What the Volkssturm was to be used as that did not conflict with the Wehrmacht. [The Confusion].
Until the beginning of March 1945 – [The use of The Volkssturm] did not correspond with Bormann’s intentions is evident from a telegram which he sent on 28 February 1945 to one Gauleiter and which on 1 March 1945 he brought to the attention of all Gauleiters in the form of Party Chancellery Circular 30/45.
This telegram reads as follows:
In your letter of 22 February 1945, you informed me that the Commanding General of II Army Corps had asked you to arrange for Volkssturm units to be deployed to man the antitank blockades being constructed in the eastern part of your Gau, and also for men of the Volkssturm to be called up to provide surveillance duties for prisoners of war or other security duties. On the other hand, as you write to me, 92 per cent of the
armaments industry of your Gau is running on an emergency basis.
I therefore repeat the following clarification. A whole series of authorities, as is now repeatedly being demonstrated, has been under the
mistaken assumption that the Volkssturm represent just another reserve to be drawn on.
This assumption is completely wrong. Apart from the relatively few men who are no longer capable of active service, the Volkssturm could and
can only recruit men whose work in the fields of the armaments industry, the Reich railways, the Reich postal system, manufacturing etc. is so
important that throughout all the years of the war they could not be released for military service but had to remain exempted from it.
If I call up these men for longer-term service in the Volkssturm then the benefit of their civilian work will be lost to the field of armaments, the Reich railways, agriculture etc. The implications of doing this have for the most part either not been considered at all, or have not been
considered well enough.
In addition:
The industries which employ these men, that is, armaments, Reich railways etc have to release certain groups of men liable for military service to the Wehrmacht at specified intervals.
It is completely impossible for the authorities to release men both to the Volkssturm and to the Wehrmacht. If I draft into the Volkssturm
men who have until now been exempted from military service, then they will no longer be available for regular military service.
All men who serve long term in the Volkssturm will be fully taken into account against the numbers which the Army authorities request
to be released for service with the Wehrmacht. In other words, if I provide a Volkssturm battalion, there will be one less battalion to be provided for the Army.
You must immediately make your Commanding General aware of this, because we must finally put a stop to Volkssturm battalions being
mistakenly used in this way. The only occasion on which it was intended to draft more men into the Volkssturm is if a direct and immediate threat of enemy attack brings local industry to a standstill. Only then – that is, in the case of the most serious threat to the local home district – should
men who are working in the armaments industry, agriculture etc. etc. be provided and sent in Volkssturm battalions into action against the enemy.
With this ‘Circular 30/45’ issued by the Party Chancellery on 1 March 1945 and quoted above , Reichsleiter Bormann once again quite clearly
set out the task for which it was intended to use the second levy, that is, the majority of the battalions of the Volkssturm.
Der Deutsche Volkssturm 1944/45: Eine territoriale Miliz im Rahmen der Landesverteidigung - Hans Kissel
An extensive list of Volkssturm-Bataillons?
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Re: An extensive list of Volkssturm-Bataillons?
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Re: An extensive list of Volkssturm-Bataillons?
Volkssturm-Bataillon ‘Breslau-Land Nr. 3’ / Volkssturm-Bataillon Leder
Bataillonsführer, Oberstleutnant (retired) D. Joachim Leder
The battalion ‘Breslau-Land Nr. 3’ had four companies with about 600 men and was equipped with about 100 Soviet, Italian and French rifles,
for which, on average, there were 15 rounds per weapon.
On the orders of the Breslau Land district command it had been given the name ‘Battalion Leder’.
Der Deutsche Volkssturm 1944/45: Eine territoriale Miliz im Rahmen der Landesverteidigung - Hans Kissel
Bataillonsführer, Oberstleutnant (retired) D. Joachim Leder
The battalion ‘Breslau-Land Nr. 3’ had four companies with about 600 men and was equipped with about 100 Soviet, Italian and French rifles,
for which, on average, there were 15 rounds per weapon.
On the orders of the Breslau Land district command it had been given the name ‘Battalion Leder’.
Der Deutsche Volkssturm 1944/45: Eine territoriale Miliz im Rahmen der Landesverteidigung - Hans Kissel
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Re: An extensive list of Volkssturm-Bataillons?
Security garrisons along the Austrian border (December 1944-March 1945) [Disaster]
On 23 December 1944, in a telegram to the Reichsführer-SS, the Chief of the Army General Staff requested that the Volkssturm in Styria and
the Lower Danube area be mobilised and that the positions on the Austro-Hungarian frontier should be manned.
Because at most only 30 Volkssturm battalions had been equipped with German and Austrian weapons and such captured weapons as could be
obtained, which had been distributed to all the Gaue in Austria, it was not possible to mobilise a large number of battalions. Also, because it was
expected that manning the frontier positions would be a long-term commitment, and it was unlikely that the Volkssturm of this area, some
districts of which were thinly populated, could single-handedly defend the positions, the population and the local industry, it was decided to
withdraw all the battalions from all the districts in the Gaue of Styria, Lower Danube and Vienna.
On the morning of 24 March 1945, that is, only one week after the beginning of the Soviet offensive from the area to the north of Lake Velencze (southwest of Budapest), the Chief of Staff of the Volkssturm was summoned to Zossen to meet the Chief of the Army General Staff.
Information had been received that the Austrian border position had been abandoned by the Volkssturm and was no longer manned at all. Generaloberst Guderian ordered it to be immediately reoccupied, and the Chief of Staff of the Volkssturm had to go immediately to Linz,
Vienna and Graz to take the necessary action.
What had happened – why had the decision been taken on local initiative to abandon the border positions?
When, in the middle of February, the farmers began their spring sowing and the workers were required in increased numbers in the factories, the
three Gauleiters had initially substantially reduced the number of battalions deployed in the border positions, and at the beginning of March had
withdrawn all the battalions.
According to the Gauleiters, they had taken these measures in agreement with the Army Supreme Commander on the Hungarian front
(Army Group South). The latter had promised to warn the Gauleiters of any imminent enemy attack so that it would still be possible to reoccupy
the border positions. But neither the Chief of the Army General Staff nor the Volkssturm leadership had been notified that a n y Volkssturm battalions had been withdrawn from the border positions.
The two Gauleiters of Lower Danube and Vienna were ordered to immediately re-form the Volkssturm battalions which had been withdrawn, and to reoccupy the border positions. In the afternoon, the Chief of Staff of the Volkssturm informed Deputy General Command of XVII Army Corps
at a meeting arranged in the local defence headquarters in Vienna. The minutes of this meeting on 25 March 1945 are attached as Appendix XIX.
Apparently, the Deputy General Command, which was responsible for the border position, had not heard, or had heard too late, that the security
garrison had been withdrawn from the position. In addition, no sector and sub-sector Wehrmacht staffs appeared to have been allocated to this border position.
Similarly, no preparations must have been made for the transfer of local Wehrmacht to the border. Mention has already been made of the order to hand over usable weapons to the Wehrmacht, which appears in the last paragraph of the minutes of the meeting in Vienna. In the early morning of 26 March, in Graz, the Gauleiter of Styria was also instructed to use his own Volkssturm battalions to reoccupy the southern sector of the Austrian border positions.
Only on 29 March 1945, that is, as always and everywhere, far too late, were Wehrkreise (local defence districts) XVII in Vienna and XVIII in Salzburg (for the region of Styria) placed under the operational and tactical command of Army Group South. Because all the Volkssturm units in the three Gaue of Lower Danube, Vienna and Styria had first to be reassembled and reformed, the weapons which had been distributed had to be
collected, and finally most of the regiments had to march on foot to the border, they arrived just as late as the weak Army battalions
from the two defence districts, the transfer of which into the area around the border positions had similarly been deferred for too long.
It seems that the case was no different with flak units from the local Luftwaffe.
Before the majority of the local Wehrmacht and Volkssturm units designated as the security garrison were able to reach their destination, Soviet troops had already broken through the border positions which were still unmanned. The fact that Wiener Neustadt fell into enemy hands
on 2 April and the city of Vienna itself only a few days later was not least the result of this sudden and unexpectedly lucky breakthrough made
by the Soviets through the border positions to the south of the Neusiedler See.
