Duncan_M wrote: ↑11 Sep 2019, 17:11
Sheldrake wrote: ↑11 Sep 2019, 10:50
Guderian was the commander of a Panzer Army, that provided one arm of the pincers that encircled Soviet forces in the pockets of 1941 that netted some 3,000,000 PW. There were other panzer and infantry armies. These were huge operations spread over areas bigger than some US States. How was a single army commander responsible for the operations of an army group? Which orders did Guderian disobey that allowed the Red army to escape? Are you for real or is this a wind up?
There were well over a dozen other generals who commanded panzer armies throughout the war, anyone of them could have done what Guderian did in 1941, especially considering Panzer Gruppe Guderian was the strongest of all four. Had he followed orders and been a team player they'd have netted even more POWs. Guderian blatantly disobeyed Bock and Kluge (at the short time he was placed in command of both Hoth and Guderian) especially during the battle of Smolensk, when Guderian refused to close the encirclement and instead pressed out, on his own initiative, to Yelnya.
Go read David Stahel's
Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East, about half the book is Guderian disobeying superiors and doing his own thing.
I have now read David Stahel's book. He obviously despises all of the German Generals and has little empathy with the problems they faced. I found his sneering tone grating after a while and struggled to finish the book. (a rare experience) We know that the Germans woefully under estimated the resilience of USSR. His book is a long series of repetitions of this single theme. The repetitive footnotes pointing out the complicity of the German Generals in Nazi war crimes is a case in point. Some of his criticisms are dubious.
It is not true to claim that capturing Moscow was impossible in 1941. We will never know. They came pretty close even after the diversion to Kiev.
He claims that the VIII Air Corps were incompetent for losing 10% of their strength as losses and 50% needing repairs over a two week period. But that loss rate looks reasonable. Losing 10% from one sortie is too high. But over two weeks from a force of close support aircraft? Isn't it the same as a very reasonable 1% loss rate per day for ten days?
His claims that the German armour should have done more to round up PW seems at odds with what i understand about manoeuvre warfare.
Returning to the point we were discussing. Yes there were lots of Panzer Generals. Guderian was one of the best known - largely for his expertise. His leadership and disobedience was key to the success of the 1940 campaign. Do read Frieser's semi official The Blitzkrieg legend. You might not think him special but the Bundeswehr clearly do.