The following renowned Historian James Lucas presents one of the best described appraisals of the Volkssturm
Reich: World War II Through German Eyes By James Lucas
The Political Military Forces
Seen from the perspective of the Party leadership the German Army had failed the Führer.
A new spirit would infuse the German soldier – a revolutionary one. Behind that wall of inflamed Nazi warriors would stand a second line of
Party-raised troops, the Volkssturm, and those in that organization who were veterans of former wars would be infected by the revolutionary spirit
of their youthful comrades, boys who had not yet reached military age. Together youth and maturity would form a second National Socialist
bulwark against which the enemy hordes would fling themselves in.
During the autumn of 1944, certain Party revolutionaries were promoted to senior positions of command and were expected to halt the Allied advances towards and into Germany. To aid the dilettante commanders in their task it was vital that new military forces be found. These
would need to be inspired with revolutionary élan if they were to succeed in the task of defending the Reich, where the traditional army had
failed.
A memorandum written by General Heusinger in 1943 had proposed a Home Defence Force, an idea which had been rejected as unnecessary at
that time by Hitler. The proposal was raised again in July 1944, in the light of experience gained by those Gauleiters who had raised civilian labour forces to dig defences along the Reichs frontiers. Out of that successful application of Reichs Defence Commissar powers, which Hitler had
given to the Gauleiters, evolved the concept of a military force raised by the Party, and, therefore, free from negative, reactionary influences.
The leadership of the organization would be that of the Party at every level – national, regional and unit. The only part that the Regular Army
would play would be in arming and equipping the new force. Even at that level the influence of the Party would be strong, because Himmler,
in his new role as Commander of Replacement Armies, was responsible for the supply of weapons.
At that period of the war there was no uncommitted manpower source from which a new, full-time military force might be obtained. The wave
of soldiers who might have been used had already been called to the colours and posted to their units. The next call-up was months away and
time could not wait until the next class of conscripted men came of age. The need for a great mass of men was now urgent. Those who would
make up the new force would need to be in reasonably good health, not too old and based locally. The only body which met these requirements
and which was not already in the armed forces or registered for military service was the work-force in the factories.
It was obvious that among the 13 million men in industry there would be many who met the criteria demanded.
The standard procedure to call up men to the colours was slow and cumbersome. A newer method needed to be found. The solution lay in the
Party’s own organization. The Gauleiters could establish from Party records which men in the factories were available for local defence service
and under their authority as Reichs Commissars could conscript the factory workers as temporary soldiers to defend the factories and their own homes. That was the original intention; for the Volkssturm to be a local unit defending its own area for a limited period of time.
The tactical unit would be a battalion and this would be activated by the Gauleiter under his Reichs Defence Commissar powers. The men of
the battalion, now armed and equipped as soldiers, would occupy the trenches which another rected body of workers would have already dug.
The Volkssturm men would hold those field fortifications until the well-armed and better-trained Regular Army arrived to relieve them.
The Volkssturm battalion would then be stood down and its men would go back to work in the factories until some new crisis caused them to
be reactivated.
In German history there had been many instances of local men being called up to guard or, if necessary, to fight in defence of their own areas.
From the earliest days of the Prussian Army the Landsturm, as such a body was named, had formed a part of the military establishment. What
was unique was that the new force would be totally outside the control of the Army until the time came for the battalions to go into action.
Hitler, acting through the Party Chancery, would advise the Gauleiter to activate the battalions within his Gau. His units would take post and
only then would they come under military control.
The proposal made in 1943 by General Heusinger was warmly received in Berlin in 1944, and on 6 September Hitler directed Martin Bormann to undertake the raising of a National Socialist military militia to which he gave the name ‘Volkssturm’.
Within three weeks the basic organization had been completed. Hitler’s Decree of 25 September, which formally raised the new body, is
interesting reading. It opens with a blazing condemnation of Germany’s allies for having failed her but claims that the situation in September
1944 was similar to that which had faced Germany in 1939, when she had stood alone against her enemies.