Der Deutsche Volkssturm 1944/45: Eine territoriale Miliz im Rahmen der Landesverteidigung - Hans Kissel
On 23 December 1944, in a telegram to the Reichsführer-SS, the Chief of the Army General Staff requested that the Volkssturm in Styria and
the Lower Danube area be mobilised and that the positions on the Austro-Hungarian frontier should be manned.
Because at most only 30 Volkssturm battalions had been equipped with German and Austrian weapons and such captured weapons as could be
obtained, which had been distributed to all the Gaue in Austria, it was not possible to mobilise a large number of battalions. Also, because it was
expected that manning the frontier positions would be a long-term commitment, and it was unlikely that the Volkssturm of this area, some
districts of which were thinly populated, could single-handedly defend the positions, the population and the local industry, it was decided to
withdraw all the battalions from all the districts in the Gaue of Styria, Lower Danube and Vienna.
On the morning of 24 March 1945, that is, only one week after the beginning of the Soviet offensive from the area to the north of Lake Velencze (southwest of Budapest), the Chief of Staff of the Volkssturm was summoned to Zossen to meet the Chief of the Army General Staff.
Information had been received that the Austrian border position had been abandoned by the Volkssturm and was no longer manned at all. Generaloberst Guderian ordered it to be immediately reoccupied, and the Chief of Staff of the Volkssturm had to go immediately to Linz,
Vienna and Graz to take the necessary action.
What had happened – why had the decision been taken on local initiative to abandon the border positions?
When, in the middle of February, the farmers began their spring sowing and the workers were required in increased numbers in the factories, the
three Gauleiters had initially substantially reduced the number of battalions deployed in the border positions, and at the beginning of March had
withdrawn all the battalions.
According to the Gauleiters, they had taken these measures in agreement with the Army Supreme Commander on the Hungarian front
(Army Group South). The latter had promised to warn the Gauleiters of any imminent enemy attack so that it would still be possible to reoccupy
the border positions. But neither the Chief of the Army General Staff nor the Volkssturm leadership had been notified that a n y Volkssturm battalions had been withdrawn from the border positions.
The two Gauleiters of Lower Danube and Vienna were ordered to immediately re-form the Volkssturm battalions which had been withdrawn, and to reoccupy the border positions. In the afternoon, the Chief of Staff of the Volkssturm informed Deputy General Command of XVII Army Corps
at a meeting arranged in the local defence headquarters in Vienna. The minutes of this meeting on 25 March 1945 are attached as Appendix XIX.
Apparently, the Deputy General Command, which was responsible for the border position, had not heard, or had heard too late, that the security
garrison had been withdrawn from the position. In addition, no sector and sub-sector Wehrmacht staffs appeared to have been allocated to this border position.
Similarly, no preparations must have been made for the transfer of local Wehrmacht to the border. Mention has already been made of the order to hand over usable weapons to the Wehrmacht, which appears in the last paragraph of the minutes of the meeting in Vienna. In the early morning of 26 March, in Graz, the Gauleiter of Styria was also instructed to use his own Volkssturm battalions to reoccupy the southern sector of the Austrian border positions.
Only on 29 March 1945, that is, as always and everywhere, far too late, were Wehrkreise (local defence districts) XVII in Vienna and XVIII in Salzburg (for the region of Styria) placed under the operational and tactical command of Army Group South. Because all the Volkssturm units in the three Gaue of Lower Danube, Vienna and Styria had first to be reassembled and reformed, the weapons which had been distributed had to be
collected, and finally most of the regiments had to march on foot to the border, they arrived just as late as the weak Army battalions
from the two defence districts, the transfer of which into the area around the border positions had similarly been deferred for too long.
It seems that the case was no different with flak units from the local Luftwaffe.
Before the majority of the local Wehrmacht and Volkssturm units designated as the security garrison were able to reach their destination, Soviet troops had already broken through the border positions which were still unmanned. The fact that Wiener Neustadt fell into enemy hands
on 2 April and the city of Vienna itself only a few days later was not least the result of this sudden and unexpectedly lucky breakthrough made
by the Soviets through the border positions to the south of the Neusiedler See.
Der Deutsche Volkssturm 1944/45: Eine territoriale Miliz im Rahmen der Landesverteidigung - Hans Kissel
Last edited by Germanicus on 26 Sep 2021, 00:02, edited 2 times in total.
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Re: An extensive list of Volkssturm-Bataillons?
Posen
16 January, the Chief of the Army General Staff, Generaloberst Guderian, had summoned the Chief of Staff of the Volkssturm in the office of
the Reichsführer-SS, SSObergruppenfuhrer und General der Waffen-SS Berger, and the military chief of the Volkssturm Command staff to his
headquarters in Wunsdorf/Zossen.
Standing in front of his large wall chart, the Generaloberst sketched out the catastrophic developments which were taking place on the Eastern Front.
Because “that man” (by which he meant Hitler) had strictly refused his request to abandon the senseless Kurland salient, now there were no reserves whatever to stabilise the existing front or to form a new front. To help overcome this dangerous shortage of troops, he said, the
Volkssturm would have to play their part. “Any suggestions, gentlemen?”
In response to this question, the Chief of Staff informed him that the twenty Gaue in the interior of Germany could be instructed to form, initially, one and, later, a second Volkssturm-Battalion z. b. V. (for special service) for use outside the boundaries of their home Gau, and to equip
these battalions with the weapons which were available in the Gaue.
After they were formed, he went on, the first twenty battalions could be brought by rail to the Oder and there – after about a week – could be placed at the disposal of the Wehrmacht.
The Generaloberst agreed with this proposal, but wanted to have these battalions transported to Posen, which had to be held “at all costs”. In reply to this, the two gentlemen from the Volkssturm Command stressed that such units could be initially only be regarded as being suitable for deployment to the rear of defensive positions, where they could be given a certain amount of training before coming into contact with the
enemy. They were, they said, completely unsuitable for offensive action and a war of movement, at least for the time being.
In addition, all experience to date, they said, led them to expect that these units would not arrive in Posen before the Soviets did. Despite these objections, the Generaloberst insisted on having his way. The first 20 Battalions z.b. V. had to be transported to Posen.
During the same afternoon of 16 January -in agreement with the Party Chancellery – the instructions to set up a Volkssturm Battalion for special
use outside the boundaries of its h o me Gau were issued to the respective Gaue of Upper Danube, Bavaria, Franconia, Halle-Merseburg, Hamburg,
Hessen-Nassau, Kurhessen, Magdeburg-Anhalt, Main-Franconia, Mecklenburg, Munich-Upper Bavaria, East Hanover, Pomerania, Saxony,
Salzburg, Schleswig-Holstein, Swabia, Sudetenland, South Hanover-Brunswick and Thuringia.
Not one of the special service Volkssturm battalions from the Gaue in the interior of Germany made it to Posen. The Soviets were faster. Some Volkssturm transport units crossed the Oder and came right up against the advancing enemy. Most of their members subsequently went
missing. The special service Volkssturm battalion from Hessen-Nassau must have been pushed northwards, because in February it was fighting at
Stargard in Pomerania and eventually was fighting at the Stettin bridgehead.
Der Deutsche Volkssturm 1944/45: Eine territoriale Miliz im Rahmen der Landesverteidigung - Hans Kissel
16 January, the Chief of the Army General Staff, Generaloberst Guderian, had summoned the Chief of Staff of the Volkssturm in the office of
the Reichsführer-SS, SSObergruppenfuhrer und General der Waffen-SS Berger, and the military chief of the Volkssturm Command staff to his
headquarters in Wunsdorf/Zossen.
Standing in front of his large wall chart, the Generaloberst sketched out the catastrophic developments which were taking place on the Eastern Front.
Because “that man” (by which he meant Hitler) had strictly refused his request to abandon the senseless Kurland salient, now there were no reserves whatever to stabilise the existing front or to form a new front. To help overcome this dangerous shortage of troops, he said, the
Volkssturm would have to play their part. “Any suggestions, gentlemen?”
In response to this question, the Chief of Staff informed him that the twenty Gaue in the interior of Germany could be instructed to form, initially, one and, later, a second Volkssturm-Battalion z. b. V. (for special service) for use outside the boundaries of their home Gau, and to equip
these battalions with the weapons which were available in the Gaue.
After they were formed, he went on, the first twenty battalions could be brought by rail to the Oder and there – after about a week – could be placed at the disposal of the Wehrmacht.
