Hello,
I'm trying to figure out what was the activity of the Ersatzheer in the second half of 1944, following the Allies knock-out campaigns in France and Belarus.
So far I understood, this activity may be divided into three main parts:
1) The gathering of every men available in the Wehrkreis by means of alarms, mobilisation plans. Walküre seems to have been the major one, giving birth to the Grenadiers Divisions, independants Grenadiers Brigades (except of a few) and Regiments followed with the build-up of the Panzer-Brigade.111 to .113.
2) The creation of the Volksgrenadier-Divisions, several others Infantrie-Division -which have been for the most part rebuilded- and the Panzer-Brigade .101 to .110 which were mainly builded-up with men from the Ersatzheer.
3) The build-up and activation of several Reserve-Division and Division Nummer designed either to back-up mauled divisions or to act as line divisions. I've counted five of such divisions beeing placed under control of the OB West beetween the 15/08/44 and the 18/09/44 (Div.Nr.172,.176,.180,.190 and .526) which seem to be quite an huge number within a so thin timeline.
Thus my questions are:
a) Did I missed something in the latter summary? Is there any errors?
b) What were the other alarms mobilisation plans, such like Walküre, being launched in the second half of 1944?
c) Did somebody have numbers regarding the creation/activation of Reserve-Division or Division Nummer during the second half of 1944?
d) Is it possible to say that Germany managed to keep on fighting despite the 1944's disasters by mean of the activation of the Ersatzheer?
In advance, thak you very much for your answers!
Best Regards,
Thomas
Ersatzheer in the second half of 1944
Hello Thomas
Very good questions, and I can only partially them.
1. I think it may be a little exaggerated to think of this as the "activation" of the Ersatzheer. Essentially, the EH was still doing in the second half of 1944 what it had been doing for the whole war, and was still doing in early 1945. Certainly extraordinary measure were taken, or ordinary measures speeded up to cope with the huge losses of the summer, but still.
For instance, merging reserve formations into the remains of active ones was fairly widely practised also at earlier times. For example, Pz.Lehr was largely formed around Reserve units, and both 11.PzD and 116.PzD absorbed reserve divisions when they arrived in France from the East in the spring of that year.
The numbers also do not tell the story that the Field Army was kept going at the expense of the Ersatzheer. On 1 July 1944, the Ersatzheer numbered 2,330,000, of whom 1.2 million belonged to training or replacement units (RH2-1339-22). On 1 October, there were 2,336,000 men in the EH, of whom 1,249,000 belonged to Ersatztruppenteile (Müller-Hillebrand). On 1 December, it was actually rather stronger than it had been in July, with 2,510,000 men, of whom 1,537,000 belonged to training or replacement units (Müller-Hillebrand, p.257). (Of the remainder, 686,000 were hospital patients and 293,000 guard personnel, administrative staff and various). On 1 January 1945, the numbers were essentially similar, and it was only very late in the war that the EH were really radically drained for immediate effect:
Total EH (Ersatztruppenteile)
1 Feb45: 2,483,000 (1,463,000)
1 Mar45: 2,259,000 (1,337,000)
1 Apr 45: 1,481,000 (~ 700,000)
Source is still Müller-Hillebrand.
2. The Ersatzpersonnell that was available on 1 July 1944 were divided thusly:
400,000 in Marschbataillone. (I have an overview of all Marschbtl. dispatched in June and July, but these are far too numerous to post here.)
500,000 recruits still undergoing training
200,000 in Geneseneabteilungen (ie, returning convalescents)
230,000 training staff
These figures do not quite match the previously quoted figure in RH2-1339 (which is also given by Müller-Hillebrand). Possibly they refer to a different point in July, I have not MH available at the moment to check.
Anyway, this would point towards some 600,000 men immediately available primarily to reinforce units, and another half million available later in the summer.
3. There is a document (RH2-1341-40) giving details of men transferred to the Field Army form the Reserve Army in September. It gives the following figures:
Osten: 58,000
OKW Theatres (not including AOK20): 19,000
It also makes clear that additionally, 14,000 men were transferred for refreshing and formation of new units in the Heimatkriegsgebiet. And this does not include men provided for "Aufstellungsvorhaben aus dem Führerprogramm, z.b. 2 Art.Brigaden, Festungseinheiten usw.".
4. #44-45 from the same file , dated 2 November, gives a more general overview. The document notes tha the total losses suffered by the Field Army in August, September and October amount to 1,192,000 men. As for the replacement of these losses, I quote in full:
Die Ersatzzuführung zum Feldheer in diesen Monaten steht hierzu in einem krassen Missverhältnis.
1.) Für die bestehenden Div., erhielt das Feldheer an Genesenen, Marsch-einheiten und spezialersatz:
In August: rd.100,000 mann
In September: rd. 77,000 Mann
In Oktober: rd. 111,000 Mann
insgesamt, rd. 288,000 Mann
2.) An Neuauftsellungen (ie, forming of new units) wurden derüberhinaus zugeführt:
a) Verbände einschl. Vollauffrischung (Units, incl. full refreshing): rd. 225,000
b) Heerestruppen an des Führerprogrammes einschl. Festungseinheiten: rd. 100,000
c) Sonstige aufstellungen und Auffrischungen: rd. 55,000
Insgesamt, rd. 380,000 Mann. (see next point for details)
3) Während der Totalausfall von Verbänden durch die Neuaufstellungen und Festungseinheiten ausgeglichen wurde, konnten die Verluste die bestehenden Div. nur zu rund 1/3 gedeckt werden. (While the loss of formations were counterbalanced by the raising of new formations, only about a third of the losses of existing units could be made good). Eine wesentlich gesteigerte zuführung von Genesene und Marscheinheiten in November ist dafür erforderlich.
5. A Notiz from Org.Abt. OKH, same date, #47-48 in same file, gives further details about the above:
Neuaufstellungen:
10 div. 29. Welle: 85,000
5 div 30. Welle: 45,000
1 div 31.Welle: 6,500
7 div 32. Welle: 72,000
+
Vollauffrischungen 25. PzD and FHH: 16,000
TOTAL: 225,000
Heerestruppen a.d. Führerprogramm:
2 Volksart. Korps: 6,000
2 Werfer-Brig.: 6,000
4 Pz.Jg.zbt.: 2,800
1 SS MG Btl: 600
TOTAL: 15,400
Festungseinheiten: 83,200
"Kleine aufstellungen und Auffrischungen": 55,000
Insgesamt, rd. 380,000 Mann
6. #49-50 in ths file is a discussion of the different totals arrived at by Org.Abt OKH and Chef H.Rüst when it comes to the personnell transferred to the Field Army between July and the end of October. The totals we have seen so far would be the OKH ones. Apparently Ch HR provides a total of 229,000 higher than this. This is more or less fully accounted for in the explanation, but the discussion itself yields several interesting points of information:
1) 120,000 men in Walküre divisions, who are not reflected in the above OKH figures.
