What percent of Ostfront losses were German?
Re: What percent of Ostfront losses were German?
In that part of the order of the 18th Army, which I have not translated, it is indicated how it is necessary to destroy operational documents. They must be burned using gasoline. Here we give a proof that the staff of the III.(germ) SS-Panzer Korps ignored an order from the 18th Army regarding the method of destroying operational documents. An important document is torn into four parts, not burned, as indicated in the order of the headquarters of the 18th Army. Thus an important document in all respects fell into the hands of the red Army. On the other hand, this allows us to learn today the structure of this tank corps as of 01.09.1944 and 15.09.1944. Note: these are two different documents. The second part of these documents (the front part of one and the back part of the other I have not yet restored) as soon as I form it, I will immediately place it here
Re: What percent of Ostfront losses were German?
DenckNamenListen - 1.9.1944 00-00 Uhr (face)
Last edited by Yuri on 09 Mar 2020, 14:07, edited 1 time in total.
Re: What percent of Ostfront losses were German?
DenckNamenListen - 15.9.1944 00-00 (revers)
Re: What percent of Ostfront losses were German?
DenckNamenListen - 15.9.1944 00-00 (face)
Last edited by Yuri on 09 Mar 2020, 22:08, edited 1 time in total.
Re: What percent of Ostfront losses were German?
DenckNamenListen - 1.9.1944 00-00 (revers)
Re: What percent of Ostfront losses were German?
January 25, 1944.
French volunteer Legion.
Headquarters of the 638th French infantry regiment.
No. 22 regimental headquarters /S / OR
Secret operation
Operation # 1.
Message.
The division received a report from an agent that there was a camp of a medium-sized gang in the forest between Belevichi (25 km North-North-East of Berezino) and Kharchichi (22 km North-North-East of Berezino).
The number of the gang is 200 bandits, probably part of the f-220 gang.
Use the message in the upcoming operation.
Cantonment area, January 25, 1944
Poo.
Colonel and commander of the regiment.
=============
Translated by: assistant chief of the Intelligence Department
Lieutenant of administrative service (signature) /Gurevich/
10.5.44
Last edited by Yuri on 10 Mar 2020, 22:20, edited 1 time in total.
Re: What percent of Ostfront losses were German?
As a result of this operation in the area of Berezino, the documents of the French regiment became a trophy of the partisans of Belarus.
Message from the Belarusian Headquarters of the Partisan Movement about sending translations of documents of the 683 French infantry regiment to the GRU.
Yes, Berezino is not the place where the French are expected to be happy.
Message from the Belarusian Headquarters of the Partisan Movement about sending translations of documents of the 683 French infantry regiment to the GRU.
Re: What percent of Ostfront losses were German?
With all the excellent information provided by Yuri, where's "mustang19"?
Re: What percent of Ostfront losses were German?
A brief summary about the French.
During the Great Patriotic war (that is, from June 22, 1941 to may 9, 1945) in (as part) the troops of the opponents of the Red Army there were people who were citizens of the Third Republic before September 1, 1939 (that is, before the beginning of the Third Great European Civil war).
These citizens can be divided into three categories
- Legionnaires (on the Soviet-European front - since October 1941);
- residents of the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine (on the Soviet-European front-since may 1943, the absolute majority went to this front);
- people whose blood was 50% (then 25%) German.
The last contingent was called up from the end of November 1942, that is, after the German troops entered the previously unoccupied part of the continental territory of the Third Republic.
The French police had lists of citizens who had German blood. These citizens were considered potentially dangerous by the government of Marshal Petain, so the French police compiled a list of them. The Germans knew this. On November 9, 1942, special teams moved with German troops to seize lists of French Germans from the French police.
Today, it is impossible to accurately determine the number of these categories of French citizens who died in the battles against the Red Army. Western propaganda prohibits research on this topic. If you don't believe it, I recommend that you try to do some research on this topic. You will not get grants. If you find your own funds, you will not get access to the archives. And, Yes, I know what I'm saying.
I have a friend-a Frenchman and a citizen of the Fifth Republic-who defended a thesis on the economic policy of the government of the Third Republic and the Vichy government in Algeria. This friend of mine worked for more than ten years in the Moscow representative office of a French oil company, his suburban dacha is a hundred meters from my dacha (and my dacha is not far from the TSAMO). When I first "met a captured the German Frenchman" (a resident of city Toulon) in the archive documents of the 333rd rifle division, I asked my friend: is there any research on this topic in France?
