What percent of Ostfront losses were German?

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Yuri
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Re: What percent of Ostfront losses were German?

#106

Post by Yuri » 21 Apr 2020, 13:45

B. Monday, August 10, 1942.
9th Company (Lieutenant Velky/or Wilki) and the 11th Company (OberLieutenant of reserve Hieketir) as punitive expeditions against the guerrillas acted 03:30 from Zapkowo (location of the reserve battalions) in the forest area, 6 kilometers South Zapkowo, where the day before it came to fighting. In the first half of the day, after a short fire fight, the partisan resistance was broken, and 70 Russian breakaway soldiers were caught in the woods.
After the rest of the 3rd Battalion (reserve) had already prepared to move at 03:45, following the division commander's telephone order, the Regiment Commander received an order at 5:00 that three reserve Battalions of the Division under the command of the 687th Infantry Regiment commander (Lieutenant Colonel Brickman) should immediately move North, since the Russians had managed to create a bridgehead at Korotoyak on the West Bank of Don, and as a result - Ostrogozhsk, an important railway junction for units, was under threat.
The radio was able to inform all the units of the 3rd Battalion of the changed situation and point them in a new direction to Iwanowka. 12:00 3rd Battalion (captain Schultz) with a light Platoon of the 13th Company (Feldwebel Kostortz) gathered in Iwanowka.
The approach of the trucks of the 1st Autocollum of the 336th Infantry Division, presented for the transfer of the battalion, was delayed. Finally, at 19:00, most of the Battalion left and by midnight reached the Northern outskirts of Rossosh, where the 10th company (OberLieutenant of reserve Huch) was located. Units of other companies and a the fighting train in 19:00 left on foot and, having passed 49 kilometers, on 11.8 about 12:00 reached the Northern suburb of Rossosh.

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Re: What percent of Ostfront losses were German?

#107

Post by Yuri » 21 Apr 2020, 13:54

42-08-10 Battle of Korotoyak 336ID (Nowaja-Kalitwa-Rossosh-Ostrogoshsk).jpg


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Re: What percent of Ostfront losses were German?

#108

Post by Yuri » 25 Apr 2020, 13:53

At this point in the report of captain Schultz, - commander of the 3rd battalion, 685th infantry regiment, 336th infantry division,- we need to make a choice: who to trust?
1. Combat officer of the Wehrmacht-battalion commander? OR
2. The OKH's generals of the Wehrmacht (that is, Colonel-General Halder and his team)?
I will explain, for those who did not pay attention to the significant differences between the captain Schultz's report and the OKH's maps.
According to the captain Schultz's report -until August 10, 1942, his 685th Infantry Regiment of the 336th Infantry Division occupies positions East of Nowaja-Kalitwa and has a junction with the Italian Division Ravenna. At the same time, the captain Schultz's battalion (as a reserve) is located in Zapkovo.
On the other hand, the OKH's generals assure us that the positions of the 294th Infantry Division are located to the East of Nowaja-Kalitwa, and that at no point in time did the 336th Infantry Division have a junction with the Italian Ravenna.
Last edited by Yuri on 25 Apr 2020, 14:16, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: What percent of Ostfront losses were German?

#109

Post by Yuri » 25 Apr 2020, 14:09

For those who have not yet made a choice, as well as those who have made the wrong choice, as well as for all of us, it is very useful to get acquainted with the report of another battalion commander - major Höke.
Major Höke, - commander of the 2nd Battalion of the 18th Infantry Regiment of the 6th Infantry Division,- reports on the actions of his battalion for August-September 1942, that is, in the same period as in the report of captain Schulz.

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Re: What percent of Ostfront losses were German?

#110

Post by Yuri » 25 Apr 2020, 15:41

This Gliederung 6th Infantry Division.
6ID_Gliederung.jpg
This OKH's map (correct for the 6.ID and its neighbors the 87. and 256. IDs) shows the location of the 6.ID on August 10, 1942.
42-08-10 II_IR18_6ID_Rshew_b.jpg

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Re: What percent of Ostfront losses were German?

#111

Post by Yuri » 25 Apr 2020, 16:07

This is the report of the commander of the 18th infantry regiment to the headquarters of the 6th infantry division.
42-10-17 18IR_6ID(1-2)_.jpg
Anlage to the Becker's report
42-10-10 II_18IR_6ID(1-2)_.jpg
42-10-10 II_18IR_6ID(3-4)_b.jpg
42-10-10 II_18IR_6ID(5-6)_.jpg
42-10-10 II_18IR_6ID(7-8)_.jpg

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Re: What percent of Ostfront losses were German?

