The Military Successes of the Waffen-SS

[Rob - wssob2]

What about the information I posted about earlier in http://www.achtungpanzer.com/panzerkamp ... ervice.htm ?There is mention of the SS taking over a Soviet T-34 tank factory – becoming SS Panzerwerk (SS Tank Workshop) to perform repairs and conversions on captured T-34s. A quantity of which went into Waffen SS service with Das Reich.

Yes - I believe that was a Kharkov (site of the famous tank manufacturing plant) and yes the tanks went to the Das Reich Divison of the SS Panzer Corps.
It was basically a one-off.

Several Waffen-SS did emply captured enemy tanks (the 7th SS used French tanks, the 24th SS used Italian ones, etc.) But using or refurbishig enemy tanks is more of a fringe benefit of war. It's not like you can make firm plans to form armored divisions form them.

The SS-WVHA, while it did manufacture some military supplies (uniforms, small arms, rations, construction material, etc.) is did not make tanks. (Although it did trade with vehicle manufacturers - e.g. concentration camp labor for schwimmwagens.)

The SS Main Supply Depot (SS-Hauptwirschaftlager - HWL) and their subordinate Troop Supply Depots (SS-Truppenwirschaftlager - TWL) AFAIK did not carry tanks.

Typically the allocation of German-manufacture tanks for the Waffen-SS came through the Chief Quartermaster (OQu) of the Army’s Panzer Inspectorate.

My understanding of how the system works is illustrated by the following:

1) Himmler sez to Hitler: "It would be a really great idea to create a 99th SS Panzer Division Sidfreid Guttridge!"

2) Hitler sez: "Great! I degree the formation of the 99th SS Panzer Division Sidfreid Guttridge!"

3)The SS Command Operations Office (SS-FHA) calls the Army Chief Quartermaster as says, I need some tanks for the 99th SS Panzer Division Sidfreid Guttridge

4) Army Chief Quartermaster says, " I can get you fifteen Panthers in February and twenty in March...."

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Rob,

On a point of information:

When enlisting fictitious W-SS formations in aid, I always find it conveys their nature rather better to use to the 39th SS Division Baron von Munchausen as the preferred exemplar.

This formation, at least in its own considerable imagination, was in every way superior to the sorry 99th SS Panzer Division Sidfreid Guttridge, notwithstanding the latter's doubtless distinguished(?) heritage.

Sid.

[Michael Kenny]

Yes - I believe that was a Kharkov (site of the famous tank manufacturing plant) and yes the tanks went to the Das Reich Divison of the SS Panzer Corps.
It was basically a one-off.

It was normal to take over a large engineering works in the rear to repair tanks. The 'good luck' at Kharkov was to get a T-34 factory full of spare parts.
Orders were issued to forbid any use of captured KV tanks as combat tanks. They were to be reserved and used as towing and recovery vehicles

[EugE]

It was normal to take over a large engineering works in the rear to repair tanks. The 'good luck' at Kharkov was to get a T-34 factory full of spare parts.
Orders were issued to forbid any use of captured KV tanks as combat tanks. They were to be reserved and used as towing and recovery vehicles

Michael you are mistaken in statement "factory full of spare parts". By whom it was supplied if the germany troops possessed this city since 1941.
Soviet 160 rifle Div. began assault Losevo area(factory location) from February 11.
Kampfgruppe Harmel - the reinforced SS-Pz.Gren.Rgt.Deutschland began assault the factory area at March 13. During one month this area became twice a battleground. Some of the factory buildings were destroyed and some heavy damaged.

