The Military Successes of the Waffen-SS

[Rob - wssob2]

A couple of observations:

hi sid...the frundsberg and hohenstaufen divisions were raised in 1943 and belong to that generation of waffen ss formations which were raised independently and not cannibalised from the heer..

I’m not sure what you mean by “cannibalized by the Heer.” The history of the Waffen-SS is in large part its various schemes to get more manpower, but in the case of the 9th and 10th SS Divisions the SS-HA turned to the Reich Labor Service to provide conscripts.

the waffen ss ness you mention consists of the following components: better esprit de corps

The “espirit de corps” in the SS varied from unit to unit and campaign to campaign. Waffen-SS units such as the Finnish Battalion, the 7th, 13th, 14th, 20th SS Divisions, etc. all went through periods of low morale. Even junior officers in the LSSAH in the 1943-45 period experienced a growing disillusionment with the progress of the War and their own personal chances of surviving it.

born out of the uniquely egalitarian culture fostered through the way the waffen ss was raised, led and nurtured..

There was no Waffen-SS "uniquely egalitarian culture” other than in the propaganda releases of the Kurt Eggers unit.

all officers had to come in through the ranks..

This is incorrect. All officers in the Waffen-SS most definitely did not come throughout the ranks.

address was simply through the rank and now herr so and so..it was simply as sturmfuhrer..standartenfuhrer..gruppenfuhrer et al..

Someday hopefully a historian will write an essay on the use of language in the SS as a tool for political indoctrination - similar to what Victor Klemperer did in his book LTI – Lingua Tertii Imperii: Notizbuch eines Philologen

the political indoctrination took care of the paradigm..which reinforced the will and determination...
the team loyalty and above all loyalty to the fuhrer oath gave the waffen ss its raison de’ t’re, its reason for existence..

This is sounding like a Kurt Eggers press release.

When you research units like the LSSAH or SSTK, under a veneer of “team loyalty” one will find a much less idealistic reality of interpersonal rivalries and infighting.

along with heroic defiance.. in many many instances..some waffen ss formations like the handschar were pathetic..

Handschar gets a bad rap, but they are hardly the first indigenous conscript unit in history to see its military performance wane as the wartime situation deteriorates. Given the lack of political motivation and the military situation, it’s unsurprising that Handschar troops started deserting to the Partisans.

at the ardennes, except for peiper's kampfgruppe..the other waffen ss formations came croppers..last stands and nihilist stay behinds for a lost cause are romantic..

“Romantic” and encouraged by Himmler and Hitler.

sid.. again! excuse me but i am missing some vital point you are making...it is but obvious that any nations military as a whole would draw from tje common pool of resources available to that nation, including man power !?

The Waffen-SS, facing limitations on German recruits placed upon it by Hitler himself, looked every which way to find alternate sources for manpower - the General-SS, the Police, the RAD, the Hitlerjugend, Volksdeutsche and eventually foreign volunteers and conscripts.

one point to be remembered sid is that the waffen ss was a part of the "wehrmacht”..

This is incorrect. Technically the Waffen-SS belonged to the SS, which was itself an independent component of the Nazi Party.

the wehrmacht is not to be equated with the heer..

Wehrmacht = “Armed Forces” in English

Heer = “Army”

In many history books, the terms are used interchangeably

what you are referring to is the resource earmarking conflict between the heer and the waffen ss..but both added up to the aggregate wehrmacht numbers..

The Third Reich spawned a many-headed hydra of armed services - the Army, Navy, Airforce, the Waffen-SS, the Order Police, the Reich Labor Service, the People’s Army, etc.

all branches of the german military were components of the wehrmacht…

This is incorrect - the Order Police being a case in point.

to stretch the point a bit.. by your line of reasoning, the fallschirmjaeger resources and marine infantry of the kriegsmarine too were made available to the luftwaffe and navy at the cost of the army?

Hitler set percentages for recruiting quotas for each branch of the armed services and the SS. As the war progressed and the manpower situation worsened, troops would be transferred from branch to branch, which is why you see Luftwaffe and Kreigsmarine troops transferred to the Army and Waffen-SS in the 1943-45 period.

student's paras thought no end of themselves…

An excellent point that similar to the Waffen-SS, the Paratroops were ideologically associated with the Nazi Party

so were the waffen ss...and i beg to differ on the issue of the caste ridden heer tradition being similar to the egalitarian waffen ss ethos..

