The following is an interesting piece written about the Volkssturm and the Werewolf movement I discovered on a Russian website.
Werewolf. Ruth Fraiger
Volkssturm and the Werewolf Movement.
Bormann and Goebbels, as well as other party functionaries like Robert Leigh, gradually came to the idea of the need for a "populist" (one might even say, to a certain extent, left) policy, which was to become a pledge of the beginning of a truly "people's war". There are obvious parallels with the Soviet Union and the role assigned to the Communist Party during the Great Patriotic War. But at the same time, we should not forget that the consistent supporters of this political line were the CA, the assault detachments of the NSDAP. At the time of the arrival of the Nazis to power it was the storm troopers who insisted on the formation of a "people's army". The CA leadership even started creating their own training camps, where the training of storm troopers was more like guerrilla training. All this led to a conflict with the Reichswehr, which ended in the massacre of 1934, Known in history as "the night of long knives". But even after CA lost its former position and lost political weight, they continued to train civilians. In 1939, instructors-stormtroopers were instructed to teach civilians the skills of shooting from a rifle. In the summer of 1944, this program was significantly expanded. It seemed that the stormtroopers had left the shadow again. But this takeoff was short-lived. When, in the autumn of 1944, the Red Army and the Allied troops approached the borders of Germany, it became clear that this was nothing more than a banal precaution. In addition, numerous party functionaries joined the struggle, who intended to multiply their political capital. As a result, CA remained an auxiliary organization. After suppressing the "coup of Röhm", the stormtroopers could not recover from the impact they had inflicted. Captured to the Americans, one of the high-ranking storm troopers said that the leadership of the Third Reich did not even consider the possibility of involving the CA in the preparation of partisan detachments.
When in September 1944 the Wehrmacht was on the verge of collapse for the first time, a number of generals agreed to the involvement of civilians. But in this case it was a question of building fortifications in the border areas of Germany. However, some military men expressed the idea of the need to create detachments of civilian militia, the nucleus of which could be played by local groups of CA. In this situation, even Hitler admitted that there was a need for such units. Not wishing to share this "pie" with the military and stormtroopers, he gave orders on the party line. He appointed Gauleaters of the NSDAP as Special Commissioners for the defense of the Reich. Now the power of party functionaries began to grow as the situation worsened on the fronts. It seemed that at such a critical moment for the Hitler regime ideological moments were more important. In this situation, the most energetic of the Gauleiters were already beginning to create their own militia detachments. But over time, these initiatives were blocked by the SS, as Himmler believed that the establishment of order in the country was his prerogative. However, in the border areas such initiatives were overlooked. For example, Erich Koch hatched plans to create his own "frontier corps" in East Prussia. Franz Hofer intended to put in the Tyrolean foothills for a gun 50 thousand people who would make up the "Corps of the Alpine Riflemen." In the eastern Ruhr, Albert Hoffmann formed a regional paramilitary formation of the Sauerland Volunteer Corps. That the establishment of order in the country was his prerogative. However, in the border areas such initiatives were overlooked. For example, Erich Koch hatched plans to create his own "frontier corps" in East Prussia. Franz Hofer intended to put in the Tyrolean foothills for a gun 50 thousand people who would make up the "Corps of the Alpine Riflemen." In the eastern Ruhr, Albert Hoffmann formed a regional paramilitary formation of the Sauerland Volunteer Corps. That the establishment of order in the country was his prerogative. However, in the border areas such initiatives were overlooked. For example, Erich Koch hatched plans to create his own "frontier corps" in East Prussia. Franz Hofer intended to put in the Tyrolean foothills for a gun 50 thousand people who would make up the "Corps of the Alpine Riflemen." In the eastern Ruhr, Albert Hoffmann formed a regional paramilitary formation of the Sauerland Volunteer Corps.
