Tigers and the 5:1 myth an analysis of Normandy combat operations involving Tigers. Chapter 1 impact analysis part 2

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Tigers and the 5:1 myth an analysis of Normandy combat operations involving Tigers. Chapter 1 impact analysis part 2

#1

Post by Christianmunich » 13 Dec 2018, 18:51

##***Operation Stack 11th July, Arrival of the 503rd ***

Operation Stack, a minor limited Operation, hardly fulfils the criteria for this thread but it represents the first action of the 503rd and the data allows rather clear-cut conclusions which is rare, so I included it. Feel free to disregard the Operation if you think it was too small or cherry-picked because it maybe is.

During the fighting around Caen the [chimneys](https://imgur.com/a/1YPDh) of the Colombelles factory area provided a scouting platform for the Wehrmacht. The British, in an attempt to deprive the Wehrmacht of this vital location, intended to capture this area with a night attack of one Brigade supported by some tanks.

Stack commenced around midnight and was able to press out the German infantry of the LWF 16, which proved again to be one of the more problematic units in the German line. Per doctrine German tanks lay behind the front awaiting intrusions. As a reaction to Stack, one company Tigers was alerted and ordered: “to eliminate by counterattack the enemy forces that have broken through, reestablish the former main line of resistance”. About 13 tanks moved out with coming daylight and approached the British forces. In the ensuing fight the Shermans of the 148 RAC were destroyed, leaving the British infantry threatened which eventually retreated after losing their anti tank guns as well allowing German infantry to regain their positions.

The commander of the 3rd Company gives his version of the events:

>The first tank had barely reached the northern outskirts of the village when it received heavy fire from enemy tanks. That resulted in a brief halt, but then the company deployed. The first platoon, under Feldwebel Sachs, sheared off to the left, the second platoon to the right. I stayed even with both platoons. The third platoon remained behind me. During that maneuver the tanks took a significant number of hits. However, at that range, they could not do us much harm .... [Description of communication issues due to destroyed antenna] …. I had my tank move forward 300 meters in a single bound and, as I looked around me, I saw, to my relief, that the first platoon followed me while the second and third platoons kept firing. We then conducted the entire attack with no radio communication. All the maneuvers were automatic. One platoon secured and provided covering fire, the other moved forward in a single bound. Little more was to be seen of the enemy tanks, since the farm where they had taken position was then only a dark cloud of smoke. The enemy infantry then withdrew with the aid of a smokescreen. As the smoke cleared somewhat, I spotted several enemy tank. At that extremely short range, every round from our gun sent another Sherman up in flames. The crews bailed out of their yet undamaged tanks in terrified panic. We received no more fire and covered the final 200 meters in a single bound. We were in the farmstead and had regained the former main line of resistance. All of that had taken about thirty minutes.

The Tiger force claimed 11 tank destroyed and 2 captured intact, at least one of those Beutepanzer[pic] was photographed. The overall German description aligns well with the British version, which we can see in the following war diary entries:

War diary of the Armored Regiment at Collombelles.
0500 hrs. Through the dust and smoke three Tiger tanks were observed hull-down at 088688 and were engaging our tanks near the X roads. They hit and put out of action three Shermans. One Tiger then advanced, it was heavily engaged and stopped slightly smoking. The other two then advanced. From 084692 four Tigers in line abreast were seen to be advancing up the X roads 084701. They were quickly engaged and after several hits on one a Firefly observed it halt. The others wheeled left into the factory.
0735 hrs. By this time there was only one tank of the A Sqn Troops at the X roads in action. The other 9 having been put out of action in the previous engagements and set on fire. One scout car lost. The majority of the crews bailed out and made their way on foot back to to LONGEUVAL, escorted by the remaining tank.
A reoccurring problem you will notice, with Allied war diaries, are repeated descriptions of knocked out Tigers. Those “knock-outs” give testimony to Tigers armour which protected the vehicle from enemy fire, for the British who were accustomed to operate in tanks which were toast after getting hit, the misconception of destroyed Tigers seems very understandable. Like with with many other engagements the Tigers were mostly unimpressed by Sherman fire and the damage witnessed by Allied crews was likely repaired. The 503rd did not specifically report any casualties but from the accounts it is implied that at least one Tiger was put out of action, though it appears this Tiger was hit by artillery after the skirmish, no Tiger was destroyed. Many tanks received multiple hits but if this caused major damage is unknown.

The war diary of the British lead infantry Brigade:
0630 hrs. 5 Black Watch reported enemy MG fire from 079705 and from houses 079703. At same time 3 enemy Mk VI [Tiger] and two Mk IV tanks were seen advancing on the X roads from area 073688. Further enemy tanks were reported firing from positions further SOUTH but could not be seen. Two Troops from A Sqdr. 148 RAC in close support 5 Black Watch engaged enemy. One Sherman was soon to get six direct hits on a Mk VI and stopped its fire.
An infantry unit reported getting engaged by the Tigers:
07.30hrs - By now 5 B.W ( Black Watch) reported enemy tanks attacking them and by 07.50 hrs they were ordered to withdraw by Bde. Comd having being badly short up by TIGER tanks.
By 0800 hrs. 9 out of 10 Shermans had been knocked out and 5 17 pdr guns RA had become ineffective. Commander 153 Inf Brig. decided that position was untenable and ordered Battalions to withdraw
A common misunderstanding of amateur historians concerns the importance of the armor even in infantry battles. Once one site completely defeats the armor of the other side the infantry soon will likely yield to the pressure. That is why the notion that tank on tank combat was not that important is absurd. If tanks were present on both sides they often duked it out and the winning side was able to then engage the exposed enemy infantry. The war diary comments of the BW highlight this.
08.10hrs - A & C Coy’s were also ordered to withdraw to main pos’n, which they did unwillingly, having completely dominated COLOMBELLES except for the Rd triangle in the EAST.
Dominating an area doesn't mean anything if your tank force got wiped and the enemy is coming for you. Countless battles in the East and the West give testament to this simple rule of WW2. The battles around Caen are likely the best example on the West Front. Once the British tank attacks were defeated the Operations died down. No advancing against enemy tanks without your own.

Stack was over.

#***5:1 TL:DR***

About 10ish Shermans were destroyed most likely nearly all of them directly by Tigers. No evidence for Tiger write-offs. Two were claimed [captured](https://imgur.com/a/4Y46x). Many Tigers were in repair after the battle but this could be related to the long road march of the entire Battalion. Some Panzer IVs have taken part in the skirmish so I can't rule out they snatched a Sherman. I would put the battle on 10-0 write-offs for the Tiger, this might be on the generous side.

***Tiger performance***

The first action of the 503rd was a major success and the view from the British perspective suggest that the odds were pretty even during the skirmish. Sherman Company versus Tiger company. Again we see the problem with the oversimplified narrative of the Germans on the defence, if the German account is correct than the Tigers were on the move when they met Allied tanks and not the other way around, as they were ordered to reestablish the HKL. British records support this and state that the German tanks were seen advancing while Shermans were holding the farmstead. . A good chunk of Tigers were in repair in the days following Stack but this also could be explained by the 200km road march to the front off all three companies. The discrepancies between German claims and British records is low and can be explained by double claiming but apparently some OB tanks were lost as well which brings the British total to about what the Germans claimed. If all those fell victims to the Tigers is debatable. There is not much room for differing interpretations of Stack, the Tigers were ordered to eliminate the British forces and did so in convincing fashion without much trouble. Despite occupying defensive positions the Shermans were unable to deal with advancing Tigers. Their troubles were exacerbated by dealing with a comparably sized enemy force.

