The Military Successes of the Waffen-SS

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John Hilly
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Re: The Military Successes of the Waffen-SS

#46

Post by John Hilly » 09 Sep 2014, 16:08

John Hilly wrote: There was 900. Panzer Lehr Brigade in Heeresgruppe Mitte during Operation Typhoon in 1941.
Correction to my post yesterday.

It was 900. Lehr Motorized Brigade.

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Re: The Military Successes of the Waffen-SS

#47

Post by JustinYT » 04 Oct 2014, 20:47

New here but was browsing through the posts an read this one, so thought I'd make this my first post. the SS were a big part of keeping the Falaise Pocket open so that the rest of the retreating German Army could escape. Groups like the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend, 9th SS Panzer Division "Hohenstaufen", and the 1st SS Panzer Division were among the SS units that were critical in keeping the gap in the pocket open. Even though it was more of a fighting retreat you'd have to consider what they were able to do a victory since none of the units were any where near full strength, and the fact that they were in constant fighting while being hit with constant artillery as the 12th was and allied planes hitting them all the time. The 12th after slipping out of the gap attempted to counter attack from outside the pocket but had to retreat due to the American 3rd Army attacking them from behind. So what the SS units did by keeping the gap open would be a victory because if they would of been trapped and destroyed/captured the Ardennes Offensive would not of been possible.


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Re: The Military Successes of the Waffen-SS

#48

Post by seaburn » 05 Oct 2014, 08:25

JustinYT wrote:New here but was browsing through the posts an read this one, so thought I'd make this my first post. the SS were a big part of keeping the Falaise Pocket open so that the rest of the retreating German Army could escape. Groups like the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend, 9th SS Panzer Division "Hohenstaufen", and the 1st SS Panzer Division were among the SS units that were critical in keeping the gap in the pocket open. Even though it was more of a fighting retreat you'd have to consider what they were able to do a victory since none of the units were any where near full strength, and the fact that they were in constant fighting while being hit with constant artillery as the 12th was and allied planes hitting them all the time. The 12th after slipping out of the gap attempted to counter attack from outside the pocket but had to retreat due to the American 3rd Army attacking them from behind. So what the SS units did by keeping the gap open would be a victory because if they would of been trapped and destroyed/captured the Ardennes Offensive would not of been possible.
Hi JustinYT, welcome to the forum. I haven't studied this subject in depth yet but I did visit Mt Ormel not so long ago and I'm obviously aware of the ferocious battle that took place there. What I'm not clear on is if the German fight to keep the gap open was an organised one from a higher command or just more piecemeal with scattered units just fighting their own way out. Is the account of the 12th's participation from Hubert Meyer's book or is there corroborating evidence that the 12th did this in an organised way from another source ? I'm sure I've seen claims from other units that they helped keep the gap open so I'd like to understand if these claims are valid or not. I know you mention the 1st and the 9th but were there no Heer units doing this also? Does anyone else have a book recommendation on the subject ? An 'unbiased' one preferably so I can discount those that puff up their own Divisions importance.

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Re: The Military Successes of the Waffen-SS

#49

Post by Sid Guttridge » 06 Oct 2014, 15:20

Hi JustinYT,

While a narrow escape from a complete annihilation is hardly a victory, it may be to the credit of those involved, be they Army or W-SS.

However, one has to ask whether the "Waffen-SSedness" of some of the formations involved was a factor or whether it was armour, mechanization, proximity to the key point, selective recruiting, etc., etc., which were the key factors.

Every man and weapon possessed by the Old Reich W-SS divisions, such as those you mention, had been syphoned off the German Army, thereby weakening it.

What you have to ask yourself is whether the creation of an independent Waffen-SS strengthened the Wehrmacht more than it weakened it by undermining the German Army, which was arguably already the best in the world and made all Hitler's conquests without indispensible W-SS assistance?

I, personally, see very little evidence of any "value added" by the creation of an independent German Waffen-SS.

In the case of the recruitment of non-"Germanic" foreigners, it was the German Army that led the way against ideological resistance from the Nazis, to whom the Waffen-SS's recruitment policies were beholden.