[Orwell1984]

The following is from pages 38 to 39 of Tankograd's book: Panzerkampfwagen T 34 - 747(r) The Soviet T-34 Tank as Beutepanzer and Panzerattrappe in German Wehrmacht Service 1941-45 328pp
http://www.tankograd.com/cms/website.ph ... 34-747.htm

The Waffen SS

The use of Beutepanzers in formations of the Waffen SS is, in principle, almost identical to the Wehrmacht use. One major difference was the number of tanks allocated to Waffen-SS units (in most cases more than in Wehrmacht units). One reason behind this was the capture of non-evacuated parts of the T-34 in Kharkov and the subsequent conversion of this factory into the SS T 34-Instandsetzungsbetrieb Tuebke where SS-Panzerjäger-Abeilung 2 (tank destroyers) of SS-Grenadier-Division Das Reich (armoured infantry) could undertake the repair of 31 T 34s that had been captured during the fighting around Kharkov in early 1943. There T 34s were later used during Operation Citadel, the famous tank battle at Kursk. Interesting to note are the figures for operational tanks, even with a major repair facility in the background: the lowest point was May 1943 with 25 T 34s (just one of which was operational) and the climax was early July 1943 with 25 T 34s (16 of which were operational). The number of 16 combat-worthy T 34 Beutepanzers on 01 July 1943 could have made this unit the most powerful T 34 Beutepanzer unit of the German Armed Forces at that date.

The SS-Panzerwerk Charkow

After retaking what was left of the tank plant (that had been evacuated in 1941) in the city of Kharkov (German: Charkow) in the spring of 1943, the Waffen-SS took over the remaining facilities and tank parts to complete T34s and to repair T34s captured nearby. The completed T 34s were handed over to SS-Panzerjäger-Abeilung 2 of SS-Division Das Reich. In some sources it is mentioned the SS continued production of T 34s on this site, yet this is highly overstated – it only completed the work of the Russians with those parts on hand and repaired tanks.

[Cult Icon]

The Panzer 38T, the most important tank next to the Panzer III in 1940-41 is not considered 'beutepanzer'?

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Cult Icon,

The Protectorate was considered as part of the Reich and the ex-Czech armaments plants there were run by German companies during the war.

The vast majority of all armour built on the 38t chassis was manufactured to German orders, in German-run and owned factories, within the Reich.

So I guess, technically, they were not "beutepanzer".

Cheers,

Sid.

[Cult Icon]

thanks for the info

[Cult Icon]

SS-Wiking was just another division the Caucasus.

[Marcus]

Two interesting posts on the Kharkov SS tank 'factory' were split off into a new thread so that discussion do not get lost in this thread.

/Marcus

[RichTO90]

The figure you posted were in response to Sid's points that reasoned along the lines that army panzer assets suffered a net decline because of Waffen SS expansions. When you posted these figures I took them (in the context of Sid's comments) to only show Army panzer companies. I did not notice mention of the Waffen SS units being included (or for that matter excluded) in them.

Okay, I remember including the Waffen-SS and Luftwaffe Panzer companies, but will double check.

My apologies, but I just realized I never came back to this point. Unfortunately, the last month has been all uproar at home and I lost track of this. We are preparing our house for sale and packing to move to the West Coast, which means my entire library is now in boxes. I will try to reconstruct the information and my analysis from my digital records, but for now I am left only with my previous recollection...

Cheers!

[Marcus]

A discussion on the quality of the Handschar division was split off into a new thread at http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 0&t=223696

[Westphalia1812]

Concerning Waffen-SS successes at Kursk:

So even though I recognize that this thread is abondoned since 2015 I am going to post a few ideas of mine regarding the often praised combat performance of the II. SS Panzerkorps during ZITADELLE:

In order to evaluate the performance of the II. SS Panzerkorps I will also analyze the performance of the XLVIII. Panzerkorps and the III. Panzerkorps.

