I concur Eindhoven and Michael are both very knowledgeable in this detail. Whilst, I understood the photographs of the destroyed Tiger’s was taken sometime after the engagement, I failed to appreciate it was two years after, that has they say allows a lot of water to flow under the bridge. Michael’s RAF reconnaissance photography puts everything in context.
headwest wrote: ↑
24 Apr 2019 15:48
Again, I am not at all well versed in this and can only go by what I have read, and that was around 11 Kurt Meyer and Wittmann meet and Meyer says they have to attack to gain some time, but also that he had spotted alot of tanks forward. My question is if they had spotted all of this why in the world would they just drive out in an open field like that or up a road?
Both, headwest, has captured the key question, which for many could be considered the Elephant in the room. Why did they consider it essential to counter attack? and why using that formation whilst consistent with earlier tactical doctrine arguably was replaced by OKW document issued June 1944,
To paraphrase “Now the Tiger, for a long time regarded as a life insurance policy is relegated to the ranks of simply Heavy Tank. No longer can the Tiger prance around oblivious of the laws of tank tactics. They must abbey the laws just as every other tank must” page 210, Tiger! The Tiger Tank: A British View, David Fletcher 1986.
Also, Hilary Doyle has referred on a number of occasions to a German Army document highly critical of Michael Wittmann’s tactical abilities, are you aware of this document and was it produced after the 8th June 1944?
So simply is it the case they had no idea what they were facing until it was too late?