Let's Build: 1. Infanterie Division

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

List of officers KIA during the Polish Campaign of 1939 (the list might be incomplete):

Oblt. Schneider Pi.Btl.1
Hptm. Heinz Iversen Kdr. 5./I.R.1 - 01.09.1939 (Kawieczyno)
Lt. Hans Gerlach 2./Pi.Btl.1 - 03.09.1939 (Pieglowo)
Lt. Paul Fritz Sohn 3./MG-Btl.31 - 12.09.1939 (Kaluszyn)
Lt. Ernst Lemke II./I.R.1 - 13.09.1939 (Domanice)
Rittm. Freiherr von Uslar-Gleichen Nachsch.Kp. - 14.09.1939 or 13.09.1939 (Skorzec)
Lt. Karl-Heinz Grigo I./I.R.1 - 14.09.1939 or 15.09.1939 (Warkocz-Glinki)
Oblt. Helmut Neumann-Collina I.R.43 - 17.09.1939
Lt. Goetz I.R.22 - 17.09.1939
Oberst Friedrich Muehlmann Kdr. A.R.1 - 03.11.1939 (DoW)

And maybe also them:

Oblt. Gerhard Pott - 02.09.1939 (Mlawa)
Lt. Josef von Dreyhausen - 12.09.1939 (Stanislawow near Minsk Mazowiecki) - but 61. Inf.Div. is more probable
Oblt. Hans Hermann Loeffler - 12.09.1939
Lt. Monch - 15.09.1939

Most important battles of the division in Poland:

Mlawa-Grudusk-Ciechanow - 01.09.1939 - 04.09.1939
Rozan at the Narew - 05.09.1939 - 06.09.1939
Brok at the Bug - 07.09.1939 - 10.09.1939
Pursuit towards Siedlce (advancing behind Pz.Div."Kempf") - 10.09.1939 - 12.09.1939
Kaluszyn - 12.09.1939
Domanice-Skórzec-Wodynie - 13.09.1939 - 15.09.1939

[tigre]

Thank you very much Tom, it was a clear explanation indeed . Cheers. Raúl M .

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Datum Gefallen Verwundet Vermisst Kranke
23.5.40 22 (6) 106 (3) 3 3
24.5.40 70 (2) 163 (4) 13 1
25.5.40 65 (2) 263 (10) 51 3
26.5.40 73 287 (12) 20 1
27.5.40 4 11 (1)

Are there any similar casualty reports of the 1. Infanterie-Division from the Polish Campaign?

[Tom Nutter]

Domen, I'm glad you asked, since I have been wondering where you obtained your information on 1.Infanterie-Division casualties in Poland, 1939. The reason I ask about your source is that I have the very first roll of NARA microfilm on 1.I.D., T315, Roll 1. On frame 2 there is a note from a Hauptmann in the Heeresarchivrat. The note is captioned "Heeresarchiv Potsdam", with a date that looks like August 8, 1943. The note states generally that this file (the KTB for 1.I.D.) was damaged by a fire in the Kriegswissenschaftlichen Abteilung on the night of 27/28 February, 1942, and that restoration of the file was done according to the remaining available pages. The Hauptmann concludes the note with an underlined statement, "Ohne Gewaehr fuer die Vollstaendigkeit". The very first dated document on the reel begins on Frame 9, and is Divisional Order No. 36, dated October 30, 1939, concerning the movement of the division "nach dem Westen." So, the entire record of the division's participation in the invasion of Poland is missing from this record. Were you fortunate enough to locate parts of that record somewhere? I think it would be interesting reading, since evidently the division had something of a bad experience at a place called Gora Kamienska----General Kortzfleisch wrote a three page memorandum for the troops dated November 9, 1939, on the subject of "Lessons of Gora Kamienska."

By the way, are you aware that Band 3 of Die deutschen Divisionen 1939-1945 by Peter Schmitz and others (Biblio Verlag, 1996) contains a 140 page stellenbesetzung for the Polish armed forces in WWII? It is in two parts; the first is for September 1939, and the second is for the period thereafter. It covers the high command as well as formations in the army, navy and air force, including all of the Polish forces in France, England and elsewhere. It was prepared by Col. Dr. Wieslaw Wroblewski and Col. Dr. Wlodzimierz Pawlak. This is probably old news to you, but I thought I would mention it anyway.

