Panzer-Abteilung 51 and 52

[tigre]

Hello to all ; the story follows...................................

Transfer to HGR. Süd to Kharkov.

On June 18, 1943 the OKH / GenStdH / Op.Abt. ordered the transfer of the Pz.Abt. 51 (former - II./ PR 33) from Grafenwöhr to the area of ​​Army Group South to Kharkov from 22 June 1943 onwards. The detachment formed part together with the Pz.Abt. 52 of Pz.Rgt.Stb. 39.

Meanwhile on June 24, 1943 the OKH / GenStdH / Op.Abt. also ordered the transfer of Pz.Abt. 52 (former - I./ PR 15) from Grafenwöhr the area of ​​Army Group South to Kharkov from June 27, 1943 onwards.

Between 24/25 June 1943 the Pz. Abt. 51 received 96 Pz Kw V Panther Ausf. D (modified). It also received 2 Panther without turret as recovery vehicles (Berge-Schlepper).

On 25 June 1943 the Pz. Abt. 51 was shipped in Grafenwöhr and then transported by rail to the eastern front in the region of Bogoduchow west of Kharkov.

Between 28/29 June 1943 the Pz. Abt. 52 received 96 Pz Kw V Panther Ausf. D (modified). It also received 2 Panther without turret as recovery vehicles (Berge-Schlepper). The first trains transport departed on June 28, 1943 to the eastern front.

From 28 June to 3 July 1943 rail transport of Pz. Abt. 52 via Krakow -Smerinka - Kiev to Odnoborowka east of Poltava. From the unloading station in Odnoborowka carried out a land march of 35km to Novo Borrisowka.

On 1 July 1943 the Pz. Abt. 51 carried out a march from Borisowka to take its readiness area in Tomarowka.

The Pz.Abt. 51 (96 + 2 Panther) and Pz.Abt. 52 (96 + 2 Panther) were subordinated to the Staff of PR 39 (8 Panther) to form the Pz.Rgt. (Panther) Lauchert, by the name of its commander Maj. Meinrad von Lauchert. The regiment had a total of 200 tanks Panther, 4 Panther turretless as recovery vehicles, 2 le. SPW (Sd.Kfz. 250/1) and 4 Mittleren Krankenpanzerwagen (Sd.Kfz. 251/8). During the great German offensive in the area of ​​Kursk, the regiment would be attached to the Pz.Gren.Div. Großdeutschland [XLVIII. AK, 4th Panzer Army, Army Group South].

Then a total of 200 combat Pz Kw V reached the area of ​​operations (plus 4 recovery) but here other problems are added because according to sources in the land marches before mentioned were burned by leaking fuel 2, 4 or 6 Panthers (according to sources) with which the number of tanks in service would be reduced to 198, 196 or 194 ...... but even more according to a combat report another 20 Pz Kw V would have been out of service due to mechanical problems, therefore the number would dropped to 178, 176 or 174 at the start of the offensive ................

Added to this the Pz. Abt. 52 lost its first commander due illness and hastily took command an officer of the Armored School of Putlos, Maj. Teepe (who was a teacher but -it seems- with little combat experience ...................)

Sources: http://www.panther1944.de/index.php/de/ ... uppenteile
http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/ubb/Forum ... 00003.html
Steel Masters 063 - Le Panzer-Abteilung 51 à Koursk" Jean Restayn.
http://warspot.ru/3055-debyut-panter
http://www.ifz-muenchen.de/heftarchiv/2 ... B6ppel.pdf

We see that to the problems of experience and training were adding other (which of course strengthened each other !!). By the way something about number of veterans and rookies? Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; the story follows...................................

In the assembly area prior to the attack. (4 July 1943).

On July 01, 1943 the PR 39 marched by Borisowka to its assembly area located northwest of Tomarovka on the Vorskla. The two armored regiments, PR v. Lauchert and PR GD would be subordinate to the 10th Pz.Brig.

On July 4, 1943 in the evening came the last train transport elements of Pz Abt 52 to Odnoborowka.

Combat Reconnaissance. (Gefechtsaufklarung)

a. General.

Combat Recce generally starts when opposing forces begin to deploy. All troops involved in the battle reconnaissance carried out by patrols, artillery observation posts, observation battalions and air reconnaissance units. The information obtained about the organization and the enemy's strength provides the basis for the development of the battle.

Well the above failed miserably and as the Panther detachments arrived at sector virtually on the eve of the offensive, this task fell mainly on the division.

Something on the offensive.

Many of the attacks fail miserably in the initial phase because decisive mistakes were committed. These may include:

• Incorrect choice of the ground (and opportunity)
• Inadequate knowledge of the enemy situation
• ineffective or inadequate coordination and support elements
• Incorrect use of the forces.

