Cult Icon wrote:Where did you get that info about a fire direction computer? that is quite interesting.
More info about the fire direction computer and how the division was supposed to operate can be found in
On Artillery by Bruce I. Gudmundsson:
Fresh memories of the 78th Assault Division's attempt to do without the massed fire of artillery units larger than battalions may have played a role in the German Army's next major experiment in division organization, the 18th Artillery Division. In contrast to the 78th Assault Division, which had been extraordinarily rich in direct fire weapons, the 18th Artillery Division was conceived of as a formation that acted exclusively through concentrated indirect fire. Its principal combat units were nine fully motorized artillery battalions, one of which had its howitzers mounted on armored, self-propelled, fully-tracked chassis.
The original concept was for the 18th Artillery Division to serve as a "focus of efforts weapon" (Schwerpunktwaffe) with which the Army High Command could powerfully reinforce an army corps or similar organization in a particularly critical situation. So that it could move rapidly from one sector to another, the division was to be entirely motorized.[...] So that the 18th Artillery Division could rapidly mass the fire of all available batteries on single targets, it was provided with an experimental fire control battery (Feuerleitbatterie).
The fire control battery might best be described as an overgrown version of the French poste central du groupe. With communication links to as many as eighteen firing units (whether single batteries, battalions, or detachments of varying size) and an almost unlimited number of observers, its job was to translate the tactical decisions of observers into a coordinated set of firing commands. Like its French antecedent, the fire control battery had the advantage of greatly simplifying the work of battery commanders trying to cooperate with other batteries to produce the simultaneous impact of scores of shells. The great danger was that the battery commander would be deprived of his role as a tactical decision maker.
This latter danger was greatly mitigated by the fact that the fire control battery was a supplement to, rather than a replacement for, traditional German fire control procedures. The batteries of the 18th Artillery Division, as well as any batteries under its operational control, retained their battery observation posts and forward observers, as well as procedures that made the battery commander, with his eyes on the battlefield, a tactical decision maker. These other observers were used for missions that were not of direct interest to the division as a whole: battery, battalion, and regimental concetrations; barrages (rarely), as well as registration and harassing fire by means of roving pieces (Arbeitsgeschütze). Only when traditional methods would not do the job -particularly when the fire of a large number of batteries needed to be concentrated quickly- did the fire control battery come into action.
The innovation of the German fire control battery was not merely one of scale. The heart of the battery (or, more precisely, its mind), was an electronic computed linked to a series of teletype machines. The computer, which was "aware" of the location of every German firing unit, quickly converted the call for fire from the observer into a series of fire commands (azimuth, range, type of projectile and fuse, number of rounds, etc.) that, three to five second laters, were automatically transmitted by teletype.
In addition to making use of the forward observers and observation posts of the artillery batteries, battalions, and regiments, the fire control battery was in contact with a number of special observers riding in armored command vehicles (Panzerbafehlswagen). Escorted by assault guns (from the 18th Artillery Division's assault gun company) and often provided with man-pack radios so that they could use observation points too small to hide an armored vehicle, these observers belonged to neither battery nor battalion but to the division as a whole. They were, in contrast to the second lieutenants and NCOs who served as battery forward observers, experienced battery (an, in some cases, battalion) commanders. Most important, they had the authority to bring down the concentrated firepower of an artillery regiment or even the whole artillery division on whatever point they designated.
In a sense, these armored observers were the descendants of the artillery liaison officers of 1918. Like their predecessors, the armored observers were not tied to any particular firing unit but had the means to gather the services of available artillery units. The armored observers represented a step up from the artillery liaison officers of World War I in that their use of radio and their links to the fire control battery allowed them contact with a larger number of potential firing batteries. Another advantage enjoyed by the armored observer was the practice of sending armored observers out in teams of two or three. This not only allowed continuous observation while on the move (one observer in an overwatch position while the others changed position) but also permitted the observation of a tactical event from two or three different vantage points.
For counterbattery work, the 18th Artillery Division had an observation battalion. Identical to the observation battalions that were usually attached to army corps and directly subordinated to Arkos, this observation battalion had three tasks. The first was to establish its intelligence network of listening and observation posts and balloons. The second, particularly important if the fire control battery was to be of any use, was to carry out a thorough survey so that the entire divisioncould be on the same grid. Last (but certainly not least) was to command the counterbattery effort. That is, rather than telling off a particular battlion or regiment for counterbattery work, the division put units under the operational control of the observation battalion.
In situations where the 18th Artillery Division was operating with a formation that had access to an to Arko or observation battalion of its own, one of these might be assigned the responsibility for the counterbattery effort. This freed the 18th Artillery Division to do what it was designed to do: rapidly concentrate its fire on single points where that fire would have a decisive impact on the outcome of a battle. The 18th Artillery Division, after all, was no better equipped for identifying and combating Soviet batteries than an to Arko commanding a similar number of firing batteries. The combination of the fire contrl battery and the armored observation vehicles, however, gave it a unique means of cooperating with hard-pressed infantry.
