the quality of german force in western front 1944?

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Kelvin
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Re: the quality of german force in western front 1944?

#16

Post by Kelvin » 28 Feb 2013, 19:59

ljadw wrote:more about the PzL:
its Panther batallion was going eastwards:first train was in Magdeburg on 5 june,last still in Paris on 9 june,and was only committed in Normandy on 15 june,that means that the PzL had only 50 % of its tanks on 6 june.

About its Tiger II tanks :these were only prototypes with technical deficiencies,and never were committed;as there was no possibility to send them back to Germany,they were blobn up in Chateaudun.

Thus,on 6 june ,only 2 1/2 PzD were operational in the west .
Hi, Ljadw, I disagree that only 2.5 PzD were operational, in accordance with your views, 2. and HJ were operational and PzLehr were 50% operational.

But you should remember that Pz.Lehr-Division was exceptionally strong division in German panzer troops. Although its Panther abteilung, I./Pz.Rgt.6 was departed for the East but it is still in France and several days departure with Pz.Lehr-Division was not regarded as 50% strength.

And besides this, Pz. Lehr Division was only one Panzer-Division with four Panzer-Grenadier battalions in the entire German army. Other Panzer divisions mostly had one only ( except 2. Pz and 21. Pz , they had two). Of four Panzer-Grenadier battalions, each had a full complement of six Sd.Kfz.251/2 and twelve Sd.Kfz.251/9 which enhanced their firepower of Panzer-Grenadier significantly. And regarding quality, I. and II./Panzer-Grenadier-Lehr-Regiment 901 was directly designated from Panzer-Lehr infantry regiment and I./Panzer-Grenadier-Lehr-Regiment 902 was directly designated from II./Pz.Lehr-Regiment. All these were Demonstration units and their fighting technique were good.

Its 10.5 cm le. Haubitzen-Abteilung were unit came from Artillerie-Lehr-Regiment and its Panzerjäger-Lehr-Abteilung 130 was directly designated from III./Pz.Lehr-Regiment. So training and technique were considered fine.

Its Panzer-Pionier-Lehr-Bataillon also had some cadre coming from Pionier-Lehr-Bataillon. And its Pz.Pi.Lehr-Btl.130 were only one units with equipped fully with SPW in all three kompanie. (83 x SPW in all on June 1 1944) Its 3. kompanie even had two sd.kfz.251/9 for fire support. No any German Panzer-Pionier-Battalion had that level of equipment.( Other Panzer-Pionier-Bataillon only had one kompanie equipped with SPW.)

In comparsion with British and US armored divison in Normandy battlefield, Each British armoured division (Guards, 7th and 11th) only had one motor battalion (armored infantry) out of four infantry battalions and they lacked assault gun weapon such as sd.kfz.251/9 for direct fire support. With regard to US armored force, they were better, they had three armored infantry battalions, and in this area, Pz.Lehr still had one more armored infantry battalion than her, and each US armored infantry battalion had only three 75mm or 105mm Howitzer mounted on Halftrack while Pz Lehr had 12 x 75mm KwK mounted on sd.kfz.251.

When talking about tank strength, even without I./Pz.Rgt.6, Pz Lehr still had 97x Pz IV, 40 Jagdpanzer IV and StuG III and 6 x Tiger, on June 1 1944, around 150 AFV, but when you go back to battle of Kursk, three powerful Waffen-SS German Panzer-Divisions : they mostly had 150 AFV around operational on July 4 1943 :

Leibstandarte had 79 x Pz IV Long, 11 Pz III Long, 12 x Tiger, 34 x StuG III and 19 x Marder (155 operational AFV)

Das Reich had 47 x Pz III Long, 30 x Pz IV Long, 18 x T-34/76, 12 x Tiger, 33 x StuG III and 11 x Marder (151 operational AFV)

Totenkopf had 59 x Pz III Long, 42 x Pz IV Long, 11 x Tigers, 28 x StuG III, 11 Marder ( 151 operational AFV)