#112

Post by Yuri » 25 Apr 2020, 16:07

42-10-10 IIBtl18IR6ID_9_800.jpg

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Re: What percent of Ostfront losses were German?

#113

Post by Jan-Hendrik » 25 Apr 2020, 16:11

Well...whats your point? As you never answer any questions?

A commander is not quite lucky with getting officers without the neccessary experience for their job.

So....what do you want to tell us??


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Re: What percent of Ostfront losses were German?

#114

Post by Yuri » 25 Apr 2020, 16:27

Both reports deserve to be translated into English by a professional translator. or at least a native English speaker with a good command of German. Since there is no professional translation into Russian, I can't convey the beauty of what is set out in major Höke's report.
What I highlighted on page 4 is a masterpiece. Even the most notorious Soviet propagandist could not have come up with such a plot.

What is important for us is that Major Höke says that the example he gave with the Man from 5th company Kazitsky is a repeated situation, althoughin it is possible in other forms.

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Re: What percent of Ostfront losses were German?

#115

Post by Ypenburg » 27 Apr 2020, 16:31

"What I highlighted on page 4 is a masterpiece. Even the most notorious Soviet propagandist could not have come up with such a plot."

Please inform us about this masterpiece. I just fail to see it even after reading 5 times. And what is the link with German Ostfront losses ?

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Re: What percent of Ostfront losses were German?

#116

Post by Yuri » 01 May 2020, 14:02

42-08-10_20 Battle of Korotojak_deutsche_Juden.jpg
Grounds for developing a version of the reinforcement of captain Schultz's battalion by German Jews.
According to the report of captain Schultz, for the attack on Korotoyak on August 16, for the reinforced 3rd battalion was next additionally assigned:
- 1 platoon of the 2nd company of the 336th sapper battalion;
- 1 unit of 2 88 mm and 2 20 mm anti-aircraft guns;
- 1 forward observer of the 7th battery (chemical mortars) of the 336th Art.Reg.;
- 1 forward observer of the 6th battery of the 71st Art.Reg.
In describing the actions of the 9th, 10th, and 11th companies of his battalion, captain Schultz classifies these companies as "reinforced": "reinforced 9th company", "reinforced 10th company", and "reinforced 11th company".
Thus, the sapper, artillery and anti-aircraft elements indicated here reinforced the already reinforced battalion and its reinforced companies.
However, when marching on August 10 from Rossosch, captain Schultz's battalion and his companys is not listed as "reinforced".
Based on the above, we can assume that when moving along the route from Rossosh to Korotoyak, the 3rd battalion of captain Schultz could receive reinforcement from the battalion of German Jews, which arrived at the Ssaguny station 4.8.42.

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Re: What percent of Ostfront losses were German?

#117

Post by Yuri » 11 May 2020, 21:55

In the course of my work with archival documents in the TsAMO until this moment, Jews in the uniform of European enemies of the Red Army met very rarely and, at the same time, never more than one person.
Therefore, the appearance of a unit consisting entirely of the German Jews was news to me.
However, I quickly learned that the Hungarian 44th Infantry Regiment also had a sapper company with 320 Jews and 28 Hungarian soldiers. In this sapper company, the Hungarians had rifles, while the Jews only had trench tools.
Thus, Korotoyak can claim the place where during the Great Patriotic war the largest number of Jews in the uniform of the troops of the enemies of the Red Army were present.
A more detailed study of the documents revealed that Korotoyak is unique not only in the presence of Jews.
With high probability, we can assume that Kortoyak is also the place where the largest number of German construction soldiers (more than 6,000 people in total) died at one moment. More precisely, these builders died in the vicinity of the village of Petropawlowskoje, which is essentially a continuation of Korotoyak on the other (Eastern) Bank of the Don river (see 300,000 scale map).
To find out and understand the reasons and circumstances for the appearance of a large number of German builders on the Eastern Bank of the don at Korotoyak, it is useful to start with this package of documents.
AOK2 Report Battle of Voronezh Title_Stamp.jpg
AOK2 Report Battle of Voronezh Title_Stamp.jpg (45.97 KiB) Viewed 789 times
Voronezh battle.
Combat report of the 2nd Army
(Army Group Weichs)
on the combat operations of troops for the period
June-July 1942
in the Voronezh direction.
There are about 200 pages in total, of which 107 pages are the text of the action report from 24.4. to 10.7.1942, the remaining pages are copies of documents.
Unfortunately, on the site GDinR.COM this set of documents has not been placed to date. But, at the time, working directly in the 500 Fund, I took a copy, however, as you can see, in black and white.

