jentz. This would really jump start his career.
Re: Why the Waffen-SS
A shorter frontline benefits the defender as he then has a deeper defenseline with more weapons per km and more reserves.Will make life more difficult for the attacker.If you are faced with a rollercompressor you will either retreat volontarily or be encircled and destroyed.ljadw wrote: ↑16 Aug 2018, 14:06A shorter frontline would also benefit the Soviets, and ,freedom of movements means : retreat .benwi wrote: ↑16 Aug 2018, 08:31Blatantly untrue.Its frontline was overlong and many of its mechanised reserves had to be given to HGNU.It could easily have been withdrawn on a shorter,more defensible frontline but that was refused.Add to that no freedom of movement and disaster is Inevitable.ljadw wrote: ↑16 Aug 2018, 07:55All Heeresgruppen had a long frontline with no depth and few reserves .benwi wrote: ↑15 Aug 2018, 09:15For the front it was holding,Heeresgruppe Mitte was the very poor relation.It had a long frontline with no depth and few reserves. A recipe for disaster.ljadw wrote: ↑14 Aug 2018, 21:57Number of German Pz and StuG in the East on May 31 1944
First operational tanks StuG,than those in repair, third those assigned/en route .
HG SU
Pz : 186/ 37 /138
StuG : 194/62/278
HGNU :
Pz : 830/133 /229
StuG : 480/87/185
HGMitte
Pz :85/14/37
StuG :404/76/68
HGN
Pz :91/53 /30
StuG : 241/53 /69
Thus, it is an exaggeration to say that HGM was the poor relation :it had 489 operational Pz and StuG,less than AG who had 1310 Pz and StuG, but more than HG SU (380 ) and HGN (332 )
Source : The Dupuy Institute Forum (German Order of Battle June 1944 in the East) ;figures by Richard Anderson .
Re: Why the Waffen-SS
I think you are out of your depth here.You would have to prove that IV SS pz corps did less than was achievable in the circonstances and was worse than other corps.There is no evidence of that.Cult Icon wrote: ↑16 Aug 2018, 14:43The IV SS PzK didn't really achieve much in their attacks East of Warsaw and in the Konrads. The former attacks, with XXXIX Panzer Korps, stopped the advance of 2TA but didn't achieve the real encirclement they were hoping for.benwi wrote: ↑16 Aug 2018, 10:57On the terrain you cannot see the corps underperforming.During the fighting in Hungary it did very well,particularly in Konrad III.There were certainly personal issues between Gille and Balck.
During the red army offensive in march 1945 Balck completely lost his head and tried to blame everybody except himself.Therefore one has to take what he says with a grain of salt.
The Konrad attacks were somewhat uncoordinated and had many pauses- inflicted significant casualties but they had heavy losses too. The defenders of Budapest fell. No big laurels here. There were many experienced Panzer Korps commanders that could have potentially controlled 3.SS, 5.SS and other formations other than Gille.
Granted, this is last year of the war, where the competitiveness of german panzer units were at a sharp low point. They couldn't match the soviets on the field. I do agree that Balck deserves a lot of responsibility for Spring Awakening as he was the chief planner. The view of Wohler and Balck that the IV SS Panzer Korps was inaccurate with its reporting and somewhat insubordinate does hold weight. Balck comments that the SS were on direct call with Himmler as Himmler was trying to make them the savior of Budapest.
Konrad III got very far.And again,you fail to prove there was an underperformance.
Re: Why the Waffen-SS
A book on the subject is "Sword Behind the shield". I think what they needed was a miracle worker for the most important job on the Eastern Front- which they didn't have in Gille and the IV SS PzK.
You seem to take extremes/static positions just to be argumentative.
You seem to take extremes/static positions just to be argumentative.
Re: Why the Waffen-SS
Krüger only left the division at the end of 1943 .He waspromotedCult Icon wrote: ↑16 Aug 2018, 15:09Das Reich reported around 2,000 tank kills in 1943- perhaps the #1 record in WW2- and already accumulated a lot by the end of the 4th battle of Kharkov (Belogorod-Kharkov operation in Soviet terms). This should have softened the impression of Kruger's claimed mediocrity.offizier1916 wrote: ↑15 Aug 2018, 20:30
it seems that Wöhler and Krüger had some issues. maybe personal, maybe due to Krügers leadership qualities. But what we can discern of these reports is the fact, that Wöhler had a very high regard of the 2nd SS Das Reich
So apparently Kruger was indeed replaced- with Lammerding.
Re: Why the Waffen-SS
No i simply ask you for substance and you do not give that.You need to prove an underperformance and that implies a detailed analysis of operations it was involved in.Just stating something is no proof.Cult Icon wrote: ↑16 Aug 2018, 15:55A book on the subject is "Sword Behind the shield". I think what they needed was a miracle worker for the most important job on the Eastern Front- which they didn't have in Gille and the IV SS PzK.
You seem to take extremes/static positions just to be argumentative.
And Konrad III did get close to relieving Budapest.There was a lot of bad blood between between Gille and Balck when the latter ordered IV SS Pz corps to retreat.There had already been bad blood between Balck and Gille during Konrad II when the latter wanted to continue the offensive which got close to Budapest.
Last edited by benwi on 16 Aug 2018, 20:22, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Why the Waffen-SS
I don't need to provide a poster of the likes of you anything...benwi wrote: ↑16 Aug 2018, 16:04No i simply ask you for substance and you do not give that.You need to prove an underperformance and that implies a detailed analysis of operations it was involved in.Just stating something is no proof.
And Konrad III did get closest to relieving Budapest.There was a lot of bad blood between between Gille and Balck when the latter ordered IV SS Pz corps to retreat.
IV SS PzK composed the bulk of the forces for the Konrads, they were "Konrad". 3.PzK/Korpsgruppe Breith/CC were in the minority. This was not an Army vs SS scenario.