##***Operation Blue coat 30 July- Early August***

Operation Blue coat was Montgomery's attempt to support the highly successful Operation Cobra on the Western Flank of the bridgehead, for this he tried to launch his own operation on the left flank of Cobra. Overall, the operation was likely intended to again simply bind some German troops and if possible achieve a British breakthrough towards the transportation hub Vire and get the area around Mont Picon. Blue coat was launched in the same area as Cobra and thus allowed the Wehrmacht to use forces more efficiently. Most of the German forces were positioned either in the Caen area or were trying to turn the tide in Cobra, other forces later were in transit to the Cobra area or prepared for the counter strike "Lüttich". To exploit the shifting forces he would later order renewed attacks in the Caen area, all in all up to 3.000 Anglo-Canadian tanks would attack the thin German lines in early August in various sectors.

The Blue Coat sector was sparsely defended. Only one ID was available supported by some tanks left behind by the 2nd PD. This let to one of the best force ratios of the campaign. The 326 ID, which arrived in Normandy the week before and overtook the frontline which allowed the 2nd PD to move West where it would engage the 2nd US Armoured Division.

Involved tank forces:

30 July:

British: ~850 tanks

German: ~20 tanks + ~ 10 Jagdpanthers

The Germans reinforced over the next few days. Reinforcements were parts of the 21st PD, 9th SS Hohenstaufen the 10th SS Frundsberg and the ***102nd SS Heavy Tank Battalion*** and some King Tigers of the 503rd, all arriving on different dates and in varying strength. All in all around 200 tanks were at one point or another engaged on the German side. The tank strength was fluctuating because most of the units brought forward only tried to stabilize the front before moving towards West,

Complete commitment: British: ~850 German: ~200.

The first days of Blue coat were successful. The extreme force ratios allowed the British to overcome the defending infantry of the 326th ID in some areas and penetrate the German lines. [Here](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/ ... hrough.jpg) you see the situation on the Western Flank of Normandy, the British forces were heading towards Vire but also some geographical features further East. [Another map late July](http://www.flamesofwar.com/Portals/0/al ... er-map.jpg). Despite some set backs like a bunch of Churchills getting knocked out by new Jagdpanthers during their debut the British forces made progress. Also interesting to note is that the advance on the eastern front didn't gain a lot ground even tough the enemy was hopelessly outnumbered. The British combat inferiority was still prevalent even under such favorable conditions. The advance in the west piggy backed on the success of the American troops who also pushed for Vire. Forces like the 6th FJ were pounded by American forces and driven back. Check for the line showing the interarmy boundary. The progress happened two days before the Tigers entered the battle.

The 102nd SS was ordered westwards, from its defensive positions around Hill 112 ( Epsom, Jupiter ), to deal with the new British attack on ***August 1st***. With the departure of the Tiger tanks, Hill 112 finally fell into British hands after several unsuccessful attempts to oust the German defenders. The unit was ordered towards the Vire area and formed a KG together with the recon battalion Hohenstaufen. The objectives of the battle group were pretty optimistic. The 9th SS Hohenstaufen together with the Tigers were ordered to crush the British attack and destroy the penetrating units. For this, a pincer movement was envisioned, battle group Weiß ( Tigers ) was ordered to the north of Vire from where it was to strike north and meet with the second pincer. One weak Panzerdivision with Tiger support was supposed to destroy an enemy force about 4 times its size in infantry and vehicles.

###***2nd August, Tigers arrive and engage:***

Arriving in the area, the situation was unclear, the British for the first time since Perch were able to at least partially roam free and the precise whereabouts of Allied units was unknown to the Germans. German commanders were afraid Vire might have fallen and ordered the Tiger Battalion to secure the town. So its comes to no surprise that what followed were moving engagements. On the way to Vire/La Bistiere the Tigers were meeting several units of the 11th Armored Division which already partially advanced past the Vire-Vassy road and were in the path of Weiß. Several smaller engagements erupted which saw the 11th Armoured getting the short end of the stick. Those engagements meant the beginning of the end of the progression of the 11th Armoured. The second company moved into Vire and started to press the British back together with paras which were excited to get heavy support.

***2nd and 3rd August Tiger actions***

Forward elements of the British forced the 2nd company to detour south on their way to Vire, several engagements happened already likely between the B Sqd 23rd Hussars and the 2nd Company. The second company eventually reached Vire and met up with paras of the 3rd Fallschirmjäger. Smaller British attacks were beaten back the company prepared for the next day.

The 1st company operated around Chedonnel where they likely met A sqd of the 23rd and made sure the British forces knew Tigers had arrived.

Daglish writes
Shortly after, Kalls reported that he had run into a British armored spearhead, and had destroyed a number of British tanks. His claim was no exaggeration: it was these Tiger tanks that had crushed the 23rd Hussars’ A Squadron....The British tanks were caught in the open as they emerged from a sunken road, struck before they could shake out from close formation and subjected to converging fire from different directions. With well-distributed fire the German volleys quickly destroyed all but four of A Squadron’s tanks.
The history of the 23rd Hussars has an eerie description of the encounter with the unexpected arrivals:
News now starts to come in from "A" Squadron who have been silent until now, and they appear to have run into an enemy Troop and they are being engaged at short range by German Armour. It sounds absolutely appalling, half their tanks have been hit and are on fire, the Squadron Leader has been badly wounded, two troops are missing and it seems as though the whole Squadron is going to be annihilated
The Tigers were identified as Panthers. Schneider Daglish and Napier agree on Tigers. I do too, the Panthers of the 9th were further North-East. The Tigers at this point were on the move just getting relocated from Caen and thus it can't be claimed that the Tigers were laying in wait for enemy forces, the more realistic scenario is that the German forces were able to scout the enemy while the Sherman squadron failed to do so, the Tiger tanks switched to ambush positions and took the squadron out. No Tiger casualties reported. The history of the 23rd Hussars state that all but 4 Shermans of the 23rd were lost. ( edit: Should read A Sqd of 23rd, mistake pointed out by Juha ) I am unsure about this. Crew casualties appear pretty light, which would suggest that many crews bailed once the Tigers opened up or the tank casualties are exaggerated. Either way the Tigers had arrived and the British armored switched onto the defensive.

Daglish on losses of the 2nd August:
The ‘horns’ of the Black Bull division were its tank regiments. These were had plunged deep into enemy territory and had paid a price. Of the division’s 145 Sherman tanks ready for action at the dawn of 2 August, ***thirty-one were reported lost at the end of the day***; six of these the vital, 17-pounder Fireflies.
The arrival of the German cavalry left its mark. The Tiger tanks immediately engaged and changed the dynamic of the battles. The British armored forces enjoyed considerable success until now. The German defense was weak and had no armor. Now the British forces were confronted with the 9th SS [ 76 tanks ] and two companies of Tigers.

A considerable portion of those were victims of the 102nd SS but as you may have noticed those are only Shermans, the recon regiment fielded and their losses were not reported. Like many times before the narrative of the pillbox Tiger gets challenged. Just 24 hours before the Tigers were defending Hill 112 and now after marching towards Vire they casually put an end to the British ambitions.

The entire battalion lost only one Tiger that day to an anti-tank line despite being engaged with several British regiments. Schneider tallied up 22 kill claims for the 102nd.

***3rd August KG Weiß starts their attack***

Unimpressed by the force ratios and engagements of the previous day, 7 2nd Company Tigers moved out in the morning together with some infantry northwards to La Bistiere area with the intention of meeting battle group Meyer, the second part of the Hohenstaufen pincer operation. The unlucky regiment of the day was the recce regiment of the 11th Armored the 2nd Northamptonshire Yeomanry. This unit had already been in contact with Tigers on the day before but now had to defend the area around La Bistière against the onslaught of battle group Weiß.