Later, all these formations were poured into the National Militia, whose activities were coordinated by the Party Chancellery. It can be assumed that both the Werewolf and the National Police and the Volkssturm were a reflection of the same program, with the difference that Volkssturm was a component of the "people's war" going along this front line, and "Werwolf" in the rear of the enemy . At least that's what was thought in theory. It was assumed that Volkssturm and the "Werewolf" were to unite the efforts of the NSDAP and the SS. In this tandem, the party was supposed to represent ideological and political interests, and the "guard detachments" were purely military. The possibility of starting a "people's war" faced certain difficulties. Nazi propaganda hinted at the possibility of waging war "behind the front line," but it was done very carefully,
During the creation of the Volkssturm, there were many doubts whether its members should act 6 enemy lines, like French franktiers, or only provide armed support to the acting army on this side of the front. The formal date for the creation of the Volkssturm can be considered September 6, 1944, when Hitler gave a secret order. Officially it was published only three weeks later. But the real point of reference was the speech delivered by Himmler on October 18. It is by no means accidental that the speech was uttered in East Prussia, where there already existed a kind of similarity of these detachments. Their appearance was timed to coincide with the celebration of the century of the Battle of Nations, which occurred in 1813. It was in this battle that the Prussian Landwehr took an active part. Himmler repeatedly spoke about them with inspiration and again returned to the problem of guerrilla warfare. He even hinted at the possibility of the revival of the "werewolf" units that existed during the Thirty Years' War. In particular, he uttered the following phrase: "Even on the territory occupied by the enemy, he does not need to believe that she has been conquered. The Germans will rise to resist. Again and again, these outbreaks will occur in the enemy's rear, just as the "werewolves" have challenged the death, the volunteers who took up arms to destroy the enemy. "
Such statements naturally aroused concern among both opponents and supporters of the Nazi regime. "Hitler revives the guerrillas!" - under this headline came the newspaper "Stars and Stripes", issued by the Allied Forces Command. The Allied officers immediately began to work among the soldiers, explaining that members of the Volkssturm who would fight in the rear would not be subject to the Hague Convention, and therefore they can not be regarded as prisoners of war when they are detained. On the same day, when Himmler announced the creation of the Volkssturm, the Allied Command issued a legal instruction detailing how to deal with civilians who resisted. Counted on it or not, but the presentation of the contents of this instruction fell into the hands of the Germans.
Thus, Nazi bonzes, who intended to create Volkssturm, faced an insurmountable obstacle - the legal status of the members of this organization. Almost immediately German propaganda began to shift the emphasis, essentially changing the idea of Himmler beyond recognition. And inside Germany and beyond, open text said that Volkssturm was never planned as a partisan movement. One of the German newspapers wrote: "Volkshturm is not some heap of badly armed civilians. This is an army of disciplined soldiers. They will not fight with chains and braids, they will not be cowardly in ambush, but they will perform with modern weapons in their hands, like true soldiers do. " This declaration was not only transmitted by all German media, but, most importantly, sent to foreign journalists. The author of this statement was propagandist Zandermann, who wrote it on the same day when Himmler delivered his speech in East Prussia. The Germans were very cautious: they did not want the members of the Volkssturm to be treated as they had dealt with the Poles of the Craiova Army who took an active part in the Warsaw Uprising. Against this background, in a number of concentration camps, the regime was even relaxed. For example, treatment with Yugoslav guerrillas became more "courteous", which was to be fixed by a special commission of the Red Cross. In response to these concessions, it was expected that the Allies would consider militia from Volkssturm as prisoners of war who had all the rights provided for by the Hague Convention on the Rules and Practices of Warfare. When Himmler delivered his speech in East Prussia. The Germans were very cautious: they did not want the members of the Volkssturm to be treated as they had dealt with the Poles of the Craiova Army who took an active part in the Warsaw Uprising. Against this background, in a number of concentration camps, the regime was even relaxed. For example, treatment with Yugoslav guerrillas became more "courteous", which was to be fixed by a special commission of the Red Cross. In response to these concessions, it was expected that the Allies would consider militia from Volkssturm as prisoners of war who had all the rights provided for by the Hague Convention on the Rules and Practices of Warfare. When Himmler delivered his speech in East Prussia. The Germans were very careful: they did not want the members of the Volkssturm were treated the same way as they dealt with the Poles of the Home Army, took an active part in the Warsaw Uprising. Against this background, in a number of concentration camps, the regime was even relaxed. For example, a "suave" was an appeal to the Yugoslav partisans, that had to fix a special committee of the Red Cross. In response to these concessions it was expected that the Allies will be treated as a Volkssturm militia of prisoners of war who possess all the rights under the Hague Convention on the rules and customs of war. Who took an active part in the Warsaw Uprising. Against this background, in a number of concentration camps, the regime was even relaxed. For example, a "suave" was an appeal to the Yugoslav partisans, that had to fix a special committee of the Red Cross. In response to these concessions it was expected that the Allies will be treated as a Volkssturm militia of prisoners of war who possess all the rights under the Hague Convention on the rules and customs of war. Who took an active part in the Warsaw Uprising. Against this background, in a number of concentration camps, the regime was even relaxed. For example, treatment with Yugoslav guerrillas became more "courteous", which was to be fixed by a special commission of the Red Cross. In response to these concessions, it was expected that the Allies would consider militia from Volkssturm as prisoners of war who had all the rights provided for by the Hague Convention on the Rules and Practices of Warfare.