At that time, by a first ruthless application of the Reich’s potential, difficult military problems had been solved and Germany’s future, as indeed
that of the whole of Europe, had been assured. These enemies of the Reich who were now approaching the Reich’s frontiers would be met by a second massive effort of the German people. This would not only fling back the enemy but would hold him at bay until the future of Germany
and all Europe could be guaranteed. Against the nihilistic plan of Jewish international interests Germany would set the assault of the whole
German people.
The Führer’s Decree ordered that all men between the ages of 16 and 60, who were capable of bearing arms, were to be enlisted into the Volkssturm. Each Gauleiter was made responsible for raising and commanding the Volkssturm battalions within his Gau and he was to use every
Party organization to enable him to carry out the task. The Chief of Staff of the SA, Schepmann, was named as the Volkssturm’s Inspector-General, responsible for training, and Kraus, leader of the NSKK (National Sozialistisch Kraftfahr Korps, the Nazi Motorized Corps) was given the post of Inspector-General of Transport and was to ensure the mobility of the Volkssturm.
The future warriors were assured that during the period of their service they would be soldiers as that term was understood in military law.
Himmler, in his capacity as Commander of the Replacement Army, was not only responsible for the arming and equipping of the entire
organization, but was also the channel through which Hitler’s orders concerning Volkssturm operations were to be passed.
To conclude his proclamation Hitler declared that the National Socialist Party was fulfilling its duty by using its own organization to bear the
main burden of the battle. The Volkssturm Decree was made public on 18 October and promulgated in the official Gazette two days later. A
special postage stamp was also issued bearing the motto, ‘A people arises’, and a new film, Kolberg, showing the heroism of the citizens of a beleaguered city, was released.
The Party’s plan was for four waves of the Volkssturm to be raised. The men of the first wave could be called up as long as their conscription did
not prejudice the national war effort, and only battalions from that wave might, with authority, be used outside their local territorial areas. The second wave would not be activated until the imminent approach of the enemy whereupon they would be mustered and go into action. The men
of the second wave were, generally, younger than those in the first wave, and were without military training. The average age of the men of the
first wave was 52 and many would have seen service during the First World War.
The third and fourth waves were made up of practically every other reasonably fit male person. Fit was a relative term to some dedicated
Gauleiters who did not scruple to enrol cripples or amputees and then not only for simple guard duties, but also for active service.
The problem of arming the six million men who, theoretically, might be liable for Volkssturm service was not easily resolved. The first wave
alone, comprising 30 per cent of the whole, would provide 1.2 million men who would be formed into 1,850 battalions. These first-wave men had
to be armed, but there was a crisis in the production of the German Army’s standard infantry rifle. Not only had production declined to 200,000 pieces per month, but the Army had to replace the 3,500,000 rifles which had been lost between April and August 1944.
The Army Ordnance Depot designed several types of robust, cheap and easily made Volkssturm weapons, relying upon pressed metal and not precision-machined parts. The weapon finally selected was the VG I-5 of which 10,000 were to be produced each month. It was planned that production would be carried out in decentralized workshops and that final assembly would be made in centralized factories. Raids by the
RAF halted the flow of weapons parts and local gunsmiths had to be employed on the task of arming the Party’s Army.
To cover deficiencies in machine-guns the Luftwaffe was directed to supply such weapons from its stocks. Two consignments, one of 150,000 and
one of 180,000 pieces, were issued for Volkssturm use. The Regular Army intended to stand aloof from the task of arming the Volkssturm,
particularly since their own firearms and supplies position was critical. An Army Order dated 12 December made the point on rations very clear.
‘The equipping … of the Volkssturm is a Party matter … only on active service will their units be fed from Army resources.’
Tactically, each battalion of the Volkssturm would have four companies, each of which was divided into four platoons each of four sections.
Since the units were locally based there was no need for a staff system or for rear echelon detachments.
Such liaison officers as would be needed would be Party members who had had military experience. The Gauleiter chose the battalion
commanders who then appointed company commanders. They in turn selected the platoon commanders who nominated the section leaders.