Started from 1943, it is hard to maintain a Pz division with 150 operational vehicles , Leibstandarte, Das Reich, Totenkopf and GroBdeutschland in Kursk, Leibstandarte in Italy , Oct 1943, Four Waffen panzer division in Ardennes and Pz Lehr division, 2. & HJ in Normandy were good periods for German Panzer troops. When comparing with other historic period, Pz.Lehr-Division , without panther battalion, still had 100% full strength and even stronger when you considered its strong Panzer-Grenadier and Panzer-Pionier troops
In overall, PzLehr-Division cannot be considered 50% strength. Also , I./Pz.Rgt. 6 with 86 operational Panther on June 1 1944 rejoined the division in mid June.
She only weakness was lack of self-propelled gun, she only received its Wespe and Hummel in July 1944

And you also omit 21. Pz division, although she were exclusively equipped with French vehicles and SPW, she had been trained for a year and she possessed 98 operational Pz IV on June 1 1944 and also had some 75mm and 105mm panzerjager mounted on French Hotchkiss and she had two battalion of self-propelled gun mounted on Lorraine chassis. and they had adequate number of motor vehicles to motorize its forces.Its had two Panzer-Grenadier battalions equipped with French SPW and her Pz.Pi.Btl.220 had two kompanies equipped with French SPW.So, you should also count this division in operation list

So, it were four operationl Panzer Divisions on eve of Normandy invasion.

For other Pz.Divisions during initial Normandy battle, I agree with your comment : Their situation were not so good : Leibstandarte and Das Reich still had about hundred of panzer and StuG operational but their training was far from complete until late July 1944 and Leibstandarte possessed no SPW in June 1944. III./SS Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 4 Der Führer (armored infantry) of 2. SS-Panzer-Division Das Reich did not have any sd.kfz.251/9. And its Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung lacked many types of SPW like sd.kfz.250/9

9. 11. and 116. Pz.Divisions 's training were not yet finished too. And Hohenstaufen and Frundsberg still in the East and even they came back to the West, though their training were completed and had field experience in the East front, their panzer status was below standard : Hohenstaufen only had 41 operational Pz IV and 38 StuG combat ready on June 1 1944 and Frundsberg had 32 x Pz IV and 34 x StuG III ready for action in the same period.

ljadw
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Re: the quality of german force in western front 1944?

#17

Post by ljadw » 28 Feb 2013, 22:01

Well,no:I was talking about the number of operational divisions,not about their strength :the fact that the PL was stronger than the other PzD is irrelevant,and,it is a fact that the Panther batallion of the PzL was going east on 6 june and was thus not available on DDay /
A discussion about the strength of these divisions is a totally other discussion .The problem is that a lot of persons always are confounding the operational status and strength .

For the 21 PzD (which was not mentioned in the OP,and thus why I did not mention it in my reply),it had a manpower strength of 14433 men,and 112 tanks of which 98 combat ready .
If one wants to compare 21 with PzL,one should calculate how many tanks,StuG,artillery,manpower,trucks, each division had available,and how much was operational .
Something that I never have seen,and I doubt it has been done .


Kelvin
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Re: the quality of german force in western front 1944?

#18

Post by Kelvin » 28 Feb 2013, 22:06

If we have both division status reports, we could do that. :)

Charles Trang
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Re: the quality of german force in western front 1944?

#19

Post by Charles Trang » 28 Feb 2013, 22:38

I dont agree with ljadw concerning Das Reich and its men of "dubious quality". In fact, Das Reich was the best performer among the SS divisions in Normandy. The 12.SS-Panzerdivision "HJ" had its highs and lows but Das Reich fought constantly well against overwhelming odds. It was never directly defeated during most of the campaign. On the contrary, it inflicted heavy losses to the Americans in the edgerow battles. And do not forget that it saved the 7.Armee by keeping the Trun - Chambois pocket open.

ljadw
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Re: the quality of german force in western front 1944?