2) 53,500 men due to differing calculations resulting from dates of transfer to the Field Army. The OKH (or more accurately, Gen.St.d.H)- figures do not include these:
a)544. Gren.Div, as this was abtransportiert in July (on the 28th)
3 VG-divisionen abtransportiert in early November
Total, 36,000 men
b) 7, Schw. Pz.Jg.Zbt., 3 MG Btls, 2 Volks-Art. Korps, 1 Korps MG Btl and some further units who are sadly not readable, with a total strength of about 14,000 men, who were also dispatched only in early November.
c) 1 Festungsunit of 1500 men, which was still in the HKG.
d) Around 2,000 personnel freed by combing out Fortress units, effective only from November.
3. 38,000 Untrained personnell. I translate the whole passage:
In the calculations of the Gen.St.d.H., none of the untrained soldiers provided to the Field Army are included, regardless of whether they went to Feldausbildungseinheiten (ie, the Field Army's own training units), to divisions forming (such as 560. VGD Norwegen) or for exchange of personnell (such as the 4,000 men to AOK Norwegen). These recruits will effect replacement for the field forces only by late November, and can thus not be put against losses through October.
This totals 211,500 men, which leaves 17,500 about whom the OKH and EH evidently don't agree.
7. An OKH overview (#52) of 13 November gives the following Ersatz figures for October:
HG Süd: 10,147
HG A: 22,638
HG M: 33,400
HG N: 17,257
Total, EF: 83,482
8. #54 gives these Ersatz figures for the EF (including Genesene):
Aug: 59,000
Sep: 58,000
Oct: 91,000
9. # 56 gives an overview of the development of the personnell situation of the Feldheer from June through November. It provides these figures:
Total Zugänge: 1,654,000
of whom;
648,000 in Marscheinheiten and returning wounded
140,00 from Walküre and Gneisenau programmes
866,000 for Auffrischhungen und Neuaufstellungen.
It also provides the number of men transferred from the EH to the Field Army in November, which was 333,000 men.
These figures are of course much higher than those previously quoted, but they refer also to June, July and November, so that is not surprising.
Time to draw some conclusions, but I shall do that in a separate post, as this one is already far too long.
cheers
Very good questions, and I can only partially them.
1. I think it may be a little exaggerated to think of this as the "activation" of the Ersatzheer. Essentially, the EH was still doing in the second half of 1944 what it had been doing for the whole war, and was still doing in early 1945. Certainly extraordinary measure were taken, or ordinary measures speeded up to cope with the huge losses of the summer, but still.
For instance, merging reserve formations into the remains of active ones was fairly widely practised also at earlier times. For example, Pz.Lehr was largely formed around Reserve units, and both 11.PzD and 116.PzD absorbed reserve divisions when they arrived in France from the East in the spring of that year.
The numbers also do not tell the story that the Field Army was kept going at the expense of the Ersatzheer. On 1 July 1944, the Ersatzheer numbered 2,330,000, of whom 1.2 million belonged to training or replacement units (RH2-1339-22). On 1 October, there were 2,336,000 men in the EH, of whom 1,249,000 belonged to Ersatztruppenteile (Müller-Hillebrand). On 1 December, it was actually rather stronger than it had been in July, with 2,510,000 men, of whom 1,537,000 belonged to training or replacement units (Müller-Hillebrand, p.257). (Of the remainder, 686,000 were hospital patients and 293,000 guard personnel, administrative staff and various). On 1 January 1945, the numbers were essentially similar, and it was only very late in the war that the EH were really radically drained for immediate effect:
Total EH (Ersatztruppenteile)
1 Feb45: 2,483,000 (1,463,000)
1 Mar45: 2,259,000 (1,337,000)
1 Apr 45: 1,481,000 (~ 700,000)
Source is still Müller-Hillebrand.
2. The Ersatzpersonnell that was available on 1 July 1944 were divided thusly:
400,000 in Marschbataillone. (I have an overview of all Marschbtl. dispatched in June and July, but these are far too numerous to post here.)
500,000 recruits still undergoing training
200,000 in Geneseneabteilungen (ie, returning convalescents)
230,000 training staff
These figures do not quite match the previously quoted figure in RH2-1339 (which is also given by Müller-Hillebrand). Possibly they refer to a different point in July, I have not MH available at the moment to check.
Anyway, this would point towards some 600,000 men immediately available primarily to reinforce units, and another half million available later in the summer.
3. There is a document (RH2-1341-40) giving details of men transferred to the Field Army form the Reserve Army in September. It gives the following figures:
Osten: 58,000
OKW Theatres (not including AOK20): 19,000
It also makes clear that additionally, 14,000 men were transferred for refreshing and formation of new units in the Heimatkriegsgebiet. And this does not include men provided for "Aufstellungsvorhaben aus dem Führerprogramm, z.b. 2 Art.Brigaden, Festungseinheiten usw.".
4. #44-45 from the same file , dated 2 November, gives a more general overview. The document notes tha the total losses suffered by the Field Army in August, September and October amount to 1,192,000 men. As for the replacement of these losses, I quote in full:
Die Ersatzzuführung zum Feldheer in diesen Monaten steht hierzu in einem krassen Missverhältnis.
1.) Für die bestehenden Div., erhielt das Feldheer an Genesenen, Marsch-einheiten und spezialersatz:
In August: rd.100,000 mann
In September: rd. 77,000 Mann
In Oktober: rd. 111,000 Mann
insgesamt, rd. 288,000 Mann
2.) An Neuauftsellungen (ie, forming of new units) wurden derüberhinaus zugeführt:
a) Verbände einschl. Vollauffrischung (Units, incl. full refreshing): rd. 225,000
b) Heerestruppen an des Führerprogrammes einschl. Festungseinheiten: rd. 100,000
c) Sonstige aufstellungen und Auffrischungen: rd. 55,000
Insgesamt, rd. 380,000 Mann. (see next point for details)
3) Während der Totalausfall von Verbänden durch die Neuaufstellungen und Festungseinheiten ausgeglichen wurde, konnten die Verluste die bestehenden Div. nur zu rund 1/3 gedeckt werden. (While the loss of formations were counterbalanced by the raising of new formations, only about a third of the losses of existing units could be made good). Eine wesentlich gesteigerte zuführung von Genesene und Marscheinheiten in November ist dafür erforderlich.
5. A Notiz from Org.Abt. OKH, same date, #47-48 in same file, gives further details about the above:
Neuaufstellungen:
10 div. 29. Welle: 85,000
5 div 30. Welle: 45,000
1 div 31.Welle: 6,500
7 div 32. Welle: 72,000
+
Vollauffrischungen 25. PzD and FHH: 16,000
TOTAL: 225,000
Heerestruppen a.d. Führerprogramm:
2 Volksart. Korps: 6,000
2 Werfer-Brig.: 6,000
4 Pz.Jg.zbt.: 2,800
1 SS MG Btl: 600
TOTAL: 15,400
Festungseinheiten: 83,200
"Kleine aufstellungen und Auffrischungen": 55,000
Insgesamt, rd. 380,000 Mann
6. #49-50 in ths file is a discussion of the different totals arrived at by Org.Abt OKH and Chef H.Rüst when it comes to the personnell transferred to the Field Army between July and the end of October. The totals we have seen so far would be the OKH ones. Apparently Ch HR provides a total of 229,000 higher than this. This is more or less fully accounted for in the explanation, but the discussion itself yields several interesting points of information:
1) 120,000 men in Walküre divisions, who are not reflected in the above OKH figures.