Best wishes.

Tom

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Domen, I'm glad you asked, since I have been wondering where you obtained your information on 1.Infanterie-Division casualties in Poland, 1939

You mean officer casualties? Surnames come from the "Namentliche Zusammenstellung der Offiziersverluste" of Heeresgruppe Nord, reinforced by other sources (mainly the Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge e.V.):

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=5&t=120220

since evidently the division had something of a bad experience at a place called Gora Kamienska----General Kortzfleisch wrote a three page memorandum for the troops dated November 9, 1939, on the subject of "Lessons of Gora Kamienska."

Very interesting. What did he write in that memorandum?

Indeed forces of the division fought for the Polish defensive positions called "redoubt Czubak" and "resistance nest Zaboklik" located on and near Gora Kamienska (Kamienska Mountain). Gora Kamienska with "Czubak" and "Zaboklik" was the most eastern part of the Polish defensive position "Rzegnowo", which was defended by 79 pp (Inf.Rgt.) from 20 DP (Inf.Div.). In combats against the "Rzegnowo" position which was defended by just one Polish regiment, Germans concentrated the main efforts of the entire Korps "Wodrig" with two infantry divisions (1. and 12.). Combats for Kamienska Gora lasted for 2 days (1 - 2 September). Gora Kamienska was defended by small Polish forces which consisted of 9th company of III./79 pp (20 DP) reinforced by 2 AT guns, 2 infantry guns and also of one platoon of cyclists (around 50 men) from 11 puł (11th uhlan regiment) of Mazowiecka Cavalry Brigade, reinforced by 2 AT guns. "Czubak" was defended by 9th company and "Zaboklik" was defended by the platoon of cyclists of Mazowiecka BK. The position was planned to be defended by the entire III./79 pp, but in the course of the battle it somehow happened, that during both assaults on the position (1st on 1 IX, 2nd on 2 IX), only forces mentioned above defended it.

Map:



The town of Mlawa after the battle - September of 1939:



Concrete fortifications along the Rzegnowska position were much weaker than those along the Mlawska position.

Only 6 concrete bunkers were finished before 01.09.1939 (numbers 1 to 6) along the "Rzegnowska" position:

http://www.schrony1939.fortyfikacje.pl/rzegno.htm

Something on combats for Gora Kamienska from the Polish point of view:

Combats on 01.09.1939:

