Why the Waffen-SS

[ljadw]

@ Sir Guttridge:

you are right. it was already a mistake to create w-ss divisions at all. 100% agree. BUT it was a natural consequences that they were created. Hitler mistrusted the loyality of the Wehrmacht from an early stage. He appeased the Wehrmacht by letting down Röhm and disarming the SA, which was seen as a concurrent by the Wehrmacht. But you know that Hitler mistrusted anyone and anything. The competences regarding war industry were completely confuse until late 43 as Speer became War-Industry Minister (still Speer hadnt full control of Luftwaffe productions due to Görings jealousy). This grotesque authority confusion was shown on many fields and areas within the third reich. And like i said, the building of an armed branch of the SS was just a natural consequence to form an Antagonist for the Wehrmacht


@Sir Guttridge: There are very interesting documents of the RSSHA, Führungshauptamt, Abteilung Waffen-SS, regarding the extreme difficult conditions of forming the 9th and 10th SS PzDiv in 43. They had a lack of everything, especially NCOs and Officers and of course a lack of Material, especially motorization. They recruited police officers and NCOs and threw them to 3-4month Waffen-SS NCO training. Most recruits were of the year 1925.

You fail to add that initially Hitler planned to disband the SS VT in case of war and to distribute them amongst the WM.

[Cult Icon]

You fail to add that initially Hitler planned to disband the SS VT in case of war and to distribute them amongst the WM.

where did you find this?

[ljadw]

H.Höhne : Der Orden unter dem Totenkopf .P 414, note 75.
There were 3 options in case of war
1 .the SSVT would remain in Germany as a security police
2. it would act in collaboration with the WM
3 . the VT would be disbanded and distributed amongst the WM .
Initially the VT were designed for police tasks .

[Cult Icon]

This is good book about Germanic SS volunteers and their motivations. It covers the motives, wartime experiences, and fates of dozens of Swedish SS men and is more illuminating than other materials on the Germanic SS that I've seen. The sample size is large enough to draw some observations.

The Swedes, like the rest of the Germanic SS cannot be stereotyped as "one type" outside of being boys or young men. Their fighting morale was effected by a large number of desertions and requests to be relieved of service, of which many of the Swedish interviewees did. :

According to "Building a Nazi Europe", the Germanic volunteers were well represented of those from middle class or higher backgrounds.

https://www.amazon.com/Hitlers-Swedes-H ... ZDK5C2AAEX


- The Swedes were split between Far rightist Swedes (part of Fascist parties in Sweden) vs. non-political types.

- A large portion were Far rightist Swedes that lionized Germany and wanted to fight communism. Many of these youth were in for a rude awakening and their combat morale plummeted due to the misery of their situation and they either deserted or arranged to leave SS service.

-Swedish Adventurers and patriots- many of them veterans of the Finnish war and were looking for the next war to fight. Others were idealistic youth.

-Swedish Army men that wanted to join a "real army".

-A portion were Swedes that were bamboozled into the SS via recruiting and bureaucratic tricks. They absolutely wanted to get out.

-Swedes in low income jobs that wanted to use SS service as an escape.

-Swedes that were unemployed and had bad options. There were some convicted felons.

[Cult Icon]

A common issue with the interviewed volunteers was that being in the Waffen SS and fighting with the Wiking and later, the III SS PzK wasn't all that it was cracked up to be. They felt lied to by the propaganda and the recruiters.

Also, a major issue of complaint was the large number of mass murders (red army pows, jews, civilians, partisans, and according to one disgrutled Swedish SS-Wiking man- they summarily executed all red army troops captured in company size or smaller in 1941) and other warcrimes (eg. raping Russian women) of serving with the Wiking division.

[j keenan]

If I remember rightly, in no year did more volunteers opt for the W-SS rather than for the Army. However, in 1943, when quotas were raised and the W-SS was allowed to enter schools and recruit youths a year younger than the Army's conscription age, it came quite close to doing so.