2) 53,500 men due to differing calculations resulting from dates of transfer to the Field Army. The OKH (or more accurately, Gen.St.d.H)- figures do not include these:
a)544. Gren.Div, as this was abtransportiert in July (on the 28th)
3 VG-divisionen abtransportiert in early November
Total, 36,000 men
b) 7, Schw. Pz.Jg.Zbt., 3 MG Btls, 2 Volks-Art. Korps, 1 Korps MG Btl and some further units who are sadly not readable, with a total strength of about 14,000 men, who were also dispatched only in early November.
c) 1 Festungsunit of 1500 men, which was still in the HKG.
d) Around 2,000 personnel freed by combing out Fortress units, effective only from November.
3. 38,000 Untrained personnell. I translate the whole passage:
In the calculations of the Gen.St.d.H., none of the untrained soldiers provided to the Field Army are included, regardless of whether they went to Feldausbildungseinheiten (ie, the Field Army's own training units), to divisions forming (such as 560. VGD Norwegen) or for exchange of personnell (such as the 4,000 men to AOK Norwegen). These recruits will effect replacement for the field forces only by late November, and can thus not be put against losses through October.
This totals 211,500 men, which leaves 17,500 about whom the OKH and EH evidently don't agree.
7. An OKH overview (#52) of 13 November gives the following Ersatz figures for October:
HG Süd: 10,147
HG A: 22,638
HG M: 33,400
HG N: 17,257
Total, EF: 83,482
8. #54 gives these Ersatz figures for the EF (including Genesene):
Aug: 59,000
Sep: 58,000
Oct: 91,000
9. # 56 gives an overview of the development of the personnell situation of the Feldheer from June through November. It provides these figures:
Total Zugänge: 1,654,000
of whom;
648,000 in Marscheinheiten and returning wounded
140,00 from Walküre and Gneisenau programmes
866,000 for Auffrischhungen und Neuaufstellungen.
It also provides the number of men transferred from the EH to the Field Army in November, which was 333,000 men.
These figures are of course much higher than those previously quoted, but they refer also to June, July and November, so that is not surprising.
Time to draw some conclusions, but I shall do that in a separate post, as this one is already far too long.
cheers
In order to properly evaluate the implications of the numerous new units formed from the Ersatzheer in the second half of 1944, there are some questions that need to be answered:
1. What was the total turnout of the EH during the period, in terms of the number of men it sent to the Field Army in one way or another?
2. How does this effort compare with previous ones?
3. How was this total distributed between formation of new units, replacing losses in existing ones and so on?
4. How does this distribution compare to previous patterns?
5. Where any new or unusual measures in evidence?
6. What effect did the transfer of personnel to the Field Army have on the EH itself?
The answers to some of these are already in the above post, but we shall proceed systematically.
1: During the six-month period of June-November, 1,686,000 men.
2: Between June 41 and July 42, the Feldheer received 2,550,000 men (Müller Hilebrand). Between June 42 and July 43, it received 2,350,000 men. During the first 6 months of 1943, the Feldheer received 868,000 men (Müller-Hillebrand). During the second half of 1943, The Ersatzheer transferred 1,094,000 men to the field Army. During the first half of 1944, the corresponding figure was 1,130,000 (both figures, Müller-Hillebrand).
Hence, it is clear that the Ersatzheer's output of personnell during this period was very (and unudually) high, but also that it was not fundamentally very dramatically different from the levels normally seen during the period June 41- June 43. It appears to have been basically similar to the levels seen during the second half of 1942, for example.
3. In late 1944, more than half the personnell transferred to the Field Army went to raise new formations or rebuild shattered ones.
4. The corresponding portions were less than a third in the first half of 44, ditto for second-half 43, and about one fifth in the first half of 1943. Hence, it is clear that an extremely high proportion of the forces generated by the Ersatzheer in late 1944 went to raise/rebuild units, rather than as replacements.
5. Apart from the above, there were emergency measures such as Walküre and the dispatch of untrained recruits to quiet places like Norway in exchange for trained personnell. But there had also previously been emergency measures, notably in late 1941. The use of Reserve formations to amalgamate or create new field formations was also a previously known practice.
6. The Ersatzheer was not weakened numerically as a result of the transfers it made to the Field Army. That was a development that is only evident in the very last phase of the war (in April 1945).
So, in conclusion, I would say that all in all, the Ersatzheer did nothing essentially different from what it had been doing all along, either in character, method or scale. It did achieve an especially, if perhaps not dramatically, high output. However, the raising of new formations gives a somewhat skewed picture of what it achieved, because it devoted an unusually high proportion of its output to that purpose. Furthermore, it achieved what it did without apparently weakening itself as an organisation.
This at least as far as numbers can tell the story. But there are also other possible aspects involved which can only be addressed from the organisational angle.
cheers
1. What was the total turnout of the EH during the period, in terms of the number of men it sent to the Field Army in one way or another?
2. How does this effort compare with previous ones?
3. How was this total distributed between formation of new units, replacing losses in existing ones and so on?
4. How does this distribution compare to previous patterns?
5. Where any new or unusual measures in evidence?
6. What effect did the transfer of personnel to the Field Army have on the EH itself?
The answers to some of these are already in the above post, but we shall proceed systematically.
1: During the six-month period of June-November, 1,686,000 men.
2: Between June 41 and July 42, the Feldheer received 2,550,000 men (Müller Hilebrand). Between June 42 and July 43, it received 2,350,000 men. During the first 6 months of 1943, the Feldheer received 868,000 men (Müller-Hillebrand). During the second half of 1943, The Ersatzheer transferred 1,094,000 men to the field Army. During the first half of 1944, the corresponding figure was 1,130,000 (both figures, Müller-Hillebrand).
Hence, it is clear that the Ersatzheer's output of personnell during this period was very (and unudually) high, but also that it was not fundamentally very dramatically different from the levels normally seen during the period June 41- June 43. It appears to have been basically similar to the levels seen during the second half of 1942, for example.
3. In late 1944, more than half the personnell transferred to the Field Army went to raise new formations or rebuild shattered ones.
4. The corresponding portions were less than a third in the first half of 44, ditto for second-half 43, and about one fifth in the first half of 1943. Hence, it is clear that an extremely high proportion of the forces generated by the Ersatzheer in late 1944 went to raise/rebuild units, rather than as replacements.
5. Apart from the above, there were emergency measures such as Walküre and the dispatch of untrained recruits to quiet places like Norway in exchange for trained personnell. But there had also previously been emergency measures, notably in late 1941. The use of Reserve formations to amalgamate or create new field formations was also a previously known practice.
6. The Ersatzheer was not weakened numerically as a result of the transfers it made to the Field Army. That was a development that is only evident in the very last phase of the war (in April 1945).
So, in conclusion, I would say that all in all, the Ersatzheer did nothing essentially different from what it had been doing all along, either in character, method or scale. It did achieve an especially, if perhaps not dramatically, high output. However, the raising of new formations gives a somewhat skewed picture of what it achieved, because it devoted an unusually high proportion of its output to that purpose. Furthermore, it achieved what it did without apparently weakening itself as an organisation.
