What the Troops Are Doing Wrong, 5 July 1941

[Jeff Leach]

Here is a document written by the commander of the German XXX Army Corps to his subordinate units. It Points out problems that had shown up after just a few Days of Active combat (the XXX Army Corps didn't attack until the 1 July 1941). It is interesting because these are many of the problems that affected other armies. Many of the Points brough up can be considered 'beginner mistakes'.

The documents was directed to the 170th and 198th Infantry Division. Both were 7th Wave divisions, the first from the 10th Military-District and the second from the 5th.


Experience from the First Days of Combat Brought up the Following Points
XXX Army Corps, 5 July 1941 [NARA Reference? (3 pages)]

1.) An attack is to be preceded by a through combat reconnaissance, carried out combat-capable patrols. These purely infantry reconnaissance patrols must be supported from the artillery observation posts. The information from all these patrols must be analyzed by division command in order to form to best possible picture of the enemy.

Once the enemy positions are recognized, the infantry are to concentrate the fire of their heavy on the section of the enemy positions were they are going to try and breakthrough. The artillery is also to support the breakthrough attempt. The artillery commanders are responsible to coordinating the artillery so that concentrated artillery fire falls on the correct target at the correct time. The infantry is to advance towards the enemy in loose formation (lockerer Gefechtsgliederung), while still having the support of the heavy weapons and artillery. All elements of the unit not necessary to the attack are to be kept at the proper distance. It is strictly forbidden wagons, horses or pack trains (Tragtiere) to follow to close behind the front line. Doing so leads to unnecessary loses and increases the risk for panic.

2.) The antitank weapons are to be close to the advancing infantry. They are to be positioned so that they can engage enemy tanks as soon as possible, at the very latest when they reach the infantry front lines.

3.) The communication between artillery and infantry in not satisfactory in any way. Those artillery battalions that have been assigned to close-cooperation with the infantry are to assign liaison staffs (Artillerie Verbindungs-Kommandos) to the infantry commands (battalions). It is the infantry battalion commanders that are to give the targets to the liaison staff. I (the corps commander) again emphasize that concentrated fire (zusammengefaßt) is to be put on the identified targets. The infantry uses these concentrated fire strikes to approach closer to and to break into the enemy positions. The artillery battalions that are directly subordinate to the division command, are to be employed in the same manner at the attack’s point-of-main-effort (Schwerpunkt). I also order that artillery observation officers be pushed so far forward that they can recognize the enemy to be combatted, as well as location of our foremost infantry line.

Counter-battery fire is the responsibility of the divisions. Subordinate heavy artillery battalions are to be used for this purpose. The corps command also has an artillery observation aircraft available that can be requested at any time.

4.) Security: Each troop is responsible for its security while on the march or while resting. It is always important to keep an eye out for enemy tanks. That officer that allows his troops to vulnerable to enemy fire or attack because of carelessness or complacency will be held accountable to me (the corps commander).

5.) It is a very bad habit of the staffs, troop columns and observation post to group up in large groups in the terrain or on the heights in view of the enemy. These make very inviting targets to the enemy artillery. I (the corps commander) am making it the responsibility of all officers to see that this practice stops.

6.) Road March: Time and again we see two or more columns marching besides each other on the already bad roads. The officers of all ranks are to make strenuous effort to see that one side of the road is always free for other traffic. Correct spacing between march columns and vehicles is to be observe in order not to form favorable targets for artillery or aircraft.

7.) Reports: There is far to little reporting. In most cases command has to get information through inquires. Forces can only be correctly guided, if command is continuously updated. Staff are to be positioned to make use of the available cable-network. When a staff changes positions, at least one officer with up-to-date information must be reachable.

8.) Aerial Recognition Signal: Aerial Recognition Signals (flags) on vehicles are only to be displayed on the appearance of aircraft. These signals are to be displayed immediately on the appearance of aircraft. They are to be left out in the presence of friendly aircraft.