His response was something like this: "I received a grant on my topic with great difficulty, with even greater difficulty getting the archive documents I needed. As for research on such a topic as the participation of French citizens in the battles against the Red Army during the Great Patriotic war, the obstacles in this way will be almost insurmountable."
According to my estimates, the number of French citizens who died in the battles against the Red Army will be:
- minimum - 50 000 people;
- maximum - 100 000 people.
During the Great Patriotic war (that is, from June 22, 1941 to may 9, 1945) in (as part) the troops of the opponents of the Red Army there were people who were citizens of the Third Republic before September 1, 1939 (that is, before the beginning of the Third Great European Civil war).
These citizens can be divided into three categories
- Legionnaires (on the Soviet-European front - since October 1941);
- residents of the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine (on the Soviet-European front-since may 1943, the absolute majority went to this front);
- people whose blood was 50% (then 25%) German.
The last contingent was called up from the end of November 1942, that is, after the German troops entered the previously unoccupied part of the continental territory of the Third Republic.
The French police had lists of citizens who had German blood. These citizens were considered potentially dangerous by the government of Marshal Petain, so the French police compiled a list of them. The Germans knew this. On November 9, 1942, special teams moved with German troops to seize lists of French Germans from the French police.
Today, it is impossible to accurately determine the number of these categories of French citizens who died in the battles against the Red Army. Western propaganda prohibits research on this topic. If you don't believe it, I recommend that you try to do some research on this topic. You will not get grants. If you find your own funds, you will not get access to the archives. And, Yes, I know what I'm saying.
I have a friend-a Frenchman and a citizen of the Fifth Republic-who defended a thesis on the economic policy of the government of the Third Republic and the Vichy government in Algeria. This friend of mine worked for more than ten years in the Moscow representative office of a French oil company, his suburban dacha is a hundred meters from my dacha (and my dacha is not far from the TSAMO). When I first "met a captured the German Frenchman" (a resident of city Toulon) in the archive documents of the 333rd rifle division, I asked my friend: is there any research on this topic in France?
His response was something like this: "I received a grant on my topic with great difficulty, with even greater difficulty getting the archive documents I needed. As for research on such a topic as the participation of French citizens in the battles against the Red Army during the Great Patriotic war, the obstacles in this way will be almost insurmountable."
According to my estimates, the number of French citizens who died in the battles against the Red Army will be:
- minimum - 50 000 people;
- maximum - 100 000 people.
Re: What percent of Ostfront losses were German?
Now a summary of the poles.
For the period from September 1, 1938 to May 9, 1945 (that is, from the time of the invasion of the army II Rzeczpospolita in the Czechoslovak Republic until the end of the Great Patriotic war), the military losses of poles - 320,000 people.
See to the estimates of researchers, for example, Wolfgang Fischer, "Europe 1914-1980: economy and population".
For the period from September 1, 1938 to May 9, 1945 (that is, from the time of the invasion of the army II Rzeczpospolita in the Czechoslovak Republic until the end of the Great Patriotic war), the military losses of poles - 320,000 people.
See to the estimates of researchers, for example, Wolfgang Fischer, "Europe 1914-1980: economy and population".
Re: What percent of Ostfront losses were German?
Consequently, the military losses of poles in the German armed forces – not less than 200,000.
No more than 120,000 people are other military losses of poles:
I. personnel (not only poles) of the armed forces of the II Rzeczpospolita in combat against the armed forces of
a) the Czechoslovak Republic;
b) the armed forces of the Third Reich;
c) the Red Army;
II. personnel of the Poles units in the armed forces of Great Britain and the USSR against the armed forces of Germany and Italy.
The upper limit of the number of military losses of poles in the armed forces of the Third Reich is 220,000 people.
Poles in the armed forces of the Third Reich crossed the border of the USSR on the first day of the Great Patriotic war - June 22, 1941.
One of the GRU's departments was engaged in research on the organization and operation of the German armed forces ' rear services.
This is the first page from the abstract to the GRU's report on the work of the rear service of the German army's infantry divisions. The part that I tried to translate is highlighted.
No more than 120,000 people are other military losses of poles:
I. personnel (not only poles) of the armed forces of the II Rzeczpospolita in combat against the armed forces of
a) the Czechoslovak Republic;
b) the armed forces of the Third Reich;
c) the Red Army;
II. personnel of the Poles units in the armed forces of Great Britain and the USSR against the armed forces of Germany and Italy.