The Generaloberst agreed with this proposal, but wanted to have these battalions transported to Posen, which had to be held “at all costs”. In reply to this, the two gentlemen from the Volkssturm Command stressed that such units could be initially only be regarded as being suitable for deployment to the rear of defensive positions, where they could be given a certain amount of training before coming into contact with the
enemy. They were, they said, completely unsuitable for offensive action and a war of movement, at least for the time being.
In addition, all experience to date, they said, led them to expect that these units would not arrive in Posen before the Soviets did. Despite these objections, the Generaloberst insisted on having his way. The first 20 Battalions z.b. V. had to be transported to Posen.
During the same afternoon of 16 January -in agreement with the Party Chancellery – the instructions to set up a Volkssturm Battalion for special
use outside the boundaries of its h o me Gau were issued to the respective Gaue of Upper Danube, Bavaria, Franconia, Halle-Merseburg, Hamburg,
Hessen-Nassau, Kurhessen, Magdeburg-Anhalt, Main-Franconia, Mecklenburg, Munich-Upper Bavaria, East Hanover, Pomerania, Saxony,
Salzburg, Schleswig-Holstein, Swabia, Sudetenland, South Hanover-Brunswick and Thuringia.
Not one of the special service Volkssturm battalions from the Gaue in the interior of Germany made it to Posen. The Soviets were faster. Some Volkssturm transport units crossed the Oder and came right up against the advancing enemy. Most of their members subsequently went
missing. The special service Volkssturm battalion from Hessen-Nassau must have been pushed northwards, because in February it was fighting at
Stargard in Pomerania and eventually was fighting at the Stettin bridgehead.
Der Deutsche Volkssturm 1944/45: Eine territoriale Miliz im Rahmen der Landesverteidigung - Hans Kissel
Last edited by Germanicus on 25 Sep 2021, 10:06, edited 1 time in total.
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Germanicus
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Re: An extensive list of Volkssturm-Bataillons?
Oder-Warthe- Stellung [NO orders]
The Gau Chief of Staff of the Gau of Mark Brandenburg had taken the place of the peacetime border militia with around 25 Volkssturm battalions, and had led these battalions into the respective sectors which they were to occupy and defend if this became necessary.
on 26 January the Soviets reached the blocking line at Tirschtiegel. Four days later, on 30 January, they brought up strong forces to the
Oder-Warthe-Stellung, the main area of fighting in the Oder-Warthe bend.
The Oder-Warthe-Stellung was one of the most strongly constructed fortified fronts in the Reich and, given sufficient men and material, was said to be impregnable.
On that same 30 January, on which the Wehrmacht Command Staff War Diary noted: “Soviets at Oder-Warthe- Stellung”, it goes on to say: “Own forces to man these positions not yet here”. Thus, as early as the night between 30/31 January, and on 31 January, the Soviets succeeded in breaking through the fortified area in its entire depth, almost without a fight.
The result of this breakthrough was of that by 1 and 2 February the enemy were able to reach the eastern periphery of Küstrin, and
the Oder on both sides of the city, and by 2 February were able to cross the river at Göritz, southwest of Küstrin, and establish a
bridgehead there. The Soviet armour, which pushed in from the north around midday on 31 January in order to take possession of the fortress by a
surprise attack, withdrew again after a Hitler Youth unit of the Volkssturm succeeded in destroying several tanks with Panzerfäuste.
How could such a collapse have come about?
It was only partly the case that on 30 January German forces to occupy the Oder-Warthe-Stellung had not yet arrived. Remnants of the Field
Army which were withdrawing in the direction of the Oder had become involved in fighting between 26 and 30 January with the Soviets as they retreated. But they were seemingly unaware that there was an extended combat zone for not far away from them. Most of the Ersatz
troop units under the command of Deputy General Command III Army Corps which were intended to occupy the position had not yet arrived,
because the orders had supposedly been given too late. As a result, the crossing points over the anti-tank ditches had not been blown, and
the blockade on the East-West routes had not been set up. Some of the Volkssturm battalions from the Gau of Mark Brandenburg
had for a few days already been manning their allocated defensive sectors, a fact which is confirmed by the accounts in the
Bundesarchiv. From among this material, the account of three Volkssturm battalions which had taken over their sectors in the
Oder-Warthe-Stellung illustrate what problems and what difficulties these battalions found themselves facing.
On 20 January, the Volkssturm Battalion from Landsberg/Warthe which had been ordered to take up position in the bunker line on both sides
of the Schwerin/Kustrin highway suddenly received the surprise order to march into its deployment area. On 21 January, it took up position.
“The Volkssturm were to defend the concrete bunkers while units of t he Wehrmacht were to occupy the areas between them”.
In the night before the first Soviet attack, the aforesaid Wehrmacht unit, including its officers, disappeared from the Wehrmacht camp
without informing the Volkssturm. The effect on the Volkssturm of being suddenly left on their own after weeks of working together in close agreement with the Wehrmacht, was considerable.
Der Deutsche Volkssturm 1944/45: Eine territoriale Miliz im Rahmen der Landesverteidigung - Hans Kissel
The Gau Chief of Staff of the Gau of Mark Brandenburg had taken the place of the peacetime border militia with around 25 Volkssturm battalions, and had led these battalions into the respective sectors which they were to occupy and defend if this became necessary.
on 26 January the Soviets reached the blocking line at Tirschtiegel. Four days later, on 30 January, they brought up strong forces to the
Oder-Warthe-Stellung, the main area of fighting in the Oder-Warthe bend.
The Oder-Warthe-Stellung was one of the most strongly constructed fortified fronts in the Reich and, given sufficient men and material, was said to be impregnable.
On that same 30 January, on which the Wehrmacht Command Staff War Diary noted: “Soviets at Oder-Warthe- Stellung”, it goes on to say: “Own forces to man these positions not yet here”. Thus, as early as the night between 30/31 January, and on 31 January, the Soviets succeeded in breaking through the fortified area in its entire depth, almost without a fight.
The result of this breakthrough was of that by 1 and 2 February the enemy were able to reach the eastern periphery of Küstrin, and
the Oder on both sides of the city, and by 2 February were able to cross the river at Göritz, southwest of Küstrin, and establish a
bridgehead there. The Soviet armour, which pushed in from the north around midday on 31 January in order to take possession of the fortress by a
surprise attack, withdrew again after a Hitler Youth unit of the Volkssturm succeeded in destroying several tanks with Panzerfäuste.
How could such a collapse have come about?
It was only partly the case that on 30 January German forces to occupy the Oder-Warthe-Stellung had not yet arrived. Remnants of the Field
Army which were withdrawing in the direction of the Oder had become involved in fighting between 26 and 30 January with the Soviets as they retreated. But they were seemingly unaware that there was an extended combat zone for not far away from them. Most of the Ersatz
troop units under the command of Deputy General Command III Army Corps which were intended to occupy the position had not yet arrived,
because the orders had supposedly been given too late. As a result, the crossing points over the anti-tank ditches had not been blown, and
the blockade on the East-West routes had not been set up. Some of the Volkssturm battalions from the Gau of Mark Brandenburg
had for a few days already been manning their allocated defensive sectors, a fact which is confirmed by the accounts in the
Bundesarchiv. From among this material, the account of three Volkssturm battalions which had taken over their sectors in the
Oder-Warthe-Stellung illustrate what problems and what difficulties these battalions found themselves facing.
On 20 January, the Volkssturm Battalion from Landsberg/Warthe which had been ordered to take up position in the bunker line on both sides
of the Schwerin/Kustrin highway suddenly received the surprise order to march into its deployment area. On 21 January, it took up position.
“The Volkssturm were to defend the concrete bunkers while units of t he Wehrmacht were to occupy the areas between them”.
In the night before the first Soviet attack, the aforesaid Wehrmacht unit, including its officers, disappeared from the Wehrmacht camp
without informing the Volkssturm. The effect on the Volkssturm of being suddenly left on their own after weeks of working together in close agreement with the Wehrmacht, was considerable.
Der Deutsche Volkssturm 1944/45: Eine territoriale Miliz im Rahmen der Landesverteidigung - Hans Kissel
Last edited by Germanicus on 25 Sep 2021, 10:07, edited 2 times in total.
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Re: An extensive list of Volkssturm-Bataillons?