On 01.09.1939 the German 1. Infanterie-Division was attacking from the area of Janowo towards Rzegnowo. In the early morning reconnaissance units of the division crossed the border and after some clashes with Polish border guards, they were cautiously advancing to the south. When reaching the river Orzyc they encountered resistance of the cyclist company of 20 DP under command of kpt. Szokała and were repulsed under some casualties on both sides (kpt. Szokała was WIA). German patrols kept trying to recognize along the Janowska road towards Rzegnowo but also here they were repulsed by the reconnaissance company of 79 pp under command of kpt. Czesław Byliński. Around 10:00 AM the German cyclist company supported by 2 guns (infantry or AT) appeared in front of positions of Polish outlooks from I./79 pp near Dobrogosty. The German company also tried to cross the river Orzyc and started combat against Polish outlooks, but it was forced to retreat by heavy fire. This was the last German attempt of crossing the river Orzyc in this area until the evening. Along the frontline of Polish II./79 pp German patrols approached the line of Polish outlooks near Dzierzgowo at 11:00 AM, but after violent fire fight they were repulsed to the north. Soon after that a German observation baloon appeared above the village of Brzozowo, but it was forced to retreat by the fire of regimental artillery of 79 pp. In the afternoon Germans gathered stronger infantry units along the frontline of II./79 pp and started an assault against Polish outlooks, but were not able to force the Poles to retreat from their positions until the evening. Soon after that the commander of 79 pp received information from the HQ of Army "Modlin", that groups of German soldiers had managed to cross the Niemyje swamp and were concentrating on the western edge of the "Rzegnowo" position (near Budy Garlinskie - Niemyje), trying to bypass the Polish defenses. Under such circumstances the regimental commander ordered mjr. Antoni Michalewski (commander of III./79 pp) to attack with his battalion strengthened by the reconnaissance company and 1 artillery troop towards the localities Tansk and Wasiły in order to repulse the enemy forces concentrating there, at the joint of defensive positions of 79 pp and 80 pp. Mjr. Michalewski left 9 company strenghtened by 2 platoons from the AT company (4 AT guns) and 1 platoon of 11 uhlan regiment at the defensive position Zaboklik - Kamienska Gora and took the rest of his forces to organize a counterattack. The counterattack started around 18:00 PM and, despite the initial failure of 7th company, was successful, forcing the Germans to retreat (some German MGs were also captured), but soon after dusk mjr. Michalewski received an order to immediately retreat to the area of Budy Garlinskie. Here the 7th company occupied defensive positions near the village Krzywonos while the rest of the battalion came back to the area of defensive position Zaboklik - Kamienska Gora. As it turned out, the order to retreat was caused by the German attack against the eastern edge of the "Rzegnowska" position, which started around 18:30 PM. The German attack was carried out by a strong group of infantry supported by 20 tanks / AFVs (I guess that AVFs were from Pz.Div. "Kempf") and at the beginning it managed to break through the joint between defensive positions of Mazowiecka Cavalry Brigade and 79 pp and started to attack positions of 9th company at "Czubak". Fortunately Polish forces which were left there by mjr. Michalewski (9th company of III./79 pp, two platoons of AT company of 79 pp and one platoon of 11th uhlan regiment near "Zaboklik") were not surprised by the German attack. What happened later was indeed a bloody failure for the Germans - Polish sources say that after just 15 minutes of fierce combats German units were forced to retreat, leaving 12 KIA, several dozens WIA and 5 destroyed tanks behind them. After that victorious combat the commander of 79 pp, worrying about his eastern flank, sent the reconnaissance company of kpt. Czeslaw Bylinski with the task of establishing contact with Mazowiecka BK. One hour before midnight kpt. Bylinski came back and reported that he managed to establish contact with Mazowiecka BK near Lanieta. During the night one more raid was carried out by forces of II./79 pp towards the Niemyje swamp in order to liquidate the threat which might have been caused by German units concentrating in that area. In the morning on 02.09.1939 forces carrying out reconnaissance in the area of Niemyje swamp came back reporting no contact with the enemy. Unfortunately during that night reconnaissance several soldiers were wounded on mines.

The first day of that war along the defensive line of 20 DP ("Mlawska" and "Rzegnowska" positions) ended with complete Polish success. The division repulsed all attacks of overhelming enemy forces (supported by Luftwaffe) not only against the "Mlawska" position (attacks carried out by 11. Inf.Div., Pz.Div."Kempf" and 61. Inf.Div.) but also along the "Rzegnowska" position (attacks carried out by 1. Inf.Div., elements of 12. Inf.Div. and "Kempf").

Combats on 02.09.1939:

On 02.09.1939 Germans once again assaulted the Polish position.

On that the Germans concentrated almost entire Corps "Wodrig" (which consisted of two divisions - 1. Inf.Div. and 12. Inf.Div.) in order to break the defensive position of Polish 79 Inf.Rgt.

Yet since the early morning hours German reconnaissance groups were sent in order to establish contact with Polish outlooks of "Rzegnowska" position and recognize Polish forces and positions. Then after long artillery preparations around 9:00 AM both divisions of Corps "Wodrig" started their assault against the Polish 79 pp on the "Rzegnowska" position:

- 1 Inf.Div. - from the area of Szumsk, via Kamienska Gora, towards Kitki, Szpaki and Zawady
- 12. Inf.Div. - from the area of Krzynowloga via Rudno Jeziorowe towards Zaboklik and Rzegnowo

In order to make their artillery fire more efficient Germans once again launched an observation baloon, which was flying in the neighbourhood of Rzegnowo and directing artillery fire of 1 ID. In the church tower in Dzierzgowo Germans located their second observation post but it was soon detected by Polish forces and destroyed by one troop of 20 pal (20 light artillery battalion).