The upper limit of the number of military losses of poles in the armed forces of the Third Reich is 220,000 people.
Poles in the armed forces of the Third Reich crossed the border of the USSR on the first day of the Great Patriotic war - June 22, 1941.
One of the GRU's departments was engaged in research on the organization and operation of the German armed forces ' rear services.
This is the first page from the abstract to the GRU's report on the work of the rear service of the German army's infantry divisions. The part that I tried to translate is highlighted.
Re: What percent of Ostfront losses were German?
My translation
==========
Features of the rear service of infantry divisions of the German army during the war with the USSR.
(compiled on the basis of captured documents)
1. The transport for supplying troops.
The transport means of the German infantry division mainly consist of three small the auto-transport columns (with a total load capacity of 90 tons), four (4) horse-transport columns, and two (2) light horse-transport columns.
It is characteristic that before the attack on the Soviet Union, many the German divisions (45.ID, 134.ID, 26.ID) an additional number of ordinary civilian carts were attached. These wagons were rented from the local Polish population in the General government.
The drivers of these horse-drawn carts were mostly local people who were hired along with their own horses. The total number of such horse carts in the division reached 150-170, and horses numbered up to 300.
The preliminary assignment of these additional means to the divisions as early as May 1941 can be explained by the fact that the German command took into account possible difficulties with supplies during the offensive in roadless areas.
In September-October 1941, according to the order of the German command, these wagons were declared mobilized for the needs of the army, and the civilian personnel were dismissed to their homes.
As a rule, these carts were used for transporting food, forage, and when the situation was tense, for ammunition was also used.
Separate special orders for supplies give a clear idea of the system of operation of transport columns during the offensive. For example, small auto-transport columns of the 26th infantry division made 150-200 km daily. 40-50 tons of ammunition were delivered daily For the division during the summer offensive of 1941.
.....
=======
The text of the main report says that these civilians are actually part of the personnel of German infantry divisions. And this conclusion of the GRU cannot be disputed.
The losses of these "civilian" poles are included in the number of civilian losses or in the number of military losses, I do not know.
==========
Features of the rear service of infantry divisions of the German army during the war with the USSR.
(compiled on the basis of captured documents)
1. The transport for supplying troops.
The transport means of the German infantry division mainly consist of three small the auto-transport columns (with a total load capacity of 90 tons), four (4) horse-transport columns, and two (2) light horse-transport columns.
It is characteristic that before the attack on the Soviet Union, many the German divisions (45.ID, 134.ID, 26.ID) an additional number of ordinary civilian carts were attached. These wagons were rented from the local Polish population in the General government.
The drivers of these horse-drawn carts were mostly local people who were hired along with their own horses. The total number of such horse carts in the division reached 150-170, and horses numbered up to 300.
The preliminary assignment of these additional means to the divisions as early as May 1941 can be explained by the fact that the German command took into account possible difficulties with supplies during the offensive in roadless areas.
In September-October 1941, according to the order of the German command, these wagons were declared mobilized for the needs of the army, and the civilian personnel were dismissed to their homes.
As a rule, these carts were used for transporting food, forage, and when the situation was tense, for ammunition was also used.
Separate special orders for supplies give a clear idea of the system of operation of transport columns during the offensive. For example, small auto-transport columns of the 26th infantry division made 150-200 km daily. 40-50 tons of ammunition were delivered daily For the division during the summer offensive of 1941.
.....
=======
The text of the main report says that these civilians are actually part of the personnel of German infantry divisions. And this conclusion of the GRU cannot be disputed.
The losses of these "civilian" poles are included in the number of civilian losses or in the number of military losses, I do not know.
Re: What percent of Ostfront losses were German?
The Polish professional railway workers are also an important segment of Polish human resources, which were actively used by the German armed forces from the beginning to the very end of the Great Patriotic war. In essence, these people were mobilized by the German authorities and performed military railway transport for the needs of the German armed forces in all areas of the Eastern European theater of operations. As you know, the leaders of the «Armia Krajowa» ("Home Army") professed a policy of "accumulating forces for the decisive moment". The consequence of this policy was the refusal to involve the Polish railway workers in sabotage activities on the Railways. This pernicious short-sighted policy led to the fact that, willingly or unwittingly, the Polish railway workers found themselves in the camp of collaborators. They had significant privileges and allowances from the German occupation authorities for the invaluable assistance they provided to the German armed forces in the war against the Red Army. Because of the fear of being punished for voluntary or involuntary collaboration, the Polish railway workers voluntarily evacuated to Germany after the Vistula-Oder operation began in January 1945.