The historian of the 11th Armoured remarks:
But by early afternoon Tiger tanks supported by infantry caught and savagely mauled the regiment around Las Bistiere, north of Vire
Other authors give us some more detail about those events.

Daglish:
Then, to their horror, a further Tiger tank appeared behind them on the rising ground 500 meters to the east of the road and proceeded to pick off a further three B Squadron tanks as they fell back... Battered by attacks from all directions, the Tiger tanks around la Bistière suffered only one total loss... As well as losing tanks, several headquarters vehicles had been abandoned in la Bistière. In forty-eight hours of combat, ***forty-seven*** Cromwell tanks were lost, leaving only a composite squadron of fourteen at the end of the action.
Jean Brisset about the incident:
However, after 1400 hours everything changed for the worse. “B” squadron, returning from Vire, reported that Tiger tanks, accompanied by infantry were advancing in their direction …. It was now too late to order British artillery to intervene …. A tank battle …. Three British tanks were destroyed and the others were hit while retreating … While they battened down they were mauled by other Tigers situated on the high ground to the west of Burcy … Soon the three squadrons began to lose one tank after another without being able to do anything to the Tigers.
One Tiger was destroyed by the Cromwells after taking 7 short range direct hits. Again a Tiger found itself destroyed in a close range fight while driving through a small town.

The German assault group was tiny, just 7 Tigers together with some infantry. The Allies wouldn't have considered such small group able to defend a latrine. The British regiment nearly collapsed in three days of combat and was disbanded after Blue Coat.

Otherwise, a very dry war diary, the diary of the Cromwell unit lamented the inequality of the tanks involved:
”B” Squadron were ordered to block the rd from X rds 646347 running NE. They were shot up by a Tiger tk coming over the high ground from 663355 and lose three tks. There more of their tks were ko'ed at 653355. Though the Tigers were engaged at short range, shells from our guns seemed to have little effect on the Tigers.
1700: “C” Sqn tp on rd at 665377 shoot at Tigers at 667383, 668377 and 667376, but Tigers withdrew with apparently only light damage
The evening report gives the casualties as 40 tankers. During the night the unit got even attacked by para troopers and lost more tanks. Daglish claims that ***47*** Cromwells were lost in two days of fighting. I am sure this number is too high but gives you to think given the small size of the German force.

We find a reoccurring theme here, the British forces were left without major combined arms support. The unit diary mentions missing artillery support. The Tigers accomplished their objective and mauled an armored regiment in the process but battle group Meyer did not fulfill their objectives. All in all the tank casualties for the 11th Armoured were 70ish in those two days of fighting. The Tigers waited in vain for Meyer and later took securing positions.

A Tiger crewman reported the following:
Hard days of fighting were behind us, and we had been successful! The company had achieved a respectable success without any losses of its own: 28 enemy tanks had been knocked out and additional ones damaged
Obviously, the statement can't be fully correct because one Tiger [ Rowsovski] was knocked out by a Cromwell. I doubt Trautmanns claim is for the 3rd only. More likely he talks about the 2nd and 3rd. Schneider tallied up 16 claims for the 3rd August. Schneider mentions two lost Tigers of the 1st company which caught up with the 2nd during the night. No further information of those two destroyed Tigers is given sadly.

During the 4th the area remained active with several exchanges. The Tigers moved into screening positions and apparently engaged the Cromwells again directly south of La Bistiere
”A” Sqd send foot patrols to find out if there are Tigers on the rd at 665373 and one tp S. Both patrols get shot up and retreat with casualties.
The Tigers eventually fell back towards Vire. Schneider claims 6 knockouts for this day. Possible recipients are the Cromwell Reg and maybe the 2nd F&F which operated 2ish miles east.

Overall the period from the 2nd to 4th August was an operational stalemate but it should not have been one. The German forces were vastly outnumbered and still managed to stop the British advances. Not only stopped they most advances they moved onto the offensive. The German attempts were not much more successful but help to highlight the disparity between the forces involved. The Tigers especially performed excellently. Wherever they engaged the enemy they inflicted heavy casualties and kept their opponents in check or even forced them to retreat. Napier gives an interesting summary of those days since the arrival of the 9th SS and the 102nd.
By nightfall, the 9th SS Panzer Division was effectively holding a line from Burcy to Montchamp and only had 28 Panthers, 7 Panzer IV and 9 StuG III operational – less than a British armoured regiment – but had stopped the advance of two British armoured divisions.
Napier's comments are an understatement. Not only did two full armoured division operate in this region they had ample support of the 3rd Division and maybe even parts of the 15th. Not even mentioning the artillery and air superiority. Napier's count of the 9th is misleading because the unit already lost a bunch of vehicles, overall together with the Tigers the Germans maybe operated a total of 100 tanks in the entire area from Vire to Montchamp. The two armoured Division had up to 500 tanks on strength but sadly the majority of them were just Shermans.

***5th - 7th August***

The later phase of Blue Coat was a back and forth, with one of the main points of contention being Chedonnel. The Tigers here as well performed superbly. Either in performing screening duty, supporting small German attacks or defeating enemy approaches. The employment of Tiger tank on high grounds again proved to be highly successful. Tiger tanks were the kings of long-range duels. A single Tiger could hamper or even stop the movement of a squadron of Shermans given the right circumstances.

An illustration of this is given for the 6th August in the unit history of the 23rd Hussars ( 11th AD )
All was quiet until about midday when the unmistakable crack of an 88 put everyone on the alert. For the first time the enemy had worked a Tiger up onto the ridge to our south … It first of all put three shells through a RHQ scout car, but, although its shots were passing within ten yards of the RHQ tanks, for some reason the Tiger did not notice them … A tank in 'C' Squadron began to fire back, and must have worried the Tiger, for it turned its attention towards the other side of the road. Without delay, it knocked out a self-propelled seventeen-pounder[M10 Achilles], one of a troop which had been sent to our support... The Tiger evidently was also having difficulty in seeing, and he either withdrew or ceased fire, for no more was heard from him for a while. [German attack starts] Very soon the rattle of Spandau came closer through the trees and the same Tiger, which had appeared in the morning, began to fire again, this time with two or three friends to assist him ... while our tanks hurled high-explosive into the trees and tried to destroy the Tigers with their 17-pounders. Soon, however, the leading company of the Warwicks [ tank regiment ] was driven back, and the enemy closed in to our main position. 'C' Squadron were beginning to lose tanks
The full text reveals the involvement of artillery which in the German records is said to have damaged the Tiger. Directing artillery on Tiger positions was often successful in forcing the Tiger back but the damage was rarely enough to destroy the tanks but a major contributor to declining operational numbers, exceptions were direct hits. A problem Allied tanks had rarely to face despite that the average combat life of a Sherman was extremely short compared to a Tiger.

The fighting while pretty static was still heavy. Many of the smaller skirmishes were decided by Tigers tanks.

Delaforce quotes a British soldier:
The Norfolks who had taken over our company HQ were getting of their trenches. They were slaughtered. As far as I knew every one of them was killed We crawled out of the trench and through the dead bodes of the Norfolks. They were lieing eveywhere. I wondered why the German infantry had not put in an appearance to take advantage of the havoc caused by the Tigers:
Schneider remarks about the same lack of German infantry which make me wonder if Schneider references the same British soldier:
German infantry fails to take advantage of this situation in a timely manner and is subsequently stopped by artillery.
The same area a day later was the scene of one of the most controversial Tiger engagements in Normandy. Conflicting reports about the action exist with many disputing their validity, even unclear is which Tiger commander is responsible. The main point of doubt is the wrong and enemy unit given by the tanker. From the German point of view one or two Tigers defeated several British attacks inflicting between 12 and 17 ko's on the attacking Shermans while firing from an elevated position. The course of action is highly contested and the jury is apparently still out on this one but British unit diaries appear to corroborate the story, same with inventory numbers of the 11th AD. Up to 3 British regiments got heat from the Hill defended by two Tigers.

