Performance of Heer and Waffen-SS in the Bulge

[jrutman53]

Hello Skyline!
OK,to be sure we are on the correct page of music. I am a retired combat veteran from the mechanized infantry(later the paras). I have driven both of the routes you described,maybe not in an armoured vehicle but my VW Rabbit!
I would still say the northern rollbahn used by PanzergruppPeiper was a little more difficult. The fast groups from the 2nd Pz and the LSSAH both had the same basic orders:get your tanks to the Muese asap and to disregard the flanks.
Bill Hermann was correct,Bastogne was bypassed to fullfill the need for the quick advance and to ignore the flanks. I would also say that Peiper bypassed Stavelot(by driving through it after his assault). Both Div used field expedience to try to accomplish their almost impossible missions.
As far as planning goes? It's nice to have a plan and march tables,bridge crossing outlines,fire plans,registered targets for arty,etc but any one in modern fast mobile combat knows,you need to think on your feet and change plans instantly during on going ops. The German army was awesome at this and with improvising(I reference the accumulation of assets during Market Garden here) and the LSSAH and 2nd Pz were no different. You also need as Napoleon said"audacity" but also more importantly LUCK! Both of these units had both of those attributes as the routes they had to take with the shortages they had and opposition they faced were very daunting. Both fast groups had competent leaders.
So my earlier question about why was it thought that the 2nd Panzer did so much better still stands? What are the criteria? Once again,not attaking or defending the position,just want the criteria as I have several pictures showing the smashed and or abandoned gear and vehicles from the 2nd Pz at the tip of their advance,just the same as the stuff at LeGlieze left behind byLSSAH?
J

[Rob - wssob2]

Here's a visual reference for everyone

[Marcus]

A link is probably more useful as the image is cut-off: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/c ... ogress.svg

/Marcus

[berlichingen]

If you had read Cole and Parker, just to cite two of the standard works on the Ardennes battle, you would know that my description of the planners is dead on, I was even gracious to them. If a staff officer falsifies march tables, if he puts in half a day to build a pontoon bridge instead of two and a half that are needed in reality,etc. etc. etc. etc. just to please the Führer, well he is well served with scyophant. As to the terrain, how many times have you driven along the different Rollbahn's? How many times have you driven from Dasburg to Marnach, then carrying on to Clervaux, Eselborn, Antoniushaff...........?

Let me guess.....you haven't heard half of the names. So once again, the terrain wasn't worse for Sepp Dietrich then it was for Manteuffel.

Finally terrain is not the same as defenses, two pairs of shoes.

It is pretty dumb to make statements about somebdody you do not know. I have travelled the areas in question more extensively than you would like to know. Particularly the Hitlerjugend division had to advance in very bad terrain(I have walked it). And the presence of 2 US infantrydivisons did not make matters any better.
Your statement about the planners shows not only a lack of knowledge but also a lot of prejudice.

[BillHermann]

Having been to the Ardennes numerous times I can say that the initial advance with respect to terrain was just as difficult on the first 3 to four days along the front. The valleys and gorges on 5th armie's front were just as difficult to navigate as the route fot the 6th army. Consider Ouren, Wiltz, Houffalize Rocefort and La Roche. The Heer units were able to navigate this terraine some of which was even more difficult. In a military situation when the cards are delt it is up to the divisions and sub units to manage the route an terrain. It was also up to the commanders to plan better routs, organize movements and find solutions. The shortcomings started from the top and went down to the lower levels but the divisional commanders had tools at their disposal to reorganize and use strategies to cope with the challenges.

Case in point the 12, 277 Volksgrenadier 12th SS on the opening days had some of the easiest terrain to cross towards Krinkelt-Rocherath. So terrain in itself can really not be used as a major issue in this case.

[Rob - wssob2]

The valleys and gorges on 5th armie's front were just as difficult to navigate as the route fot the 6th army.

That is my understanding as well.


Here's some information I've compiled about the 12th SS Division's performance during the Bulge:

Dec 14:
Division troops receives word of the Ardennes offensive. I SS Panzer Corps units are the spearhead of the offensive, and are assigned five routes (code named A, B, C, D & E) to advance. The Hitlerjugend division is assigned routes A, B and C. Division is to be split into four kampgruppe:
Kampfgruppe Müller will advance along Route B (Udenbreth - Malmédy - Spa - Theux) with the following components
SS-PGR 25 (minus I Battalion)
12. SS Panzerjäger Abt. (21 Jagdpanthers armed with 75mm guns)
II Bat./12. SS Artillery Regt. (18 artillery pieces)
Two flak batteries
Engineer company


Kamprgruppe Kuhlmann will take Route C (Losheim - Stavelot - La Glieze - Aywaille) formed from
12th SS Panzer Regt. - 37 or 38 Panthers, 33 or 39 Mark IV's tanks (sources vary)
Heer Jagdpanzer Abteilung 560
III Bat./SS-PGR 26
I Bat./12. SS Artillery Regt. with 18 artillery pieces


Kampfgruppe Krause will follow up on Route B with the following components
SS-PGR 26 (minus III Bat.)
12th SS Artillery Regt. (minus I & II Battalion) - with eighteen 150mm and four 105mm guns
12th SS Werfer Abt. with 30 nebelwerfers
12th SS Flak Abt.
12th SS Pionier Abt.