Küstrin [Amazing]
When the Volkssturm Command Staff in Berlin became aware that the special service battalions provided by the 20 Gaue in the interior of
Germany were no longer able to get to the surrounded fortress of Posen, after the Chief of the Army General Staff had given his approval, the transport arriving in Küstrin and Frankfurt-an-der-Oder from 26 January onwards were stopped and unloaded. All these special service Volkssturm battalions of the first levy and later of the entire second levy were here placed under the command of the Wehrmacht.
They were mobilised for the construction and defence of the Oder front, including the two cities of Küstrin and Frankfurtan-der-Oder which had been declared to be Festungen.
In addition to local Volkssturm units from both drafts, the following units, among others, were in action on the Oder front:
The Volkssturm Battalions z. b.V. ‘Hessen II’ and ‘München’ at Lebus, the Volkssturm Battalion ‘Potsdam’ at Klessin. On the Oder to the east of
Lossow, Volkssturm Battalion z.b. V. 22/1 (‘Oberdonau’), Volkssturm Battalions z. b. V. 15/1 (‘Mainfranken’), 27/95 (‘Dresden’) and
Battalion 16/156 (‘Brieskow’) together formed the Petersdorff Regiment which was part of Kampfgruppe z. b.V.(later Division) Raegener.
In Küstrin itself two Volkssturm battalions, of which one came from Küstrin and the other from Lüneburg. the Küstrin Volkssturm
Battalion which was brought to take over a sector of the Oder-Warthe-Stellung near Trebitsch and was marched back again
from there.
Its commander gives this account: “On the evening of 31 January, after we had arrived in Kustrin, I was instructed to send the men home with the
order to be available the following morning at 9 a. m. But not all of them came back; a large number of them belonged to the personnel of the Finance Ministry, all or some of whom were accommodated in the Stülpnagel Barracks. This authority vanished overnight, taking with it the people who belonged to the battalion. The rest of our people turned up loyally and bravely as ordered.
Soon I received orders to relinquish 106 men to the artillery. It’s true that there were guns and ammunition there, but there was no one to man them. Another part of the battalion I had to surrender to the ‘Lüneburg’ Battalion. The remainder of them were engaged in entrenchment work on the periphery of the town.”
A third Kustrin Volkssturm Battalion, for which there were also no weapons available, was used as a construction and work battalion. Some of the men from this battalion were later equipped with weapons from the dead and wounded and then sent themselves into action.
Considering initially there was no military organisation, suprisingly Küstrin was held against countless and often very strong Soviet attacks from
30 January to 29 March 1945, that is, for two whole months. Only on 31 March did the Wehrmacht communiqué announce: “The gallant defenders of Küstrin have succumbed to superior enemy forces”.
Der Deutsche Volkssturm 1944/45: Eine territoriale Miliz im Rahmen der Landesverteidigung - Hans Kissel
When the Volkssturm Command Staff in Berlin became aware that the special service battalions provided by the 20 Gaue in the interior of
Germany were no longer able to get to the surrounded fortress of Posen, after the Chief of the Army General Staff had given his approval, the transport arriving in Küstrin and Frankfurt-an-der-Oder from 26 January onwards were stopped and unloaded. All these special service Volkssturm battalions of the first levy and later of the entire second levy were here placed under the command of the Wehrmacht.
They were mobilised for the construction and defence of the Oder front, including the two cities of Küstrin and Frankfurtan-der-Oder which had been declared to be Festungen.
In addition to local Volkssturm units from both drafts, the following units, among others, were in action on the Oder front:
The Volkssturm Battalions z. b.V. ‘Hessen II’ and ‘München’ at Lebus, the Volkssturm Battalion ‘Potsdam’ at Klessin. On the Oder to the east of
Lossow, Volkssturm Battalion z.b. V. 22/1 (‘Oberdonau’), Volkssturm Battalions z. b. V. 15/1 (‘Mainfranken’), 27/95 (‘Dresden’) and
Battalion 16/156 (‘Brieskow’) together formed the Petersdorff Regiment which was part of Kampfgruppe z. b.V.(later Division) Raegener.
In Küstrin itself two Volkssturm battalions, of which one came from Küstrin and the other from Lüneburg. the Küstrin Volkssturm
Battalion which was brought to take over a sector of the Oder-Warthe-Stellung near Trebitsch and was marched back again
from there.
Its commander gives this account: “On the evening of 31 January, after we had arrived in Kustrin, I was instructed to send the men home with the
order to be available the following morning at 9 a. m. But not all of them came back; a large number of them belonged to the personnel of the Finance Ministry, all or some of whom were accommodated in the Stülpnagel Barracks. This authority vanished overnight, taking with it the people who belonged to the battalion. The rest of our people turned up loyally and bravely as ordered.
Soon I received orders to relinquish 106 men to the artillery. It’s true that there were guns and ammunition there, but there was no one to man them. Another part of the battalion I had to surrender to the ‘Lüneburg’ Battalion. The remainder of them were engaged in entrenchment work on the periphery of the town.”
A third Kustrin Volkssturm Battalion, for which there were also no weapons available, was used as a construction and work battalion. Some of the men from this battalion were later equipped with weapons from the dead and wounded and then sent themselves into action.
Considering initially there was no military organisation, suprisingly Küstrin was held against countless and often very strong Soviet attacks from
30 January to 29 March 1945, that is, for two whole months. Only on 31 March did the Wehrmacht communiqué announce: “The gallant defenders of Küstrin have succumbed to superior enemy forces”.
Der Deutsche Volkssturm 1944/45: Eine territoriale Miliz im Rahmen der Landesverteidigung - Hans Kissel
Last edited by Germanicus on 25 Sep 2021, 10:07, edited 1 time in total.
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Germanicus
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Re: An extensive list of Volkssturm-Bataillons?
The Oder front [Remarkable]
The Oder front was held until the middle of April 1945, that is, until the beginning of the last Soviet offensive. But the fact that it was possible to build it up out of nothing at the end of January 1945 would have been impossible without the Volkssturm, the local Volkssturm units and the
special service battalions brought in from the interior of Germany. This result is all the more remarkable in the light of the intention of the Soviet
high command, which had issued the following orders: “After breaking through the German defences and shattering the enemy forces in western Poland, we shall press on deep into Brandenburg, take Berlin with support from the neighbouring front and reach the line of the Elbe with armour
and motorised units”.
Der Deutsche Volkssturm 1944/45: Eine territoriale Miliz im Rahmen der Landesverteidigung - Hans Kissel
The Oder front was held until the middle of April 1945, that is, until the beginning of the last Soviet offensive. But the fact that it was possible to build it up out of nothing at the end of January 1945 would have been impossible without the Volkssturm, the local Volkssturm units and the
special service battalions brought in from the interior of Germany. This result is all the more remarkable in the light of the intention of the Soviet
high command, which had issued the following orders: “After breaking through the German defences and shattering the enemy forces in western Poland, we shall press on deep into Brandenburg, take Berlin with support from the neighbouring front and reach the line of the Elbe with armour
and motorised units”.
Der Deutsche Volkssturm 1944/45: Eine territoriale Miliz im Rahmen der Landesverteidigung - Hans Kissel
Last edited by Germanicus on 25 Sep 2021, 06:44, edited 1 time in total.
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Germanicus
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Re: An extensive list of Volkssturm-Bataillons?
Pomerania (February-March 1945) [The sacrifice for another]
Festung Schneidemühl”. In the two districts of Arnswalde and Friedeberg, seven Volkssturm battalions had been formed.
The Volkssturm played a large part in the defence of Kolberg: “In the West, on 9 March, a strong attack against the positions of
Volkssturm Battalion Pfeiffer was repulsed”
lasting 14 days, the defenders of the city had fulfilled the task which had been assigned to them. “Despite the lack of any support from the
Luftwaffe, the combined deployment of armed forces from the Army, the Kriegsmarine, and the Volkssturm had succeeded in holding the city
against all the concentrated attacks made by two Soviet tank units, reinforced by units of the 3rd, 4th and 6th Polish Infantry Divisions, by
armoured, mortar and artillery units, including the 4th Artillery Regiment, sufficiently long enough to enable 70 to 80,000 refugees and the
majority of the combat group (with the exception of 350 to 400 men who could not be evacuated) to be evacuated by sea to the West.
German casualties dead, wounded and missing were estimated at 40 per cent, and in the case of the Volkssturm as high as 60 per cent”.
Without any heavy weapons, these old men in the Maikuhle defended every inch of ground so that the port could be held open for the
evacuation as long as possible ... The people of Kolberg will never forget how the men of the Volkssturm sacrificed themselves on their behalf.