War diary of the 2nd Fife and Forfar Yeomanry:
Meanwhile a number of Tiger tanks had established themselves on the high ground on our eastern flank at Le Haut Periere and were able to engage A Sqn. from the rear at a range of about 2500 yds. These Tigers quickly caused A Sqn. 5 tank casualties.
Admitting actual tank losses was rare, admitting 5 was a unique. A second regiment also reports skirmishes with the very same Tigers:
21:00 A Sqn report two Tigers at 720345 and endeavour to engage them from 100x. Tigers open up and sub unit has to withdraw
The unit reported the same position but came from a different direction which supports German sources claiming Sherman closing in on the hill from different directions. The unit had to withdraw which is war diary slang for getting defeated. One of the Tigers was claimed ko'ed by the British forces this is corroborated by German records. The Tiger was towed back but was in bad shape. Depending on the accuracy of the claims this action could be one of the most impressive of the Normandy campaign. A pair of Tigers keeping several British regiments at bay while inflicting heavy casualties.

Daglish refers to this hill around Chênedolle as “Tiger hill”:
Long range ‘88’ fire from ‘Tiger hill’ above Chênedollé was to plague Sherman tanks and Royal Artillery M10s alike.
After the 2nd August, the day the Tigers arrived, no further advances were achieved by the 11th Armoured divisions, it even lost ground to Weiß and his Tigers.

***5:1 TL:DR***

Tallying up all mentioned claims by Schneider for the 2nd to 7th [adjusted 8th claim ] we get a staggering ***63*** claims. 6 Tigers were destroyed according to Schneider, Napier lists 5. Per Schneider: one of them fell victim to anti-tank gun, one to a Cromwell one to artillery, one broke down with a burning enginge ( :-) ) and two unknown. The two unknown tanks got lost during night apparently [ Schneider is not clear on this ] this makes a tank fight very unlikely. In the British armoured regiments, war diaries is no claim for a Tiger mentioned. Regardless of overclaiming on the German side this battle is bad news for the sceptics. Even worse the only confirmed tank kill came from a Cromwell and not one of the hundreds of Shermans present.

The German claims will be scrutinized more in the statistical digest.

***Tank casualties***

Napier gives 236 British tanks as ***ko'ed*** which means this number excludes all tanks "lightly damaged". My personal research shows this number is too low. For German forces, Napier gives 116 casualties which, like in all battles, is the number of German tanks which stopped being operational which means every light casualty is included even maintenance. British numbers don't include M-10s because those were part of the artillery arm. Applying the same casualty criteria, the ratio would exceed 3:1. In the face of the Tiger kills on the Western flank this ratio appears “low” but is explained by high German losses in several counterattacks on the Eastern flank unrelated to the 102nd.

***Tiger performance***

From the first engagement with the British, the advance of the 11th Armored Division was stopped and several units had to pull back. Isolated observation of the Tiger shows they performed exceptionally well during Blue Coat and contained the British advance without much trouble. German attempts to press the vastly superior forces back failed but not due to lack of Tiger combat results. The British forces were not hard pressed to advance, the US forces were out in the open which made this tactical stalemate an acceptable outcome for the Allies. The British could call themselves victorious especially with the gains made in the early phase, pre Tiger. Despite that the actions were a showcase of the tactical dominance of Tiger units.

The operational status for the unit only dropped by 9 for the entire weak despite constant heavy combat, this is truly astonishing. The 102nd claimed dozens of destroyed tanks in return and contained vastly superior British forces.

***No rest***


While the 102nd was engaged around Vire the Canadians launched Operation Totalize and threatened a breakthrough which would encircle a large amount of German forces. The 102nd SS after their very successful week around Vire was now ordered eastwards to support the shaky German units. The 102nd was in constant combat since its arrival in early July. Many of the Canadian and Polish units were fresh troops without battle experiences, they would now face one of the most veteran tank forces of WW2. Against the common wisdom of extremely unreliable German tanks, the Tigers who dominated Hill 112 for most of July managed to move 50 Km towards Vire where they violently put down the advance of the Black Bull and then moved back 70km towards Falaise where they immediately engaged Canadian and British forces, all within 8 days. The unit reported 30 operational Tiger right before they moved towards Vire and after mauling the 11th AD the unit reported 21 operational Tigers moving towards Falaise. Of the remaining Tigers only 3 seem to have been damaged during the week-long fighting. The extremely high operational rate for a supply-starved unit in constant combat with dozens of kill claims. The 11th Armoured, for example, started Blue Coat with ~220 Shermans and Cromwells, five days later and already receiving replacements the unit had ~120 operational. Despite all that the attrition rates were favouring the Allies which at this point had shipped nearly 8000 AFVs towards Normandy. The Allies knew what it took and they came prepared.

Sadly I wasn't able to find many pictures of this battle but will update the post if I find some or anybody posts them in the comments.

edit: I have skipped Goodwood. While reading it again I noticed it is pretty shitty and I have to either rewrite or cut down to and TL:DR . I will post Goodwood at a later date.

###***Operation Tractable 14th August - 15th August***

With Totalize falling short of its ambitious goals a new operation was launched after the battle-weary regiments were filled with repaired and new Shermans. The Canadians were unable to fully replenish their losses and only reached 75% despite their delivery regiments running out of tanks. The British Columbia regiment alone received 39 Shermans to compensate thus virtually raising a new regiment. The diary of the F squadron of the delivery regiment, reveals 119 vehicles were delivered to the brigade delivery squadrons which already had Shermans in stock.

On the German side no significant Armored replacements arrived but the fresh 85th ID had now fully arrived after some forward elements already took part in Totalize. The HJ and the attached Tigers pulled back after Totalize to again create some form of mobile reserve and deep defense. Napier gives 53 operational tanks on the German side with 24 of those being Tigers. Overall the German situation was dire and a major strategic defeat was imminent. The goal of the German forces in this sector now was delaying the inevitable to give the remaining units the chance to retreat.

The Allies saw themselves confronted with an opportunity of unexpected proportions. The Canadian forces for Tractable had around 500 tanks. The 1st Polish armoured division was kept in reserve but intervened later and moved towards Trun unopposed by Tigers. The Poles would eventually dig themselves in and repel desperate German attacks which resulted in one of their most prolific battles of World War 2. Starting with a lacklustre performance against the veteran HJ in early August the Poles upped their game and contributed greatly to the closing of the gap behind the German forces.

Forces:

Canadian: ~500
German: ~50

Reynolds puts the tank strength at 700vs50 and describes the chances of a defensive success as remote. My ratio is roughly 10:1 Reynolds would be 14:1. Differences in numbers can be explained by the inclusion of the Polish forces.

***14th August, The operation begins***

Despite their heavy losses just 5 days earlier, the Canadian were again able to assemble an impressive force. Some of the involved forces had little enemy contact during Totalize and were at full strength like the Fort Garry horse which is here [seen](https://imgur.com/a/VgslH) preparing to get moving.

Zuehlke:
Sitting in a Sherman to the east of Soignelles, Captain Jim Tedlie, the newly arrived battle captain of British Columbia Regiment’s ‘C’ Squadron, had never seen so many tanks. “Visualize a mass of tanks, sponson to sponson, just a phalanx of armour ....“Seemed to be tanks as far as one could see,” newly promoted 1st Hussars Major Brandy Conron observed.
Tigers of the 101st were positioned in Assy and the 102nd was further south around Hill 184 after getting pressed out of Potingy.