Units of German infantry supported by strong artillery fire were attacking along the road from Szumsk via Kitki towards Budy Garlinskie. One German battalion had already been defeated here on the previous day, but despite that Germans were repeating their attacks in order to break the Polish resistance, cross the Niemyje swamp once again, and bypass the "Mlawska" position.

Commander of Army "Modlin" (gen. Przedrzymirski) alarmed by the threat of outflanking the "Rzegnowska" position in his phone call with the commander of 20 DP (płk. Lawicz-Liszka), ordered him to shorten the defensive line of 79 pp, moving its eastern edge more to the west, and leaving the entire "Zaboklik" resistance nest to units of Mazowiecka BK. He expected that the commander of MBK would send additional units there (apart from that platoon of cyclists).

In connection with that order the commander of 79 pp (ppłk. Konstanty Zaborowski) had to move his 7th and 9th companies (from III./79 pp) to the area Rogale - Dobrogosty, from which they were to be used in the planned counterattack towards the north-west, together with I./79 pp. As the result the entire defensive section of III./79 pp (so Gora Kamienska) remained in hands of Cpt. Hoppe, commander of 9th company. The 9th company was only reinforced by 6 additional HMGs, one AT platoon (2 AT guns) and the platoon of infantry guns of 79 pp (2 guns).

Nobody expected (including gen. Przedrzymirski), that the commander of Mazowiecka BK (płk. Jan Karcz) - because of lack of any spare reserves - would only leave this one platoon of cyclists from 11 puł (~50 soldiers) at "Zaboklik". Despite the fact that płk. Lawicz-Liszka reinforced this platoon by 2 AT guns (one platoon), it was still too weak to acomplish a very important task - the defence of the joint between 2 Great Units (20 DP and Mazowiecka BK).

Under such circumstances, when after violent combats the outlooks of 79 pp had been forced to retreat from their protruding positions towards the main defensive position around 12:00 AM, the artillery of Korps "Wodrig" once again started its artillery preparation - this time for the general assault. The assault had been preceded by strong artillery preparation (10 Abteilungen = 120 guns from 1. and 12. Inf.Div. - the artillery preparation against Kamienska Gora was coordinated and commanded by Generaloberst Werner von Fritsch himself, the commander of Art.Rgt.12). According to Polish sources this heavy artillery fire on Kamienska Gora lasted for 8 hours (12:00 PM - 18:00 PM). Under covering fire of their own artillery, German infantry already started to attack Polish positions around 15:00 PM. Their 1. Inf.Div. was attacking from the direction of Szumsk towards Kitki and Kamienska Gora, while 12. Inf.Div. was attacking from the direction of Krzynowloga Mala towards "redoubt Zaboklik" and Kamienska Gora with "Czubak".

The commander of AT company of 79 pp (two platoons from which - 2 AT guns each - were supporting the 9/79 pp on Gora Kamienska), kpt. Stanislaw Grudzinski, wrote in his memoirs:

"At 15:00 PM the general German assault started. Units of 1. and 12. German infantry divisions, supported by tremendous artillery fire and many tanks, launched an attack against the foremost edge of the defensive position of our regiment. Left wing of the regiment - I. battalion - holds its positions. Right wing of the regiment - the reinforced 9th company under kpt. Hoppe on Kamienska Gora and the platoon of cyclists from 11 puł on the "Żaboklik" position are receiving violent enemy attacks. The regiment is fighting for life and death. Waves of German infantry are advancing towards our positions closer and closer. Our artillery (12 howitzers from 88 dac and 8 guns cal. 75mm from 59 dal) had laid a barrage fire. The first wave of Germans encountered our minefield. Mines were throwing away human bodies, weapons and equipment by their explosions. Then our wonderful boys started to heavily, bloodily and with great sacrifice make use of their weapons - but vainly..."