If, by 16 March, there were signs that Volkssturm units were beginning to disintegrate, who would dare to sit in judgment on them after the enormous physical and mental burden they had endured for 12 whole days?
In the early morning of 18 March 1945 a city completely devastated and burned to the ground fell into the hands of the enemy. In his letter of
thanks to the defenders of the city, Oberst Fullriede wrote: “Under the hardest conditions, which required real men, you have proven yourselves
to be the equals of those men who once fought under these same walls with Gneisenau and Nettelbeck”.
Der Deutsche Volkssturm 1944/45: Eine territoriale Miliz im Rahmen der Landesverteidigung - Hans Kissel
Festung Schneidemühl”. In the two districts of Arnswalde and Friedeberg, seven Volkssturm battalions had been formed.
The Volkssturm played a large part in the defence of Kolberg: “In the West, on 9 March, a strong attack against the positions of
Volkssturm Battalion Pfeiffer was repulsed”
lasting 14 days, the defenders of the city had fulfilled the task which had been assigned to them. “Despite the lack of any support from the
Luftwaffe, the combined deployment of armed forces from the Army, the Kriegsmarine, and the Volkssturm had succeeded in holding the city
against all the concentrated attacks made by two Soviet tank units, reinforced by units of the 3rd, 4th and 6th Polish Infantry Divisions, by
armoured, mortar and artillery units, including the 4th Artillery Regiment, sufficiently long enough to enable 70 to 80,000 refugees and the
majority of the combat group (with the exception of 350 to 400 men who could not be evacuated) to be evacuated by sea to the West.
German casualties dead, wounded and missing were estimated at 40 per cent, and in the case of the Volkssturm as high as 60 per cent”.
Without any heavy weapons, these old men in the Maikuhle defended every inch of ground so that the port could be held open for the
evacuation as long as possible ... The people of Kolberg will never forget how the men of the Volkssturm sacrificed themselves on their behalf.
If, by 16 March, there were signs that Volkssturm units were beginning to disintegrate, who would dare to sit in judgment on them after the enormous physical and mental burden they had endured for 12 whole days?
In the early morning of 18 March 1945 a city completely devastated and burned to the ground fell into the hands of the enemy. In his letter of
thanks to the defenders of the city, Oberst Fullriede wrote: “Under the hardest conditions, which required real men, you have proven yourselves
to be the equals of those men who once fought under these same walls with Gneisenau and Nettelbeck”.
Der Deutsche Volkssturm 1944/45: Eine territoriale Miliz im Rahmen der Landesverteidigung - Hans Kissel
Last edited by Germanicus on 25 Sep 2021, 10:08, edited 1 time in total.
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Germanicus
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Re: An extensive list of Volkssturm-Bataillons?
Neisse Line [The Benchmark]
Within a week, almost all the weapons and all the other equipment were available on the Neisse for the Volkssturm battalions there. Whether there
were enough weapons to equip all 32 battalions can no longer be ascertained from the available documents.
On 19 February 1945 the Soviets advanced to the line Forst-Guben. The units of the German Field Army which were withdrawing in front of the
enemy and were extremely combat weary, were halted by the Volkssturm along the Neisse line. They reinforced the Volkssturm in those parts of the
positions which were expected to be tactically important.
Only one day later, on 20 February, the Volkssturm deployed in Guben, on the eastern periphery of the city, succeeded in repulsing an advanced armoured enemy unit and in destroying two tanks by Panzerfaust in the process.
After this there was a noticeable quietening of the Neisse front, which lasted until the large-scale Soviet offensive began on 16 April.
Th e Volkssturm battalions from the Neisse area remained deployed in support of the Wehrmacht to the end in their homeland. The deployment of
t h e Volkssturm in the positions along the Neisse is a particularly instructive example for the use of a territorial militia within the framework of
local defence.
Despite sheer improvisation – within 10 days, men were called up into the unit, the unit was formed, the defensive position was prepared for defence, the unit was equipped with weapons, which first had to be brought in, training was carried out on these weapons and in the defensive
positions – the Volkssturm on the Neisse were able not only to fulfil the task which had been assigned to them, to receive the retreating troops
of the Field Army in their positions, but to go beyond this in successfully defending this position for two whole months with the units of
the Field Army which were insufficient to do the job alone.
Der Deutsche Volkssturm 1944/45: Eine territoriale Miliz im Rahmen der Landesverteidigung - Hans Kissel
Within a week, almost all the weapons and all the other equipment were available on the Neisse for the Volkssturm battalions there. Whether there
were enough weapons to equip all 32 battalions can no longer be ascertained from the available documents.
On 19 February 1945 the Soviets advanced to the line Forst-Guben. The units of the German Field Army which were withdrawing in front of the
enemy and were extremely combat weary, were halted by the Volkssturm along the Neisse line. They reinforced the Volkssturm in those parts of the
positions which were expected to be tactically important.
Only one day later, on 20 February, the Volkssturm deployed in Guben, on the eastern periphery of the city, succeeded in repulsing an advanced armoured enemy unit and in destroying two tanks by Panzerfaust in the process.
After this there was a noticeable quietening of the Neisse front, which lasted until the large-scale Soviet offensive began on 16 April.
Th e Volkssturm battalions from the Neisse area remained deployed in support of the Wehrmacht to the end in their homeland. The deployment of
t h e Volkssturm in the positions along the Neisse is a particularly instructive example for the use of a territorial militia within the framework of
local defence.
Despite sheer improvisation – within 10 days, men were called up into the unit, the unit was formed, the defensive position was prepared for defence, the unit was equipped with weapons, which first had to be brought in, training was carried out on these weapons and in the defensive
positions – the Volkssturm on the Neisse were able not only to fulfil the task which had been assigned to them, to receive the retreating troops
of the Field Army in their positions, but to go beyond this in successfully defending this position for two whole months with the units of
the Field Army which were insufficient to do the job alone.
Der Deutsche Volkssturm 1944/45: Eine territoriale Miliz im Rahmen der Landesverteidigung - Hans Kissel
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Re: An extensive list of Volkssturm-Bataillons?
Breslau (January–6 May 1945) [The Bloody Shock - To the Soviets]
An impressive example of the way the Volkssturm were deployed in support of the German Wehrmacht, and of the effectiveness of local militia
units, is provided by the siege of Breslau from January until the beginning of May 1945.
Breslau was defended by a total of 40,000 to 50,000 soldiers, among whom at least 15,000 were members of the Volkssturm.
The formation and the command and care of all Volkssturm units and Volkssturm members in Breslau was the responsibility of the Gau Chief of
Staff for Lower Silesia, SA Obergruppenführer Herzog.
In addition to the fortress units, which mainly consisted of members of the Volkssturm, also involved in the defence of Festung Breslau were 26 combat battalions, 10 construction battalions and 2 training, or rather Ersatz battalions of the Volkssturm. The average strength of these units was 400 men. The majority of all the Volkssturm battalions deployed in Breslau had been recruited from the city itself; only five combat battalions came from the surrounding rural districts.
All battalions for which no specific home area is shown came from the City of Breslau itself.
Details of the individual battalions are given below, with the names of their commanders and home areas being shown in brackets.
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/21 (Koschate, Pflan – zLiegnitz);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/22 (Hanke – Schweidnitz);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/23 (Kanter);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/24 (Meinecke);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/30 (Bannwitz);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/31 (Göbel – Rothenburg);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/32 (Böhm);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/33 (Pöhlemann);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/34 (Zöke);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/35 (Sämann – Oels);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/36 (Strauss);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/37 (Torzewski);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/41 (Klose, Kalusche, Dörsing [killed]);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/42 (Stephan [killed], Merkle);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/44 (Klüger);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/46 (Peschke);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/48 (Störel [killed]);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/66 (Fischer);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/67 (Graf Kayserling – Militsch, Trebnitz);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/68 (Kayserling [killed], Stein [killed], Koch);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/75 (Bischoff);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/74 (Pötsch – formed at end of February from Breslau railwaymen);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/76 (Herpischböhm – formed from the Breslau Postschutz);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/52 Kampf-Bataillon (Mende – formed from the NSKK, served first as transport unit, then employed on Pioneer duties);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/HJ-Kampf-Bataillon 55 (Seifert)
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/HJ-Kampf-Bataillon 58 (Lindenschmidt).
b) Construction Battalions
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/38 (Augustin); Bau-Bataillon
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/40 (Scharz, Schymeck); Bau-Bataillon
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/43 (Stemmler); Bau-Bataillon
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/45 (Schönwolf); Bau-Bataillon
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/49 (Schriever); Bau-Bataillon
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/50 (von Holleufer); Bau-Bataillon
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/54 (Roll); Bau-Bataillon
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/59 (Stricker); Bau-Bataillon
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/72 (Hain) Bau-Bataillon
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/73 (Nollau) Bau-Bataillon
c)
Volkssturm-Ausbildungs-Bataillon 21/71 (Mietsch)
Volkssturm-Ersatz-Bataillon 21/51 (Buhr).