Your opinions are a joke
Even when Himmler was in charge of the replacement army, from the recruits born in 1928 the Waffen-SS received 95,000 out of total of 550,000 which was much more than any previous time.So the Waffen-SS was never a drain on the Heer at any time.

[j keenan]

This is good book about Germanic SS volunteers and their motivations. It covers the motives, wartime experiences, and fates of dozens of Swedish SS men and is more illuminating than other materials on the Germanic SS that I've seen. The sample size is large enough to draw some observations.

The Swedes, like the rest of the Germanic SS cannot be stereotyped as "one type" outside of being boys or young men. Their fighting morale was effected by a large number of desertions and requests to be relieved of service, of which many of the Swedish interviewees did. :

According to "Building a Nazi Europe", the Germanic volunteers were well represented of those from middle class or higher backgrounds.

https://www.amazon.com/Hitlers-Swedes-H ... ZDK5C2AAEX


- The Swedes were split between Far rightist Swedes (part of Fascist parties in Sweden) vs. non-political types.

- A large portion were Far rightist Swedes that lionized Germany and wanted to fight communism. Many of these youth were in for a rude awakening and their combat morale plummeted due to the misery of their situation and they either deserted or arranged to leave SS service.

-Swedish Adventurers and patriots- many of them veterans of the Finnish war and were looking for the next war to fight. Others were idealistic youth.

-Swedish Army men that wanted to join a "real army".

-A portion were Swedes that were bamboozled into the SS via recruiting and bureaucratic tricks. They absolutely wanted to get out.

-Swedes in low income jobs that wanted to use SS service as an escape.

-Swedes that were unemployed and had bad options. There were some convicted felons.

Only a round about 200 fought for Hitler compared to 9 000 who served for the Allies

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi benwi,

Thank you for your post. It serves to reinforce my point about the institutional weaknesses of the W-SS that made it hard to maintain major formations in the field. On average the three senior W-SS divisions had to be withdrawn within a year of the opening of the Eastern Front to be rebuilt and became armoured formations (hence the "panzer" in panzergrenadier). As a result, they all missed the arguably decisive Stalingrad Campaign.

You also write that you can understand that the W-SS would want an armed part in the military campaigns. As an institution desirous of burnishing its own and the Nazi Party's reputation, yes. However, all its men were already allocated to military service in the Army until late 1938, so the existence of an independent W-SS added not a single man to the German order of battle.

Cheers,

Sid.

[benwi]

Hi benwi,

Thank you for your post. It serves to reinforce my point about the institutional weaknesses of the W-SS that made it hard to maintain major formations in the field. On average the three senior W-SS divisions had to be withdrawn within a year of the opening of the Eastern Front to be rebuilt and became armoured formations (hence the "panzer" in panzergrenadier). As a result, they all missed the arguably decisive Stalingrad Campaign.

Cheers,

Sid.

They were not the only units to be refitted in the west.If they had been meant for the offensive in the south,they would have had a shorter refit Only the Leibstandarte could potentially have been involved as it was in the area of Army group south.Totenkopf could never have been used in the offensive as it was still heavily involved around Demjansk and was refitted much later in 1942 than the other two divisions.Das Reich was also not in the south.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Cult Icon,

Certainly there is a utility in having elite divisions. But why would these need to be in an independent organization like the W-SS? Does not the "Grossdeutschland" illustrate that this was perfectly achievable within the Army?

As for ideological motivation, the W-SS was meant to be the ideological spearhead against Bolshevism. Yet by the end of 1944 it had suffered a slightly lower proportion of its losses against the Red Army than had the Army, and a slightly higher proportion of its losses against the Western Allies than had the Army.

Its utility as a PR base for recruiting "Germanic" volunteers is also questionable. Danes and Norwegians joined at an average rate of only four a day each. It was the German Army that initially recruited all other nationalities except these "Germanics"!