The platoon of cyclists (~50 men) defending the "Żaboklik" had literally evaporated. After 5 hours since the beginning of artillery preparation and 2 hours since the beginning of German assault - around 17:00 PM - the Germans finally managed to capture "Żaboklik". Almost all Polish defenders lost their lives. But the "redoubt Czubak" was still holding. Cpt. Grudzinski luckilly managed to withdraw his AT guns (two platoons) from "Żaboklik" to "Czubak". In the meantime the "Czubak" position had also been reinforced by 2 infantry guns from the infantry artillery platoon of 79 pp.

Polish positions on Gora Kamienska were also being attacked by at least ~30 Stuka dive bombers.

Let's quote memoirs of kpt. Grudzinski:

"Waves of German aircrafts are once again diving down, with bloody yawl, and throwing ropes of bombs. The 9th company on "Czubak" takes the hardest beating from them. "Czubak" is the key position of the entire regiment, there is an excellent view from it and it overhelms the entire area with its fire. That's why Germans have launched a terrific storm of fire, grenades and bombs on the entire "Czubak"."

On 19:30 PM, when overhelming forces of German infantry have launched their final assault against "Czubak", they only had to mop up the shaken remnants. But the defenders managed to hold a bit more. Only after the dusk kpt. Hoppe with remnants of his company leaved their defensive positions and retreated towards Rzegnowo.

That was not yet the end of the battle for Gora Kamienska. When commander of the 79 pp received information that "Czubak" and "Żaboklik" had been lost, he ordered to carry out a counterattack on these positions which was to be conducted by II./79 pp under mjr. Zuske reinforced by elements of III./79 pp and 63 company of TK tankettes under por. Mieczyslaw Kosiewicz. But the entire action took place long time after the dusk and without any artillery support - that's why the attack collapsed in German fire somewhere along the road from Borkowo-Falenty to Rzegnowo.

Soon after capturing "Zaboklik" and "Czubak" Germans attempted to expand the breakthrough of Polish defenses towards the west by another attack of 1. Inf.Div. against the Kitki-Rogale section of Polish defensive line, which was defended by I./79 pp under mjr. Jozef Bach. At the beginning they wanted to partially break into the defensive line of 1st company of this battalion (por. Wladyslaw Pajewski), but after double Polish counterattacks Polish forces regained their previous positions and the Germans, under heavy casualties, were forced to retreat.

As the result of capturing "Czubak" and "Zaboklik" Polish 79 pp was ordered to withdraw from the "Rzegnowo" position, covered by night, and to occupy new defensive positions (bolting position) along the line Debsk-Pawlowo-Nosarzewo-Marynin Maly. Unfortunately 79 pp didn't manage to imperceptibly detach from the enemy, and thus it was constantly being harrased by German artillery fire and chased by German infantry during its withdrawal, carrying out slowing down combats. Despite that the regiment - under covering fire of Polish outpost located on the Hill 159 to the east from Nosarzewo - managed to organize a new defensive position along the ordered line until 23:00 PM on 02.09.1939:

- I. battalion - along the line Nosarzewo Borowe - Nosarzewo Polne
- II. battalion - along the edge of the forest east from Mlodynin
- III. battalion - along the section Debsk - Pawlowo

The regiment managed to immediately establish contact with the neighbouring (in the west) 80 pp but there was no contact with Mazowiecka BK in the east, so the eastern flank of the regiment was bare. There were no any field fortifications along the new defensive position so soldiers of the regiment immediately started to dig shooting nitches, despite the fact that soldiers were exhausted by the day-long combat and very hungry.

Płk. Marian Porwit wrote about the withdrawal of 79 pp to the bolting position (under enemy pressure):

"Firm attitude of soldiers, if the withdrawal towards the bolt position took place without any disruptions."

In order to clog the gap which was created between Mazowiecka BK and 79 pp, 8 DP (which had been in reserve until that moment) was ordered to carry out a counterattack towards Grudusk in the morning on 03.09.1939. The breakthrough of the Polish "Rzegnowska" position affected the cohesion of defense of Polish 20 DP, but yet didn't destroy it. The situation of Polish defence could improve together with the fresh reserves (8 DP) entering the battle.

Unfortunately, on the next day the counterattack of 8 DP failed. Also Pz.Div."Kempf", 1st Kav.Brig. and elemens of 12. Inf.Div. forced Mazowiecka BK to retreat, due to which units of 20 DP found itself outflanked from the east.

During the night from 3 to 4 and in the morning on 4 September Polish 20 DP abandoned its defensive lines. Polish withdrawal was quickly detected by German reconnaissance and they immediately directed larges forces of Luftwaffe in order to bomb the withdrawing Poles. Retreating units of 20 DP and 8 DP were cought in the daylight (4 IX) by Stuka bombers, as the result both divisions were seriously shattered and needed several days for reorganization.

Fortunately the Germans were not chasing Polish 20 and 8 DP (which retreated towards Warsaw), but turned their main efforst and the main axis of their attack towards Rozan and Pultusk (where another fierce battle took place).

By the way, are you aware that Band 3 of Die deutschen Divisionen 1939-1945 by Peter Schmitz and others (Biblio Verlag, 1996) contains a 140 page stellenbesetzung for the Polish armed forces in WWII? It is in two parts; the first is for September 1939, and the second is for the period thereafter. It covers the high command as well as formations in the army, navy and air force, including all of the Polish forces in France, England and elsewhere. It was prepared by Col. Dr. Wieslaw Wroblewski and Col. Dr. Wlodzimierz Pawlak. This is probably old news to you, but I thought I would mention it anyway.

Wow, 140 pages long Stellenbesetzung is impressive! I didn't know about that, thanks very much for this info!

The reason I ask about your source is that I have the very first roll of NARA microfilm on 1.I.D., T315, Roll 1. On frame 2 there is a note from a Hauptmann in the Heeresarchivrat. The note is captioned "Heeresarchiv Potsdam", with a date that looks like August 8, 1943. The note states generally that this file (the KTB for 1.I.D.) was damaged by a fire in the Kriegswissenschaftlichen Abteilung on the night of 27/28 February, 1942, and that restoration of the file was done according to the remaining available pages. The Hauptmann concludes the note with an underlined statement, "Ohne Gewaehr fuer die Vollstaendigkeit". The very first dated document on the reel begins on Frame 9, and is Divisional Order No. 36, dated October 30, 1939, concerning the movement of the division "nach dem Westen." So, the entire record of the division's participation in the invasion of Poland is missing from this record. Were you fortunate enough to locate parts of that record somewhere?

That's a pity. Unfortunately I wasn't able to locate parts of that record anywhere. I only have got data concerning officer losses (KIA) of individual divisions of Heeresgruppe Nord, but the list might be of course incomplete. I also have got some data on overall casualties of some units (including some divisions and brigades) of HG Nord.

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Short view on the village of Żaboklik (modern view - probably the photo is taken from the side of Gora Kamienska):

http://beb.esiedlce.pl/Zabokliki/Zaby1.jpg

Płk. Konstanty Zaborowski - commander of 79 pp in 1939:

[Baldrick]

Hello Tom and Domen 121,

first let me thank you both very much for your interesting posts.

Regarding the death of Oberleutnant Prince Wilhelm von Preussen I have found some additional information in the regimental history of Infanterie-Regiment 1:

There is a report of the assault of Blaregnies (written Blaragenies in the german reports) from a platoon leader of III./I.R. 1 and a second one from the regimental commander of I.R. 1, Oberst Grase.

Furthermore I noticed a newspaper article from 1985 about the same topic.

The newspaper article and the report from the platoon leader where reflecting the actions from the front-line soldiers point of view, while Oberst Grase gives a wider review about the situation of that day.

The last two reports where written in the late fifties as a contribution to the regimental history. However, some details, which Tom found in the NARA documents, where not mentioned.