I think in this action they successfully met all errors (shared responsibility between the Army Corps, division and regiment / brigade)

Previous situation: From the starting position of the Fourth Panzer Army, Soviet artillery positions and their defense system could not be seen. There was only one solution ........ The army launched a limited-objective attack on the afternoon of July 4, before the opening of the main offensive, in order to seize the commanding heights of Syhino (south west Butovo).
Despite successfully conquer the starting position for the attack ..... The weather improved enough that night (4/5 July 1943), but the roads were mud and Soviet artillery remained very active. In short, the main elements of XLVIII Panzer Corps took their assembly areas on time. However the 10th Armoured Brigade (Oberst Decker), suddenly found extreme difficulties with the marshland (Ground Recce when?? and within a sector under German control by now).

Now, regarding the creation of a brigade HQ whose mission was to control 300 tanks of the division "Grossdeutschland".
It was nothing new or unknown to the Germans and was the norm until the end of the campaign in France in 1940 (these brigades also controlled about 300 tanks) ...

Regarding it was a mistake to concentrate so many tanks on a narrow strip of land (3 km), well there is nothing unusual nor is it a tactical error since there is a form of attack in column (regiment, battalion or companies); This type of attack is used when looking to maintain the momentum of the attack at one point and the worn down units are relieved by surpassing it, therefore maintaining the momentum of the offensive ...............

Finally, another big problem: As detectors of magnetic mines were not effective, engineers used probes to locate mines and lifted them by hand. On the night of July 4/5 German the divisions planned for the attack had detachments of engineers opening lanes through the Soviet minefields. This was a slow and dangerous work, and could not always be completed before the attack ........................

The night of July 3 fell in the area between the Donets and Desna. The 2nd Company of Pi Btl Division "Grossdeutschland" had sent a demining group of ten men. This group of ten men raised mines 2700 facing the hills of Butovo during the night of July 3/4. Two thousand seven hundred mines in five hours of total darkness.

Sources: http://www.panther1944.de/index.php/de/ ... uppenteile
Panzer Tactics - German Small-Units Armor Tactics in WWII.
U.S. War Department "Handbook on German Military Forces" (Mar'45) TM-E 30-451
Kursk - The German View
Countermine MINE AND OPERATIONS IN THE BATTLE OF KURSK. Mr. Andrew Remson and Ms. Debbie Anderson.
Scorched Earth-Hitler's War on Russia. Vol.2.
http://www.network54.com/Forum/47207/me ... Kursk+1943

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; the story follows...................................

The course of the battle - July 05, 1943. Previous comments.

The terrain on which the attack would take place was a vast plain, broken by numerous valleys, small woods, irregularly scattered villages and crossed by several rivers and brooks. Among these, the Pena river ran with a fast flowing between steep ravines. The ground rose slightly north favoring the defender. Extensive cornfields covered landscape making difficult the observation in the area. The sandy paths became impassable by the rains. In short it was not a favorable terrain for tanks, but in no way it was a tank-proof terrain..................

The concept of the operation used was different from Model (in the north) as in south the armored formations would led the attack from the outset. The Germans attacked in armored wedge with a tank battalion deployed in a front of 1200 meters and two companies in front (if possible one of Pz Kw VI Tiger)..................

Mechanized Forces' Attack: Germans put emphasis on the need to concentrate the tanks effort in the decisive points. The armored regiment usually attacked in waves, with the unit echeloned in depth, one battalion after the other. When the regiment attacked with two battalions in front, it was essential that another regiment formed the second wave.

At 06:00 hours and after two hours of artillery fire the XXXXVIII Pz Korps went on the attack ..... Because the VIII Air Corps was primarily support the II SS Panzer Korps, the XXXXVIII Pz Korps had a limited air support. The Panzer Corps advance suffered significant delays due to the struggle not only against the Russians but also against formidable terrain obstacles..............

Obstacles in the sector: antitank ditch and ravine east of Beresowyj, with deep minefields and barbed wire obstacles in front of the ravine. The gully and ditch are also filled with water. Minefields N of Point 229.8. Road leading to the NE of Butowo mined. Two anti-tank ditches southeast of Luchanino.

The PR v. Lauchert advanced as second wave behind the PR GD against Moschtschenoje located due north. Meanwhile Grenadiers also left their trenches, but the expected support of tanks never came.............. The failure occurred in the first attack in Butovo on July 05, was not due technical problems of any new weapon. The reason was much more mundane as the Panther tanks of von Lauchert could not overcome a stream running south and southeast of Butovo, which could not be avoided; the mud on the bed of the stream was indescribable, plus one undiscovered minefield in front of Soviet lines and many tanks lost their tracks being easy prey to the Soviet defensive fire...................

Tactic: mined obstacles are often registered only after the tank has entered it. In that case, it is important to prevent other tanks doing the same. If the enemy anti-tank defenses came into action at the same time, the fire must be returned immediately and, if available, the vehicles should lay down a smokescreen. If it is not possible to avoid the obstacle, engineers must clear lanes while other tanks provide support from covered positions ..............

Well here's another aspect, due to a technical failure (smoke launchers were activated after getting fire on it) were removed from the first models of Panther........

Another factor highlighted as critical, if the main effort was with the XXXXVIII Pz Korps (I say this as that Corps was assigned the new Panther Regiment) why did not get priority in close air support?

And knowing the difficult terrain and obstacles and the heavy rains in the sector, what happened with the support of engineers? (This aspect was not reinforced).