This at least as far as numbers can tell the story. But there are also other possible aspects involved which can only be addressed from the organisational angle.
cheers
Hello Qvist,
Thank you very much for taking time to bring such usefull informations and for your insightfull analysis.
I agree, "activation" is an exaggeration. If I had to reformulate my question it would be: did the activity of the Ersatzheer in the second half of 1944 can be seen as a rupture point in it organisation with the main cause being the transfer of an unusual amount of personnel to the Feldheer? In short, did those measures happen to tranform the Ersatzheer to the point that it radically changed and actually became a new organisation?
During the second half of 1944, the Ersatzheer underwent several changes, most of which tend to centralize it activity. The main changes were a drastic simplification of the replacement system with the drop of the affiliated reserves bataillons,the scrap of some services departements and the combinaison of others. All in all the Ersatzheer came to seek for productivity rather than quality and to efficiency rather than effectivness. It lead me to think of the second half of 1944 as a rupture in the replacement system whose obvious causes were the creation of Western Front and the consecutive disasters of Normandy and Belarus/Ukraine.
The Ersatzheer may not have had to "reinvent the weel", I mean, it already exist some emergency measures and the difference may be saw in the extend to which those measures have been implemented in the second half of 1944. Bluntly, did the Walküre/Gneisenau/Alarm Künste emergency plans have been used to a wider degree than say, 1941 for Walküre? The same apply to the Erstazheer Divisions. I can only bring some elements for the latter one.
On the 15.08.1944, there were 6 Reserve-Division in the OB West (148.Res.Div, 157.Res.Div, 158.Res.Div, 159 Res.Div, 182.Res Div, 189.Res.Div) plus the Div.zbV.136. 2 (158. and 182.Reserve-Division) were dissolved respectively in July and August (the first was destroyed the second was used for the build-up of the 16.I.D), 2 other (148. et 157.Reserve-Division) were used in September for the build-up of the 158.I.D et 157.Geb.Div and the Division zbV .136 was, as far as I can track it history, used for Antwerp costal defense and dissolved in October. 3 divisions were put under control of the OB West in September (Division Nummer.172,.176 and .526) and were dissolved between September and November in order to back-up, rebuild existing units or create new ones. A grand total of 9 Ersatzheer divisions were used by the OB West to strenghten it position between August and mid-September 1944. Now, on the 16.09.44, there were 5 Ersatzheer divisions under the OB West control (Div.Nr.526, Div.Nr.172, Div.Nr.176, 189.Res.Div [Reste], 159.Res.Div), 2 were dissolved (159. and 189.Res.Div) in the course of the month and three more divisions were put under control of the OB West (Division zbV.406, 180. and 190. Reserve-Division). Thus we have 12 Ersatzheer Division being used by the OB West between August and fall September 1944. It appear to be an huge number, especially considering the fact that the Ersatzheer was at the time forming up Grenadier and Volksgrenadier divisions. But, as you said, it would need a reference to get an idea on how those movements of Ersatzheer divisions can be condidered exceptionnal. (Sources are lexikon-der-whermacht.de and OKH order of battles, see http://www.forces.ca/dhh/downloads/ahq/ahq077.pdf and http://chrito.users1.50megs.com/kstn/okh/16sep44.htm )
Best Regards,
Thomas
Thank you very much for taking time to bring such usefull informations and for your insightfull analysis.
1. I think it may be a little exaggerated to think of this as the "activation" of the Ersatzheer. Essentially, the EH was still doing in the second half of 1944 what it had been doing for the whole war, and was still doing in early 1945. Certainly extraordinary measure were taken, or ordinary measures speeded up to cope with the huge losses of the summer, but still.
I agree, "activation" is an exaggeration. If I had to reformulate my question it would be: did the activity of the Ersatzheer in the second half of 1944 can be seen as a rupture point in it organisation with the main cause being the transfer of an unusual amount of personnel to the Feldheer? In short, did those measures happen to tranform the Ersatzheer to the point that it radically changed and actually became a new organisation?
The Ersatzheer is basically a platform between the manpower pool of Germany and the Feldheer: this means that a drop in the strenght of the Ersatzheer is only possible when Germany happen to be out of manpower to be given to the army. Thus the question may be to which extend the Ersatzheer can be said to outbound it ability to provide enought replacement without altering it structure or it fonctioning? I mean, you have around 400.000 men being given to the Feldheer on the second half of 1944 as an extra compared to the average batch between June 1941 and July 1943: does this augmentation was enough to shaken this organisation permanently (i.e, using recruits who were planified to be sended later in the year, sending of some training staff personnel etc...) All in all, those 400.000 men could have mean a drop in the quality of the Ersatzheer as an institution by mean of measures taken to cope with a sudden increase of the Feldheer replacement needs.2: Between June 41 and July 42, the Feldheer received 2,550,000 men (Müller Hilebrand). Between June 42 and July 43, it received 2,350,000 men. During the first 6 months of 1943, the Feldheer received 868,000 men (Müller-Hillebrand). During the second half of 1943, The Ersatzheer transferred 1,094,000 men to the field Army. During the first half of 1944, the corresponding figure was 1,130,000 (both figures, Müller-Hillebrand).
Hence, it is clear that the Ersatzheer's output of personnell during this period was very (and unudually) high, but also that it was not fundamentally very dramatically different from the levels normally seen during the period June 41- June 43. It appears to have been basically similar to the levels seen during the second half of 1942, for example.
During the second half of 1944, the Ersatzheer underwent several changes, most of which tend to centralize it activity. The main changes were a drastic simplification of the replacement system with the drop of the affiliated reserves bataillons,the scrap of some services departements and the combinaison of others. All in all the Ersatzheer came to seek for productivity rather than quality and to efficiency rather than effectivness. It lead me to think of the second half of 1944 as a rupture in the replacement system whose obvious causes were the creation of Western Front and the consecutive disasters of Normandy and Belarus/Ukraine.
5. Apart from the above, there were emergency measures such as Walküre and the dispatch of untrained recruits to quiet places like Norway in exchange for trained personnell. But there had also previously been emergency measures, notably in late 1941. The use of Reserve formations to amalgamate or create new field formations was also a previously known practice.
The Ersatzheer may not have had to "reinvent the weel", I mean, it already exist some emergency measures and the difference may be saw in the extend to which those measures have been implemented in the second half of 1944. Bluntly, did the Walküre/Gneisenau/Alarm Künste emergency plans have been used to a wider degree than say, 1941 for Walküre? The same apply to the Erstazheer Divisions. I can only bring some elements for the latter one.