You might want to take a look at the [map](https://imgur.com/a/uCQF0). This was the plan for Tractable, Quesnay was to be bypassed this time. you see the forces approached from the North of Quesnay woods. [Here](https://imgur.com/a/W4kha) how it worked out. The final push on Falaise was delayed tho and losses again were high. Hill 140 where the B.C.R got caught is marked. The overall approach, carried by several hundred bombers, went well until the first minor geographical obstacle, the Laizon river. The 1st Hussars and Fort Garry Horse where ordered to cross the river at Montboint directly next to Assy. Both regiments were part of the 2nd AB which had no major combat on the 9th and 10th and thus was able to avoid the carnage around Quesnay, but this time their attack path would bring them close to the Tigers.

With the attack underway, some Tigers from the II./sSSPzAbt 101st got order to move north towards Rouvres to support the 85th ID. The Canadians advanced too fast and caught one Tiger moving unobservant, the Tiger was commanded by the company commander Wendorff. Finding themselves in unexpected combat they hastily took out one Sherman which was Wendorff's 84th claim and his last. They tried to aim on the second, the Firefly was faster and knocked the Tiger out killing Wendorff and several of the crew, one of them killing himself trapped in his seat. The company commander was replaced and 5 remaining Tigers started to move towards the Laison and wrecked havoc in the ranks of A&C Sqn and HQof the 1st Hussars. According to Schneider this is Wendorff's tank [211](https://imgur.com/a/u8g9M) but there are inconsistencies, turret number and location for example.

Schneider:
SS-Oberscharführer Brand takes over the command of the company and destroys 19 Shermans of the Canadian 6th Armoured Regiment ( 1st Hussars) attempting to cross the Laizon River near Rouvres.
This claim can be corroborated by various sources but the actual number of kills is questionable. But the effect of the Tiger was felt without a doubt, the 1st Hussars were pressed northwards and crossed the River near Rouvre where the 4th AB was supposed to cross. Now dozens if not hundreds of tanks were pressing over the small River in this area. Check the map, while there is no commentary you see how both 2nd AB regiments changed course and went north this is often explained by troubling river crossing but I think it is related to the resistance around Assy after the 1st Hussars finally crossed more than half of the regiment was out of action.

Napier:
The two remaining tanks and three others from the company then engaged the throng of tanks around Assy and Rouvres, taking a heavy toll.
Reynolds on the same incident:
There was indeed chaos as the Shermans tried to negotiate the stream – one squadron of the 1st Hussars lost eleven of nineteen tanks trying to find its way across.
The evening reports of the 1st Hussars gives some indication of the damage sustained. One squadron was down to 7 tanks and a second was down to 4 both squadrons had to be amalgamated. Overall the unit was down to 24 operational tanks, and if we assume the unit was close to full then more than 30 casualties were suffered this day. B Sqn was intended as a reserve but after the clash in the morning, the B Sqn had to take charge and relieve the other squadrons.

The unit diary of the 1st Hussars rather dry:
In that the Laizon river was not reported as tank obstacle; That B Sqn became the leading Sqn and that A C and HQ lost so many of their tanks
After shaking of their loss, the Tigers stood their ground despite facing roughly 100 tanks in this area. The Germans lost only the single tank which was unexpectedly caught while moving towards Rouvre, once the Tigers were aware of the threat the Canadians suffered major casualties like the days before. The left flank of the Canadian attack was not working out. But the sheer mass of their armored forces and weakness of the German defense allowed the Canadians to press over the Laison further North. The 85th ID without major Tiger support was unable to withstand the several hundred tanks and started to give ground and surrender in huge numbers. A welcomed change of pace for the Canadians who for most of their Normandy campaign were engaged with fanatical HJ. The 85th despite being fresh was near collapse after 5 days in Normandy.

The Tigers fell back and crossed the Laizon as well in order to build new defensive lines, here the trouble for the Canadians started. With the 101st guarding the Northern flank and the 102nd having their backs and guarding the south against the Sherbrooke Fusiliers. This line would pose major problems the next day.

Schneider:
A tank attack out of Soulangy is repelled by three tanks …. ten enemy tanks are knocked out …. Orders received to withdraw to the northeast outskirts of Falaise. Tiger 231 is total loss. One Tiger is destroyed by infantry in close combat.
Canadian infantry was closing in on Assy where some Tigers spend the night, one Tiger appears to have remained there supporting the infantry. According to Zuehlke the German infantry immediately surrendered leaving the Tiger alone to its demise:
The Tiger was not so easily quelled. Three Crocodiles attempted to engage it and were promptly knocked out. Finally, the Glens pushed a 6-pounder anti-tank gun through woods to gain a side-on angle. A round of newly issued Sabot ammunition put the Tiger out of action
There are some questions about this Tiger since the area was used by the 101st but only the 102nd recorded a loss to infantry in close combat ( see above ). I am unsure about Zuehlke's description.

The 14th saw three Tigers getting destroyed in heavy combat. One of them was [Loritz](https://imgur.com/a/sirMh) Tiger in front of Falaise.Schneider claims at least 30 kills. The 85th was getting overran and the HJ was also losing tanks. Overall the day likely saw more than 100 tank casualties on both sides. The 85th was breaking so was the 12th SS so was the rest of the German forces in Normandy. Collapse was near

##***15th August, Canadian forces try to exploit their break in***

The Canadian troops had established themselves in a 2 miles deep bridgehead over the Laison. The situation on the German side became more desperate with every hour and was highlighted by the general order to withdraw all Flak units. Other specialized forces like engineers and workshop personnel were already moving out. Now, damaged tanks were rarely repaired. The HJ infantry again was moved into the front lines.

Tanks of the 101st who were able to hold their positions the day before now operated around Hill 160 to Hill 168 which was in the flank of the Canadian penetration. The Tigers defended a line from 160 to 159, arriving HJ started to dig in around Soulangy and 168. An attack on the German position around 160 was successful with the Tiger being able to escape. 12 Canadian tanks were claimed for a damaged Tiger. Further south an attack towards the main objective 159 was ordered, point 168 had to be taken before.

Zuehkle on the skirmish:
A battle began the instant the Can Scots crossed the start line ... ‘D’ Company advanced through a hedgerow and came up against a Tiger tank stationed behind the facing hedgerow. Major Larry Hen-derson summoned the Hussars to engage it. With no time to resupply, the Hussars were fighting with little ammunition and even less fuel. Not that it mattered. As the eleven tanks emerged from the first hedgerow, several fell prey to hidden anti-tank guns and burst into flame. The survivors reversed into the hedgerow’s cover, ignoring the Can Scots’ pleas for help. Henderson sent one of ‘D’ Company’s PIAT teams crawling towards the hedge to range in on the Tiger. Their first round exploded harmlessly inside the hedge, and the Tiger’s machine gun killed the two men. After raking the field and firing 88-millimetre rounds into ‘D’ Company’s position, the Tiger prowled off
Reynolds on the fighting around point 168:
It cost the Canadian Scottish 160 casualties to reach and then hold Point 168 to the south-east of Soulangy. Shermans were prevented from joining them on the hill by the two Tigers with KG Kraus.
The 1st Hussars after their engagements with Tigers the day before were reluctant to support the infantry after getting hit again:
Despite their hesitance to join the fray, the Hussars lost six tanks.
After 168 was taken an attack on Soulangy, further West, gets repulsed by the two Tigers:
Lieutenant Colonel Colwell next ordered the Winnipeg Rifles to assault Soulangy ... Only the 17th Duke of York’s Hussars’ armoured cars were available, but again minimal resistance was promised. Instead, more 12th SS infantry and Tiger tanks waited. Only ‘A’ Company managed to gain the village, immediately being set upon by two Tigers. After half its men were killed or wounded, the company retired at 2100 hours. The Yorks wisely opted to steer well clear of the Tigers, staying out of the fight entirely.
From the German perspective with an engagement before the Winnipeg assault:

[/quote]The company chef of the Grenadiers came over. He asked us to drive forward in our Tiger and get his men out ... our commander immediately agreed ... The reported tanks showed between the house of Soulangy. We made out six Sherman driving line astern ... In accordance with well tested tactic, the commander fired first on the point tank then on the one in the rear ... The other four, too, were set on fire in a short time. They had hardly found time to locate our position... Suddenly ... a column of armored personnel carriers appeared ... In quick succession, our explosive shells and machine gun salvos hit the fully loaded APCs.[/quote]

II had trouble to verify those claims and only found that 4 FGH tanks were koed there possibly some more. But the Canadian attack on Soulangy failed with heavy casualties. A major issue here is the missing diary of the FGH as an important puzzle piece. It is only known that the FGH suffered heavy tank casualties.