Cheers,

Sid

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Re: The Military Successes of the Waffen-SS

#50

Post by JustinYT » 12 Oct 2014, 08:00

Hi Seaburn, thanks for the welcome. From what I've read an learned yes it was an organised fighting retreat, by the end of the fight it may have become more piecemeal as it turned into rear guard action, but it was an organised effort to the best of the abilities, a piecemeal every unit for themselves mentality would of resulted in the gap closing an the remainder of German forces would of surely been trapped. The 12th were originally ordered to hold Hill 159 which is NW of Falaise an eventually retreated after the Canadians broke through the 12th's Western flank, what was left of it after the fight for Hill 159 was over were ordered to help hold the northern section of the gap. No I did not read that in Meyers book, which I havent gotten a chance to read just yet, I think I've only read about the 12th counter attacking outside the gap once or twice, but my gut says they probably did if you consider the make up of the 12th, fanatical Hitler youth who had already been fighting in Normandy since D-Day mixed with combat hardened NCO's from the Eastern front that is a mixture that would definitely create a hard fighting force, but yes the 12th did help keep the gap open, I'm not sure about the Heer units since I'm not too learned up on them so I couldnt say.

Hi Sid, true to some a narrow escape from complete annihilation may not seem as a big victory, but what it allowed to happen the battle of the bulge makes it a victory in my opinion, if the gap was closed an the remaining German forces surrendered there would of been no battle of the bulge an no extension of the war for a time, the Germans almost succeeded in their plans to re take Antwerp I dont know the exact distance but I'm pretty sure they were in the too close for comfort area. I think the effect of the W-SS being there had an effect just as much as the other factors you mentioned, I think the biggest effect the W-SS brought to that battle was their fanatical way of fighting in that they more times than not would fight until there was no one left standing, I remember a quote I read once from an American officer it went something like, "the Wehrmacht troops surrendered as we expected an the SS fought till they were destroyed as we expected" to me thats a psychological factor that a regular army like the Wehrmacht doesnt bring with it. When you know your about to get into a fight with SS you already know the score its a last man standing type of fight I've heard a lot of vet's say how much they hated fighting the SS units. I agree to a point that every man an weapon given to the SS hurt the regular Army, except for some like the 12th which were in some cases made up of 65% Hitler youth who were destined to be SS soldiers eventually more times than not.
I cant say for 100% certain that the creation of the W-SS helped the German army or hurt it, if any thing it is probably closer to 50 50 an in same cases 60 40 in both ways. The original W-SS units that were around for the beginning of the Eastern front campaign an the Western campaign more than likely added no direct benefit as their record in battle shows they didnt do all that well, but later on in the war I could see how the W-SS units did add value, I hate to keep using the 12th as an example but they seem to be a good one, at the time of D-Day the 12th was made up of mostly fresh to the battlefield Hitler youth with hardened Eastern front vets as their NCO's, which to me is a recipe for an extremely aggressive an very tough fighting force. I recently read about the 12th in Normandy prior to the battle for the Falaise gap there was a quote about them that about sums them up, it went 'All had the will to reach the sea. It was difficult to get them back on the leash again. The order to fall back was met with disbelief, and as a result was followed only after a long delay.' it went on to say that later on witnesses said they saw boys from the division upset an crying over the fact that they didnt get to throw the Allies back into the sea. If there was any added value to the W-SS being in existence it was the psychological factor they brought with them an the fact that they generally backed it up with how they would fight until they couldnt fight any more is a value, if you can deploy a force to the field that can put fear into your enemies its a value. The W-SS also recruited non Germans as well such as the Fins an Bosnian s as well, I believe they even recruited from France if I'm not mistaken

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Re: The Military Successes of the Waffen-SS

#51

Post by Sid Guttridge » 12 Oct 2014, 16:30

Hi JustinYT,

I am not sure escaping from one debacle at Falaise to prepare for another in the Ardennes helps your case much!

Nobody in the 12th SS Division was destined to be an SS soldier. They were all destined by law to serve in the Army. What the W-SS was allowed to do by the NSDAP government was to circumvent this by pre-emptively recruiting school-aged youths in the year before they were due to be called up by the Army.