The interwar German Army (Reichwehr) got rid of its “caste-ridden tradition” in the 1920’s. The German Army of the 1930’s and into WWII was actually a pretty meritocratic organization.

Again, there was no "egalitarian waffen ss ethos” - for example, Himmler had to intervene into the poor treatment Flemish volunteers received under Waffen-SS drill instructors in September 1941. The poor treatment the Finnish SS volunteers experienced became a diplomatic issue between Nazi Germany and Finland. SSTK Commander Eicke basically called his Volksdeutsche replacements worthless.

again no value judgments please..in some ways the ss ethos produced its own unique qualities..

When studying history, however, one has to make value judgements based on the evidence. One of those “unique qualities” the SS ethos seems to have produced was the tactic of locking civilians into a barn and setting it on fire, a practice done by different Waffen-SS unit from France to Istria to Byelorussia. Given this common tactic across time and SS units,one has to wonder if this tactic was taught as part of SS counterinsurgency doctrine.

however the strategic wisdom of the prussian general staff tradition was superior where grand strategy and utilisation of resources were concerned…

A great weakness of the Waffen-SS was in its higher-command functions, which is why you see an influx of Army commanders transferred into the various SS division and corps commands as staff officers. SS senior officers took Army divisional command courses (typically at Wünsdorf)

thats what produced the brilliant chain of victories..even where loyalty was concerned its difficult to do blanket distinction.. general feldmarschall manstein made the famous point .. " pruessiche feldmarshalle meutern nicht" when turning down the july conspirators.. and manstein was the archetypal prussian general staff product whereas ss stalwarts like schellenburg, fegelein and kaltenbrunner ratted out on hitler when the ship was sinking...so....

Fegelein is a great example of a Waffen-SS officer who knew how to play Third Reich power politics. There are, of course, many others - “Sepp” Dietrich, Eicke, Skorzeny, et. al.

[ljadw]

[quote="JustinYT"

c) In Stalingrad of the 210,000 Germans encircled, 10,000 remained to fight on, 105,000 surrendered, 35,000 left by air and the remaining 60,000 died, committed suicide in the 11 weeks after being encircled. Doesnt look like everybody liked the idea of being a Soviet POW[/quote]


That is not was has been said : what has been said is that the majority of the German soldiers at Stalingrad became POW and did not die for the Führer and that this is an indication that having the choice between become POW or die for the Führer,they chose to become POW .
105000 POW/60000 died from all causes:the majority chose to become POW,preferring Soviet inprisonment to death .It is always better to be a POW than to be a dead hero .

It was the same in Normandy : more men of the Hitlerjugend division became POW than were killed .

[JustinYT]

and of those who chose to become POW's at Stalingrad how many died shortly after when the Red Army let them freeze to death?

[dshaday]

Hi Karelia

To confirm what you have already presented about Overman's confirmed figures being only part of the true picture.

Regarding Rüdiger Overmans statement "It seems entirely plausible, while not provable, that one half of the 1.5 million missing on the eastern front were killed in action, the other half (700,000) however in fact died in Soviet custody". p. 289

One reason why Overman makes this statement is because of the Maschke Commission’s estimate of German deaths of 1.094M German POW deaths in Russia. This commission used multiple sources to come up with this figure. Overman says of the commission's finding “ So, though this is an estimate, it can be considered a well-founded one”. If you add Overman’s confirmed deceased POW figure with his estimate of 700,00 you come close to the Maschke Commission’s figure.

All the best

Dennis

[dshaday]

Hi sandeepmukherjee196

one point to be remembered sid is that the waffen ss was a part of the "wehrmacht"..the wehrmacht is not to be equated with the heer.. what you are referring to is the resource earmarking conflict between the heer and the waffen ss..but both added up to the aggregate wehrmacht numbers..all branches of the german military were components of the wehrmacht...

As has already been pointed out, the Wehrmacht does not include the Waffen SS. It is good to get the terminology right. The Waffen SS were, however, subordinated in time of war to the German Army. That is surely why the national conscription allotment for the SS came out of the Army’s fixed share.

It is very true that the Wehrmacht and SS were fighting on the same side. I have said as much myself in previous posts on the forum. So I see a lot of the Army’s objection being down to criticism of the management of those scarce resources by the Waffen SS (which can be debated either way) and a bruised ego. In fact, I would criticise the army for not doing more to help train/assist the Waffen SS to do a better job with those scarce resources.