Strangely enough, but this trick worked. At the end of October 1944 the counterintelligence of the Allies decided that she had perverted the original essence of the Volkssturm organization. A week later, the Chief of Staff of the Allied Command, General V. Smith issued a directive stating that Volkssturm detachments must be treated in accordance with the requirements of the Hague Convention, provided they met the first and second paragraphs of the convention (that is, the detachment was commanded by an officer who had Signs of distinction, and the members of the detachment openly carried weapons). British intelligence already inquired as to whether the "werewolves" mentioned by Himmler were part of the Volkssturm or not. At least on October 31, 1944, the British Foreign Minister reported to the House of Commons, That "from the point of view of international law there are no significant differences between Volkssturm and our local self-defense forces that were established in 1940". And he added: "They have the right to be perceived as a legal entity of the belligerent side." The subsequent policy of the Allies was limited to arresting only the commanders of the Volkssturm detachments. As for the other members of the detachment, as a rule, they were released to freedom. At the same time, all those released were warned that the next captivity would be punishable by death.
The Soviet side, never strictly following the letter of the Hague Convention, was not so lenient. In addition, the Soviets had previously used the people's militia as partisan detachments. The Germans carried out bloody punitive operations against them. As a result, one should not expect that after the crisis in the war the situation on German soil will somehow be different. In addition, many Red Army men misled the brown color of the uniform of Volkssturm. Prisoners were mistaken for Nazi functionaries. Although in many cases employees of Volkssturm did not have any uniform at all. Provided that they often did not wear any identification marks, it is not surprising that citizens from Volkssturm were accepted either for partisans or for saboteurs. One of the Red Army men, who was captured by the Germans at the end of the war, confirmed these suspicions. Only at the very end of the war the Soviet occupation administration began to create separate camps for the prisoners from Volkshturm, although they were still perceived as Nazi guerrillas. According to reports, one of these camps was established in East Prussia in the town of Insterburg.
So was Volkssturm a partisan formation? The directives of the party office clearly indicate that this organization should be regarded as a means to stop tank breakthroughs, acting strictly within the limits prescribed by the Hague Convention. Martin Bormann even sent out to all Gauleiter the copies of the Hague Convention, so that they brought local units of Volkssturm in strict compliance with it. One of the leaders of the Volkssturm Hans Kissel also issued a refutation, in which he stated that his organization had nothing in common with the "werewolves" and the partisan movement. After the war, Kissel argued that in order to maintain order in the detachments of this "people's militia", in 1945 a special system of military justice was introduced. Perhaps this is what kept Volkssturm from turning into a simple armed crowd.
Of course, Volkssturm had his own patrol reconnaissance, which could penetrate into the rear of the enemy. Given that the members of Volkssturm could only be distinguished by armband, such attacks were very reminiscent of partisan actions. For example, on April 9, 1945, a special detachment Haupt threw into the American rear a lot of such patrols, which moved mostly on bicycles. It happened in the area of the Thuringian Forest. But the task of scouts from Volkssturm in this situation was to learn about relations between Americans and local residents in detail. In February 1945, the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal Schörner suggested that most of the Volkssturm was absorbed by the army units. But at the same time he stressed that the patrol intelligence had to remain unchanged, Since the collection of information was the only thing in which Volkssturm succeeded. He said: "Small local groups of Volkssturm were very active in the rear and on the flanks of the enemy." In general, this proposal, which was never implemented, can be regarded as one of the Wehrmacht's attempts to strengthen its power in order to launch a successful guerrilla war in the enemy's rear.
Despite the refutations of Hans Kissel, it is possible that on the initiative of local Gauleiter and kraeslayter whole battalions of Volkssturm could be trained in the tactics of guerrilla warfare. So, for example, many civilians from Eschweiler, questioned by the counterintelligence of the First US Army, claimed that Volkssturm, formed in their city, was trained in sabotage, sabotage and ambushes. Most of those who passed out such training were not grouped in detachments. To avoid capture by the enemy, they had to portray themselves as ordinary civilians. Or another example: the soldiers captured in Rheinland reported that several times a week they trained civilians. The training program assumed the same sabotage, sabotage and tactics of partisan actions. A similar situation was observed in the Tyrolean foothills, where the Alpine hands from March to April passed training courses that did not differ much from those practiced in the Werwolf camps. By the way, many of them eventually ended up among the "werewolves."
