12. SS-Panzerdivision "Hitlerjugend" losses in the summer of 1944

[mihaiS]

Note: This is my first post on this forum. My apologies if it doesn't warrant its own thread. Do redirect me to an appropriate one, if so.

There are two specific passages that bother me in Kurt Meyer's Grenadiere:

The division’s total strength was 500 junior enlisted personnel, noncommissioned officers and officers.

- in a paragraph that refers to mid-August 1944

The combat strength of the division was roughly 600 infantry; it was divided into two Kampfgruppen. Tanks were no longer available; the remaining tanks were in Luttich being repaired. There was no ammunition available for the heavy field-howitzer battery. One 88 mm Flak battery was deployed at the crossroads northwest of Spontin in a ground-support role.

- 4-5 September 1944

I've seen these numbers quoted in other books about the Hitlerjugend, and also used to calculate an 80% casualty rate in this division's Wikipedia article. On the other hand, Hubert Meyer estimates in The History of the 12.SS-Panzerdivision Hitlerjugend that the division lost 8,000-9,000 men (out of 20,000) in the battles that took place during the summer months. Personally, I find his book, and its casualty reports, far more thorough than K. Meyer's, but I don't understand where this huge difference stems from. Could it be that K. Meyer's numbers refer to the combat strength of the division's Panzergrenadier regiments only, or perhaps a random Kampfgruppe?

[Richard Anderson]

Note: This is my first post on this forum. My apologies if it doesn't warrant its own thread. Do redirect me to an appropriate one, if so.

There are two specific passages that bother me in Kurt Meyer's Grenadiere:

The division’s total strength was 500 junior enlisted personnel, noncommissioned officers and officers.

- in a paragraph that refers to mid-August 1944

The combat strength of the division was roughly 600 infantry; it was divided into two Kampfgruppen. Tanks were no longer available; the remaining tanks were in Luttich being repaired. There was no ammunition available for the heavy field-howitzer battery. One 88 mm Flak battery was deployed at the crossroads northwest of Spontin in a ground-support role.

- 4-5 September 1944

I've seen these numbers quoted in other books about the Hitlerjugend, and also used to calculate an 80% casualty rate in this division's Wikipedia article. On the other hand, Hubert Meyer estimates in The History of the 12.SS-Panzerdivision Hitlerjugend that the division lost 8,000-9,000 men (out of 20,000) in the battles that took place during the summer months. Personally, I find his book, and its casualty reports, far more thorough than K. Meyer's, but I don't understand where this huge difference stems from. Could it be that K. Meyer's numbers refer to the combat strength of the division's Panzergrenadier regiments only, or perhaps a random Kampfgruppe?

It is almost certainly Kampfstärke that he is quoting. The division battle casualties lost reported for 1 January-31 August 1944 totaled 8,572 (1,750 KIA, 3,812 WIA, and 3,010 MIA), with another 369 lost through illness, accidents, and the like. Another 903 wounded and 264 sick and so forth were recorded as being fit and remaining in the field. So 8,941 personnel lost to the division, which numbered 20,540 (including 216 HiWi) as of 1 June 1944. So as of 1 September in theory the division totaled around 11,000-plus.

Furthermore, on 18 June, the division reported a kampfstärke of 413 officers, 1,900 NCO, 14,674 EM, a Versorgungtruppen strength of 86 officers, 351 NCO, and 2,477 EM, and a total strength of 499 officers, 2,251 NCO, 17.151 EM, and 208 HiWi (ULTRA HW5/510, CX/MSS/T224/42, 24 June 1944). However that kampfstärke actually includes the Troß of the combat units, which were a significant portion of their strength.

[mihaiS]

It is almost certainly Kampfstärke that he is quoting. The division battle casualties lost reported for 1 January-31 August 1944 totaled 8,572 (1,750 KIA, 3,812 WIA, and 3,010 MIA), with another 369 lost through illness, accidents, and the like. Another 903 wounded and 264 sick and so forth were recorded as being fit and remaining in the field. So 8,941 personnel lost to the division, which numbered 20,540 (including 216 HiWi) as of 1 June 1944. So as of 1 September in theory the division totaled around 11,000-plus.