I. Strenght comparison

XLVIII. Panzerkorps 05.07.1943: 505 tanks + 147 SPGs = 652 armored vehicles(operational);

Sources: 1. 505 tanks: Kursk 1943 The Southern Front(Osprey Campaign 305) p. 24
2. 147 SPGs: Demolishing the Myth p. 136 (Kindle version)

II. SS Panzerkorps 05.07.1943: 378 tanks + 202 SPGs = 580 armored vehicles(operational);

Sources: 1. 378 tanks: Kursk 1943 The Southern Front(Osprey Campaign 305) p. 24
2. 202 SPGs: Demolishing the Myth p. 137 (Kindle version)

III. Panzerkorps 05.07.1943: 338 tanks + 109 SPGs = 447 armored vehicles(operational);

Sources: 1. 338 tanks: Kursk 1943 The Southern Front(Osprey Campaign 305) p. 24
2. 109 SPGs: The Forgotten Battle of the Kursk Salient p. 3266 (Kindle version), chapter 2 In the shadow of the main attack

Notes: Looking at the numbers the XLVIII. Panzerkorps is the strongest of the three corps. In theory it therefore is the most efficient corps. But there is a problem with this conclusion. 200 of the 652 armored vehicles belonged to the Panzer-Brigade 10. This unit was attached to the pz gren div Großdeutschland. The brigade was comprised of 200(204?) panthers. This meant that GD was the strongest division in the 4. Panzerarmee and also in army group south. Even though this sounds pretty promising there are serious flaws with that composition:
1. This huge armored force(315 tanks) was squeezed into a rather small and heavily mined part of the front. On flat and open terrain this deployment might work but this wasn't the case in front of the XLVIII. Panzerkorps. In front of GD lay the Berezovyi ravine. This terrain proved to be a serious obstacle for the XLVIII. Panzerkorps.
The 3. Pz Div that also had to cross the this ravine only had 90 operational tanks on 05.07.1943. It didn't have any panthers or tigers. The 11. Pz Div had 100 tanks but also no panthers or Tigers.

Instead of splitting Panzer-Brigade 10 up and deploying it on the hole corps front they advanced in a rather narrow corridor trying to manouver around the Berezovyi ravine. Additionally the panthers weren't combat proven and had a fair amount of mechanical flaws.

,,It was against their sector of the front where Fourth Panzer Army’s numerically more powerful formation, von Knobelsdorff’s XXXXVIII Panzer Corps, launched its offensive. Even before the start of the attack, the enemy encountered very serious problems to minefields and the difficulties with assembling such a significant number of troops and equipment on such a narrow sector." (Demolishing the Myth, p. 154, Kindle version).

II. German offensive plans

The main effort of army group south was to be made by the 4. Panzerarmee. The II. SS Panzerkorps would advance and secure the prokhorovka axis. The XLVIII. Panzerkorps was to advance and capture Oboian. After that is done the XLVIII. Panzerkorps is to take over and seize Kursk while the II. SS Panzerkorps secures its right flank. Army detachment Kempf would cover the flanks of the advancing 4. Panzerarmee.

Notes: Interestingly the II. SS Panzerkorps was to make the main effort of the southern attack in the first phase. This is odd since both the XLVIII. Panzerkorps and the III. Panzerkorps were more experienced in armored operations. This may has something to do with Hitler(or rather Himmler) wanting to expand Waffen-SS influence during army offensives.

III. Soviet defensive plans

The voronezh front under Nikolai F. Valutin was to stop the german advance, grind down the panzer forces and then conduct the soviet summer offensive, Operation Polkovodets Rumianstev, to seize the Belgorod - Tomarovka - Kharkov area.

IV.Advance of army group south

On 05.07.1943 4. Panzerarmee and army detachment Kempf start their offensive. The II. SS and XLVIII. Panzerkorps break through the first defensive belt. Army detachment Kempf has serve problems due to the nothern donets river and limited air support. The attached sPzAbt 503 cannot use its 42 tigers properly. The LAH advances nine kilometres, the furthest advance of army group south on the fith of july. The next five days can be summed up by saying that the three Panzercorps slowly grinded their way forward while being counterattacked by brigade or corps sized RKKA units. On 12.07.1943 the voronezh front launches three major counterattacks:

1. The attack by the 6GA and 1TA in the XLVIII. Panzerkkorps sector.
2. The attack by the 5GTA in the II. SS Panzerkorps sector.
3. The attack by the 7GA in the Corps Raus sector.

