I found another account of the events of 8 August 1944 for the 1 Polish Armd Div in a report in the war diary of 18 C Armd Car Regt (12 Manitoba Dragoons) and thought it might be of interest. It doesn't solve any of our questions but might provide another useful viewpoint:
RG 24, C-3, vol. 14248 File/dossier 977, T-12715 - 18 Cdn Armd C Regt (XII Manitoba Dragoons)
“C” Sqn 18 Cdn Armd C Regt
(XII Manitoba Dragoons)
15 Aug 44
2nd in Command
18 Cdn Armd C Regt
XII Manitoba Dragoons
REPORT ON PHANTOM PATROL WITH H.Q. POLISH ARMD DIV.
At approx 1100 hrs 8 Aug 44 Capt. Phillips contacted 3 Polish Inf Bde HQ in a fd in the vicinity of IFS 0463, and Lt Laird remained with them as the bde link. Soon after, the whole division concentrated in the same fd and Capt. Morris and Capt. Phillips reported to 10 Polish Armd Bde and the Polish Armd Div HQ respectively. At about 1400 hrs the division began moving in a south easterly direction, and when halted in the vicinity of 046628, SE of IFS, an air attack by heavy bombers, later reported to be American, was made on the area of CORMELLES, directly north of us. Quite heavy losses were sustained by the allies, including the Polish Armd Div.
The column then moved on, and whilst stopped in the area 072598, came under quite hy shell fire from the south. There were numerous casualties, including a direct hit on the General’s tank – luckily it was a dud. After the shelling had ceased, Capt. Phillips contacted the GOC Polish Armd Div, for the first time. Contact previously had been rather hard, as Tac HQ, travelling well forward with the Armd Bde, was moving rather fast. The General wanted infm as to where the flanking tps were, as his leading tps were being fired at from both flanks in the area 085585. We informed him that the Highland Div had not achieved its objective – the wooded area 1059, and that his right flank was ahead of the adv of 4 Cdn Armd Div. With that infm, he withdrew his armour towards last light, having sustained fairly hy casualties, approx 38 tanks. At this time, Tac Div HQ pulled out very suddenly, leaving Capt. Phillips Armd C, First Cdn Army AASU and the British Phantom vehs behind. As no one had said where or when they were going – and no infm could be obtained from anyone as to their whereabouts, these three vehs did not catch up to them again until 0845 hrs the following morning. TAC HQ was harboured in a fd with 10 Polish Armd Bde in the area CRAMESNIL 0857. The tactical picture from this point on was the same as set out in Major Black’s report, but the following points are considered worth noting.
1. It was rather hard at first to get any infm from the Polish staff, but after a while they found that as we were sup them with most of their infm, it was worth their while to keep us in “the picture”. I was even told to move my car nearer the ACV at one time. The GOC was very helpful, having stated that he was once an LO, and knew what it was like.
2. It was found that the AASU Phantoms and our own phantoms worked well together – as we could “gang up” on the Polish staff and share the infm.
3. In order to get infm, one had to listen in to all conversations.
4. Air sp from flanking divisions could normally be obtained with a minimum of delay.
5. On several occasions the Polish Comd would not have known the whereabouts of the flanking tps, and in some cases his own fwd tps, if it had not been for the infm sup by our Phantom service.
6. It is considered that the Tac HQ was rather too far fwd at times for good control. There were times when it was right up with the fwd tps. It moves in a very “bunched” fmn, and is vulnerable to air or arty attacks.
1. That a relief crew be carried in a Sc car as the hours are normally too long for one operator.
2. A loudspeaker and portable table of some description necessary.
3. A separate slidex for this net – as it does not fill the bill for the required purpose, and also might compromise the regt slidex.
4. The most convenient map is the 1/50,000.
5. Two teams necessary – one for the set, and one to decode and encode.
(I.L. Phillips) Capt.
2nd in Command “C” Sqn
18 Cdn Armd C Regt
XII Manitoba Dragoons.
Major Black was the 2nd-in-Command of the 18 Cdn Armd Car Regt. Anyone seen a report by him? It's not in the regiment's war diary as far as I could see.