This was in some respects an excellent system since the men of the smaller detachments – section and platoon – would have usually served
together in a Party ‘block’. To overcome the problem of a Party official expecting to hold rank in the Volkssturm because of his political position,
it was ordered that no major Party formation could join the Volkssturm enbloc.
The clothing of the Volkssturm was as simple as its organization. Under the terms of the Geneva Convention it is not necessary for a combatant
to wear full uniform. So long as he can be recognized as a soldier, that is sufficient, and in that context an armband provides identification.
Certainly, Germany in the desperate situation of 1944 could never have supplied uniforms to the new Volkssturm army.
The only items on general issue were identity documents, identity tags and the necessary armbands. These carried the words ‘Deutscher
Volkssturm – Wehrmacht’ sometimes, but not always, followed by numbers indicating the Gau, battalion and company. Party members wore
their usual uniforms from which the collar patches and shoulder strap insignia consisted of silver stars worn on two black rectangular collar
patches; four stars in the case of a battalion commander, three, two and one for ranks from company commander down to section leader
respectively.
In an effort to clothe men with warm garments a final collection was made by the Party’s charity organizations and was very successful. Some Gauleiters were able to provide from such sources the stout boots, warm clothing and overcoats that each Sturmmann was recommended to
wear. Each man supplied his own equipment: a rucksack, blanket, water-bottle, mug and eating utensils.
The weapons establishment for a first-wave battalion was 649 rifles, 31 light and six heavy machine-guns; for a second-wave unit 576 rifles,
30 light and three heavy machine-guns; while no establishment was laid down for the third and fourth waves for whom, it was anticipated,
shotguns or hunting rifles would be sufficient.
Mortars were on establishment but were seldom used as they were often commandeered by Regular Army units to increase their own
establishment of such weapons. The familiar picture of a Volkssturm man is of an elderly gentleman armed with one or other of the newly
introduced types of rocket-launcher, either the Panzerfaust or the Panzerschreck. Six of each of these were on issue to each battalion.
It must be appreciated that these numbers of men and women were the laiddown establishments. They were seldom met and it was not unusual
for the battalion to be issued with fewer weapons than expected or for those weapons to be practically useless. Great numbers of captured
enemy guns were issued for which there was little ammunition. The equality of sacrifice demanded by the National Socialist Party was unusually
rigid in the matter of the issue of firearms to the Volkssturm. It might have been expected that in those Gaus where there was little immediate danger, few weapons would have been distributed to the battalions and that more lavish supply would have been made to the units in the
provinces facing the most immediate danger. This did not happen.
The Volkssturm battalions in the eastern provinces which were activated to face the Red Army received only the same number of weapons as
those battalions in unthreatened areas of central Germany. Thus, in East Prussia, some battalions went into action with its men armed with
foreign rifles and 30 rounds of ammunition and with no prospect of further supplies.
Although the Volkssturm was conceived as an infantry force there were certain anomalies. One Prussian battalion obtained a battery of 75mm
field guns from a museum and soon had them in firing condition, using the artillery pieces to support the attacks launched by their own infantry companies. Some units with NSKK leaders converted soft skin vehicles to armoured cars for reconnaissance missions.
Gauleiter Koch, always an innovator, formed a night-fighter squadron made up of civilian light aircraft piloted by Volkssturm men who had been trained by the waffe. Koch’s flying circus never saw action. Lack of petrol grounded the machines.
Although the Volkssturm was conceived as a stop-gap force, whose men would only be called from their factories when the enemy drew near, inevitably there were occasions when the battalions were put into action as front-line troops. One of the Party criticisms concerning Volkssturm
was that the battalions in the west, which had had a longer time to train and to prepare for battle, did not perform so well as the units in the
east.
It says a lot for the morale of the Volkssturm men of the east that they stood firm. Consider how they must have felt as they, armed with a
miscellany of firearms and equipped only for a short infantry action, marched towards the front, passing on their march heavily armed panzer
units which were withdrawing in front of the Red Army. The panzers were pulling back, yet they, the Volkssturm, under-trained and poorly
armed, were expected to hold back the Red hordes.