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Re: What percent of Ostfront losses were German?

#118

Post by Yuri » 11 May 2020, 22:04

I have modified this well-known scheme to explain the AG Weichs report.
Voronezh_Korotoyak_AG_Wecihs(mod).jpg

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Re: What percent of Ostfront losses were German?

#119

Post by Yuri » 11 May 2020, 22:06

And this is an additional diagram on 1:300 000 scale map, where you can see all the points we need.
42-07-03_05 Voronesh_Korotoyak_1800.jpg
Sorry, the explanation of the diagrams will be a little later.

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Re: What percent of Ostfront losses were German?

#120

Post by Yuri » 22 May 2020, 06:51

I suppose that not all members of this forum served in the armed forces of their countries, and those who served were not all infantrymen or gunners. Therefore, before explaining why the German builders were on the beachhead on the Eastern (or rather, Northern) Bank of the Don at Korotoyak (Petropawlovskoje), it is useful to familiarize with the content of the document "Instructions for the organization of defense and combat".
The document was issued on 4.12.42 by the commander of Army Group "Hollidt" (XVII.AK) - General of Infantry Hollidt.
Although the document was published in the winter 1942, its content is relevant for any time of the year. Moreover, even today, the content of this document has not lost its relevance.
The document fell into the hands of the red Army on the Chir river during operation "Little Saturn".
42-12-04_AG_Hollidt_Order.jpg
My bad translation is below.
=========================

The commander of the group Hollidt. Command post of the corps
4.12.42
CONFIDENTIALLY

Instructions for the organization of defense and conduction combat.

1. I remind the Führer's order that the positions held must be held under all conditions. There can be no withdrawal or retreat. The duty of each unit is to defend the position to the last possible opportunity. In this case, the behavior of officers of all degrees is crucial.
2. Every officer should understand that his behavior in battle is an example for his subordinates. Even a small mistake can have serious consequences, for which the officer is held accountable.
3. His position should by all means and with full tension forces to be strengthened. There can be no question of any firmness in defense until the infantry in the firing position have trenches 180 cm deep and 60 cm wide, connected by communication passages. The infantry leading the battle must be have (able) to hide from enemy tanks and artillery fire in their positions and dugouts, only then can they let the enemy tanks pass to take up the fight with the enemy's advancing infantry.
The same applies to reinforcements and reserves located on the second and third lines, which are not allowed to be in the open field and must immediately dig in.
Positions of artillery batteries must also be equipped to repel the enemy's infantry advance. The guns must be secured from shrapnel action by digging in, but not by reducing horizontal fire. Positions of all batteries and command posts must be equipped for defense at the nearest distances, so they are strong points where a possible breakthrough of the enemy can be delayed by counterattacks.
4. Special importance should be attached to anti-tank defense.
A well-entrenched unit is quite capable of passing attacking tanks through its location, which is confirmed by numerous examples, after which the task of anti-tank artillery is to conduct a battle with enemy tanks.
However, anti-tank defense will only be effective when the infantry will remain in their positions under any circumstances.

5. All orders and orders must be controlled by higher authorities. Therefore, each commander and chief must personally verify the correctness, speed and integrity of the execution of their orders, which means that commanders must often be among their subordinates in battle and personally check the implementation of their orders and the state of construction of trenches.
6. Care for the troops is also shown in a planned, well-thought-out change of units. If the situation allows, the soldiers on the front line should be relieved from time to time so that they can sleep, wash, and put their weapons and uniforms in order. Unwashed and unshaven soldiers - is not a sign of morale, but only proves the lack of care and initiative of commanders
7. Of particular importance is the maintenance of warrior's spirit in a personal communication on subordinates, personal conversations and, above all, a constant concern of the soldiers. A soldier must know that his commander is doing everything possible for him. Then it will be able to bear all the difficulties that arise from insufficient support or from a difficult combat situation.
8. I expect from all commanders and officers that they will not expect an order from above regarding the care of their subordinates, but will take the necessary decisions on their own initiative and find a way out of the situation.
Signed: Hollidt.
General of infantry.

Translated:
Military interpreter of the intelligence Department of the headquarters of the South-Western front
Technician/engineer 2 rank (signature) /Bergelson/

3 copies.
print. E.M.
15.1.43

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