Similar initiatives were taken on Volkssturm on the Eastern Front. In early January 1945, German officers who served in the army intelligence, began a campaign to replenish their units. In the course of it, they selected a lot of Volkssturmists who had to undergo "special training". The selected persons were mostly stormtroopers, gendarmes and party officials. Approximately thirty people were sent to the Landsberg camp in East Brandenburg, where they were actively trained in partisan activities, which they had to put into practice in the Soviet rear. The chef of this program was an Abwehr officer, Richard Graivn. On the eve of the offensive of the Red Army, these "graduates" were divided into several groups, which consisted of five to ten people, and transferred to the disposal of another scout, By the name of Geldenbrand. These small groups were supposed to destroy bridges and railways in the Soviet rear, to attack small detachments of the Red Army. At the disposal of Geldenbrand, even there were two equipped airfields, which were secretly built near Landsberg. All this indicated that the groups thrown into the rear of the Red Army had to be supplied with weapons and food from the air, and therefore, to act for a long time. As soon as the Red Army was occupied by Landsberg, Soviet counterintelligence tracked the radio transmitter. As a result, most of the saboteurs trained here were detained. They were quickly condemned and publicly shot for "educational" purposes. And therefore, to act long enough.
Similar detachments also operated in Silesia, except that here they consisted of adolescents, led by experienced officers. These teams waited for the advance of the Red Army, automatically falling into the Soviet rear. According to reports of the NKVD, in the winter of 1945, these groups not only made several attacks against the Red Army, but also actively participated in the defense of "fortresses" like Breslau and Glogau. In addition, Volkssturm created the so-called volunteer corps "Upper Silesia". From it, 350 people were selected, trained in the camp of Nysa-Luzhitsk, which was controlled by the Werewolf. The tactics of these saboteurs were no different from the usual: sabotage, sabotage, the presence of caches with weapons in the forests.
As the Soviet offensive gained momentum, and the Red Army approached Berlin, more and more desperate attempts were made to provoke "popular resistance". Propaganda, held under the slogan "Hatred and revenge", called on the population of East Prussia "to use any means to fight the Bolsheviks." Kreislaiter Koenigsberg on March 1 declared: "The struggle must be wily, like the Indians. All means are good for fighting Bolshevism. " Captured in late April, the German admitted: on the eve of the fall of the city, almost the entire male population was broken up into teams that were supposed to operate in the Soviet rear. Some of these sabotage groups were fairly well armed. In the eastern part of the city was created a huge number of hiding places.
Such facts only reinforce the feeling that in reality Volkshturm was not very different from the "Werwolf." Especially if we take into account that part of the Volkssturm became "werewolves." For example, in Cologne several fanatical Nazis from the local Volkssturm were sent to a five-day "internship" in Osnabruck. All "trainees" were junior officials of the Nazi Party and old party members. Apparently, the leadership of the "Werewolf" believed that these "proven comrades" did not need much effort to master the wisdom of guerrilla warfare. In Eastern Austria, the differences between Volkssturm and Werewolf were completely obliterated, mainly because both organizations were led by the same person - Obersturmbannführer-SS SS Farion. Army officers, who trained "werewolves" in Graz, That most of the recruits were members of Hitler Youth and Volkssturm. Farion himself repeatedly notified the higher-ranking SS chief that he had actively recruited future "werewolves" in Volkssturm. Another factor that contributed to blurring the line between Volkshturm and Werwolf was the reluctance of the Gauleiter of the Lower Danube, Hugo Yuri, to attract adolescents from the Hitler Youth to the Werwolf. In these conditions, the Nazi guerrillas had to look for another source of replenishment of their movement. There was a fundamental reluctance of the Gauleiter of the Lower Danube to Hugo Yuri to attract adolescents from the Hitler Youth to the "Werewolf." In these conditions, the Nazi guerrillas had to look for another source of replenishment of their movement. There was a fundamental reluctance of the Gauleiter of the Lower Danube to Hugo Yuri to attract adolescents from the Hitler Youth to the "Werewolf." In these conditions, the Nazi guerrillas had to look for another source of replenishment of their movement.
https://history.wikireading.ru/71017