The feelings of the Volkssturmmüanner can also be well imagined when the ‘No retreat!’ orders were issued. The author of one report stated how
he rang an army unit to ask for permission to withdraw from a village which he and a handful of men were still holding. The officer at the other
end of the telephone line was adamant. ‘There will be no withdrawal. Any man leaving his post will be shot.’ To that tirade the writer of the
report asked who would form the firing-squad, for the soldiers had abandoned the place days earlier. The officer hung up.
Inevitably, there were some units which showed incredible bravery and others which broke up leaving the men to return home. Among those
units which demonstrated the devotion to duty for which the Party had hoped were the East Prussian battalions in beleaguered Königsberg. The
Volkssturm there, organized into 11 battalions, fought alongside army units and one Sturmmann won the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross for his bravery in destroying enemy tanks at close quarters. In Pomerania the Volkssturm destroyed nearly 400 Russian armoured fighting vehicles using Panzerfaust rocket-launchers. The tank-busting detachments rode around the province on bicycles and one group, having knocked out 15 tanks during one morning, received an alarm call during the afternoon and promptly smashed a
further six enemy machines.
At Kolberg, on the Baltic coast, the scene of action of Goebbels’ propaganda film, the Volkssturm garrison held out for three weeks to cover the evacuation of 80,000 refugees and wounded. The Berlin Volkssturm was called out during November and was employed in constructing field
defences and minelaying along the Oder river line. Some battalions were then put straight into battle during January and March against the
attacks launched by the 1st Belorussian Front which had broken through the German defences. In the Reichs capital about 30 battalions of Volkssturm saw service and their arms included 15 different types of rifle and ten types of machine-gun. Most men were issued with only ten
rounds and one battalion was disbanded in the Berlin Olympic stadium when the unit ran out of rifle ammunition.
The Volkssturm battalions in Breslau had, perhaps, the most impressive record. The garrison of 35,000 troops, and an SS regiment, together with some laneous German Army units and the Luftwaffe, was backed by 15,000 Volkssturmmänner. This determined garrison held the Silesian city
from 14 February until 6 May, obstructing the advance of three Soviet Army Corps and tying down the Red divisions until the war’s end.
An example of the deployment of a Volkssturm battalion outside its own Gau area is that of one from upper Austria which was activated during January 1945.
Three days’ training was given, conducted entirely in the open air, and then the unit, 560 men strong, was entrained and sent to the Oder front. During the first week the battalion not only held its sector in the face of Red Army tank assaults but also launched counter-attacks, fighting its
way forward through massed artillery barrages. Such courage was costly and within that first week half the battalion had been killed in action.
For six weeks the Austrians held the line and their short period out of action was brought to an end when they were put back in to face the
Soviet assault on 16 April. The Austrian battalion held and flung back the assaults of the 362nd Red Army Infantry Division, but such an unequal contest could have only one result.
The Soviets broke through at last and the remnants of the battalion conducted a fighting retreat towards Berlin. In their withdrawal they
destroyed a further 17 Russian tanks. The Austrians were submerged in the fighting to the south-east of Berlin, some of the survivors managing to reach the west and to pass into American prisoner-of-war camps. The others were taken by the Russians but were not shot as partisans, which
had been the fate of those who had surrendered in Königsberg, in Breslau and in many other places.
In retrospect the idea of a locally based militia defending home and hearth and the factories in which its men worked was a good one. In
practice, however, the concept was seldom met. The fighting capabilities of the battalions depended to a very marked degree upon the Gauleiter.
If he was an anxious man and called them out too early, factory production suffered and the aggressive edge of the men was lost in the waiting
time. Other Gauleiters waited so long to activate their battalions that when they were formed they were untrained and ill-equipped. It is a fact
that the greatest number of men who were eligible for Volkssturm service were not called up or saw little or no active service.
As we have seen the battalions differed in quality. Some fought well, others very bravely indeed. There were battalions that dissolved under fire
and not a few that broke up before they ever reached the combat area. In any case, the battalions had only local significance. At a national level
the Volkssturm achieved little and the concept of a people’s militia rising spontaneously and battling with National Socialist ferocity proved to be just another of the Nazi Party’s unrealized ambitions.
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