Why the Waffen-SS

[Aida1]

Hi Aida1,


On top of this, you also have the problem of explaining why the three other Reich-raised Waffen-SS panzer divisions saw no action for up to 15 months after their first formation, while their army equivalents were back in action in half the time? Again, Why this special treatment for the Waffen-SS?



I
Cheers,

Sid.

Again ridiculous because of what the intended role of these divisions was. Has been told io you before but you choose not to read what i post.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Aida1,

As I have pointed out to you before, if the 9th, 10th and 12th Waffen-SS Divisions could only be deployed in the West, this made them less flexible and useful than equivalent Army divisions which could be deployed anywhere. What you are doing by employing this argument is simply adding to the questions against the advisability of the creation of the Waffen-SS as a separate military arm in the first place. I am perfectly content that my position should be unexpectedly reinforced by you in this way.

You post, "No division was sent to France to have a nice holiday." How much more so is that true of all the Army divisions on the Eastern Front? Most of them never even got the opportunity to go to France over June 1942 to June 1944! Even the 3rd Waffen-SS's four months in France was more than most Army divisions got. Holiday or not, France was a very easy posting compared with the Eastern Front over mid-1942 to mid-1944, during which period five of the six Reich-raised Waffen-SS divisions spent anything between nearly half and all their time there engaging in no combat whatsoever!

1st and 2nd Waffen-SS Divisions actually spent approaching half the 24 months between June 1942 and June 1944 in inactive theatres in the West. 9th and 10th Waffen-SS Divisions saw only brief combat for two or three months and 12th Waffen-SS Division saw no combat at all in the first year of its existence. I would suggest to you that this makes it look as though five of the six Reich-raised Waffen-SS divisions were not pulling their full weight on operations over mid-1942 to mid-1944.

Yup, apparent special treatment for the senior Reich-raised Waffen-SS divisions. The German Army had ten motorised divisions, not one of which was posted to France in 1942-43. All remained on operations on the Eastern Front. By contrast, the two senior Waffen-SS divisions spent half 1942 in the backwater of France, a month away from any active theatre of operations.

The Grossdeutschland Division reinforces my point. It was yet another Army motorized division that stayed on the Eastern Front and did not go to France.

According to you above, the senior Waffen-SS divisions were no more damaged by their first year in Russia than the ten equivalent Army motorized divisions. Yet, while the Army divisions continued the struggle on the Eastern Front throughout the year, first two, and then all three, senior Waffen-SS divisions were withdrawn for rebuilding in Germany and France. Why the Waffen-SS? Why not the Army divisions? Looks a lot like special treatment to me!

However good or bad the reasoning or motivation behind it, the fact remains that the Reich-raised Waffen-SS divisions spent a high proportion of their time over mid-1942 to mid-1944 not on any active battlefront. By contrast, most of their Army equivalents were continuously on operations throughout this period.

This is not a criticism of the divisions concerned themselves - they just went where they were told to go.

However, it is an indictment of the way the history of the Waffen-SS is written that, according to you, with your numerous Waffen-SS divisional histories, none of the authors concerned appear to have noticed that so much of the years from mid-1942 to mid-1944 was spent by five of the six Reich-raised Waffen-SS divisions far from any active battlefront, while most of their Army equivalents were continuously on active battlefronts.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Peter89]

With all due respect Sid, I don't see what you are arguing for. I mean I understand your arguments, but what you are trying to prove? That the Waffen-SS got special treatment in many cases?

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Peter89,

I am not trying to "prove" anything.

I am simply observing the prolonged absences of five of the six senior, Reich-raised Waffen-SS divisions from active battlefronts anywhere over mid-1942 to mid-1944, when, by contrast, the great majority of the equivalent Army divisions were struggling on several battlefronts.

From what Aida1 says, it appears that Waffen-SS "historians" have, for some reason, failed to notice this and some of their readers are, it appears, reluctant to accept it.

This rather contradicts the public image of the Waffen-SS as Nazism's ideological spearhead against Soviet Bolshevism.

This leads to the question; Why such special treatment for the senior, Reich-raised, Waffen-SS divisions, when the equivalent Army divisions could have done exactly the same job?

There is clearly differential treatment between the Waffen-SS and Army going on that is not explicable by random chance and it is worth asking why this is so.

As the thread title says, "Why the Waffen-SS"?

Cheers,

Sid.

[Peter89]

Hi Peter89,

I am not trying to "prove" anything.

I am simply observing the prolonged absences of five of the six senior, Reich-raised Waffen-SS divisions from active battlefronts anywhere over mid-1942 to mid-1944, when, by contrast, the great majority of the equivalent Army divisions were struggling on several battlefronts.

From what Aida1 says, it appears that Waffen-SS "historians" have, for some reason, failed to notice this and some of their readers are, it appears, reluctant to accept it.