Due to these counterattacks(which on tactical level all failed) and the heavy casualties army group south endured operation ZITADELLE lost its steam. From 13.07. - 15.07.1943 german forces conducted minor offensive operations. XLVIII. Panzerkorps tried to neutralize soviet forces in the Tolstoye Woods, Totenkopf tried to expand its bridgehead across the Psel and Das Reich linked up with the III. Panzerkorps at Lenski hoping they could destroy the 69th army that in the meantime had already slipped through the thinly held encirclement. On 15.07.1943 Zitadelle had ended but small scale fighting continued on for several days.

V. Analysis of combat performance

Yes, the II. SS Panzerkorps advanced the furthest of all german units participating in ZITADELLE. The problem is not the statement itself but rather how certain authors and posters try to explain it. The SS did not advance "further" because of superior leadership, elan or training but rather due these reasons:

1. The terrain in front of the Leibstandarte and Das Reich was rather flat and open. They didn't have to cross a ravine or the nothern donets. The right flank of the Totenkopf on the other hand faced a rather different situation. They had to cross part of the nothern donets and just like the III. Panzerkorps got bogged down. The 11. Pz Div faced the most favourable terrain in the XLVIII. Panzerkorps sector. On 05.07.1943 it was the only division of the corps to advance on shedule. This is quite interesting since it shows that a heer unit(without tiger tanks) could advance just as "fast" as the SS divisions when confronted with the same more favorable terrain while the Totenkopf proved that the SS units advanced equally slow as the heer units when confronted with the same diffecult terrain.

2. II. SS Panzerkorps got more air support in the beginning of the attack which enabled it to break through the first defensive belt more quickly than the XLVIII. Panzerkorps and the III. Panzerkorps(which received almost no air suppport on 05.07.1943). This is pretty obvious since it was supposed to play the main role during the first phase of ZITADELLE. ,,Consequently, the advance of the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps to the north, towards Oboian’, depended directly on how quickly the SS troops would be able to overcome the line of the 6th Guards Army in the Dubrova – Iakovlevo area and to move out on the Prokhorovka axis." (Demolishing the Myth, p. 134, Kindle version).

3. The three SS divisions had more infantry and an overall more favorable composition of forces. Every one of the three SS divisions had an integrated tiger company. These were evenly split up between the divisions which enabled them to use these assets on a broad front. More importantly the tigers and their crews were combat proven. This stands in stark contrast with the deployment of Panzer-Brigade 10 as explained above. Heavy Panzer batallion 503 also assigned all of her three companies to the 6., 7. and 19. Panzer divisons but those tigers couldn't be deployed properly on the first day due to the crossing of the nothern donets.
Additionally the minefields in the III. Panzerkorps sector were much more dense than those placed in front of the 4. Panzerarmee.

Conclusion:
After reading Zamulin, Töppel and Forczyk I came to the conclusion that the supposedly superior performance of the II. SS Panzerkorps was rather a logical consequence of certain advantages held by these SS divisions that the army units didn't enjoy.
Overall the offensive was a complete operational failure. To single out these SS divisions and state that they performed superior(or even having more potential effectiveness) doesn't fit with the operational account of this battle.

Interestingly when the II. SS Panzerkorps steam faded away III. Panzerkorps began advancing more steadily and actually caused a small panic in the Voronezh front HQ. The XLVIII. Panzerkorps, just like the II. SS Panzerkorps, broke through the first section of the third defensive belt. So this "furthest advance" actually wasn't that much further than that of its left neighbour.

A lot has been said about the 5GTA failure at Prokhorovka but what about the failure of the II. SS Panzerkorps to seize Prokhorovka in the first place. It never accomplished its task of capturing the most important objective in the first phase of the attack. Additionally they also failed to expand the Psel bridgehead. It seems like Dennis Showalter was wrong in Armor and Blood when he stated that an ideological force is more able to break enemy opposition.