There is an arguable case that the creation of the 12th W-SS Division was a mistake, as it concentrated a large number of motivated youths with junior leadership potential into a single formation. They were almost all lost in a couple of months serving as ordinary infantrymen, when they might have been better used as junior leaders in a much larger number of formations. The Germans suffered a similar debacle in 1914 when a couple of divisions raised from university students were shot to pieces by the British at Ypres, thereby depriving the German Army of numerous junior officers later in the war. Albert Speer was particularly scathing about the wastefulness to Germany of the 12th W-SS Division's losses of prime manpower. Far from being an example of "value added", 12th W-SS Division, which took nearly twice as long to field as an equivalent Army division, may have been the reverse. Furthermore, it left no legacy, as after its initial batch of selectively recruited manpower had been lost in Normandy, its successor was undistinguished. The 12th W-SS Division was an unrepeatable one-off, with an arguable downside for the wider Wehrmacht.

Certainly the Waffen-SS recruited non-Germans, but it was slower to do so than the German Army, which did not have the Waffen-SS's racial hang-ups. It was a political decision in late 1942 that led to the Waffen-SS recruiting "non-Germanics". By then the Army already had a Spanish Division and several western European "legions" in its ranks, besides hundreds of thousands of Eastern volunteers. The W-SS was actually against their recruitment until late 1942.

It is interesting that you concentrate on the W-SS in Normandy. Did you know that this force created as an ideological foe of Communism actually lost a slightly higher proportion of its casualties on the Western Front than did the German Army and a lower proportion on the Eastern Front than the German Army? As it transpired, the Waffen-SS turned out to be more of a spearhead against Liberal Democracy than against communism!

In Normandy all the W-SS formations were armoured. By contrast, most German Army divisions in Normandy were horsedrawn infantry, often equipped with captured artillery and usually including unreliable battalions of Eastern volunteers. Is it any wonder the Allies would rather have run into a typical German Army formation than a typical W-SS formation?

Cheers,

Sid.

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Re: The Military Successes of the Waffen-SS

#52

Post by JustinYT » 12 Oct 2014, 19:06

Hi Sid, I think escaping the Falaise gap so that they could later launch the Ardennes offensive does help, dont forget just how close Peiper came to getting Antwerp which was the stated goal for the offensive. Having a chance to turn things around vs you lost a big big portion of your fighting force on the Western front is big to me consider how much faster the war could of been over if not for the battle of the Bulge a lot of people said an say Hitler was dumb for the Ardennes campaign but what's the old SAS motto "fortune favors the bold"? Germany was loosing the war so the roll of the dice was worth it in my eyes. I've seen different accounts of the 12th's losses in Normandy from only having a few hundred men to it having about 12,000 men according to Kurt Meyes report on casualties, it did though loose almost or all it's tanks and artillery, so the 12th was not destroyed but more it was hurt far worse in the Ardennes offensive and was never able to recover after. It does seem odd though that the W-SS lost more men on the Western front than the Eastern front you would think it would be the opposite since the fighting on the East was more brutal. The only thing I could think of was that a lot of the W-SS were transferred to the West which could explain that, also its no surprise that their losses were higher since they had a habit of fighting to the death. Yeah it is funny that the SS ended up being a spear head against liberal democracy then communism but the communists didnt have what the West had.

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Re: The Military Successes of the Waffen-SS

#53

Post by seaburn » 12 Oct 2014, 19:26

Hi JustinYT. I think its quite interesting that you mention 'fight to the death' a lot in relation to the 12th - which is a perception I always had of the WSS as a whole before I knew anything about them - But when you look at the Regimental Commanders of the 12th - Mohnke, Meyer and Wunsche - they had all fought on the EF and survived the Western front too - add the other movers and shakers from the LSAH and the 12th - like Wisch, Bremer Peiper Frey, Hansen, et al and it seems that these guys did not 'fight to the death', in fact many went into captivity. I wonder was it just the young guys who died that way?

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Re: The Military Successes of the Waffen-SS

#54

Post by Harro » 12 Oct 2014, 19:28

JustinYT wrote:Hi Sid, I think escaping the Falaise gap so that they could later launch the Ardennes offensive does help, dont forget just how close Peiper came to getting Antwerp which was the stated goal for the offensive.
He did not come close to getting Antwerp at all. 12th SS was stopped dead in its tracks, Peiper did not manage to reach the Meuse. If (and that's allready a big "if") they had ever managed to reach the Meuse and actually cross it, his remaining Panzers would have to cross another 130km to Antwerp through open plains with no protection against allied fighterbombers and those who managed to survive that would have to capture a complete town with harbor before "getting" Antwerp.