According to the German military railway officials, the presence of a large number of professional Polish railway workers is one of the main reasons for excluding the problem of a shortage of professional personnel on the German Railways in 1945.
1st and 9th pages of translation from German from the Handwritten testimony of a prisoner of war major Fritz Abbas, Commissioner for unloading and commandant of the station Ostrovets-Svito.
…
IX. Provision of Railways with service personnel.
As I have noticed, the German railway administration is currently implementing a policy that always provides it with the necessary personnel in abundance, which became possible as a result of the abandonment of huge railway lines in the East and in the West – from here the railway personnel returned to Germany.
In addition, I know that part of the Polish railway workers who have worked on the Railways with the Germans for many years have also moved to Germany, because they are afraid that they will be held responsible for such a long collaboration with the Germans.
Because of the above, I am convinced that it is unlikely that even in the future there will be a shortage of qualified railway personnel in Germany.
...
According to the German military railway officials, the presence of a large number of professional Polish railway workers is one of the main reasons for excluding the problem of a shortage of professional personnel on the German Railways in 1945.
1st and 9th pages of translation from German from the Handwritten testimony of a prisoner of war major Fritz Abbas, Commissioner for unloading and commandant of the station Ostrovets-Svito.
IX. Provision of Railways with service personnel.
As I have noticed, the German railway administration is currently implementing a policy that always provides it with the necessary personnel in abundance, which became possible as a result of the abandonment of huge railway lines in the East and in the West – from here the railway personnel returned to Germany.
In addition, I know that part of the Polish railway workers who have worked on the Railways with the Germans for many years have also moved to Germany, because they are afraid that they will be held responsible for such a long collaboration with the Germans.
Because of the above, I am convinced that it is unlikely that even in the future there will be a shortage of qualified railway personnel in Germany.
...
Re: What percent of Ostfront losses were German?
Losses of Czechs and Slovaks can be defined similarly, but the following circumstance should be taken into account. Slovak losses in the fighting against the Red Army are divided into two parts: losses in the Slovak armed forces and losses in the German armed forces.
On the other hand, Czechoslovak military units participated in combat operations against the German armed forces as part of the armed forces of the Red Army (including Slovaks who had defected to the Soviet partisans), and Great Britain.
In the fighting against the German armed forces, 12 - 15,000 Czechs and Slovaks died.
Consequently, between 135,000 and 138,000 Czechs and Slovaks died in action against the Red Army (including actions against Soviet partisans).
On the other hand, Czechoslovak military units participated in combat operations against the German armed forces as part of the armed forces of the Red Army (including Slovaks who had defected to the Soviet partisans), and Great Britain.
In the fighting against the German armed forces, 12 - 15,000 Czechs and Slovaks died.
Consequently, between 135,000 and 138,000 Czechs and Slovaks died in action against the Red Army (including actions against Soviet partisans).
Re: What percent of Ostfront losses were German?
In February 1944, by a special decree of the Fuhrer of the Great German Reich, mandatory universal military service was introduced in all the occupied territories of the Soviet Union (excluding Bessarabia), which were not part of the USSR until August 23, 1939 (the Fuhrer's decree indicates this date).
Men between the ages of 17 and 60 who lived in these territories before August 23, 1939, including those who were on German territory as "Osterbeiter", were subject to conscription into the German armed forces.
Men of great-Russian nationality who lived in these territories before August 23, 1939, as well as men of all nationalities of the USSR who did not live in these territories before August 23, 1939, were not subject to conscription. This all, as Great-Russians and as non-Russians, should be called "Russians".
Example of Mobilization in Estonia:
Men between the ages of 17 and 60 who lived in these territories before August 23, 1939, including those who were on German territory as "Osterbeiter", were subject to conscription into the German armed forces.
Men of great-Russian nationality who lived in these territories before August 23, 1939, as well as men of all nationalities of the USSR who did not live in these territories before August 23, 1939, were not subject to conscription. This all, as Great-Russians and as non-Russians, should be called "Russians".
Example of Mobilization in Estonia: