Why the Waffen-SS
Re: Why the Waffen-SS
Pure nonsense!
The Panzer divisions were fine for defensive work.
The Panzer divisions were fine for defensive work.
-
- Member
- Posts: 367
- Joined: 20 Sep 2015, 11:37
- Location: the sun
Re: Why the Waffen-SS
what do you want to buy?
Re: Why the Waffen-SS
If you want to study an effective way to stop the defensive capabilities of panzer divisions, study the Red Army attacks in 1945. The Vistula-Oder Offensive in particular, in which firepower went into the operational depths and paralyzed the panzer reserves from even making a stubborn defensive stand. In Normandy there was no such success. You guys spend too much time fighting your so-called "fanboys" on the internet.
Re: Why the Waffen-SS
Rückmarsch Then and Now: The German Retreat from Normandy
Re: Why the Waffen-SS
I notice that the myth of allied air power is still around.
The key achievement of allied air power was accomplished in the build up to the invasion - the neutralization of the Luftwaffe and the achievement of effective air supremacy.
Allied air power inflicted little physical damage on the German forces.
The main effect was psychological. Allied strategic air power was used in a tactical role on a limited number of occasions. Troops subjected to it explained that they survived but were so shocked by the impact of the bombing that it took them some time to become capable of offering significant resistance to a follow up attack by ground forces.
The main psychological effect of fighter bomber attacks was to create fear that any movement would result in being attacked. All German movements, both tactical and operational were dominated by this fear. The planning assumption was to estimate how long a particular movement should be expected to take and then double it.
The Germans were beaten in Normandy in part due to systemic failure of their intelligence and logistics organisations, the Waffen SS had, of course, nothing to offer in these key areas. German operational level planning was equally as bad as intelligence and logistics, although again the Waffen SS had nothing to offer in this important area.
Another interesting fact is that German tactical doctrine played to the allied strength. 12 SS Panzer, for example, was, in fact, a professional organisation. As such it was predictable. The Canadians knew that once they had attacked and seized an objective, the Germans would immediately leave cover and attempt a counter-attack. The Canadians would then be able to use their superiority in artillery to pound the Germans when they were in the open. It seems to have worked on numerous occasions.
Regards
John
The key achievement of allied air power was accomplished in the build up to the invasion - the neutralization of the Luftwaffe and the achievement of effective air supremacy.
Allied air power inflicted little physical damage on the German forces.
The main effect was psychological. Allied strategic air power was used in a tactical role on a limited number of occasions. Troops subjected to it explained that they survived but were so shocked by the impact of the bombing that it took them some time to become capable of offering significant resistance to a follow up attack by ground forces.
The main psychological effect of fighter bomber attacks was to create fear that any movement would result in being attacked. All German movements, both tactical and operational were dominated by this fear. The planning assumption was to estimate how long a particular movement should be expected to take and then double it.
The Germans were beaten in Normandy in part due to systemic failure of their intelligence and logistics organisations, the Waffen SS had, of course, nothing to offer in these key areas. German operational level planning was equally as bad as intelligence and logistics, although again the Waffen SS had nothing to offer in this important area.
Another interesting fact is that German tactical doctrine played to the allied strength. 12 SS Panzer, for example, was, in fact, a professional organisation. As such it was predictable. The Canadians knew that once they had attacked and seized an objective, the Germans would immediately leave cover and attempt a counter-attack. The Canadians would then be able to use their superiority in artillery to pound the Germans when they were in the open. It seems to have worked on numerous occasions.
Regards
John
Re: Why the Waffen-SS
Histan, the Panzer divisions have a long track record (1939-1944) on all fronts for stubbornly holding positions until the infantry/armor bleeds out. That's the furthest extent of my statement. The operational and strategic inferiority of the wehrmacht on all fronts was obvious ( in 43-45).
Re: Why the Waffen-SS
You a pint so you can drown your sorrows while reading about the failure of your much vaunted SS
-
- Member
- Posts: 367
- Joined: 20 Sep 2015, 11:37
- Location: the sun
Re: Why the Waffen-SS
Histanhistan wrote: ↑28 Aug 2018, 23:46I notice that the myth of allied air power is still around.
The key achievement of allied air power was accomplished in the build up to the invasion - the neutralization of the Luftwaffe and the achievement of effective air supremacy.
Allied air power inflicted little physical damage on the German forces.
The main effect was psychological. Allied strategic air power was used in a tactical role on a limited number of occasions. Troops subjected to it explained that they survived but were so shocked by the impact of the bombing that it took them some time to become capable of offering significant resistance to a follow up attack by ground forces.
The main psychological effect of fighter bomber attacks was to create fear that any movement would result in being attacked. All German movements, both tactical and operational were dominated by this fear. The planning assumption was to estimate how long a particular movement should be expected to take and then double it.
The Germans were beaten in Normandy in part due to systemic failure of their intelligence and logistics organisations, the Waffen SS had, of course, nothing to offer in these key areas. German operational level planning was equally as bad as intelligence and logistics, although again the Waffen SS had nothing to offer in this important area.
Another interesting fact is that German tactical doctrine played to the allied strength. 12 SS Panzer, for example, was, in fact, a professional organisation. As such it was predictable. The Canadians knew that once they had attacked and seized an objective, the Germans would immediately leave cover and attempt a counter-attack. The Canadians would then be able to use their superiority in artillery to pound the Germans when they were in the open. It seems to have worked on numerous occasions.
Regards
John
One of my grandfathers was Leutnant and Zugführer in 2nd PzDiv and your claims are - highly controversial- quotations of authers like Zetterling. My grandfather told me that in Normandy the PERMANENT attacks of Jagdbomber were crucial. Moral wise of course. But also regarding mobile warfare and losses. Manoeuvre was not possible and losses in the small country roads were permanent on a daily basis. Not only tanks, but Cars, trucks, ammunution, fuel, nachrichtenausrüstung etc He died 2011 as i was still young. He should have made an account on AHF
Re: Why the Waffen-SS
I wanted to know LSSAH k.i.a. in Greece which I researched and posted here other than that I have no Interest
-
- Member
- Posts: 367
- Joined: 20 Sep 2015, 11:37
- Location: the sun
Re: Why the Waffen-SS
Re: Why the Waffen-SS
My post represents the current view of air power and its accomplishments in the Normandy Campaign. Here is just one example
After Normandy, allied analysts examined the causes of German armoued losses in Normandy:
65 per cent by allied tanks or ant-tank weapons
10 percent by aircraft
25 percent abandoned, broken down, or out of fuel.
Of 223 Mk V Panthers destroyed in 1944, 14 were killed by aircraft (11 by RPs)
In the Falaise Pocket during August, Typhoons claimed 222 armoured vehicles but only 13 of the total 388 found destroyed were attributed to RPs or 3 percent.
All of this information is taken from reports prepared by the scientists operating in theatre to get accurate information on weapon effectiveness. Just another area where the Western Allies were superior to the Germans.
Regards
John
After Normandy, allied analysts examined the causes of German armoued losses in Normandy:
65 per cent by allied tanks or ant-tank weapons
10 percent by aircraft
25 percent abandoned, broken down, or out of fuel.
Of 223 Mk V Panthers destroyed in 1944, 14 were killed by aircraft (11 by RPs)
In the Falaise Pocket during August, Typhoons claimed 222 armoured vehicles but only 13 of the total 388 found destroyed were attributed to RPs or 3 percent.
All of this information is taken from reports prepared by the scientists operating in theatre to get accurate information on weapon effectiveness. Just another area where the Western Allies were superior to the Germans.
Regards
John