In the early morning of May 23, I.R. 1 continued its advance in the direction of Cambrai. Right from the beginning the men heard artillery fire in the far distance. Returning reconnaissance patrols (Reiterspähtrupps) reported that the road ahead was free of enemy troops. Between the villages Binche and Givry the men of III./I.R. 1 noticed the first unarmed French stragglers. French equipment and some dead bodies where also discovered. The CO of the III./I.R. 1 gave the order to unfold the battalion and to advance beside the main road. When the first parts of III./I.R. 1 crossed the railway line between Quevy le petit and Blaregnies they came under machine gun and mortar fire from Blaregnies. The distance between the German and the French troops was around 1.200 meters. The area was hilly and rising in the direction of Blaregnies. The village was situated behind a ridge, only some roofs where visible. The CO of the battalion gave the order to return the fire with machine guns and mortars and to prepare for the assault on the village. During this preparations the battalion suffered its first casualies. The regimental commander and his staff, who marched behind III./I.R. 1, immediately came forward and established a “Gefechtsstand” from where Oberst Grase gave the following orders:

III./I.R. 1 should attack the village Blaregnies.

The attached II./AR 1 should support the attack by concentrating the fire on the ridge.

13./I.R. 1 should fire into the village to destroy the supposed enemy reinforcements.

I./I.R. 1 should advance left of III./I.R. 1 to prevent a breakout.

II./I.R. 1, Pionierzug und Reiterzug should act as a reserve force.

The soldiers of III./I.R. 1 where under constant enemy fire while they where advancing towards Blaregnies. During this assault the battalion suffered most of its casualties. When they got nearer, they noticed some white flares over the north of the village, indicating the presence of other German troops. When the battalion reached the edge of the village, the enemy fire weakend and there was nearly no resistance when they fought their way into the village. The flares had been fired from soldiers of I.R. 22 who simultaneously attacked from the north and prevented a breakout in this direction. In the aftermath of the battle the Germans discovered that the village was full of French troops who suffered many casualties from the German artillery fire. Oberst Grase wrote that around 700 of the best French colonial soldiers where captured. They belonged to a division which made a breakout from Maubeuge and tried to reach French troops in the area of Lille.

German casualties, according to one of the reports, where 2 soldiers dead, 18 men wounded from which four died later. Among them was the company commander of 11./ I.R. 1, Oberleutnant Wilhelm von Preussen, who received three shots in the stomach from which he died two days later in a military hospital.


1. Infanteriedivision, 23.05. 1940, von Tycowicz, Rudolf, „Das Infanterie-Regiment 1“, München, 1966


Sources:

von Tycowicz, Rudolf, „Das Infanterie-Regiment 1“, München, 1966

Wittrien, Ernst, „Vier Stunden lang im schwersten Feuer – vor 45 Jahren fiel Prinz Wilhelm von Preussen an der Spitze der 11. Kompanie des Infanterie-Regiments 1“, Ostpreussenblatt Nr. 24, 15. Juni 1985

Best regards,

Ralf

[tigre]

Thank you very much Ralf; grosse hilfe . Cheers. Raúl M .

[Baldrick]

Hello,

the casualties of 1. I.D. during the Polish Campaign of 1939 where mentioned in a Feldzugbericht which was signed by Generalleutnant von Kortzfleisch in January of 1940.

According to this report the division lost:

Dead: 7 Offiziere, 213 Unteroffiziere und Mannschaften
WIA: 17 Offiziere, 383 Unteroffiziere und Mannschaften

these where 3,4 % of the Ausrückstärke.

I.R. 22 suffered the highest casualties with 7%, followed by I.R. 1 with 6%.

Moreover, 360 soldiers left the division because they fell ill.

3,7 % of the horses where killed (100 from gunshot wounds) and 397 (5,5%) horses where transferred to the Pferdelazarett, where 2/3 recovered and returned to their units.

Total loss of vehicles:
PKW = 4,2 %
LKW = 4,4 %
Kräder = 11,7 %

It is not clear if all wounded soldiers survived or if some died later in hospital.

all the best,

Ralf

Source:
N.N.: Die 1. Division im Polenfeldzug

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Hi Baldrick!