On the 15.08.1944, there were 6 Reserve-Division in the OB West (148.Res.Div, 157.Res.Div, 158.Res.Div, 159 Res.Div, 182.Res Div, 189.Res.Div) plus the Div.zbV.136. 2 (158. and 182.Reserve-Division) were dissolved respectively in July and August (the first was destroyed the second was used for the build-up of the 16.I.D), 2 other (148. et 157.Reserve-Division) were used in September for the build-up of the 158.I.D et 157.Geb.Div and the Division zbV .136 was, as far as I can track it history, used for Antwerp costal defense and dissolved in October. 3 divisions were put under control of the OB West in September (Division Nummer.172,.176 and .526) and were dissolved between September and November in order to back-up, rebuild existing units or create new ones. A grand total of 9 Ersatzheer divisions were used by the OB West to strenghten it position between August and mid-September 1944. Now, on the 16.09.44, there were 5 Ersatzheer divisions under the OB West control (Div.Nr.526, Div.Nr.172, Div.Nr.176, 189.Res.Div [Reste], 159.Res.Div), 2 were dissolved (159. and 189.Res.Div) in the course of the month and three more divisions were put under control of the OB West (Division zbV.406, 180. and 190. Reserve-Division). Thus we have 12 Ersatzheer Division being used by the OB West between August and fall September 1944. It appear to be an huge number, especially considering the fact that the Ersatzheer was at the time forming up Grenadier and Volksgrenadier divisions. But, as you said, it would need a reference to get an idea on how those movements of Ersatzheer divisions can be condidered exceptionnal. (Sources are lexikon-der-whermacht.de and OKH order of battles, see http://www.forces.ca/dhh/downloads/ahq/ahq077.pdf and http://chrito.users1.50megs.com/kstn/okh/16sep44.htm )
Best Regards,
Thomas
Hello Thomas
cheers
Well, this is where some further organisational analysis would come in handy. What is clear is that there was no numerical weakening of either the Ersatzheer in general or it replcament components specifically until a later time, and this argues against such a conclusion. But then again, this may obscure qualitative changes for the worse.I agree, "activation" is an exaggeration. If I had to reformulate my question it would be: did the activity of the Ersatzheer in the second half of 1944 can be seen as a rupture point in it organisation with the main cause being the transfer of an unusual amount of personnel to the Feldheer? In short, did those measures happen to tranform the Ersatzheer to the point that it radically changed and actually became a new organisation?
The Ersatzheer is basically a platform between the manpower pool of Germany and the Feldheer: this means that a drop in the strenght of the Ersatzheer is only possible when Germany happen to be out of manpower to be given to the army. Thus the question may be to which extend the Ersatzheer can be said to outbound it ability to provide enought replacement without altering it structure or it fonctioning? I mean, you have around 400.000 men being given to the Feldheer on the second half of 1944 as an extra compared to the average batch between June 1941 and July 1943: does this augmentation was enough to shaken this organisation permanently (i.e, using recruits who were planified to be sended later in the year, sending of some training staff personnel etc...) All in all, those 400.000 men could have mean a drop in the quality of the Ersatzheer as an institution by mean of measures taken to cope with a sudden increase of the Feldheer replacement needs.
During the second half of 1944, the Ersatzheer underwent several changes, most of which tend to centralize it activity. The main changes were a drastic simplification of the replacement system with the drop of the affiliated reserves bataillons,the scrap of some services departements and the combinaison of others. All in all the Ersatzheer came to seek for productivity rather than quality and to efficiency rather than effectivness. It lead me to think of the second half of 1944 as a rupture in the replacement system whose obvious causes were the creation of Western Front and the consecutive disasters of Normandy and Belarus/Ukraine.
I'm sorry, but I am not sure I quite understand the question - probably better that you rephrase than that I try to guess.The Ersatzheer may not have had to "reinvent the weel", I mean, it already exist some emergency measures and the difference may be saw in the extend to which those measures have been implemented in the second half of 1944. Bluntly, did the Walküre/Gneisenau/Alarm Künste emergency plans have been used to a wider degree than say, 1941 for Walküre? The same apply to the Erstazheer Divisions. I can only bring some elements for the latter one
Arrgh - I seem to have lost a write-up I did a while ago on the Reservedivisionen, on the basis of Müller-Hillebrand. Perhaps I'll get a chance to have another look at that before too long. I also have some additional EH files from this period. Nice overview.On the 15.08.1944, there were 6 Reserve-Division in the OB West (148.Res.Div, 157.Res.Div, 158.Res.Div, 159 Res.Div, 182.Res Div, 189.Res.Div) plus the Div.zbV.136. 2 (158. and 182.Reserve-Division) were dissolved respectively in July and August (the first was destroyed the second was used for the build-up of the 16.I.D), 2 other (148. et 157.Reserve-Division) were used in September for the build-up of the 158.I.D et 157.Geb.Div and the Division zbV .136 was, as far as I can track it history, used for Antwerp costal defense and dissolved in October. 3 divisions were put under control of the OB West in September (Division Nummer.172,.176 and .526) and were dissolved between September and November in order to back-up, rebuild existing units or create new ones. A grand total of 9 Ersatzheer divisions were used by the OB West to strenghten it position between August and mid-September 1944. Now, on the 16.09.44, there were 5 Ersatzheer divisions under the OB West control (Div.Nr.526, Div.Nr.172, Div.Nr.176, 189.Res.Div [Reste], 159.Res.Div), 2 were dissolved (159. and 189.Res.Div) in the course of the month and three more divisions were put under control of the OB West (Division zbV.406, 180. and 190. Reserve-Division). Thus we have 12 Ersatzheer Division being used by the OB West between August and fall September 1944. It appear to be an huge number, especially considering the fact that the Ersatzheer was at the time forming up Grenadier and Volksgrenadier divisions. But, as you said, it would need a reference to get an idea on how those movements of Ersatzheer divisions can be condidered exceptionnal. (Sources are lexikon-der-whermacht.de and OKH order of battles, see http://www.forces.ca/dhh/downloads/ahq/ahq077.pdf and http://chrito.users1.50megs.com/kstn/okh/16sep44.htm )
cheers
Qvist,
"Walküre" I, called-up on December 1941 was used to build-up 4 divisions (17.Welle) made of 3 regiments with 2 bataillons and 3 specialist/mobile compagnies, the I.R.551 and .557 had 3 bataillons: this means around 140 compagnies. In addition, each division had a artillerie-regiment with 2 abteilung. (See http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Zus ... 16-35W.htm and http://www.diedeutschewehrmacht.de/infa ... vision.htm )
"Walküre" II, called-up in June 1942 helped producing 3 divisions (20.Welle) composed around 2 slightly understrenght regiments (13 coys each), one artillerie-regiment with 3 abteilung, a Pi.Abt and an Aufkl.Abt. This would mean around 100 infantry compagnies. (Same sources as above)
"Walküre" III, called-up on November 1943, gave birth to 11 infantry regiment (Gren.Reg.1021 - .1026 and Gren.Reg..1029 - .1033) so around 110 compagnies according to the I.D (n.A) gliederung. (See http://forum-der-wehrmacht.de/index.php ... entry50298 )
Now, for 1944:
"Walküre" (IV and beyond)
Between the 24.07.1944 and the 28.07.1944 WalKüre IV have been called-up, giving birth to 6 Grenadier-Brigade (1131,1132,1133,1134,1135 and 1136), in fact ad-hoc regiments composed of 10 compagnies and an artillery battery (one abteilung for the .1131). Furthermore, 6 Grenadier-Regiment have been raised using Walküre units on the 01.07.1944 (1065, 1066, 1067, 1068, 1069, 1070) with 14 compagnies for the .1066,.1068,.1069,.1070, 10 compagnies for .1065 and .1067 and a artillery batterie for the .1069 (See http://www.feldgrau.net/phpBB2/viewtopic.php?t=12586). This means a total of 136 infantry compagnies.