From memory, German newsreels for the public often merge Army and Waffen SS combat units in their reporting. They had no hang-ups with having to separating the two, since they were on the same side.

All the best

Dennis

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi RichT90,

Exactly.

Sid.

[seaburn]

Hi All, this appears to be getting side tracked into the Heer V WSS debate which has already been covered by the 'Why the WSS thread' - Has anyone got any other examples of 'The military successes of the WSS' ?

[RichTO90]

Hi RichT90,

Exactly.

Sid.

Cheers Side!

BTW, it's RichTO90

[RichTO90]

Hi All, this appears to be getting side tracked into the Heer V WSS debate which has already been covered by the 'Why the WSS thread' - Has anyone got any other examples of 'The military successes of the WSS' ?

For sure there are any number of tactical and even operational successes that could be attributed to the W-SS. Strategic? No, I think not.

So...

KG Peiper in the Ardennes. Excellent at exploiting a seam opened by 3. FJD, which allowed them to overrun various units unprepared to resist them...in turn allowing them to massacre various said soldiers, plus the odd civilians. Once encountering real resistance, hunkered down and then abandoned all equipment and fled to fight again another day...oh, and of course massacring prisoners and civilians in the process.
Rest of 1. SS-PzD...not even that much success...oh, and of course massacring prisoners and civilians in the process.
12. SS-PzD...not even that much success...oh, and of course massacring prisoners and civilians in the process.
2. SS-PzD, exploited near operational vacuum created by 5. PzAOK...beat up on elements of the 7th AD just withdrawn from the St. Vith pocket...and then ground to a halt...oh, and of course massacring prisoners and civilians in the process.
9. SS-PzD...see 2. SS-PzD...oh, and of course massacring prisoners and civilians in the process.

Normandy?
12. SS-PzD? Engaged in first counterattacks against the beachhead, which resulted in an embarrassing debacle. Afterwards? Excellent defensive battles that eventually resulted in 50% casualties in the committed elements of the division, which eventually had to break and run for the German border like everyone else...oh, and of course massacring prisoners and civilians in the process.
17. SS-PzGD...like 12. SS-PzD was engaged in the initial counterattacks against the beachhead, which resulted in an embarrassing debacle.
1. SS-PzD? Ditto, minus the initial embarrassing debacle of a counterattack, instead, Wittmann brought laurels on the division by beating up on halftracks, carriers, and a couple of unprepared Cromwells...before getting his Tiger KOed by a 6-pounder.
2. SS-PzD? Ditto, minus Wittmann.
9. SS-PzD? Ditto.
10. SS-PzD? Ditto.

BTW, all "details" in the above strictly tongue-in-cheek of course. Doesn't do to rile the fanbois.

[seaburn]

It should be kept in mind that sometimes, just sometimes there are people who read these posts that are not the slightest bit interested in the 'Pro V anti WSS' merry go round that perpetuates and sullies all these threads eventually. There are people who just want to learn about military engagements at a given time in a given location. Or am I alone in this. :roll: If I had to write a paper on the Military engagements of a WSS unit or Division and only spoke about the negatives, I'd get a big fat zero...... I would need to give both sides of the coin and then I could obviously come to a negative conclusion if the evidence pointed that way.... I was rather hoping that this thread would be the place for such an academic discussion.

[ljadw]

and of those who chose to become POW's at Stalingrad how many died shortly after when the Red Army let them freeze to death?

and of those who became POW in 1941 how many died shortly after when the WM let them freeze to death?

[RichTO90]

It should be kept in mind that sometimes, just sometimes there are people who read these posts that are not the slightest bit interested in the 'Pro V anti WSS' merry go round that perpetuates and sullies all these threads eventually. There are people who just want to learn about military engagements at a given time in a given location. Or am I alone in this. :roll: If I had to write a paper on the Military engagements of a WSS unit or Division and only spoke about the negatives, I'd get a big fat zero...... I would need to give both sides of the coin and then I could obviously come to a negative conclusion if the evidence pointed that way.... I was rather hoping that this thread would be the place for such an academic discussion.

Indeed, but the "other side of the coin" was already expressed at considerable length, especially WRT Peiper's "success" in the Ardennes. The point being that ultimately you must first define what you mean by "success" and what level of operations you are applying it to. Unfortunately, few ever seem willing to do so.