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Re: The Military Successes of the Waffen-SS

#55

Post by Sid Guttridge » 12 Oct 2014, 20:38

Hi JustinYT,

I don't know where you get the idea that the Ardennes offensive came anywhere close to success.

For a start, the Americans defeated the offensive with barely any British forces being engaged at all - and it was the British who were potentially most at risk.

Furthermore, German battle casualties were significantly higher than those of the Americans in the Ardennes.

Nor were the W-SS more likely to die than Army combat troops.

W-SS fatalities were about 32% of the force whereas the army was about 26% (I will have to check the exact stats). However, given that the Waffen-SS had almost no logistical tail because it relied on the Army for its logistics, it is probable that W-SS combat soldiers were no more likely to die than their direct Army equivalents. Indeed, there is no particular reason why W-SS casualties could not have been the lighter, given that they more often had the motorization and armour to escape the worst debacles.

In one sentence you write, "I've seen different accounts of the 12th's losses in Normandy from only having a few hundred men to it having about 12,000 men according to Kurt Meyes report on casualties....."

However, in the same paragraph you also write, "their losses were higher since they had a habit of fighting to the death."

If 12,000 members of 12th W-SS Division escaped, (the majority of the formation) then they can hardly have all fought to the death.

I suggest you may be choosing to believe what you want to believe, regardless of evidence that is already in your own hands.

Cheers,

Sid.

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Re: The Military Successes of the Waffen-SS

#56

Post by JustinYT » 13 Oct 2014, 09:30

well Peiper got to somewhere outside of Stoumont which is about a 2 hours from Antwerp, during the winter maybe 3 or 4, the Ardennes offensive wasnt about destroying the Americans or Allies as much as it was about retaking the Antwerp port and cutting off the only deep harbor available that allowed the Allies to continue their push on Germany. If you look at what the plan was, to cut the Allies in two, retake Antwerp harbor an put the Allies in a worse position since their supply lines an mostly their ability to bring up more troops was not where it needed to be. So yeah they got pretty close to where they needed to be. I suggest you not try to use to separate sentences that were about two different things an try to blend them as one. The first sentence about the differing reports on the 12th's casualties in Normandy, where the second sentence you noted was in response to your statement about the W-SS as a whole having a higher casualty rate than others. Yeah the W-SS being a more motorized group should of had lighter casualties since they would of been able to escape from a bad situation, but running away wasnt generally their style, it seems more time than not the W-SS would stay in a fight longer than they should fighting to the last man style is a waste. Troops are more easy to replace than tanks vehicles an artillery. I think part of it also comes down to the individual commanders, you had some who didnt care what the outlook was they would stay and fight until they died, an then you have some who wouldnt sacrifice all their men in a loss

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Re: The Military Successes of the Waffen-SS

#57

Post by Sid Guttridge » 13 Oct 2014, 11:48

Hi JustinYT,

I fail to see your point. Certainly Antwerp is only a few hours from the furthest tip of the German Ardennes advance - provided nobody wanted to oppose them. Yet the people most at risk, the Anglo-Canadians armies, barely had to be engaged to prevent this happening because the US Army sorted the Germans out without significant outside assistance. The Germans came nowhere close to success in the Ardennes.

I am fully entitled to put your two contradictory statements together. Indeed, you put them together yourself in the same paragraph. If 12,000 members of the 12th W-SS Division escaped from Normandy (the great majority of the formation) they can hardly have fulfilled your proposition that the W-SS generally fought to the death.

You write, "but running away wasnt generally their style". Nor, I would suggest, was it generally the style of the German Army. Besides, it rather depends on what youi mean by "running away". Part of Nord Division fled in its first action on the Finnish front. The W-SS disobeyed orders by abandoning Kharkov in early 1943. Was this "running away"? W-SS units were at the head of the charge to the break-out from the Korsun pocket. Was this "running away"? And what about the Falaise action we have been talking about? Personally, I see no particular problem with any of these last three actions, but none of them show a blind willingness to fight to the death. Rather, they betray a healthy sense of self preservation.