Walküre was not bounded to the latter units, the Sperr-Division (to be soon renamed Grenadier-Division and formed in the course of July) were parts of the Walküre mobilisation. See http://forum-der-wehrmacht.de/index.php ... entry50323 and http://www.feldgrau.net/phpBB2/viewtopi ... sc&start=0 for the full document regarding the 541.Sperr/Grenadier-Division formation and an educated statement on the connection between Sperr-Division and Walküre units.
So, for a single division, the core of two regiments (stab and stabs-Kp) on the three which made a Sperr/Grenadier Division, their heavy compagnies and 3 artillerie abteilung were formed using Walküre units.
"Brünhilde"
Two other regiments were raised under codeword "Brunhilde", which was at the time the "Walküre" equivalent for the General-Gouvernement Wehrkreis (See http://forum-der-wehrmacht.de/index.php ... topic=5964 ). Those regiments, .1071 and .1072, did have 9 and 10 infantry compagnies.
**WK General Gouvernement: Gren.Rgt.1071 (9 compagnies) and .1072 (10 compagnies)
So, the original Walküre called-up, Walküre IV, seems to have been quite similar to the December 1941, I and III levy. But then it expended and was involved in the creation of the 17 Sperr/Grenadier-Division, which make quite a difference.
It seem not to have been the only use of Walküre during the second half of 1944. Between September and October, the threatened Western Wehrkreis (V, VI, XII) underwent an huge mobilisation of manpower which used Walküre mobilisation plan.
WK V
Walküre units of Div.Nr.465 and .405
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... gt35-R.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... t525-R.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... Rgt5-R.htm
Other Walküre units:
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... Ers7-R.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... GR2112.htm
**WK V: Div.Nr.465 (parts) - Kampfgruppe C/V (?), Div.Nr.405 (parts) - Einheit A/V (?), Einheit D/V (?) and Pz.Abt.2112, Pz.Gren.Reg.2112 (Pz.Brig.112)
WK VI
Walküre units of Div.Nr.466
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... t426-R.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... bt15-R.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... t276-R.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... Abt6-R.htm
Walküre units of Div.Nr.526 (526.Reserve-Division)
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... t211-R.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... t253-R.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... t536-R.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... t253-R.htm
Walküre units of Div.Nr.176
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... nNr176.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... ivisions-F
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... at1176.htm
Other Walküre units:
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... gt16-R.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... 2111-R.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... GR2111.htm
**WK VI:
Div.Nr.466 (parts) - Gren.Ersatz.Rgt. 416 (11 compagnies), Gren.Ersatz.Rgt.426 (11 compagnies), Radfahr-Ersatz-Abt.15 [KG Oster] (3 squadrons), Fla-Blt.276 (3 infantry compagnies), Gren.Blt.BEA.6 (4 infantry compagnies), Pi.Btl.1176 (3 infantry compagnies)
Div.Nr.526 [526.Reserve-Division] (parts) - Gren.Ersatz-Rgt.211 (12 compagnies), Gren.Ausb.Rgt.253 (16 compagnies), Res.Gren.Rgt.536 (18 compagnies), Res.Pi.Blt.253 (3 compagnies)
Div.Nr.176: The whole division was builded-up with Walküre personnel for a total of 10.637 men.
Gren.Ers.und.Ausb.Rgt.16 (mot.) (?) [The regiment was activated within both Walküre and Gneisenau called-up.], Pz.Abt.2111 and Pz.Gren.Reg.2111 (Pz.Brig.111)
WK XII
Walküre units of Div.Nr.462, Div. "Claer" and Div. "Castorf"
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=60400 http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... r462-R.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... onHagl.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... r172-R.htm
Other Walküre units:
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... 2113-R.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... GR2113.htm
Possibly part of the WK XII Walküre levy:
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... gt34-R.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... gt36-R.htm
**WK XII: Div.Nr.462 (parts) - Kampfgruppe 5/XII (1 bataillon,5 compagnies) and 9/XII [15/XII ?] (2 bataillons), Div. "Claer"- Kampfgruppe 9/XII (?), 11/XII (?), 13/XII (?), Div.Castorf [172.Reserve-Division] - Kampfgruppe 91 (2 regiments, Gren.Reg.1057 and 1058), Pz.Abt.2113, Pz.Gren.Reg.2113 (Pz.Brig.113) and possibly 1/XII (2 bataillons), 3/XII (1 bataillon: "bataillon Weinen").
Furthermore, the Wehrkreis X used a particular emergency plan, Alarm Küste, in order to draw some manpower to face the September Western Allies operations.
Alarm Küste"
**WK X: Einsatz-Div.Nr.180 [Div.Nr.480] and Einsatz-Division Nr. 190 [Div.Nr.190]
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... gt22-R.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... t269-R.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... eg22-R.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... t520-R.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... g225-R.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... at20-R.htm
**WK X: Gren.Ers.und.Ausb.Rgt.22 (3 bataillons), Gren.Ers.und.Ausb.Rgt.269 (3 bataillons), Gren.Ersatz-Rgt.520 (2 bataillons)
Art.Ers.u.Ausb.Rgt.22, Art.Ers.u.Ausb.Rgt.225, Pi.Ersatz.Blt.20 (4 compagnies).
The above listing is certainly not complete but it still give a good overview.
So it seems that the Walküre called-up in 1944 outmatched to a hight degree the December 1941 one, which was to until 1944 the higher Walküre levy, but well a confirmation would be great.
Best Regards,
Thomas
Sorry, I'll try to be more clear. You were arguing that the second half of 1944 didn't seen any unusual measures, not seen before, in order to cope with the increasing needs of the Feldheer. You took the exemple of 'Walküre', an emergency plan which have been use in 1944, in 1943, in 1942 and in 1941. My point is that a difference may have took place in the extent to which those plan were put in practice, essentially how many time they have been called in a specific timeline and of course the amount of soldiers they managed to free for the Feldheer. I'll try to give some input regarding 'Walküre', taking military units as a base on which to get an evaluation of the respective importance of those two called-up.I'm sorry, but I am not sure I quite understand the question - probably better that you rephrase than that I try to guess.
"Walküre" I, called-up on December 1941 was used to build-up 4 divisions (17.Welle) made of 3 regiments with 2 bataillons and 3 specialist/mobile compagnies, the I.R.551 and .557 had 3 bataillons: this means around 140 compagnies. In addition, each division had a artillerie-regiment with 2 abteilung. (See http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Zus ... 16-35W.htm and http://www.diedeutschewehrmacht.de/infa ... vision.htm )
"Walküre" II, called-up in June 1942 helped producing 3 divisions (20.Welle) composed around 2 slightly understrenght regiments (13 coys each), one artillerie-regiment with 3 abteilung, a Pi.Abt and an Aufkl.Abt. This would mean around 100 infantry compagnies. (Same sources as above)
"Walküre" III, called-up on November 1943, gave birth to 11 infantry regiment (Gren.Reg.1021 - .1026 and Gren.Reg..1029 - .1033) so around 110 compagnies according to the I.D (n.A) gliederung. (See http://forum-der-wehrmacht.de/index.php ... entry50298 )
Now, for 1944:
"Walküre" (IV and beyond)
Between the 24.07.1944 and the 28.07.1944 WalKüre IV have been called-up, giving birth to 6 Grenadier-Brigade (1131,1132,1133,1134,1135 and 1136), in fact ad-hoc regiments composed of 10 compagnies and an artillery battery (one abteilung for the .1131). Furthermore, 6 Grenadier-Regiment have been raised using Walküre units on the 01.07.1944 (1065, 1066, 1067, 1068, 1069, 1070) with 14 compagnies for the .1066,.1068,.1069,.1070, 10 compagnies for .1065 and .1067 and a artillery batterie for the .1069 (See http://www.feldgrau.net/phpBB2/viewtopic.php?t=12586). This means a total of 136 infantry compagnies.