Within the framework of the Besslein Regiment, Volkssturm battalions 41 (Klose) and 42 (Stephan) had played a successful part in narrowing
the Peiskerwitz bridgehead”
Even after Hitler was dead, and Berlin had already fallen, Breslau still fought on. Only when it became clear to the Festung Commandant on 5 May 1945 that he could no longer count on being relieved by Heeresgruppe Schörner, did he decide to capitulate. Only the Gau Chief of Staff of the Lower Silesian Volkssturm, SA Obergruppenführer Herzog, distanced himself from this decision and urged that they should fight on.
The Festung Commandant, General Niehoff, capitulated on the following day, 6 May 1945. The SA Obergruppenführer committed suicide.
Der Deutsche Volkssturm 1944/45: Eine territoriale Miliz im Rahmen der Landesverteidigung - Hans Kissel
An impressive example of the way the Volkssturm were deployed in support of the German Wehrmacht, and of the effectiveness of local militia
units, is provided by the siege of Breslau from January until the beginning of May 1945.
Breslau was defended by a total of 40,000 to 50,000 soldiers, among whom at least 15,000 were members of the Volkssturm.
The formation and the command and care of all Volkssturm units and Volkssturm members in Breslau was the responsibility of the Gau Chief of
Staff for Lower Silesia, SA Obergruppenführer Herzog.
In addition to the fortress units, which mainly consisted of members of the Volkssturm, also involved in the defence of Festung Breslau were 26 combat battalions, 10 construction battalions and 2 training, or rather Ersatz battalions of the Volkssturm. The average strength of these units was 400 men. The majority of all the Volkssturm battalions deployed in Breslau had been recruited from the city itself; only five combat battalions came from the surrounding rural districts.
All battalions for which no specific home area is shown came from the City of Breslau itself.
Details of the individual battalions are given below, with the names of their commanders and home areas being shown in brackets.
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/21 (Koschate, Pflan – zLiegnitz);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/22 (Hanke – Schweidnitz);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/23 (Kanter);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/24 (Meinecke);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/30 (Bannwitz);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/31 (Göbel – Rothenburg);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/32 (Böhm);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/33 (Pöhlemann);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/34 (Zöke);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/35 (Sämann – Oels);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/36 (Strauss);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/37 (Torzewski);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/41 (Klose, Kalusche, Dörsing [killed]);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/42 (Stephan [killed], Merkle);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/44 (Klüger);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/46 (Peschke);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/48 (Störel [killed]);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/66 (Fischer);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/67 (Graf Kayserling – Militsch, Trebnitz);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/68 (Kayserling [killed], Stein [killed], Koch);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/75 (Bischoff);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/74 (Pötsch – formed at end of February from Breslau railwaymen);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/76 (Herpischböhm – formed from the Breslau Postschutz);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/52 Kampf-Bataillon (Mende – formed from the NSKK, served first as transport unit, then employed on Pioneer duties);
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/HJ-Kampf-Bataillon 55 (Seifert)
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/HJ-Kampf-Bataillon 58 (Lindenschmidt).
b) Construction Battalions
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/38 (Augustin); Bau-Bataillon
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/40 (Scharz, Schymeck); Bau-Bataillon
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/43 (Stemmler); Bau-Bataillon
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/45 (Schönwolf); Bau-Bataillon
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/49 (Schriever); Bau-Bataillon
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/50 (von Holleufer); Bau-Bataillon
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/54 (Roll); Bau-Bataillon
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/59 (Stricker); Bau-Bataillon
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/72 (Hain) Bau-Bataillon
Volkssturm-Bataillon 21/73 (Nollau) Bau-Bataillon
c)
Volkssturm-Ausbildungs-Bataillon 21/71 (Mietsch)
Volkssturm-Ersatz-Bataillon 21/51 (Buhr).
Within the framework of the Besslein Regiment, Volkssturm battalions 41 (Klose) and 42 (Stephan) had played a successful part in narrowing
the Peiskerwitz bridgehead”
Even after Hitler was dead, and Berlin had already fallen, Breslau still fought on. Only when it became clear to the Festung Commandant on 5 May 1945 that he could no longer count on being relieved by Heeresgruppe Schörner, did he decide to capitulate. Only the Gau Chief of Staff of the Lower Silesian Volkssturm, SA Obergruppenführer Herzog, distanced himself from this decision and urged that they should fight on.
The Festung Commandant, General Niehoff, capitulated on the following day, 6 May 1945. The SA Obergruppenführer committed suicide.
Der Deutsche Volkssturm 1944/45: Eine territoriale Miliz im Rahmen der Landesverteidigung - Hans Kissel
Last edited by Germanicus on 26 Sep 2021, 00:03, edited 5 times in total.
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Germanicus
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Re: An extensive list of Volkssturm-Bataillons?
Volkssturm in the West
According to entries in the Wehrmacht Command Staff War Diary, on 15 January 1945 there were deployed in support of the Wehrmacht 22 Volkssturm battalions from the Gau of Baden-Alsace, 9 battalions from th e Gau of Westmark, and 6 battalions from the Gau of Moselland.
According to another entry dated 6 February, on that date 14 Volkssturm battalions were under the command of Armeeoberkommando (AOK) 1.
The 22 Volkssturm battalions from Baden, a number of Volkssturm batteries with captured guns which had been formed as skeleton batteries
using Army officer personnel, and six Volkssturm battalions from Württemberg were deployed in support of the Wehrmacht from January 1945
on the relatively quiet Upper Rhine front under the command of the 19th Army. These 28 Volkssturm battalions formed the majority of the infantry battalions available to the army, earning the humorous nickname ‘19th (Volkssturm) Army’.
In the Volkssturm battalions from Baden, which were formed from the first and second levies, every one-and-a-half weeks a quarter of the Volkssturm personnel were replaced by fresh men.
The battalions from Württemberg were specially formed units. After spending an initial four weeks on the Swiss border and being trained there,
these battalions spent another four weeks on the Upper Rhine front. Then they were relieved by fresh battalions coming from the Swiss border,
and returned to Württemberg.
The Gauleitung in Stuttgart expected to be able to gradually train all the Württemberg Volkssturm by means of this process of relief
and replacement.
After the Allied armies crossed the German border in the West, Volkssturm battalions were deployed in support of the Wehrmacht on the northern
Western Front. Thus, for example, in March 1945 one battalion from the Gau Westphalia North was fighting on the Rhine, and by the end of
March half-a-dozen battalions were deployed on the Dortmund-Ems Canal and on the Ems.
Although, for example, in Stuttgart over 35,000 men liable for service in the Volkssturm were actually registered, in January 1945 only four
Volkssturm battalions were ready for action, and shortly before the occupation of the city on 22 April, only four other battalions were in the
process of being formed.
Kreis Sinsheim/Baden : Within the Kreis, 5 Volkssturm battalions had been formed, but not assembled.
Der Deutsche Volkssturm 1944/45: Eine territoriale Miliz im Rahmen der Landesverteidigung - Hans Kissel
According to entries in the Wehrmacht Command Staff War Diary, on 15 January 1945 there were deployed in support of the Wehrmacht 22 Volkssturm battalions from the Gau of Baden-Alsace, 9 battalions from th e Gau of Westmark, and 6 battalions from the Gau of Moselland.
According to another entry dated 6 February, on that date 14 Volkssturm battalions were under the command of Armeeoberkommando (AOK) 1.
The 22 Volkssturm battalions from Baden, a number of Volkssturm batteries with captured guns which had been formed as skeleton batteries
using Army officer personnel, and six Volkssturm battalions from Württemberg were deployed in support of the Wehrmacht from January 1945
on the relatively quiet Upper Rhine front under the command of the 19th Army. These 28 Volkssturm battalions formed the majority of the infantry battalions available to the army, earning the humorous nickname ‘19th (Volkssturm) Army’.