Over two thirds of Waffen-SS men survived the war and their overall losses amongst combat troops appear to have been in line with those of the German Army. Indeed, if you want to use casualties as a measure of self sacrifice, that of the Army's Grossdeutschland Division tops that of any W-SS division. And, unlike the politicized warriors of the Waffen-SS, the Grossdeutschland really did suffer almost all its casualties fighting Communism on the Eastern Front.

The real problem with W-SS myth-building is that it obscures the far more important achievements of the German Army, of which the W-SS, militarily, was little more than a clone.

Cheers,

Sid.

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Re: The Military Successes of the Waffen-SS

#58

Post by Harro » 13 Oct 2014, 18:05

JustinYT wrote:well Peiper got to somewhere outside of Stoumont which is about a 2 hours from Antwerp, during the winter maybe 3 or 4, the Ardennes offensive wasnt about destroying the Americans or Allies as much as it was about retaking the Antwerp port and cutting off the only deep harbor available that allowed the Allies to continue their push on Germany. If you look at what the plan was, to cut the Allies in two, retake Antwerp harbor an put the Allies in a worse position since their supply lines an mostly their ability to bring up more troops was not where it needed to be. So yeah they got pretty close to where they needed to be.
Antwerpen and Stoumont are separated by 170 km, for a Panther tank on straight open roads without opposition and enough fuel (!!!) a four to five hour ride, but with the narrow twisty Ardennes roads from Stoumont to the Meuse more like seven to eight hours. Of these 170 km some 130 km would have led Peiper through open terrain north of the Meuse which would have been a field day for the allied airforce like it was in Normandy. Whatever would have managed to survive and would have managed to reach Antwerp would have been far to weak to actually take the town and its port. Now, you can ignore all those factors and claim that it would have been a 2 hour walk in the park but you're only fooling yourself.

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Re: The Military Successes of the Waffen-SS

#59

Post by Dwight Pruitt » 13 Oct 2014, 19:20

Harro wrote: Antwerpen and Stoumont are separated by 170 km, for a Panther tank on straight open roads without opposition and enough fuel (!!!) a four to five hour ride
Not to mention probably at the limit of the Panther's very finicky and fragile final drives.

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Re: The Military Successes of the Waffen-SS

#60

Post by Rob - wssob2 » 14 Oct 2014, 03:16

I think escaping the Falaise gap so that they could later launch the Ardennes offensive does help
Well, Falaise was a complete disaster for Nazi Germany, and essentially signified the Wehrmacht's almost-complete evacuation from occupied France. Fifty-thousand casualties is nothing to dismiss, and the losses in material and armored vehicles were devastating. On the plus side, a lot of German senior commanders were able to slip away to fight another day.

...dont forget just how close Peiper came to getting Antwerp which was the stated goal for the offensive.
We have a thread on a performance comparison between the Fifth Panzer Army and the SS Sixth Panzer Army called "Performance of Heer and Waffen-SS in the Bulge" and located at http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 0&t=194015

On the "Why the Waffen-SS thread, RichTO90 posted some interesting information on the Ardennes Combat Simulation Data Base (ASDB) and his observation that the 18th Volksgrenadier Division gave the best performance during the campaign.
I've seen different accounts of the 12th's losses in Normandy from only having a few hundred men to it having about 12,000 men according to Kurt Meyes report on casualties, it did though loose almost or all it's tanks and artillery, so the 12th was not destroyed but more it was hurt far worse in the Ardennes offensive and was never able to recover after.
Agree with you that there are some pretty wide disparities in the 12th SS manpower strength post Normandy. The lowest figures (e.g. 650 men) are probably for combat troops and exclude service and support troops. The number also probably increased as scattered Hitlerjugend troops managed to regroup. At any rate, by the first week of Sept when the unit was in Germany it was pretty clear the division had lost over 9,000 men in the campaign.

Actually, Hitlerjugend's casaulties were not worse in the Ardennes offensive. Hitlerjugend total casualties for Dec 16-Jan 16 were 577 killed, 1,802 wounded, 755 missing

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