Walküre was not bounded to the latter units, the Sperr-Division (to be soon renamed Grenadier-Division and formed in the course of July) were parts of the Walküre mobilisation. See http://forum-der-wehrmacht.de/index.php ... entry50323 and http://www.feldgrau.net/phpBB2/viewtopi ... sc&start=0 for the full document regarding the 541.Sperr/Grenadier-Division formation and an educated statement on the connection between Sperr-Division and Walküre units.
So, for a single division, the core of two regiments (stab and stabs-Kp) on the three which made a Sperr/Grenadier Division, their heavy compagnies and 3 artillerie abteilung were formed using Walküre units.
"Brünhilde"
Two other regiments were raised under codeword "Brunhilde", which was at the time the "Walküre" equivalent for the General-Gouvernement Wehrkreis (See http://forum-der-wehrmacht.de/index.php ... topic=5964 ). Those regiments, .1071 and .1072, did have 9 and 10 infantry compagnies.
**WK General Gouvernement: Gren.Rgt.1071 (9 compagnies) and .1072 (10 compagnies)
So, the original Walküre called-up, Walküre IV, seems to have been quite similar to the December 1941, I and III levy. But then it expended and was involved in the creation of the 17 Sperr/Grenadier-Division, which make quite a difference.
It seem not to have been the only use of Walküre during the second half of 1944. Between September and October, the threatened Western Wehrkreis (V, VI, XII) underwent an huge mobilisation of manpower which used Walküre mobilisation plan.
WK V
Walküre units of Div.Nr.465 and .405
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... gt35-R.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... t525-R.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... Rgt5-R.htm
Other Walküre units:
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... Ers7-R.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... GR2112.htm
**WK V: Div.Nr.465 (parts) - Kampfgruppe C/V (?), Div.Nr.405 (parts) - Einheit A/V (?), Einheit D/V (?) and Pz.Abt.2112, Pz.Gren.Reg.2112 (Pz.Brig.112)
WK VI
Walküre units of Div.Nr.466
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... t426-R.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... bt15-R.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... t276-R.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... Abt6-R.htm
Walküre units of Div.Nr.526 (526.Reserve-Division)
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... t211-R.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... t253-R.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... t536-R.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... t253-R.htm
Walküre units of Div.Nr.176
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... nNr176.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... ivisions-F
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... at1176.htm
Other Walküre units:
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... gt16-R.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... 2111-R.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... GR2111.htm
**WK VI:
Div.Nr.466 (parts) - Gren.Ersatz.Rgt. 416 (11 compagnies), Gren.Ersatz.Rgt.426 (11 compagnies), Radfahr-Ersatz-Abt.15 [KG Oster] (3 squadrons), Fla-Blt.276 (3 infantry compagnies), Gren.Blt.BEA.6 (4 infantry compagnies), Pi.Btl.1176 (3 infantry compagnies)
Div.Nr.526 [526.Reserve-Division] (parts) - Gren.Ersatz-Rgt.211 (12 compagnies), Gren.Ausb.Rgt.253 (16 compagnies), Res.Gren.Rgt.536 (18 compagnies), Res.Pi.Blt.253 (3 compagnies)
Div.Nr.176: The whole division was builded-up with Walküre personnel for a total of 10.637 men.
Gren.Ers.und.Ausb.Rgt.16 (mot.) (?) [The regiment was activated within both Walküre and Gneisenau called-up.], Pz.Abt.2111 and Pz.Gren.Reg.2111 (Pz.Brig.111)
WK XII
Walküre units of Div.Nr.462, Div. "Claer" and Div. "Castorf"
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=60400 http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... r462-R.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... onHagl.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... r172-R.htm
Other Walküre units:
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... 2113-R.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... GR2113.htm
Possibly part of the WK XII Walküre levy:
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... gt34-R.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... gt36-R.htm
**WK XII: Div.Nr.462 (parts) - Kampfgruppe 5/XII (1 bataillon,5 compagnies) and 9/XII [15/XII ?] (2 bataillons), Div. "Claer"- Kampfgruppe 9/XII (?), 11/XII (?), 13/XII (?), Div.Castorf [172.Reserve-Division] - Kampfgruppe 91 (2 regiments, Gren.Reg.1057 and 1058), Pz.Abt.2113, Pz.Gren.Reg.2113 (Pz.Brig.113) and possibly 1/XII (2 bataillons), 3/XII (1 bataillon: "bataillon Weinen").
Furthermore, the Wehrkreis X used a particular emergency plan, Alarm Küste, in order to draw some manpower to face the September Western Allies operations.
Alarm Küste"
**WK X: Einsatz-Div.Nr.180 [Div.Nr.480] and Einsatz-Division Nr. 190 [Div.Nr.190]
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... gt22-R.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... t269-R.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... eg22-R.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... t520-R.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... g225-R.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... at20-R.htm
**WK X: Gren.Ers.und.Ausb.Rgt.22 (3 bataillons), Gren.Ers.und.Ausb.Rgt.269 (3 bataillons), Gren.Ersatz-Rgt.520 (2 bataillons)
Art.Ers.u.Ausb.Rgt.22, Art.Ers.u.Ausb.Rgt.225, Pi.Ersatz.Blt.20 (4 compagnies).
The above listing is certainly not complete but it still give a good overview.
So it seems that the Walküre called-up in 1944 outmatched to a hight degree the December 1941 one, which was to until 1944 the higher Walküre levy, but well a confirmation would be great.
Best Regards,
Thomas
Hello Thomas
It may be interesting to look at an actual breakdown of EH strength (as of 1 September 1944), in order to get an impression of just what those strength figures represent, and hence of what potential existed for drawing on "core" EH personnell to replace combat losses.
These figures are for German military personnell, not including officers (who are added as a separate category towards the end): (Heimatkriegsgebiet/in besetzten Gebieten)
Firstly, as you see, almost two thirds of the EH consist of either hospital patients, convalescents or recruits. These are of course already designated for transfer to the Field Army.
Of the remaining 680,000, about 475,000 belong to various administrative and support staffs, Landesschützen and so on. Of these, no more than roughly 16,000 men were classed kv1 (ie, fit for all duties), and 30 years old or less. Hence, the reinforcement potential they represented for the Field Army was insignificant. This leaves us pretty much with the Stammpersonal and staff of training and reserve units and schools, which numbered slightly more than 200,000, of whom some 50,000 were kv1/30-.
All in all, it seems to me that the establishment part of the EH (at least as of 1 September) did not really contain very large numbers of men of a category that made them suitable for employment with the Field forces. Also, it does not seem that they can have achieved their high output by drawing on such groups of personnell, which simply are too few to matter much in this regard.