The Canadians were unable to gain significant room against even weaker opposition this time. After the strong advance on the 14th, the Canadians lost momentum. The coordination of the entire attack showed it weakness, the artillery was unable to fully support the renewed advanced because it was not able to follow quickly enough, even essentials like fuel were missing due to logistical problems. Especially in the areas defended by Tiger the Canadians had trouble. Without a single Tiger write-off. That the momentum of the attack now stalled might also be in a not insignificant part due to the decision to again bring in the HJ, after the 85th ID the day before surrendered in the hundreds the fanatical soldiers of the Hitleryouth again proved to be unwilling to give ground. Most sites defended by the HJ on the 15th remained in German hands or at least only minor push backs were sustained. A Canadian war diary remarked “... they prefer death to surrender” and another Canadian about combat with the 12th “Few prisoners were taken the enemy preferring to die rather than give in"

The historian of the first Hussars remarks:
The moral of the unit that night was low ... the men were dog-tired and it seemed as if a very determined effort was being made to beat the [2nd Armoured Brigade] right into the ground. All the regiments in the brigade had terrific casualties in both tanks and men
The 2nd AB had no major clashes with Tiger during Totalize and thus avoided the carnage that happened around Quesnay, the 4th AB was hit instead. This time the 2nd had the dubious honor to engage the Tigers on the right flank.

The diary of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division quoted in several publications:
It appeared that the enemy had once again established an-anti tank screen on the southern slopes of the high ground which the Armoured Brigade was unable to penetrate.
The Tigers were bypassed by the Poles who advances further north to Mont Ormel and began to close the gap around the German Army. The Wehrmacht was decisively beaten and the remnants started to flee east. The combat continued after the end of Tractable, and the 16th saw two Tigers making their last stand in Falaise together with remnants of the HJ.

During Tractable and Totalize the Allied air forces inflicted mind-boggling 1000 friendly fire casualties on the Canadian and Polish forces. I will leave it to your imagination what the bombers did to the Germans.

#***5:1 TL:DR***

For the 14th and 15th Schneider lists 3 total write-offs. Schneider tallies a total of ***43*** claims + one “several enemy tanks knocked out”. If Schneider overlaps some of the claims is possible. That heavy damage was done by the Tigers is out of the question but we will later need to further evaluate the claims. Per Schneider one tank due to infantry, one due to Firefly, one unknown. Even with a healthy dose of scepticism, it looks like the Tigers, with their dying breath, have done it again. More about this later

***Tractable tank losses?***

Napier gives the Canadian losses for those two short days as 118. For the defending German units he gives 35 losses.

Napier's approach on casualties leaves doubts. There are no complete records for the Canadian armoured units and he arrives at the losses by using operational figures. This obviously neglects replacements. He presents different sets of numbers which interestingly already show +140 casualties. I will expand on this further later

***Tiger performance TL:DR***

The situation for the 101st and 102nd went from bad to worse during August. Given the overall situation the German remnant forces and Tigers should have gotten overrun, they didn't. Dozens of knocked out Allied tanks again marked the way through what was now isolated resistance. For the 14th and 15th the Tiger performance was superb. This should not have happened. Entire armoured regiments had to engage in costly battles with pairs of Tigers. That is not how combined arms warfare is supposed to look like. The Sherman forces were abysmal.

Napier:
Counterattacking from Soulangy, three Tigers of the 2nd Company claimed to have destroyed ten Shermans of the fort Farry Horse at point 184. The Tigers, three Panthers and Jagdpanzers fought successful delaying action all day, breaking back past the Canadian tanks to new positions when surrounded.
Furious at the false report of the capture of Point 159 and the failure of repeated attacks, Kitching ordered the British Columbia Regiment to attack that evening. The new plan was for the regiment to advance at 2100 hours to take point 159 via Point 168 in the south-west but when the remaining tanks of the regiment ( by then nearly all replacement tanks and crews ) got to point 168, the attack was cancelled. Here A and B squadrons were fired on by the same Tigers and anti-tank guns that had previously destroyed the Fort Garry Horse tanks. The recce troops used the superior speed of their Stuart tanks and advanced almost to the objective before they were forced to withdraw.
The illusion of the war-winning Sherman does not withstand thorough investigation. So better not investigate. How often did you hear about the Sherman butchery in August? Yea, I guessed so.

***Aftermath***

Tractable together with other Operations in other sectors marked the end of the Normandy campaign, shortly after Tractable the Allies closed the Falaise gap and trapped huge amounts of German troops and resources. The remaining Tigers were already falling back to the Seine with the rest of the forces over packed roads. Very few Tiger remained in the cauldron with most being able to move eastwards after Tractable at least for a while. Trying to flee from the Allies the German forces started to leave behind most of their equipment. From predator to [prey](https://imgur.com/a/NH8eT) most [Tigers](https://imgur.com/a/pfgkj) were subsequently lost on the way to the Seine, most of them left behind when fuel run out. Some Tigers were left at the Seine because the Wehrmacht was unable to ferry them over. No bigger coordinated operations of Tigers took place after Tractable. Isolated Tigers or pairs kept acting as rearguard during the fighting withdrawal and a good number of them were lost this way.

***Defeat catches up with the Tigers 19th August, fluff version***

The 19th August while certainly no heavy combat day in the context of this post is still an interesting illustration of the collapse of the Tiger units. I will post Schneiders entry for the 19th completely
Orders are issued to break through via Vignats to Necy to the first company, two barrels of fuel are carried on board. after refueling, the company withdraws to the northeast (still three Tigers). Enemy forces are encountered west of Briux. After two antitank-gun hits, Tiger 241 (SS-Untersturmfiihrer Schroif) starts burning. The Tiger following Schroif runs into his tank and is also lost. The lead tank that of the company commander of the first company, SSHauptsturmfiihrer Kalls is able to get through. Tigers 214 and 222 are employed on the road Trun Vimoutiers, one enemy tank is destroyed. Several enemy air raids are sustained without damage. During the defense of the command post of the 12th SS in Necy, three Tigers are lost. A single Tiger is destroyed in close combat by the infantry of the South Alberta Regiment advancing on Saint-Lambert sar Dive.


Once able to dictate the flow of battles, stopping Sherman hordes from going through, the Tigers now were panic-stricken trying to flee.

The 101st had a slightly better day.
Two Tigers support the breakout of the 3. Fallschirm Jager Division from the Falaise Pocket. Two more Tigers detached to Kampfgruppe Olböter knock out eight enemy tanks and clear a path by fire. In an assault of the South Alberta Regiment at St Albert, one Tiger is knocked out by infantry in close combat. Three Tigers stop the attack of the Queens Own.
6 Tigers lost in ground combat on this day. The second company of the 102nd was pretty much done after this day. Being one of 8 Tiger companies the unit claimed a total of 61 tanks knock out.
Last edited by Christianmunich on 14 Dec 2018, 16:28, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Tigers and the 5:1 myth an analysis of Normandy combat operations involving Tigers. Chapter 1 impact analysis part 2

#2

Post by Michael Kenny » 14 Dec 2018, 12:05

It appears selective quoting is going on here and numbers being used that can not possibly be right.