In the Volkssturm battalions from Baden, which were formed from the first and second levies, every one-and-a-half weeks a quarter of the Volkssturm personnel were replaced by fresh men.
The battalions from Württemberg were specially formed units. After spending an initial four weeks on the Swiss border and being trained there,
these battalions spent another four weeks on the Upper Rhine front. Then they were relieved by fresh battalions coming from the Swiss border,
and returned to Württemberg.
The Gauleitung in Stuttgart expected to be able to gradually train all the Württemberg Volkssturm by means of this process of relief
and replacement.
After the Allied armies crossed the German border in the West, Volkssturm battalions were deployed in support of the Wehrmacht on the northern
Western Front. Thus, for example, in March 1945 one battalion from the Gau Westphalia North was fighting on the Rhine, and by the end of
March half-a-dozen battalions were deployed on the Dortmund-Ems Canal and on the Ems.
Although, for example, in Stuttgart over 35,000 men liable for service in the Volkssturm were actually registered, in January 1945 only four
Volkssturm battalions were ready for action, and shortly before the occupation of the city on 22 April, only four other battalions were in the
process of being formed.
Kreis Sinsheim/Baden : Within the Kreis, 5 Volkssturm battalions had been formed, but not assembled.
Der Deutsche Volkssturm 1944/45: Eine territoriale Miliz im Rahmen der Landesverteidigung - Hans Kissel
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Germanicus
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Re: An extensive list of Volkssturm-Bataillons?
Gau Watheland
The majority of the 27 Volkssturm-Bataillones under the command of the Wehrmacht which moved into the B–1 Line as the combat garrison.
B–1 Line
Seven Volkssturm artillery battalions in the western area of the Gau were on the spot, but could not be used in this capacity because the Wehrmacht could not provide any support personnel, and the men themselves had, for the most part, never operated a gun before.
B–1 Line in my Gau (which had taken a workforce of about 300,000 6 months to complete) had to be occupied in time to serve as an impregnable blocking line. To help achieve this, as the result of tireless and painstaking work (Generalleutnant Matterstock), the precise firing values for all weapons in this very deep system of positions, several hundred kilometres long, had been calculated and recorded. In addition to the blocking groups on the Eastern Front, it was planned to occupy the B–1 Line with 14 combat divisions. Thus, according to all the assurances given to me by the Wehrmacht, this line would be the obstacle over which neither a German soldier nor a Bolshevist could cross in an East-West direction.
In this situation, the Volkssturm of the Wartheland was moving up past the Wehrmacht in the direction of the B–1 Line and the front. It had been envisaged that, in addition to these units from the Eastern Front, 14 divisions should man the positions. The Wehrmacht provided just two battalions. Apart from these, it was the majority of the 27 Volkssturm battalions under the command of the Wehrmacht which moved into the B–1 Line as the combat garrison.
Reichsminister Dr Goebbels, in his capacity as Gauleiter of Berlin, by telephone to help me, and in the difficult situation in which we found ourselves, to assign 12–15 Volkssturm battalions from Berlin. The basic promise given by Reichsminister Goebbels was later extensively qualified by deputy Gauleiter Schach, who stated that Berlin was prepared to provide 12 battalions, but without weapons.
By 23 January 1945, the Gau was overrun, so that it was too late for the intended deployment of the 12 Berlin battalions to take place in Gau Wartheland.
Der Deutsche Volkssturm 1944/45: Eine territoriale Miliz im Rahmen der Landesverteidigung - Hans Kissel
The majority of the 27 Volkssturm-Bataillones under the command of the Wehrmacht which moved into the B–1 Line as the combat garrison.
B–1 Line
Seven Volkssturm artillery battalions in the western area of the Gau were on the spot, but could not be used in this capacity because the Wehrmacht could not provide any support personnel, and the men themselves had, for the most part, never operated a gun before.
B–1 Line in my Gau (which had taken a workforce of about 300,000 6 months to complete) had to be occupied in time to serve as an impregnable blocking line. To help achieve this, as the result of tireless and painstaking work (Generalleutnant Matterstock), the precise firing values for all weapons in this very deep system of positions, several hundred kilometres long, had been calculated and recorded. In addition to the blocking groups on the Eastern Front, it was planned to occupy the B–1 Line with 14 combat divisions. Thus, according to all the assurances given to me by the Wehrmacht, this line would be the obstacle over which neither a German soldier nor a Bolshevist could cross in an East-West direction.
In this situation, the Volkssturm of the Wartheland was moving up past the Wehrmacht in the direction of the B–1 Line and the front. It had been envisaged that, in addition to these units from the Eastern Front, 14 divisions should man the positions. The Wehrmacht provided just two battalions. Apart from these, it was the majority of the 27 Volkssturm battalions under the command of the Wehrmacht which moved into the B–1 Line as the combat garrison.
Reichsminister Dr Goebbels, in his capacity as Gauleiter of Berlin, by telephone to help me, and in the difficult situation in which we found ourselves, to assign 12–15 Volkssturm battalions from Berlin. The basic promise given by Reichsminister Goebbels was later extensively qualified by deputy Gauleiter Schach, who stated that Berlin was prepared to provide 12 battalions, but without weapons.
By 23 January 1945, the Gau was overrun, so that it was too late for the intended deployment of the 12 Berlin battalions to take place in Gau Wartheland.
Der Deutsche Volkssturm 1944/45: Eine territoriale Miliz im Rahmen der Landesverteidigung - Hans Kissel
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Re: An extensive list of Volkssturm-Bataillons?
Volksturm-Bataillones identified Der Deutsche Volkssturm 1944/45: Eine territoriale Miliz im Rahmen der Landesverteidigung - Hans Kissel
Reichsgau Oberschlesien
Volkssturm-Bataillon 23/280 (motorised) [Bataillonsführer NSKK Standartenführer Domsch.]
Volkssturm-Bataillon 23/281 [Bataillonsführer Hauptmann der Reserve Weinrich [Oppeln]
Volkssturm-Bataillon 23/282 [Bataillonsführer Oberleutnant der Reserve Neubert [Oppeln}
Volkssturm-Bataillon 23/283 [Bataillonsführer Oberleutnant der Reserve Caja, [Krappitz]
Oppeln, the Rural District
Volkssturm-Bataillon 23/284 [Gross-Döbern–Kupp]
Volkssturm-Bataillon 23/285 [Bataillonsführer SA-Obersturmbannführer Jaenicke, [Oppeln].
Volkssturm-Bataillon Habelschwerdt [Kreis of Habelschwerdt/Silesia]
Gau Watheland B-1 Line
Kampfkommandeur 1 in Dilltal (Kreis Welun)
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/1 from Posen Stadt
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/35 from Birnbaum
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/37 from Eichenbrück
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/57 from Jarotschin
Kampfkommandeur 2 to Schieratz
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/69 from Kolmar
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/147 from Samter
Kampfkommandeur 3 to Schieratz
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/19 from Posen Stadt
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/45 from Gostingen
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/47 from Oppenbach
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/169 from Wreschen
Kampfkommandeur 4 to Schwarzau (Kreis Kalisch)
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/61 from Kalisch
Kampfkommandeur 4 to Wandalenbrück (Kreis Turek)
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/9 from Posen Stadt
Kampfkommandeur 4 to Turek
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/137 from Obornik
Kampfkommandeur 5 to Warthebrücken
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/41 from Gnesen
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/73 from Konin
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/81 from Kosten
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/161 from Warthebrücken
Kampfkommandeur 6 to Babenwald
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/29 from Dietfurt
Kampfkommandeur 7 to Grünholm
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/55 from Hohensalza
Kampfkommandant of the Leslau Schröttersburg
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/99 from Leslau
Kampfkommandant of Schröttersburg
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/31 from Gombin
On 20 January 1945, the following additional Volkssturm battalions were placed under the command of the Wehrmacht:
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/15 from Posen Stadt
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/27 from Seenbrück (Kreis Posen-Land)
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/43 from Wittingen (Kreis Gnesen)
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/49 from Oppenbach (Kreis Grätz)
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/65 from Reichtal (Kreis Kempen)
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/71 from Scharnikau
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/77 from Hinterberg (Kreis Konin)
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/135 from Moglino
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/139 from Ostrowo
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/155 from Schroda
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/167 from Wollstein
POSEN
According to credible statements made by men of the Volkssturm who came through the fighting, these Bataillones were wiped out,
leaving only a few survivors.