Furthermore, on 18 June, the division reported a kampfstärke of 413 officers, 1,900 NCO, 14,674 EM, a Versorgungtruppen strength of 86 officers, 351 NCO, and 2,477 EM, and a total strength of 499 officers, 2,251 NCO, 17.151 EM, and 208 HiWi (ULTRA HW5/510, CX/MSS/T224/42, 24 June 1944). However that kampfstärke actually includes the Troß of the combat units, which were a significant portion of their strength.

Thank you for the reply. I must admit that even a Kampfstärke of 500-600 seems wrong, given the fact that the division still had ~11,000 men, but I suppose that a significant portion of those 9,000 casualties came from its Panzergrenadier units, so I guess it makes sense.

However, I still don't understand that 80% casualty rate mentioned (twice even) in the Wikipedia article. Apparently it references "The Waffen-SS: Hitler's Elite Guard at War 1939–1945", written by George Stein, which in turn cites the aforementioned quotes by Kurt Meyer, while also adding the following:

The 12th SS Panzerdivision "Hitler Jugend", for example, lost 80 per cent of the combat troops with which it had gone into action.

Assuming that he means 80% of its Kampfstärke, and given the previous estimate of 600 combat ready men in the aftermath of the Falaise Pocket, it would imply that, at 100%, the division had a combat strength of only 3000? Am I missing something, or is this percentage completely wrong? I know that Wikipedia is hardly a bastion of academic integrity, but this is really odd.

[Richard Anderson]

Oh, almost certainly he was actually referring to the Grabenstärke of just the remaining infantry in that remark. With just a few tanks and artillery pieces operational most of the Panzer and Artillerie truppen were probably already on their way to the rear to begin re-equipping along with the remaining divisional services.

[Sheldrake]

12 SS Panzer Division set up a base near the river Seine and their field replacement battalion was brought forward from somewhere near Dreux. 12 SS were involved in fighting west of the Seine. There is a report that the division was down to 10 tanks and 300 men, but Hubert Meyer the author of the divisional history was the IA and says that number excludes KG Mohnke. It is worth noting that the divisional strength may not include KG detached under temporary command of some other formation.

[Richard Anderson]

12 SS Panzer Division set up a base near the river Seine and their field replacement battalion was brought forward from somewhere near Dreux. 12 SS were involved in fighting west of the Seine. There is a report that the division was down to 10 tanks and 300 men, but Hubert Meyer the author of the divisional history was the IA and says that number excludes KG Mohnke. It is worth noting that the divisional strength may not include KG detached under temporary command of some other formation.

Very true. Also, insofar as I know, the FEB was held out of battle until then and remained in the vicinity of Dreux - Verneuil-sur-Aure throughout June-August. It is unclear how many of the 2,438 men in the FEB as of 1 June were actually forwarded to the front during the battle, so it alone may account for a large part of the assumed 1 September strength. Then there is the wrinkle that Mohnke's "kampfgruppe" was actually a conglomeration of random SS and Heer units he took command of c. 19 August during the breakout of the "Falaise" pocket. Meyer may only have been aware of the strength of the KG SS-PzGR 25. / 26. / Krause / Schrott / Brückner / Hein / whatever he might have reported. In any case, kampfstärke was a very good way to measure the combat effectiveness of a unit, but a very bad way of assessing the numerical personnel strength of a unit.

[mihaiS]

I have just discovered that Niklas Zetterling also addresses this in "Normandy, 1944: German Military Organization, Combat Power and Organizational Effectiveness":

In many publications it has been said that the 12. SS-Panzer-Division “Hitlerjugend” only had a few hundred men left after the end of the Falaise battle on 22 August. This is completely wrong. According to the very thorough research in the records of casualties suffered by the division presented by Meyer, it is clear that the division lost about 8,000 officers and men, killed, wounded and missing.38 The casualty reports are almost complete for all the divisions units, but those few exceptions warrant the round figure of 8,000.