First:
Screenshot_1.jpgyhn.jpg
This is so wrong that its laughable. What appears to have happened is the worst possible account of losses has been chosen in order to inflate the claims for the Tiger. There is simply no way that 47 Cromwells could have been lost leaving 14 survivors.
47 +14 is 61 which just happens to be the full establishment of Cromwells for an Armoured Regiment. Tank states for the start of the advance show that they had only 55 Cromwells to begin with.

Now for a very sly bit of deception and partial quoting:
Screenshot34r_1gh.jpg
In the above instead of quoting the Unit War Diary he uses a book (Charge Of The Bull)

https://www.amazon.co.uk/Charge-Bull-Ar ... 0951234900


where the author is clearly paraphrasing the War Diary. Why would anyone do that when they could just quote the original War Diary? Is there something in the War Diary that he does not want us to see?..........

.
Screenshot_kedkll  2.jpg
Now we see two small snippets from the 3 and a bit pages devoted to August the 3rd in the War Diary. Note the throwaway line about them being attacked by Paratroopers during the night and losing more tanks.
What the War Diary actually says is:

A Squadron suffer heavy casualties during the night through enemy inf and Bazookas. They loose their right hand troop and two centre Troops except one tank.

There are 4 troops of 4 tanks in a Squadron. What they are reporting is that A Squadron lost 75% of its tanks to infantry during the night. Up to 11 tanks. This is two more tanks than they say the Tigers destroyed during the day.
So that is why the War Diary is not scanned or quoted verbatim. It would reveal that German Infantry destroyed more Cromwells than the mighty Tiger and directly contradict the Tiger crewman's claim he would prefer you believe:

Hard days of fighting were behind us, and we had been successful! The company had achieved a respectable success without any losses of its own: 28 enemy tanks had been knocked out and additional ones damaged

This book is also listed as a reference and pages 292-294 deal with this engagement.

https://www.amazon.co.uk/Armoured-Campa ... n+normandy

Napier repeats the numbers in the War Diary (not the 47 figure) and again credits over half the kills to German Infantry. He also gives the Cromwell losses that day as 5 knocked out and four damaged along with 2 Cromwell CS tanks. He also states the losses as 18 Cromwells in total for the previous 24 hours. That matches the 9 mentioned in the War Diary to Tigers and c.10 to infantry.
The Tiger may claim 50% of the c 20 losses but there is no way they can be credited with up to 47 Cromwells.
It is very easy to be taken in by a wall of text. If you have no way of checking the information then these distortions can slip past you. The Tiger crew kill-claims on this day (August 3rd) simply do not match up with the War Dairy and are either mistakenly inflated or deliberate invention.


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Re: Tigers and the 5:1 myth an analysis of Normandy combat operations involving Tigers. Chapter 1 impact analysis part 2

#3

Post by Christianmunich » 14 Dec 2018, 14:23

Michael Kenny wrote:
14 Dec 2018, 12:05
The Tiger may claim 50% of the c 20 losses but there is no way they can be credited with up to 47 Cromwells
Nobody said this. Nobody. I literally said I do not believe Daglish's claim. It is right there in the text, here for you again:
The evening report gives the casualties as 40 tankers. During the night the unit got even attacked by para troopers and lost more tanks. Daglish claims that 47 Cromwells were lost in two days of fighting. I am sure this number is too high but gives you to think given the small size of the German force.
Why on earth do you act like somebody said the Tigers got 47 of those. This is a complete misrepresentation of what I wrote. Nobody attributed those to Tigers and I even said I believe his overall numbers to be too high. I never worked with this number. Do you apologise for this gross mischaracterization of my arguments?

Here another quote of me about Daglish number:
Daglish gives 47 British losses for two days with only 14 Cromwells remaining[49]. >>>>> His claims are suspect and disregarded by me.<<<<<
If you consider opposing arguments powerful you just start to make stuff up. Difficult to have an honest discussion this way.
It appears selective quoting is going on here and numbers being used that can not possibly be right.
Nobody here used those numbers. Stop lying. I have only "awarded" 13 knockouts to the Tiger and this includes potential other British units as well which reported having engaged Tigers in the area where the unit fought. I still drastically reduced Tigers kills form numbers in other sources. All this is explained in my posts. 9 of these were direct, in writing, mention by the unit diaries. The diary literally attributes at least 9 to Tigers.

I have no idea what you mean by selective quoting. None honestly.

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Re: Tigers and the 5:1 myth an analysis of Normandy combat operations involving Tigers. Chapter 1 impact analysis part 2

#4

Post by Juha » 14 Dec 2018, 15:14

After first cursory look. Interesting but
"The history of the 23rd Hussars state that all but 4 Shermans of the 23rd were lost. I am unsure about this. Crew casualties appear pretty light, which would suggest that many crews bailed once the Tigers opened up or the tank casualties are exaggerated."

You missed the important "A Squadron", add that and the quoted first sentence is ok.

Juha

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Re: Tigers and the 5:1 myth an analysis of Normandy combat operations involving Tigers. Chapter 1 impact analysis part 2

#5

Post by Christianmunich » 14 Dec 2018, 15:44

An oversight, the rest of the text refers to A Sqd multiple times. Thanks for pointing out tho. I will leave it with an edit pointing to the msitake

In the Allied tank loss chapter I have written it correctly:
The 23rd Hussars suffered significant casualties in an ambush that was likely set by Tigers[36] [37][38], despite the identification of Panthers. Panthers operated around Estry. Losses of the 23rd Hussars can be verified by the war diary and the official history of the 23rd Hussars. The unit history claims all but 4 Shermans of A squadron were koed[39]. This would speak for massive losses but seems unlikely unless the unit was severely understrength.

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Re: Tigers and the 5:1 myth an analysis of Normandy combat operations involving Tigers. Chapter 1 impact analysis part 2

#6

Post by Michael Kenny » 14 Dec 2018, 19:12

Juha wrote:
14 Dec 2018, 15:14


You missed the important "A Squadron", add that and the quoted first sentence is ok.

And even then you have to know how many tanks A Squadron started with. Almost certainly less than the normal 19.

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Re: Tigers and the 5:1 myth an analysis of Normandy combat operations involving Tigers. Chapter 1 impact analysis part 2

#7

Post by Christianmunich » 15 Dec 2018, 00:07

Michael Kenny wrote:
14 Dec 2018, 19:12
Juha wrote:
14 Dec 2018, 15:14


You missed the important "A Squadron", add that and the quoted first sentence is ok.

And even then you have to know how many tanks A Squadron started with. Almost certainly less than the normal 19.
Again you are showing that you have not read properly and just moved through it hoping to find "mistakes" which you didn't find. Here is what I wrote about this:
The 23rd Hussars suffered significant casualties in an ambush that was likely set by Tigers[36] [37][38], despite the identification of Panthers. Panthers operated around Estry. Losses of the 23rd Hussars can be verified by the war diary and the official history of the 23rd Hussars. The unit history claims all but 4 Shermans of A squadron were koed[39]. This would speak for massive losses but seems unlikely unless the unit was severely understrength.
Disgusting how good I am, isn't it? Good lord I am on fire!!!!!

Imagine how powerful a researcher is who applies your thorough sense for research but to both sides equally in an objective manner. Yeah, that is me. I know the A sqd was understrength and mentioned it accordingly. A researcher who will not favour one side but work objectively. Am I the first ever?