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/1 Posen Stadt
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/9 Posen Stadt
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/35 Birnbaum
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/55 Hohensalza
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/57 Jarotschin
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/169 Wreschen
Identified Kreis
Kreis Posen-Stadt: Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/19
Kreis Altburgund: Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/29 / Volkssturm-Bataillon ‘Altburgund’
Kreis Birnbaum: Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/35
Kreis Eichenbrück: Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/39
Kreis Gostingen: Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/45
Kreis Jarotschin: Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/57
Kreis Kolmar: Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/69 [Bataillonsführer Freiherr von Lüttwitz]
Kreis Kolmar: Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/71
Kreis Kosten: Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/81
Kreis Krotoschin: Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/83
Kreis Schroda: Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/155
Kreis Wollstein: Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/167
Other identified Volkssturm-Bataillones
Volkssturm-Bataillon z.b.V. 10/Hessen II
Volkssturm-Bataillon 22/I ‘Oberdonau’ [Bataillonsführer Hauptmann der Reserve Ferdinand Lichtenberger]
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/137 [Obornik]
Volkssturm-Einsatz-Bataillon Küstrin 1
Reichsgau Oberschlesien
Volkssturm-Bataillon 23/280 (motorised) [Bataillonsführer NSKK Standartenführer Domsch.]
Volkssturm-Bataillon 23/281 [Bataillonsführer Hauptmann der Reserve Weinrich [Oppeln]
Volkssturm-Bataillon 23/282 [Bataillonsführer Oberleutnant der Reserve Neubert [Oppeln}
Volkssturm-Bataillon 23/283 [Bataillonsführer Oberleutnant der Reserve Caja, [Krappitz]
Oppeln, the Rural District
Volkssturm-Bataillon 23/284 [Gross-Döbern–Kupp]
Volkssturm-Bataillon 23/285 [Bataillonsführer SA-Obersturmbannführer Jaenicke, [Oppeln].
Volkssturm-Bataillon Habelschwerdt [Kreis of Habelschwerdt/Silesia]
Gau Watheland B-1 Line
Kampfkommandeur 1 in Dilltal (Kreis Welun)
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/1 from Posen Stadt
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/35 from Birnbaum
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/37 from Eichenbrück
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/57 from Jarotschin
Kampfkommandeur 2 to Schieratz
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/69 from Kolmar
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/147 from Samter
Kampfkommandeur 3 to Schieratz
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/19 from Posen Stadt
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/45 from Gostingen
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/47 from Oppenbach
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/169 from Wreschen
Kampfkommandeur 4 to Schwarzau (Kreis Kalisch)
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/61 from Kalisch
Kampfkommandeur 4 to Wandalenbrück (Kreis Turek)
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/9 from Posen Stadt
Kampfkommandeur 4 to Turek
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/137 from Obornik
Kampfkommandeur 5 to Warthebrücken
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/41 from Gnesen
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/73 from Konin
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/81 from Kosten
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/161 from Warthebrücken
Kampfkommandeur 6 to Babenwald
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/29 from Dietfurt
Kampfkommandeur 7 to Grünholm
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/55 from Hohensalza
Kampfkommandant of the Leslau Schröttersburg
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/99 from Leslau
Kampfkommandant of Schröttersburg
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/31 from Gombin
On 20 January 1945, the following additional Volkssturm battalions were placed under the command of the Wehrmacht:
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/15 from Posen Stadt
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/27 from Seenbrück (Kreis Posen-Land)
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/43 from Wittingen (Kreis Gnesen)
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/49 from Oppenbach (Kreis Grätz)
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/65 from Reichtal (Kreis Kempen)
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/71 from Scharnikau
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/77 from Hinterberg (Kreis Konin)
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/135 from Moglino
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/139 from Ostrowo
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/155 from Schroda
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/167 from Wollstein
POSEN
According to credible statements made by men of the Volkssturm who came through the fighting, these Bataillones were wiped out,
leaving only a few survivors.
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/1 Posen Stadt
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/9 Posen Stadt
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/35 Birnbaum
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/55 Hohensalza
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/57 Jarotschin
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/169 Wreschen
Identified Kreis
Kreis Posen-Stadt: Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/19
Kreis Altburgund: Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/29 / Volkssturm-Bataillon ‘Altburgund’
Kreis Birnbaum: Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/35
Kreis Eichenbrück: Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/39
Kreis Gostingen: Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/45
Kreis Jarotschin: Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/57
Kreis Kolmar: Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/69 [Bataillonsführer Freiherr von Lüttwitz]
Kreis Kolmar: Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/71
Kreis Kosten: Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/81
Kreis Krotoschin: Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/83
Kreis Schroda: Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/155
Kreis Wollstein: Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/167
Other identified Volkssturm-Bataillones
Volkssturm-Bataillon z.b.V. 10/Hessen II
Volkssturm-Bataillon 22/I ‘Oberdonau’ [Bataillonsführer Hauptmann der Reserve Ferdinand Lichtenberger]
Volkssturm-Bataillon 36/137 [Obornik]
Volkssturm-Einsatz-Bataillon Küstrin 1
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Germanicus
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Re: An extensive list of Volkssturm-Bataillons?
Panzer-Nahkampf-Brigade "Hitlerjugend" - Volkssturm
#1Post by lutrebois » 01 May 2019, 20:40
viewtopic.php?f=50&t=241917&p=2203022&h ... c#p2203022
#1Post by lutrebois » 01 May 2019, 20:40
- E - 1.jpg (94.73 KiB) Viewed 366 times
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Germanicus
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Re: An extensive list of Volkssturm-Bataillons?
The following post has been loosely touched upon previously however I have cleaned it up.
Panzer-Nahkampf-Brigade 2 (Klein-Körries)
Hitlerjugend-Kampfgruppe Stünke. [formed from Jagd-Bataillon Hitlerjugend Braunschweig 1 , Jagd-Bataillon Hitlerjugend Braunschweig 2]
Hitlerjugend-Panzernahkampf Brigade [Nuremberg]
Hitlerjugend-Panzervernichtungs-Bataillon 1 Franken
Hitlerjugend-Panzervernichtungs-Bataillon 2 Franken
Hitlerjugend-Panzervernichtungs-Bataillon 3 Franken
Hitlerjugend-Panzervernichtungs-Brigade
Five Hitlerjugend-Bataillon, with a strength of 2,750 boys, were in the process of
being raised and trained in the Bavarian Ostmark by 22 April. They were quartered in
Cham, Reichenbach and Roding. This Panzervernichtungs-Brigade consisted of
members of the Hitler Youth districts of Bayreuth and Middle Franken.
Kampfeinsatz der Hitler-Jugend im Chaos der letzten Kriegsmonate. Hans Holzträger
Re: An extensive list of Volkssturm-Bataillons?
#432Post by Germanicus » 25 Jul 2017, 15:24
viewtopic.php?f=50&t=192705&p=2089685&h ... .#p2089685
Panzer-Nahkampf-Brigade 2 (Klein-Körries)
Hitlerjugend-Kampfgruppe Stünke. [formed from Jagd-Bataillon Hitlerjugend Braunschweig 1 , Jagd-Bataillon Hitlerjugend Braunschweig 2]
Hitlerjugend-Panzernahkampf Brigade [Nuremberg]
Hitlerjugend-Panzervernichtungs-Bataillon 1 Franken
Hitlerjugend-Panzervernichtungs-Bataillon 2 Franken
Hitlerjugend-Panzervernichtungs-Bataillon 3 Franken
Hitlerjugend-Panzervernichtungs-Brigade
Five Hitlerjugend-Bataillon, with a strength of 2,750 boys, were in the process of
being raised and trained in the Bavarian Ostmark by 22 April. They were quartered in
Cham, Reichenbach and Roding. This Panzervernichtungs-Brigade consisted of
members of the Hitler Youth districts of Bayreuth and Middle Franken.
Kampfeinsatz der Hitler-Jugend im Chaos der letzten Kriegsmonate. Hans Holzträger
Re: An extensive list of Volkssturm-Bataillons?
#432Post by Germanicus » 25 Jul 2017, 15:24
viewtopic.php?f=50&t=192705&p=2089685&h ... .#p2089685