As a matter of general interest, the EH also had 127,865 German civilian personnell at this point.
cheers
I don't question that Walküre specifically or formation of new units generally was more intensive during this period than earlier - this is already confirmed by the overall figures quoted above. What I would rather question is if and to what extent this was accomplished at the price of compromising the Ersatzheer's ability to continue to generate manpower subsequently. Again, adressing that fully requires analysis or sources I do not have, so I can really only partially address it.Sorry, I'll try to be more clear. You were arguing that the second half of 1944 didn't seen any unusual measures, not seen before, in order to cope with the increasing needs of the Feldheer. You took the exemple of 'Walküre', an emergency plan which have been use in 1944, in 1943, in 1942 and in 1941. My point is that a difference may have took place in the extent to which those plan were put in practice, essentially how many time they have been called in a specific timeline and of course the amount of soldiers they managed to free for the Feldheer. I'll try to give some input regarding 'Walküre', taking military units as a base on which to get an evaluation of the respective importance of those two called-up.
It may be interesting to look at an actual breakdown of EH strength (as of 1 September 1944), in order to get an impression of just what those strength figures represent, and hence of what potential existed for drawing on "core" EH personnell to replace combat losses.
These figures are for German military personnell, not including officers (who are added as a separate category towards the end): (Heimatkriegsgebiet/in besetzten Gebieten)
(BA-MA RH2-1361)Higher staffs (Divisions upwards): 7,805/525
Dienststellen und Einheiten d. Fz.Wesens: 14,433/-
Offices and Units of the Motor Pool Organisation, insofar as this comes under the Ersatzheer: 19,496/-
Medical stations and offices, incl. Reservelazaretten and Medical Students Abteilungen: 67,289/-
Veterinary stations and offices: 15,419/-
Dienstellen der Heeresverwaltung: 6,578
Wa A, with associated offices: 9,789/-
Kommandanturen aller Art: 8,918/-
Bombing Damage Units (Germans only): 15,547/-
Feste Dienststellen: 7,893
Various Static installations, offices and units: 39,144/91
TOTAL: 212,928
Landesschützen units and POW guards personnell: 237,886/-
Standorteinheiten: 26,224/-
TOTAL: 264,110
Stammpersonal training and reserve units: 86,847/11,974
Stammpersonal replacement units: 45,403/643
TOTAL: 144,867
Schools and Lehrtruppen: 58,816/24
TOTAL: 58,840
TOTAL, Ersatzheer Personnell: 680,745
Replacements incl. Genesene: 452,467/30,414
Gen. in Genesendeeinheiten: 161,377/17079
Hospital inmates: 657,910/-
On Work Leave: 27,104 /-
TOTAL, Replacement Personnell: 1,346,551
Plus Officers: 110,677
GRAND TOTAL: 2,137,973
Firstly, as you see, almost two thirds of the EH consist of either hospital patients, convalescents or recruits. These are of course already designated for transfer to the Field Army.
Of the remaining 680,000, about 475,000 belong to various administrative and support staffs, Landesschützen and so on. Of these, no more than roughly 16,000 men were classed kv1 (ie, fit for all duties), and 30 years old or less. Hence, the reinforcement potential they represented for the Field Army was insignificant. This leaves us pretty much with the Stammpersonal and staff of training and reserve units and schools, which numbered slightly more than 200,000, of whom some 50,000 were kv1/30-.
All in all, it seems to me that the establishment part of the EH (at least as of 1 September) did not really contain very large numbers of men of a category that made them suitable for employment with the Field forces. Also, it does not seem that they can have achieved their high output by drawing on such groups of personnell, which simply are too few to matter much in this regard.
As a matter of general interest, the EH also had 127,865 German civilian personnell at this point.
cheers
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Tom Peters
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Re: Ersatzheer in the second half of 1944
Someone was kind enough to point me to this thread, which I have found very informative. Clearly, both Qvist and Aps have access to detailed information on the Ersatzheer.
I have been going through microfilm records (T78R411, primarily), and I have a number of questions on the Ersatzheer in general, with respect to the western front, summer-autumn 1944:
1) Were reserve divisions (148, 157, 158, 159, 189) still part of the Ersatzheer, and only part of the Heer when they were formally converted into "non-reserve" divisions ?
2) Were zvB divisions (such as the 406th) part of the Ersatzheer or Heer ? I have conflicting answers on this.
3) If I had to identify Div.Nr. units (mobilization divisions, not reserve divisions) that fought during autumn 1944 on the western front, would this be: 176, 180, 190, 462, and 526 ?
thanks,
Mad Dog
I have been going through microfilm records (T78R411, primarily), and I have a number of questions on the Ersatzheer in general, with respect to the western front, summer-autumn 1944:
1) Were reserve divisions (148, 157, 158, 159, 189) still part of the Ersatzheer, and only part of the Heer when they were formally converted into "non-reserve" divisions ?
2) Were zvB divisions (such as the 406th) part of the Ersatzheer or Heer ? I have conflicting answers on this.
3) If I had to identify Div.Nr. units (mobilization divisions, not reserve divisions) that fought during autumn 1944 on the western front, would this be: 176, 180, 190, 462, and 526 ?
thanks,
Mad Dog
Re: Ersatzheer in the second half of 1944
Hi Tom
1. Certainly. In theory. Which is to say, probably.
2 and 3. No idea, sorry.
cheers
1. Certainly. In theory. Which is to say, probably.
2 and 3. No idea, sorry.
cheers
-
Tom Peters
- Member
- Posts: 1550
- Joined: 04 Sep 2004, 22:18
- Location: GA
Re: Ersatzheer in the second half of 1944
The zvB divisions certainly seem to be in a grey area. Some sources imply they were Ersatzheer, and other say otherwise.
thanks,
Mad Dog
thanks,
Mad Dog
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Tom Peters
- Member
- Posts: 1550
- Joined: 04 Sep 2004, 22:18
- Location: GA
Re: Ersatzheer in the second half of 1944
What was the reason for Walkure II ?
What was the reason for Walkure III ?
Did Brunhilde take place under the control of the Ersatzheer ?
thanks,
Mad Dog
What was the reason for Walkure III ?
Did Brunhilde take place under the control of the Ersatzheer ?
thanks,
Mad Dog
Re: Ersatzheer in the second half of 1944
Tom Peters wrote:Someone was kind enough to point me to this thread, which I have found very informative. Clearly, both Qvist and Aps have access to detailed information on the Ersatzheer.
I have been going through microfilm records (T78R411, primarily), and I have a number of questions on the Ersatzheer in general, with respect to the western front, summer-autumn 1944:
1) Were reserve divisions (148, 157, 158, 159, 189) still part of the Ersatzheer, and only part of the Heer when they were formally converted into "non-reserve" divisions ?
2) Were zvB divisions (such as the 406th) part of the Ersatzheer or Heer ? I have conflicting answers on this.
3) If I had to identify Div.Nr. units (mobilization divisions, not reserve divisions) that fought during autumn 1944 on the western front, would this be: 176, 180, 190, 462, and 526 ?
thanks,
Did 148, 157, 158, 159 and 189 not the part of Heer ? They are deployed outside Germany.
Mad Dog