Thanks for the info. But what about missing soldiers and officers - did he mention any?

Dead: 7 Offiziere

Hmm, list of KIA officers of HG Nord mentions more KIA (or MIA and not found) officers from this division:

1. Oblt. Schneider Pi.Btl.1
2. Hptm. Heinz Iversen Kdr. 5./I.R.1 - 01.09.1939 (Kawieczyno)
3. Lt. Hans Gerlach 2./Pi.Btl.1 - 03.09.1939 (Pieglowo)
4. Lt. Paul Fritz Sohn 3./MG-Btl.31 - 12.09.1939 (Kaluszyn)
5. Lt. Ernst Lemke II./I.R.1 - 13.09.1939 (Domanice)
6. Rittm. Freiherr von Uslar-Gleichen Nachsch.Kp. - 14.09.1939 or 13.09.1939 (Skorzec)
7. Lt. Karl-Heinz Grigo I./I.R.1 - 14.09.1939 or 15.09.1939 (Warkocz-Glinki)
8. Oblt. Helmut Neumann-Collina I.R.43 - 17.09.1939
9. Lt. Goetz I.R.22 - 17.09.1939

10. Oberst Friedrich Muehlmann Kdr. A.R.1 - 03.11.1939 (DoW ?)

What about MG-Btl.31 (and KIA Lt. Sohn) - was it considered as part of the division or just as attached unit?

Total loss of vehicles:
PKW = 4,2 %
LKW = 4,4 %
Kräder = 11,7 %

And the number of vehicles of this division at the beginning of Polenfeldzug was (according to Niehorster):

PKW - 400 (4,2% = 17)
LKW - 408 (4,4% = 18)
Kräder - 498 (11,7% = 58)

Here something about the number of vehicles in other divisions:

http://www.feldgrau.net/forum/viewtopic ... 20#p223594

Edit:

Another map of the battle of Mlawa (p. 249) and map of the last phase of the siege of Modlin (p. 252):

http://books.google.pl/books?id=XX5KcTN ... q=&f=false

[Baldrick]

Hello Domen,

unfortunately there are no more details regarding the KIA and MIA soldiers. Maybe Oberst Muehlmann and Oberleutnant Schneider where first counted as WIA and MG-Btl. 31 (Lt. Sohn) wasn´t considered as part of the division - but this is only my speculation.

Edit: Just had a quick look a the regimental history of I.R. 1 and found a remark about a railway accident with many casualties of I.R. 1 and the staff of A.R. 1. The exact date is not mentioned, but the regiment was loaded on the 30. October 1939. Oberst Muehlmann died 03.11.39, I would assume that he was injured in this accident.

all the best,

Ralf

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Hi Ralf,

I think that also Oblt. Neumann-Collina and Lt. Goetz might have died of wounds (I'm not sure if on 17 IX division was still involved in combats). But of course they died on 17 IX (either of wounds or in battle doesn't change the date).

Best regards,
Peter

[Christoph Awender]

Hello

Here is the first preview of my new Gliederungen section. I plan to include all KStN 1939-1945 which are still available, Stellenbesetzungen, equipment, Zustandsberichte etc...
Hope you like it.

http://www.wwiidaybyday.com/kstn/1infdiv.html

/Christoph
@Domen121... Where from do you have this image???

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

@Domen121... Where from do you have this image???

From:

http://www.mapywig.org/

[Christoph Awender]

@Domen121... Where from do you have this image???

From:

http://www.mapywig.org/

Hello...

Can´t find it there. The point is that I did this "map drawing" many years ago for a research project. Funny how things turn up somewhere after years.

/Christoph

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Hi Christoph,

Can´t find it there.

You should use the map index (1:100,000 maps):

http://igrek.amzp.pl/mapindex.php?cat=WIG100

Here it is - P36 S31 (Mlawa):

http://igrek.amzp.pl/WIG100_P36_S31

The point is that I did this "map drawing" many years ago for a research project.

Not this particular - this "map drawing" was made by me, just using Paint and basing on the above map.

Maybe you made a very similar map basing on same sources about German movements.

/Peter