This rather contradicts the public image of the Waffen-SS as Nazism's ideological spearhead against Soviet Bolshevism.

This leads to the question; Why such special treatment for the senior, Reich-raised, Waffen-SS divisions, when the equivalent Army divisions could have done exactly the same job?

There is clearly differential treatment between the Waffen-SS and Army going on that is not explicable by random chance and it is worth asking why this is so.

As the thread title says, "Why the Waffen-SS"?

Cheers,

Sid.

But I guess it's obvious, no?

The Waffen-SS was a party-army, and as such it received special treatment, for example longer periods of recuperation, better access to supplies and equipment, etc.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Peter89,

I would largely agree, but this is not obvious to everyone, particularly those who are already heavily invested in its mystique rather than its reality, or newcomers to the subject.

The Waffen-SS was a project with clear political virtue for the Nazis, but not necessarily one of clear military virtue for Germany.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Cult Icon]

But I guess it's obvious, no?

The Waffen-SS was a party-army, and as such it received special treatment, for example longer periods of recuperation, better access to supplies and equipment, etc.

Broad generalizations- even if we are talking about the "premier" units of the SS- cannot really be applicable as the circumstances were complicated. This is immediately apparent if one has the SS literature/data and not engage in conjecture. Yes and no. Overall rhetoric games and language manipulation is a fool's errand.

For instance 101 and 102 SS Heavy Panzer battalion did their primary training with a crash course April-May 1944- quite minimal. 101 seems to have wasted a lot of time prior to the training compared to 102. SS Pz Regiment 12 had a very under-resourced training course and relied on improvised crash courses- on site- to develop officers and ncos from their SS/HJ recruits/air force conscripts. This lehrgang continued throughout the normandy campaign to generate replacements for crew casualties.

Or one could argue that the HJ division was "favored" as it held the bulk of the Caen frontline- having one of the most important jobs- and was allocated a lot of replacement tanks and other resources. Or you could argue that it was mainly because the unit was at "ground zero".

or one could wonder why the 101 SS Heavy tank battalion had so many inexperienced personnel and only 6 out of 12 platoon commanders having actual combat experience in tanks.

One could make the argument that the proposed third SS Tiger battalion in March 1943, Totenkopf, and Wiking divisions were not as "favored" as Leibstandarte and Das Reich given that they were deployed exclusively in the East and spent an excessive amount of time in the front line. And, also not as well equipped with vehicles and replacements particularly after June 1944 when the Normandy theater was prioritized. The development of the third SS Tiger battalion of the Totenkopf cadre was delayed by months due to resources being shifted to boost the Das Reich and Leibstandarte Tiger units first.

The 17.SS GvB in the West Front was a mess of a formation for this existence and underequipped. Yet for some reason it was getting assigned important roles despite AOK complaints. You can see the same thing with the German regular army.

Things happen, it doesn't need to have rhythm or reason or follow statements developed from assumptions & prejudices.

This things I just stated are in various literature and based on data- Das Reich Tigers, Totenkopt Tigers, GvB divisional histories, HJ etc.

[Aida1]

But I guess it's obvious, no?

The Waffen-SS was a party-army, and as such it received special treatment, for example longer periods of recuperation, better access to supplies and equipment, etc.

As a general rule would not be correct. The only divisions having longer periods without action would be the ones that were lucky to be sent to OB West or anywhere else without action and that included Heer divisions. Geting enough vehicles was a problem for waffen ss divisions too, particularly the ones set up later. DR and LAH would be the only ones that would get priority over other waffen ss divisions where men and equipment is concerned..

[Aida1]

Hi Peter89,

I am not trying to "prove" anything.

I am simply observing the prolonged absences of five of the six senior, Reich-raised Waffen-SS divisions from active battlefronts anywhere over mid-1942 to mid-1944, when, by contrast, the great majority of the equivalent Army divisions were struggling on several battlefronts.

From what Aida1 says, it appears that Waffen-SS "historians" have, for some reason, failed to notice this and some of their readers are, it appears, reluctant to accept it.

This rather contradicts the public image of the Waffen-SS as Nazism's ideological spearhead against Soviet Bolshevism.

This leads to the question; Why such special treatment for the senior, Reich-raised, Waffen-SS divisions, when the equivalent Army divisions could have done exactly the same job?

There is clearly differential treatment between the Waffen-SS and Army going on that is not explicable by random chance and it is worth asking why this is so.

As the thread title says, "Why the Waffen-SS"?

Cheers,

Sid.

Obviously a load of nonsense as has been pointed out to you several times. You still are intentionally ignoring the historical reasons for the sending of DR and LAH to France in 1942 and the fact that the 3 others you mentioned were purely meant for OB West and to stay there until the allied landing.
And obviously completely not talking about waffen ss divisions that were on the front most of the time
You have a lot of bias but not a lot of knowledge.