So in fact, no, you are not alone in wanting an objective analytical POV expressed. It just rarely happens.

[seaburn]

Tks Rich T090 - would it ever be possible do you think that there would be an impartial poster one day who can say .....this unit did well here but not here..... Does it have to be the case that you're either totally 'for or agin' (sic) or that you can't get past your ultra promotion/disdain for the organisation as a whole....

By the by, I have no Idea what has gone on before with the Peiper/Ardennes thread but surely Peiper was not the only person who fought for the WSS....

[RichTO90]

Tks Rich T090 - would it ever be possible do you think that there would be an impartial poster one day who can say .....this unit did well here but not here..... Does it have to be the case that you're either totally 'for or agin' (sic) or that you can't get past your ultra promotion/disdain for the organisation as a whole....

The problem is that logic and evidence rarely have much importance attached to them in these discussions.

By the by, I have no Idea what has gone on before with the Peiper/Ardennes thread but surely Peiper was not the only person who fought for the WSS....

It was just a few posts ago in this thread, buried in the rhetoric about the stalwart Nordic...

[dshaday]

Hi Seaburn

As per your original comment regarding examples of military successes of the Waffen SS you can have a look at the following brief notes for starters. Some have already been mentioned, but I have included them so as to keep things in one place/together;

a/ April 1941 advance elements of Das Reich (motorcycle company) in a daring move capture Belgrade, the capital of Yugoslavia. They took the city’s surrender, and with some reinforcements defended it against counterattacks. The main German Army forces arrived the next day. SS-Hauptsturmführer Fritz Klingenberg received the Knights Cross for this action.

b/ Operations in Greece. The Leistandarte successfully takes the two main passes defended by Greek and Commonwealth troops. The Klidi Pass and the Kleisoura Pass are key in the Greek First Army’s main line of resistance, and are now broken. After the pitched battle on the Metsovon Pass the Greek First Army surrenders to the Leistandarte (Sep Dietrich). The Leibstandarte vigorously pursues Commonwealth forces till their evacuation from Greece. The Leibstandarte occupied a position of honour in the victory parade through Athens.

c/ The Leibstandarte seized the first bridgehead over the Dnieper, broke through the Soviet defences at the Crimea at Perekop and stormed Taganrog and Rostov. The 5th SS Viking Division pursued the Russians to the Sea of Azov.
Das Reich captured Belgrade in 1941 and later broke through the Moscow defences and came within 50km of the Kremlin.

d/ In the battle of Kursk the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Panzer Divisions advanced the furthest and virtually crippled the Soviet 5 Guards tank Army around Prokhorovka.

e/ The 1st SS Panzer Corps was rushed to Kharkov in early 1943 to help stem the Soviet advance. They succeeded in doing so and, by the end of March, had actually retaken the city and helped stop the Soviet offensive. Hitler was so impressed that he declared the Corps to be 'worth twenty Italian divisions' (Hitler's Table Talk, 5 April 1942, pp 402-3, cited in Reitlinger, 1981, p 156).


In defence:
f/ When the Soviets cut off the Totenkopf and five army divisions at Demyansk in February 1942, Eicke's division led "the nucleus of a mixed force of surrounded army and waffen SS formations that hung onto the Valdai Hills, prevented a major Russian breakthrough, and stabilized the weakened right flank of Army Group North." Later spearheading the breakthrough to German lines. Charles W. Sydnor Jr., Soldiers of Destruction: The Death's Head Division, 1933-1945, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), page 211

g/ In December 1943, the Red Army broke through the German lines in the Ukraine and surrounded nearly 60,000 troops at Cherkassy. The 5th SS Viking provided critical mobile armoured defence of the pocket and led the breakout to the west into the German relief force.

On these occasions, at Demyansk and Cherkassy, the Waffen SS had helped to prevented another potential Stalingrad-type loss.

h/ In Normandy in 1944, remnants of nineteen German divisions were trapped in the Falaise Pocket. Waffen SS units were instrumental in keeping open a corridor until a significant number of the units had escaped.

i/ At Arnhem in 1944 SS units were instrumental in delaying the advance of British paratroopers to the bridge, and in later defeating the main body. They were instrumental in the general defence of the region, and thwarting the Allied offensive.

All the best

Dennis