Kampfgruppe Bremer, the understrength 12th SS Aufklärung-Abt., is also assigned Route C.
I Bat./SS-PGR 25 is assigned to advance Route A. In addition, the Heer 14th Werfer Regt. is temporarily attached to Hitlerjugend. The division orders are to slice through the American lines at the Losheim Gap and proceed onward to the Meuse.

Dec 15:
US 2nd Infantry Division ("Indian Head") in combat near Wahlerscheid. The 12th SS does not have adequate intelligence on the activity or positions of the US 2nd ID, which will have major implications on the progress of the upcoming campaign.

Dec 16:
Germans attack; the Battle of the Bulge begins.

SS-PGR 25 assigned to assist 277th VGD capture Rocherath, defended by the US 99th Infantry Division. 277th VGD repulsed at Rocherath Forest; 12th SS troops (I/SS-PGR 25) have to take over assault. SS-Panzerjager Abt. 12 in heavy combat in the Rocherath forest. SS troops are tentative; the opportunity to open up an advance route for March Group A is lost. Germans fail to take their first day objectives. 12th SS forces in combat at Krinkelt.

Dec 17:
II/SS-PGR 25 & SS-Panzerjäger Abt. 12 capture Rocherath and force elements of the US 23rd and 393rd Infantry Regiments to withdraw to Elsenborn. Hitlerjugend units suffer heavy casualties. The division has not yet acheived a breakthrough on Advance Route A.

Dec 18:
Division transferred to II SS-Panzerkorps. 12th SS halted at Butgenbach. I/ SS-Panzer Regiment 12 and SS-PGR 25 attack the villages of Rocherath and Krinkelt. US 99th and 2nd Infantry Divisions inflict heavy losses on the Germans. 6th SS Panzer Army orders 12th SS to cease attacks on the twin villages. 12th SS forces withdraw in order to attack the village od Bütgenbach.

I Abt., SS-Panzer-Regiment 12 in combat at Rocherath. Panther tanks of the 1st and 3rd Companies in combat at Krinkelt. Lacking infantry support, the Hitlerjugend panzers suffer heavy losses against elements of the US 38th Infantry Regiment, the 741st Tank Battalion, and the 644th and 801st Tank Destroyer Battalions. Sixth SS Panzer Army order the 12th SS to suspend attacks on the twin towns of Rocherath-Krinkelt. Advance Route A is impassable. US V Corps orders US units to withdraw fromm the twin towns.

12th SS Flak Abt. shoots down four Allied planes.

Dec 19:
Remaining 12th SS troops withdrawn from Rocherath. The division blames the muddy road conditions, the spirited defense of the US 99th ID and the failures of the 277th and 12th VGD for their defeat.

II SS Panzer Corps orders 12th SS to advance towards Bütgenbach. SS-PGR 26, Schwere-Panzerjäger Abt. 560 and the staff command of SS-Panzer-Regiment 12 are assigned to capture the town. III/SS-PGR 26 reaches Bülligen under intense US artillery fire. By midday, the shelling and the muddy roads slow the division's advance to a crawl.

Dec 20:
US 26th IR, supported by artillery, blunts the 12th SS advance at the Bütgenbach Estate.

With the Sixth SS Panzer Army's advance effectively stalled; Hitler (German Supreme Command West) decides to reinforce the Fifth Panzer Army, which has made strong gains in the southern sector of the Ardennes.

[jrutman53]

Here's a visual reference for everyone

OK Rob,
I assume from the graphic that your criteria for success in this case is distance advanced? That is one of many factors including battle strengths of each side,terrain ,supplies,luck, in fact all kinds of factors that would measure how well a unit did. If your only criteria is distance advanced then yes,the 2nd Pz did much better. Both armies failed to reach the objective
Yes,the terrain was not bad for HJ and the VGren but they did run up against 2 very good veteran Regts that had an awesome amount of arty support. The Germans knew full well about how good our arty was and if they could have closed up to our positions like the Vietnamese learned to do they would have been better off. But every Infantry assault by the HJ was defeated with large amounts of casualties.
The regular army in the south used different breakthrough tactics as well. The 6SS PzA used a large arty prep that was not observed by spotters and so was pretty much wasted. It alerted allied units. The 5th A used either very short,pre planned fires or none at all and had their assault troops creep into the american lines before opening combat. They also opened up a nice large hole when the untested American Inf Div(105 I think) surrendered and thus had more room to manuever and bring supplies up.
J

[berlichingen]

Case in point the 12, 277 Volksgrenadier 12th SS on the opening days had some of the easiest terrain to cross towards Krinkelt-Rocherath. So terrain in itself can really not be used as a major issue in this case.