[Peter89]

The Waffen-SS was established to create a party army, and as such, it received special treatment. However, it doesn't mean that every single Waffen-SS unit received better treatment or that all the Heer units received bad treatment.

I thought it's obvious that Waffen-SS existed primarily for political reasons; for example, it allowed foreign nationals to fight for Germany, or exempt ethnic Germans in other Axis countries to serve their time in the military of their respective nations.

Other than my relatives who were forced into the Waffen-SS and thus generally despised it, I have no dog in the fight, if I'm using that phrase correctly.

[Aida1]

Hi Aida1,

As I have pointed out to you before, if the 9th, 10th and 12th Waffen-SS Divisions could only be deployed in the West, this made them less flexible and useful than equivalent Army divisions which could be deployed anywhere. What you are doing by employing this argument is simply adding to the questions against the advisability of the creation of the Waffen-SS as a separate military arm in the first place. I am perfectly content that my position should be unexpectedly reinforced by you in this way.

Y
Cheers,

Sid.

Being devious again as usual by intentionally misinterpreting what i stated. Being meant for OB West meant that they SHOULD not be deployed elsewhere. OB West did need mobile reserves and had been completely depleted of them in 1943. I pointed out to you before that Hitler forbade depleting OB West and that rule was valid for all divisions belonging to OB west but then did it anyway when a crisis developed in the east and as a consequence 9 and 10 ss were absent in june 1944.

[Aida1]

Hi Aida1,





1st and 2nd Waffen-SS Divisions actually spent approaching half the 24 months between June 1942 and June 1944 in inactive theatres in the West. 9th and 10th Waffen-SS Divisions saw only brief combat for two or three months and 12th Waffen-SS Division saw no combat at all in the first year of its existence. I would suggest to you that this makes it look as though five of the six Reich-raised Waffen-SS divisions were not pulling their full weight on operations over mid-1942 to mid-1944.



Cheers,

Sid.

Which is nonsense for the reasons you know very well. Given that the allies would not tell Hitler beforehand when they were going to land ; Germany did continuously have to have divisions in France including good mobile divisions and so they would spend this time not fighting . You make it into a reproach being in reserve in France including when the landing was imminent in 1944

[Aida1]

Hi Aida1,


Yup, apparent special treatment for the senior Reich-raised Waffen-SS divisions. The German Army had ten motorised divisions, not one of which was posted to France in 1942-43. All remained on operations on the Eastern Front. By contrast, the two senior Waffen-SS divisions spent half 1942 in the backwater of France, a month away from any active theatre of operations.

Cheers,

Sid.

Again ignoring why DR and LAH were sent. You actually want Hitler to send depleted mot div of AGN or AGC when an allied landing was considered imminent instead of the almost refitted DR which was near and LAH which was at full strength Implicitly you are saying that Hitler knew there would be no landing and he sent them to have a rest because that is exactly what preferential treatment means.

[Aida1]

Hi Aida1,


However, it is an indictment of the way the history of the Waffen-SS is written that, according to you, with your numerous Waffen-SS divisional histories, none of the authors concerned appear to have noticed that so much of the years from mid-1942 to mid-1944 was spent by five of the six Reich-raised Waffen-SS divisions far from any active battlefront, while most of their Army equivalents were continuously on active battlefronts.

Cheers,

Sid.

You really are overestimating yourself here by thinking you have made a discovery that not any historian has ever noticed . Serious historians know very well all the things i told you here and i am not specifically talking about authors of the unit histories i mentioned who were not historians anyway .I am talking about history works on the second world war written by historians who clearly are better informed than you and less biased .Reason you have no support for your statements which are a purely uninformed and biased personal opinion for which you give zero source and authority.

[Aida1]

'Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommando der Wehrmacht 1942 Teil 2 Percy Schramm Bernard & Graefe Verlag pp 902-903

4 november 1942
The führer has ordered that the 6 pz div and 2 infantry divisions including the 306 are to be transferred from west to east, namely to Heeresgruppe B as intervention reserve behind the Rumanian 3rd and Italian 8 army. The refit of the 6 Panzer should not be done to the detriment of the other mobile divisions of OB West....

Comment by General Warlimont
With the west-east shift ordered on this day in favour of Heeresgruppe B , the Original thought of an exchange at a ratio of 2 battle weary east divisions for 1 refitted division from the west , was abandoned again. It is highly probably that a procedure emerged which would be used more and more, that Zeitzler had himself promised by Hitler without participation of the OKW staff, divisions for the east which he knew very well from his former position, and Jodl silently accepted. Even when the west could certainly give some units given the advanced time of year, still the anarchistic way of given orders meant an overexploitation of diminishing forces , which ended with the very poor equipment of the west at the time of the invasion in june 1944. Moreover it was clear in advance that the abovementioned units would be insufficient for their missions in the east and would also come too late.'

Just some context about shifting divisions between east and west.