Given the fact that the SS-Nebelwerfer-Abteilung, parts of SS-Panzerjäger-Abteilung 12 and parts of SS-Ersatz-Bataillon 12 joined the division while it was in Normandy, it is clear that it had around 12,000 men on 22 August 1944. Even though most of its infantry were casualties, the division was far from destroyed. Certainly, its combat power was diminished drastically, but its rear services seem to have been almost intact.

Now I'm curious if the German version of K. Meyer's book specifically mentions Kampfstärke/Infanteriestärke when these (300, 500, 600) numbers are presented. I understand that this terminology is quite complicated and confusing, but surely you don't just translate all these terms as just "division strength" whenever they appear.

[Richard Anderson]

Now I'm curious if the German version of K. Meyer's book specifically mentions Kampfstärke/Infanteriestärke when these (300, 500, 600) numbers are presented. I understand that this terminology is quite complicated and confusing, but surely you don't just translate all these terms as just "division strength" whenever they appear.

You do if you're Chester Wilmot, Charles Whiting, Max Hastings, Stephen Ambrose, Tony Beevor, et al. It's simpler to repeat a factoid that fits into a narrative - "the incompetent allied generals and their cowardly troops were unable to overcome the valiant defenders of Europe against the Bolshevik menace without massive superiority" is a popular one it fits into - rather than actually digging into complex and diffuse records that paint a much more complicated and nuanced picture. Note that in my list of the usual suspects there are two journalists, a novelist, a soldier, and a discredited historian. It's pretty obvious that a good story is more important than factual analysis to them.

[hannibal2]

Just curious: Who is the discredited historian?

[eindhoven]

Just curious: Who is the discredited historian?

Stephen Ambrose most likely.

"Stephen Ambrose – perhaps best known for his 1992 book "Band of Brothers" – was embroiled in a plagiarism scandal in 2002 when charges were made that he had taken sections of historian Thomas Childers' book "Wings of Morning" and put them in his book "The Wild Blue." And "It is alleged that he(Ambrose) invented many meetings he claimed to have had with Eisenhower, and even fabricated entire interviews with him."

Much of what is written about WW2 is regurgitating over and over again into the mouths of interested offspring who then go out and spout nonsense. Even more is simply untrue when you yourself do the primary research. Kurt Meyer was no different. An arrogant author who fired literary volleys at the British for tank attacks without infantry support yet himself sent SS-Panzer-Regiment 12 into Bretteville-l'Orgueilleuse without infantry support to a disastrous outcome and a commander with a knack for needing to be rescued.

You are right to lean more towards Hubert Meyer though his material is severely dated and incomplete. HIAG doesn't share but their material is available to those with knack. I would suggest Cazenave's volumes on the 12th SS-Panzer Division.

[Richard Anderson]

Just curious: Who is the discredited historian?

Stephen Ambrose most likely.

Sorry, I missed this somehow. Yes, indeed, I was referring to Ambrose. Very sad case.

You are right to lean more towards Hubert Meyer though his material is severely dated and incomplete. HIAG doesn't share but their material is available to those with knack. I would suggest Cazenave's volumes on the 12th SS-Panzer Division.

Agreed. I would really enjoy getting into the Hungarian-held SS archives.

[vonKarl]

we know the war diary of the 12th SS Panzer Division 'Hitlerjugend' battalion was destroyed on orders.
Only one from Division II./Btl.Rgt.26 12.SS-Pz.Div. HJ SS-Hauptsturmfuhrer Lübbe was reconstructed with the help of comrades while he was still a prisoner for the period from September 3, 1944 to May 8, 1945. This war diary tells about the Battle
near Párkány Hungary until the move to Ennz Austria and surrendered to Americans.

Allegedly, documentation collector Hubert Meyer wrote the history of the division in connection with this reconstructed war diary, whether this corresponds to this reconstruction of SS Hauptsturmfuhrer Lübbe is unknown and questionable.