Rebuilding the 14. Panzer-Division, 1943

[CNE503]

Hello,

If my sources are correct, the divisions which were destroyed in Stalingrad were all raised again in Spring 1943.
Amongst them, a large part used the Grenadier-Regimenter numbered from 875 to 891, raised by the Ersatzheer from February 6th, 1943.
In particular, the 16. Panzer Division used a large part of verstärktes Grenadier-Regiment (motorisiert) 890 (from Wehrkreis IV) and the 24. Panzer-Division did the same with the verstärktes Panzergrenadier-Regiment 891 from Wehrkreis IX.
Similarly, the 345. and 386. Infanterie-Divisionen (motorisierte) were used to create new 29. and 3. Infanterie-Divisionen (motorisierte) - soon to be renamed Panzergrenadier-Divisionen.

But which was the units used to build again the 14. Panzer-Division?

Thanks for your help.
Cheers,

CNE503

[Leo Niehorster]

Hi,

Appears that the 14. Panzer Division was not raised from any of the amored or motorized reserve units in France.

Summary/translation:
The 14. Panzer Division was fortunate in that it had a good basis for its phoenix-like rising. In France it had available some 3000–4000 members of the "old" division, consisting of the service elements (apparently many had escaped destruction), recovered wounded, returning leave takers, and personnel who had been on detached duty (schools, special courses, etc.). Some experienced personnel was also transferred from other armored units, (no details). The rest were apparently inexperienced troops. New was the Pz.Aufkl.Abt. 14, raised using the remnants of the Division's Kradschützen-Battalion 64 as well as elements of the Pz.Aufkl.Rgt. 91 (1. Panzer Division ) and the Panzertruppenschule II (Krampnitz/Potsdam). The Pz.Jg.Abt. 4 was not raised again.

All from
  Rolf Stoves
  Die gepanzerten und motorisierten Deutschen Grossverbände (1935–1945)
  Podzun-Pallas, Bad Nauheim, 1986
  ISBN 3-7909-02729-9

NOTE;
This book should be used with caution. Mixed bag of bad, good, OK, and some apparently invented. Stoves has no bibliography, and rarely notes his sources. In this case, however, he indicates Rolf Grams' unofficial divisional history; but Grams himself nowhere specifies where the bits and pieces for the "new" division came from. So where Stoves' got his stuff I don't know.

Cheers
Leo

[CNE503]

Thank you Leo, for your answer and your warning.
Similarly, do you know what units were used to rebuild the 60. Infanterie Division (motorisiert), which was the only motorized division not to benefit to a reserve motorized division?

Cheers,

CNE503

[Leo Niehorster]

Tessin says that while in France the 60. Inf.Div. (mot) managed to raise from its own personnel remnants as of 15.03.43:
— Rgt.Hqs. & I./Gren.Rgt. 92, 13./92. → renamed III./120 (Because the 92nd was raised separately as Heerestruppen.)
— I. & II./Gren.Rgt. 120 & 14./120
— Bn.Hqs. & 1./Pz.Abt. 160
— I./Art.Rgt. 160 (with 3 batteries)
— Pion.Btl. 160
— one signal company
(120th later renamed Füs.Rgt, FHH)
The Gren.Rgt. 271 ("Feldherrnhalle" = FHH) of the 93. Inf.Div. was used to raise second Grenadier-Regiment of the division. (271st later renamed Gren.Rgt. FHH)
Again, no Pz.Jg.Abt. (An antitank company was eventually raised in Nov.43, the battalion finally in June 44.)

A secondary source indicates further personnel replacements came from parts of the Pz.Gren.Rgt. 891 (Heerestruppe, raised 12.03.43), the Artillerie-Lehr-Rgt. Jüterborg, the Panzertruppenschule II (Krampnitz/Potsdam), Gren.Ers.Btl. FHH (Potsdam, raised 23.09.42) [1], Asub.Btl. FHH (Arsnwalde, raised 23.09.42) [1], and one infantry replacement battalion from the SA-Standarte Feldherrnhalle itself.
  Erich Jainek,
  "Soldaten der Standarte Feldherrnhalle",
  Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, Rosenheim, 1997.
  ISBN 3-920722-46-9

Stoves offers less and nothing else.

[1] Provided replacements for the Gren.Rgt. 271.

Cheers
Leo

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi C|NE503,

Not quite all the Stalingrad mechanized divisions were brought back to their former status. This was partly because the senior Waffen-SS divisions, which had missed Stalingrad while rebuilding in France, at this time began to receive tanks that would otherwise have gone to the Army.

Rebuilt Army ex-Stalingrad divisions lost in early February 1943 were the majority of the formations used to occupy Northern Italy in July-August the same year. This rapid turn around was because the Ersatzheer had the structure to reconstruct them quickly.

If one compares them with the two W-SS divisions (9th and 10th) formed at the same time, one can see that the W-SS, which lacked the Erstazheer's institutional back-up of depots, training areas, equipment, etc., took far longer to get its formations into the field. In my opinion, this is one of the main reasons to question the utility of an independent Waffen-SS.

Cheers,

Sid.

[CNE503]

Tessin says that while in France the 60. Inf.Div. (mot) managed to raise from its own personnel remnants as of 15.03.43:
— Rgt.Hqs. & I./Gren.Rgt. 92, 13./92. → renamed III./120 (Because the 92nd was raised separately as Heerestruppen.)
— I. & II./Gren.Rgt. 120 & 14./120
— Bn.Hqs. & 1./Pz.Abt. 160
— I./Art.Rgt. 160 (with 3 batteries)
— Pion.Btl. 160
— one signal company
(120th later renamed Füs.Rgt, FHH)
The Gren.Rgt. 271 ("Feldherrnhalle" = FHH) of the 93. Inf.Div. was used to raise second Grenadier-Regiment of the division. (271st later renamed Gren.Rgt. FHH)
Again, no Pz.Jg.Abt. (An antitank company was eventually raised in Nov.43, the battalion finally in June 44.)

Thanks Leo, so it means that this division, supposedly destroyed in the Stalingrad pocket, still maintained three infantry battalions and two specialized-regimental companies, a tank company with the command cadre of a tank battalion, an entire field artillery battalion, a half of its signal battalion. It is roughly between one half and one third of its theoretical strength!

Anyway, thank you for these very valuable pieces of information!
Cheers,

CNE503

[CNE503]

Sid,

You're totally right, I didn't mean that the operational quality of these new divisions were equal to the formers' one. But it is a fact that before the end of Spring 1943, the twenty divisions destroyed in Stalingrad were raised again, and some of them were deployed in operational area (Italy for instance) as early as late June 1943 (five months after they were destroyed).

Your point between Heer and Waffen-SS is very interesting, thank you for sharing it.
Cheers,

CNE503

[Leo Niehorster]

Thanks Leo, so it means that this division, supposedly destroyed in the Stalingrad pocket, still maintained three infantry battalions and two specialized-regimental companies, a tank company with the command cadre of a tank battalion, an entire field artillery battalion, a half of its signal battalion. It is roughly between one half and one third of its theoretical strength!

No. What is meant is that there arrived enough men in France of the "old" 60. Inf.Div. (mot) to form the "new" units. These veterans had not been in the "old" division when it was destroyed in Stalingrad. They were used as a corset to form "new" units. I even very much doubt that all the veterans in the "new" had been members of the same numbered "old" units.

Hope that clears the matter up.

Leo

(Edit for stupid mistake)

[CNE503]

Leo,

I guess you meant 60. Infanterie Division (motorisiert) and not 14. Panzer Division in your last message
Anyway, where did all these veterans come from? Except the divisional replacement battalion, convalescents and those who where on leave for a reason (NCOs or specialist courses for instance), I can't understand that so many veterans from a destroyed division could be used to form another one. I tried to track down the replacement units which provided support to the 60. Infanterie Division (motorisiert), but the training and replacement units that I found (Grenadier Ersatz-Bataillone (motorisierte) 92 and 120, Grenadier Ausbildungs-Bataillon (motorisiert) 92) were not disbanded at the end of the winter 1942/43.

Of course, they should have been provided from somewhere, but it is difficult to understand the full process, unlike other units raised again at this time which were created again according to a well-known one (371. Infanterie Division for instance).

Thanks for your help!
Cheers,

CNE503

[dshaday]

Hi CNE503

If one compares them with the two W-SS divisions (9th and 10th) formed at the same time, one can see that the W-SS, which lacked the Erstazheer's institutional back-up of depots, training areas, equipment, etc., took far longer to get its formations into the field. In my opinion, this is one of the main reasons to question the utility of an independent Waffen-SS.

The conclusion in this comment by Sid is highly speculative. I have pointed out the errors in this in previous posts.

The Army were instrumental in restricting the size of the W-SS and its ability to build up a large pool of replacement soldiers (which the army had allowed itself to create eg back-up depots). All heavy equipment for the W-SS came through the arm, and delays of this is the responsibility of the army (since that is the arrangement the army forced onto the W-SS). I have not heard of any lack of training areas by the W-SS hindering it.

The 9th and 10th SS divisions took longer to form for a number of reasons. Particularly:
[*]The divisions were originally trained as Panzer Grenadier Divs, but were re-designated as Panzer Divs before training was completed. Additional elements then had to be trained
[*]Equipment shortages (responsibility of the army).
[*]Special permission was needed to raise the new/additional divisions because of the army manpower quotas. Because of the army's restrictive quota on W-SS recruiting (and the W-SS technical requirement for recruits to be volunteers), a new recruiting campaign was required.
[*]These divisions did not have any existing infrastructure like those army units re-built after Stalingrad.

Regards

Dennis

[CNE503]

Well Dennis, according to my small knowledge of the replacement process in the German army at this time, I agree more with Sid. Of the two structures, Heer and Waffen-SS, one was a pain in the ass for equipment, replacement, cadre structure at a time when there were a lot of other priorities. According to SS status, it was a volunteer force, so it was from the start not sufficient to handle the burden of a massive world war on three or four theaters of operations, and it seems it had been a burden more than an asset for the German army... But your point is also interesting.

Anyway, it is not the topic at all of this thread, and I'd like that we focus on the rebuilding of the 60. Infanterie Division (motorisiert)...
Thanks.

Cheers,

CNE503

[dshaday]

Hi CNE503

I agree that we should return to the topic of 60.Inf Div.

I am surprised that a post about the W-SS was even made in this thread.
I just wanted to clear up the specific comment that just because the W-SS took comparatively longer to create the 9th and 10th SS that this is therefore one of the main reasons to question the utility of an independent Waffen-SS with respect to the German army. I do not want to highjack this thread with a W-SS vs Army analysis.

Regards

Dennis

[CNE503]

Thank you Dennis. I'd be glad to read you on this topic elsewhere!
Best regards,

CNE503

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Dennis,

You are attempting to reverse reality.

The German Army long predated the Waffen-SS. Therefore, every Reich-raised man and weapon the Waffen-SS accumulated was acquired at the expense of resources otherwise destined for the German Army. Thus it was the Waffen-SS that was restricting the size of the German Army, not the reverse. And it was the German Army that was obliged by political pressure to facilitate the expansion of the Waffen-SS in numerous ways - manpower, doctrine, equipment, specialist training, etc., etc, at its own expense. This therefore raises the question, as to where the "value added" was in the creation of an independent Waffen-SS?

The case of the rebuilding of the armoured component of the divisions lost at Stalingrad (and Tunisia) illustrates this point, and has been raised before,"It is also worthy of note that these two divisions (9th and 10th W-SS Panzer) took 15 months to field. By contrast, the three Army panzer divisions annihilated at Stalingrad (14th, 16th, 24th), later in the same month as 9th and 10th W-SS Panzer Divisions began to be raised, returned to action over September-October 1943, or over 8-9 months."

Cheers,

Sid.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi CNe505,

About 10% of the manpower of all divisions were on leave, on courses, convalescing, etc., at any one time and part of the non-combatant "tail" of many divisions was outside the encirclement.

In addition, all divisions still had men training in depot.

60th Division was unique. It was the former Brigade Danzig expanded to divisional size. It was the last Welle 1 active division formed.

Furthermore, if I remember correctly, it was the only division raised in the new Wehkreis XX (West Preussen) and so it may have had more manpower available in depot than most.

Cheers,

Sid.