#20

Post by ljadw » 28 Feb 2013, 23:29

1)Das Reich never fought as a division,but always in small parts
2)Most of its men (9000) were untrained recruits
3°It had to use forced volunteers from the Alsace:=manpower of dubious quality

ljadw
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Re: the quality of german force in western front 1944?

#21

Post by ljadw » 28 Feb 2013, 23:45

DR had in june 1944 617 trucks in running order,44 operational Pz IV ,25 operational Panther and 33 operational StuG.
I doubt that one can say that a division that had only a third of its trucks operationak,can be considered as operational.
And,if such a division had to use forced volunteers (not only the malgré nous,the enthusiasm of the German recruits was as much absent),the quality os that division must be very low .

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RJ55
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Re: the quality of german force in western front 1944?

#22

Post by RJ55 » 01 Mar 2013, 07:19

ljadw wrote:1)Das Reich never fought as a division,but always in small parts
2)Most of its men (9000) were untrained recruits
3°It had to use forced volunteers from the Alsace:=manpower of dubious quality
Heer units, and especially mobile units, almost never fought as "pure" divisions. The German doctrine was to form Kampfgrouppen [battle-groups] for every operational or tactical task.
Front-line soldiers and officers were well aware of the shortcomings in the organisations of Pz, PanzGren and motorised units in battle.
So to maximize fighting power all the mechanised troops in a unit [or several units] were brigaded into an ad-hoc organisation. As the war went on the numbers of panzer battalions [or at least the number of tanks in each battalion] dropped as production could not keep pace with loses.

So to give an attack or counter-attack maximum chance of success, the tanks, armoured infantry, armoured infantry, armoured engineers, SP anti-tank guns and artillary were made into a battlegroup under one commander, and deployed. The unarmoured units left out would hold ground of tactical importance or act as a shield while the armoured group became the sword. Perhaps the most infamous battlegroup of all was Pieper's amoured battlegroupe in the Battle of the Bulge [in 1944] which drawn from 1st SS Panzer Div. But really the Germans had been using Kampfgrouppen since the very beginning of the war.
In 1941 Guderian brigaded the armoured units of 3rd & 4th Panzer because of the losses in tanks. Heavy Panzer Regiment Bake was also an amalgam of the tanks and other AFV's from 6th and 8th Panzer...the list goes on....

So a German battlegroup philosophy was used from the company level almost to army level. it was the most efficient way to fight a war with limited resources.

The American and British used the battlegroup concept also, but made the mistake of assigning units more or less permanently to Combat Commands [US] or Brigades [UK]. This was a mistake, because as losses mounted, the CC lost combat power. Far better to pull the depleted units out of the CC, and replace them with fresh units. Or amalgamate battalions, which is what the Germans did very well.

Thus one would see a German KG with a tank battalion or from a Heer Pz Div, mated with an SS PzGren regiment and other sub-units from both divs in a KG. After the mission was over, the units would return to their parent divisions.

To a lesser extent this also occurred in German infantry divisions as well. Basically, it is intelligent all-arms doctrine to suit the tactical situation at hand. There is no point giving a mountain division armour it can't use, but mostly armour, infantry, artillary and engineers fight better as a team. It is a force-multiplier effect.

In the north African desert against Rommel the British did not fair well for a long time because a lot of the time because often the UK armoured units imagined they were like the cavalry of old, and charged into battle. The Germans picked them off with their 88's and then ambushed them with the Panzer regiment.

Perhaps one of the the worst cases of failed doctrine on the German side was at Kursk, where Porsch Tigers [who had no machine guns] were combined into a single Panzer Regiment. They should have been escorted with Pz IV's or Panthers, because they had no anti-infantry defence [no co-ax] machine gun and hence were attacked by Soviet poineers and infantry using satchel charges and other hand-held anti-tank gear. This is what happens when infantry get separated from tanks, and when tanks have no defence against infantry.

The reason for making a one-model regiment of the Elephants was undoubtedly maintainence-related. Germany was short of mechanics, and new models of these P-Tigers and the Panthers had teething problems. The wider mistake, was attacking at Kursk, instead of letting the Soviets come to them.

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