Not at all. There is only a track through the woods between Hollerath and Rocherath-Krinkelt. Can only be visited by walking which I have done twice. On this track all wheeled vehicles of 12th SS got stuck in the mud. In addition, the woods were defended by infantry.

[berlichingen]

Having been to the Ardennes numerous times I can say that the initial advance with respect to terrain was just as difficult on the first 3 to four days along the front. The valleys and gorges on 5th armie's front were just as difficult to navigate as the route fot the 6th army. Consider Ouren, Wiltz, Houffalize Rocefort and La Roche. The Heer units were able to navigate this terraine some of which was even more difficult.

The issue is that you have 2 US infanterydivisions in the north and only one regiment in front of 47th Panzercorps . In the south the defenders limited themselves to defend the towns because of the lack of density of the defense. Had more infantry been available there then the woods could have been defended and then the advance of 47 th corps would have been seriously slowed down as blocking the road is very easy.

[berlichingen]

. In a military situation when the cards are delt it is up to the divisions and sub units to manage the route an terrain. It was also up to the commanders to plan better routs, organize movements and find solutions. The shortcomings started from the top and went down to the lower levels but the divisional commanders had tools at their disposal to reorganize and use strategies to cope with the challenges.

This is just empty retoric. If a wooded area like the Ardennes is properly defended by infantry then any armored advance will be extremely difficult and not fast. There are no miracle solutions for that.

[BillHermann]

Case in point the 12, 277 Volksgrenadier 12th SS on the opening days had some of the easiest terrain to cross towards Krinkelt-Rocherath. So terrain in itself can really not be used as a major issue in this case.

Not at all. There is only a track through the woods between Hollerath and Rocherath-Krinkelt. Can only be visited by walking which I have done twice. On this track all wheeled vehicles of 12th SS got stuck in the mud. In addition, the woods were defended by infantry.

Indeed could not agree more seeing that I have been in the forest and fields as well. But that was not my point and my apologies if I was not clear. I was taking about terrain. The lay of the land in near the twin villages was much easier compared to the sectors south of there. It was an example only, I am aware that the attacking force had a challenge with the forest, the Elsenborn Ridge and the veteran units that were against them but with strategy and creativity on the 6th panzer army could have made some headway.

And the key point is that an argument states that the terrain n itself was a core reason for the 1st SS failure. It was less to do with terrain and more to do with planning and organization.

[berlichingen]

Yes,the terrain was not bad for HJ and the VGren but they did run up against 2 very good veteran Regts that had an awesome amount of arty support. .

The terrain was very bad between Hollerath and Rocherath-Krinkelt and the HJ infantry had to fight dismounted there after the 277.VGD had failed.

[berlichingen]

Case in point the 12, 277 Volksgrenadier 12th SS on the opening days had some of the easiest terrain to cross towards Krinkelt-Rocherath. So terrain in itself can really not be used as a major issue in this case.

Not at all. There is only a track through the woods between Hollerath and Rocherath-Krinkelt. Can only be visited by walking which I have done twice. On this track all wheeled vehicles of 12th SS got stuck in the mud. In addition, the woods were defended by infantry.

Indeed could not agree more seeing that I have been in the forest and fields as well. But that was not my point and my apologies if I was not clear. I was taking about terrain. The lay of the land in near the twin villages was much easier compared to the sectors south of there. It was an example only, I am aware that the attacking force had a challenge with the forest, the Elsenborn Ridge and the veteran units that were against them but with strategy and creativity on the 6th panzer army could have made some headway.

You cannot make a woods and a dirt track disappear. Cleaning a wood of infantry is difficult and will take time. There is no miracle solution for this. The HJ division would never have been capable of a fast advance.

[berlichingen]

The regular army in the south used different breakthrough tactics as well. The 6SS PzA used a large arty prep that was not observed by spotters and so was pretty much wasted. It alerted allied units. The 5th A used either very short,pre planned fires or none at all and had their assault troops creep into the american lines before opening combat. They also opened up a nice large hole when the untested American Inf Div(105 I think) surrendered and thus had more room to manuever and bring supplies up.
J

The artillery prep was the same all over the front and was organized from above. The 26 th VGD did get permission for infiltrating their infantry behind the lines befroe the artillery prep profiting fiom the fact that US infantry kept to the villages during the night. That would not have been possible if the US defenses would have been denser and infantry would have permanently manned positions inn the woods.

[BillHermann]

Again you lost my point in he defence of the HG, I never said it was not hard for them. You are thinking in the most simplistic of ways with the argument. Compare the terrain near Ouren minus any defence and the one could navigate on foot much faster through forest and the twin villages compared to the valley near Ouren or Wiltz.

In no way do I say it was not hard for the HJ but It's obvious though that the shortcomings on the north shoulder with the 6th panzer Amy was more about the planning and organization ( battle plan ) over the terrain alone as the Heer divisions had similar and more challenging terrain in the first 5 days and managed.

This of course does not include opposing forces as this is only in regards to the terrain argument and the fact that the northern shoulder was poorly planned.