Indeed, the German Army's negative views of the W-SS's predecessors may well have been influenced by institutional rivalry, but they are also based on the empirical evidence of their early military limitations during the Polish Campaign.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Benwi,

It didn't much matter where the three senior W-SS divisions were in mid 1942, as they were all too ground down to sustain divisional strength. They thus missed not only the 1942 summer offensive, but the winter campaign at Stalingrad. Had they been capable of a significant offensive contribution in the south in mid 1942, Nazi prestige would have demanded their presence. Yet they were absent at the crux of the war.

If a similar proportion of the senior Army formations had been withdrawn over the summer and winter of 1942-43, all the 50-odd Welle I, Active panzer, motorized, mountain and infantry divisions would have disappeared from the line with fatal consequences. That this didn't happen was because the Army had a more sustainable recruitment, training and replacement infrastructure than the W-SS.

Cheers,

Sid.

[benwi]

Hi Benwi,

It didn't much matter where the three senior W-SS divisions were in mid 1942, as they were all too ground down to sustain divisional strength. They thus missed not only the 1942 summer offensive, but the winter campaign at Stalingrad. Had they been capable of a significant offensive contribution in the south in mid 1942, Nazi prestige would have demanded their presence. Yet they were absent at the crux of the war.

If a similar proportion of the senior Army formations had been withdrawn over the summer and winter of 1942-43, all the 50-odd Welle I, Active panzer, motorized, mountain and infantry divisions would have disappeared from the line with fatal consequences. That this didn't happen was because the Army had a more sustainable recruitment, training and replacement infrastructure than the W-SS.

Cheers,

Sid.

That is incorrect.Leibstandarte was refitted in the east and sent to OB West in july.Das Reich was refitted in Germany and also sent to France in july.Both divisions were sent to France because of the threat of an allied invasion. They could have been used in the east earlier if that intent had existed.Totenkopf was refitted much later than the other two.

6.and 7. Panzerdivisions of the Heer were also in France refitting so the Waffen SS divisions were not the only ones sent away for refit.

[ljadw]

Not true:DR and LSS were not ready at the day of Uranus.And they were not sent to France because of the threat of an allied invasion , but to be refitted and transformed in a mobile division .Only one division could be used in the east in november 1942 : 6PzD.There was no threat of an invasion in the autumn of 1942,but DR and the LSS remained in France . Thus ....
The LSS had lost 50% of the 11000 men with whom it invaded the SU on June 22 1941, the losses of DS were even heavier. The figures at WWII stats are speaking volumes .

[benwi]

Not true:DR and LSS were not ready at the day of Uranus.And they were not sent to France because of the threat of an allied invasion , but to be refitted and transformed in a mobile division .Only one division could be used in the east in november 1942 : 6PzD.There was no threat of an invasion in the autumn of 1942,but DR and the LSS remained in France . Thus ....
The LSS had lost 50% of the 11000 men with whom it invaded the SU on June 22 1941, the losses of DS were even heavier. The figures at WWII stats are speaking volumes .

Clearly contradicted by the unit histories of DR and LAH.There was certainly the threat of an allied invasion(as mentioned for example in Entscheidung im Westen 1944,Dieter Ose p 23) and that is t why DR and LAH where in France to the disposal of OB West.You seem to have forgotten the landing at Dieppe so it was not just a threat.DR was also part of the forces that occupied Vichy France in november 1942.They could perfectly have been sent earlier to the east together with 6.Pz. but they were needed in France.

[CNE503]

Clearly, at this time, these three units were divisions needing to be refitted to become mechanized units, that could be hypothetically used in limited combat operations in France (in case of an improbable maritime invasion or for security purposes). But in no way fit to mobile high intensity warfare in the Eastern Front.

Thank you Sid for your excellent posts - in case some of the contributors forget to say something about them...

Cheers,

CNE503