I also undervalued Daglish claims for at least 14 direct Tiger knockouts and gave only 10. Is this possible? A person just doing a good job without withholding information and trying to gaslight people? Is it possible that the one true researcher has arrived to deliver unbiased actual valuable conclusions to people? I think yes.

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Re: Tigers and the 5:1 myth an analysis of Normandy combat operations involving Tigers. Chapter 1 impact analysis part 2

#8

Post by Michael Kenny » 15 Dec 2018, 02:02

Christianmunich wrote:
15 Dec 2018, 00:07


Again you are showing that you have not read properly and just moved through it hoping to find "mistakes" which you didn't find.
It does not require you to admit error to prove you made an error.
Even a blind man can see multiple people have found multiple mistakes in nearly everything you wrote. It painfully obvious you are way out of your depth. Anyone using Schneider as a source for British losses is deluded.

Christianmunich wrote:
15 Dec 2018, 00:07
The unit history claims all but 4 Shermans of A squadron were koed. This would speak for massive losses..................
This is the actual passage :
Screendeshot_15feew.jpg
Note the claims it was Panthers they engaged not Tigers.

Also note the infantry attacks on the tanks::
Screenshot_223.jpg
Screenshot_2w2.jpg
You claim you have established only Tigers engaged 23rd Hussars!

The War Diary is brief but notes:
Aug 1st 3 Shermans 'struck off'
Aug 6 9 Shermans 'struck off'
Aug 11 5 Shermans 'struck off'.
A total of just 17 Shermans and only 14 of them cover the period when you claim 'massive' losses.

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Re: Tigers and the 5:1 myth an analysis of Normandy combat operations involving Tigers. Chapter 1 impact analysis part 2

#9

Post by Christianmunich » 15 Dec 2018, 02:09

Michael Kenny wrote:
15 Dec 2018, 02:02
Christianmunich wrote:
15 Dec 2018, 00:07


Again you are showing that you have not read properly and just moved through it hoping to find "mistakes" which you didn't find.
It does not require you to admit error to prove you made an error.
Even a blind man can see multiple people have found multiple mistakes in nearly everything you wrote. It painfully obvious you are way out of your depth. Anyone using Schneider as a source for British losses is deluded.

Christianmunich wrote:
15 Dec 2018, 00:07
The unit history claims all but 4 Shermans of A squadron were koed. This would speak for massive losses..................
This is the actual passage :

Screendeshot_15feew.jpg

Note the claims it was Panthers they engaged not Tigers.

Also note the infantry attacks on the tanks::
Screenshot_223.jpg
Screenshot_2w2.jpg

You claim you have established only Tigers engaged 23rd Hussars!

The War Diary is brief but notes:
Aug 1st 3 Shermans 'struck off'
Aug 6 9 Shermans 'struck off'
Aug 11 5 Shermans 'struck off'.
A total of just 17 Shermans and only 14 of them cover the period when you claim 'massive' losses.
Calling your bluff. You know those were no Panthers. Tell us right now that you actually believe those were PAnthers and not misidentified Tigers. You will not do that right?

Reading more and more of your posts I got your style. You will "sow doubt" even if there is none but never commit to actual opinons because you know you can't defend them. Please tell me if you actually believe the A Sqd was roughed up by Panthers, yes or no? Kenny.

You did the same with the 7th August you knew those were Tigers but kept throwing "mud" but never commited to giving any other explanation.

Those were Tigers misidentified as PAnthers. Tell us if you believe those were Panthers....

I nailed you with your bad faith style on the 7th August and will do it here again. Pay attention everybody kenny will not claim those were Panthers he just hopes people believe those were Panthers.

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Re: Tigers and the 5:1 myth an analysis of Normandy combat operations involving Tigers. Chapter 1 impact analysis part 2

#10

Post by Michael Kenny » 15 Dec 2018, 02:24

Christianmunich wrote:
15 Dec 2018, 02:09

Pay attention everybody kenny will not claim those were Panthers he just hopes people believe those were Panthers.
I post the original documentation and let readers form their own conclusions.
I find it a better method than posting fabricated War Diary entries.

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Re: Tigers and the 5:1 myth an analysis of Normandy combat operations involving Tigers. Chapter 1 impact analysis part 2

#11

Post by Christianmunich » 15 Dec 2018, 02:30

Haha knew it. You know those are no PAnthers and therefore don't want to ridicule yourself by claiming so.

For the reader, the secondary sources agree those were Tigers, Panthers operated further North East. Kenny knows this as well that is why he would never claim those were Panthers. Maximum bad faith style.

Bluff called....

Being honest with you doesn't work apparently, so I say how it is.

You know those were no Panthers because you know which units operated where. You are still trying to make the reader believe those were Panthers. This is quite despicable if we are being honest. That is why I immediately said you should say you believe those are Panthers. You straight up hope people believe the wrong thing because you are that upset about my 5:1 home run. Honestly, this is really really sad.

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Re: Tigers and the 5:1 myth an analysis of Normandy combat operations involving Tigers. Chapter 1 impact analysis part 2

#12

Post by Michael Kenny » 15 Dec 2018, 02:49

I guess the 'bazooka' men' must be misidentified French farmers?

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Re: Tigers and the 5:1 myth an analysis of Normandy combat operations involving Tigers. Chapter 1 impact analysis part 2

#13

Post by Christianmunich » 15 Dec 2018, 02:55

Not falling for the Gish Gallop.

You know those are no Panthers but still want people to believe it were. This is really really sad kenny.

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Re: Tigers and the 5:1 myth an analysis of Normandy combat operations involving Tigers. Chapter 1 impact analysis part 2

#14

Post by Michael Kenny » 15 Dec 2018, 03:50

Christianmunich wrote:
15 Dec 2018, 02:09


Calling your bluff. You know those were no Panthers. Tell us right now that you actually believe those were PAnthers and not misidentified Tigers. You will not do that right?................Please tell me if you actually believe the A Sqd was roughed up by Panthers, yes or no? .............Those were Tigers misidentified as PAnthers. Tell us if you believe those were Panthers....................nailed you........Pay attention everybody kenny will not claim those were Panthers he just hopes people believe those were Panthers..............Haha knew it. You know those are no PAnthers and therefore don't want to ridicule yourself by claiming so...............For the reader, the secondary sources agree those were Tigers, Panthers operated further North East........... that is why he would never claim those were Panthers. Maximum bad faith style...............Bluff called....Being honest with you doesn't work apparently, so I say how it is.............You know those were no Panthers because you know which units operated where. You are still trying to make the reader believe those were Panthers............... said you should say you believe those are Panthers. You straight up hope people believe the wrong thing because you are that upset about my 5:1 home run.......Not falling for the Gish Gallop............ Honestly, this is really really sad.
Can you read this map?

mar2018211ghrfn.jpg

Now compare it to this map from Heimdal's Hohenstaufen book. I have marked the important bits.
Chenedolle ,,;.jpg
Now to understand the scale of your error you would have to know the date for the claim A squadron lost all but 4 tanks and where they were located at the time. Have a good think about that before making an even bigger fool of yourself.
I have grabbed your earlier posts so editing will not erase your massive own-goal.
Christianmunich wrote:
15 Dec 2018, 00:07

Disgusting how good I am, isn't it? Good lord I am on fire!!!!!
Not all of you, just your pants
Last edited by Michael Kenny on 15 Dec 2018, 03:59, edited 1 time in total.

Christianmunich
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Re: Tigers and the 5:1 myth an analysis of Normandy combat operations involving Tigers. Chapter 1 impact analysis part 2

#15

Post by Christianmunich » 15 Dec 2018, 03:55

lmao the map is date 4th August

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