Sources: http://www.panther1944.de/index.php/de/ ... uppenteile
Panzer Tactics - German Small-Units Armor Tactics in WWII.
U.S. War Department "Handbook on German Military Forces" (Mar'45) TM-E 30-451
Kursk - The German View
Countermine MINE AND OPERATIONS IN THE BATTLE OF KURSK. Mr. Andrew Remson and Ms. Debbie Anderson.
Scorched Earth-Hitler's War on Russia. Vol.2.
http://www.military-info.de/wk2/wk2.htm

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; the story follows...................................

The course of the battle - July 05, 1943. Actions.

Already on July 5, 1943 XXXXVIII Pz K had problems; GD was deployed in a dense formation with marshland to its front and was severely punished by Soviet artillery. Engineers were unable to establish favorable crossing points and many tanks fell victim to the red aviation. (We see here the little air support for the Army Corps)...........

At 06:45 hours the Panthers' regiment assembled in the depression north of Moschenoje, but only would be engaged once the PR GD crossed the ravine in Beresowyj (scheduled for 7:30 hours). At 06:55 was received the report that the GD PR crossing the marshy and strongly mined ground became more and more difficult.

At 08:00 hours the 160 Panthers of the PR 39 left their assembly area towards Beresowyj and at 08:15 hours crossed the railway. 09:45 hours only a few tanks of GD PR managed to cross the ravine; a Tiger suffered a breakdown and blocked the crossing. At 09:50 hours Soviet planes attacked the concentration of German tanks.

At 10:05 hours PR GD tanks advanced through the ravine in Beresowyj. At 12:10 hours, a full battalion of PR GD advancing toward the hill 210.7, but no one of them Panther.

Tactic - Combat Support: the obstacles are used to delay or break the momentum of the attack or deviate the attacker to unfavorable terrain and invariably will be protected by fire. While engineers open gaps, the most important point is to prevent the immobilized tanks become inactives and turn a target in a firing range......

At 16:00 hours the GD had 30 Panthers, 15 Pz Kw IV, four infantry battalions and an anti-tank unit moving toward the northwest corner of Tscherkasskoje.

The Gefreiter Werner Kriegel of Pz.Abt. 51 recalled that:

"[...] In the afternoon of day 5, the Pz.Abt. 51 had only 22 Panther tanks in service. Around 28 were totally destroyed, the rest damaged. My colleagues complained about the final drive and overheating their engines.

While the Pz Abt 52 quickly lost 30% of its strength due to defensive fire and dense minefields before the first defensive belt .......................

Losses of tanks on July 05 amounted to 249, of them 131 mines.

Front line at the end of the period: Machine tractor station - 237.8 - NW part of Tscherkasskoje - area just S of the stream E of Krassnyj Potschinok.

Sources: http://www.panther1944.de/index.php/de/ ... uppenteile
Panzer Tactics – German Small-Units Armor Tactics in WWII.
U.S. War Department "Handbook On German Military Forces" (Mar'45) TM-E 30-451
Kursk – The German View
MINE AND COUNTERMINE OPERATIONS IN THE BATTLE OF KURSK. Mr. Andrew Remson and Ms. Debbie Anderson.
Scorched Earth-Hitler’s War on Russia. Vol 2.
http://www.military-info.de/wk2/wk2.htm
A MEASURE OF THE REAL-WORLD VALUE OF MIXED MINE SYSTEMS. Dupuy Institute
http://planetarmor.com/forums/showthrea ... 859&page=2
KOSAVE

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; the story follows...................................

The course of the battle - July 06, 1943. Actions.

The night was quiet in the sector of the GD. Just before 04:30 and after heavy fighting, the III./ Grenadier Reg GD took the western part of Tscherkasskoje. The elements of tanks and infantry, who had managed to cross the ravine north of Beresowyj regrouped in the eastern edge of Jarki, waiting to resume the advance. The PR 39 (Panthers) withdrew to Jarki after failing to storm the hill 232.4. The main force of PR GD, which was moving towards Hill 237.8 through Butowo road, could not reach their destination because a bridge had collapsed. Advanced elements of Panthers Reg reached the fork southeast of Tscherkasskoje at 05:00. Towards 0715 the road northeast of Butowo was cleared, and the GD tanks moved along it ..............

Minefields: Tanks of the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps had to wait while engineers cleared gaps through the minefields by hand. Engineers from both, the 11th Panzer Division and Grossdeutschland Panzergrenadier Division, were involved in this effort. However, the attack had to be delayed until 08:30.

At 08:30 the 11. Pz and PR GD advanced from the line 246.0 to 232.4. At 09:35 the head tanks of the div (Reg Strachwitz) were counteracted by Soviet tanks 2 km northeast of 246.0. Strachwitz required all nearby forces remain under his command for an immediate attack, as he had no contact with the Panthers Reg. At 10:25 he had not yet any contact with the Panthers of von Lauchert, and Strachwitz received permission to launch his attack. The division ordered to take Luchanino instead of attacking Alexejewka.

By midafternoon an attack carried out by the PR GD on Soviet positions near Dubrowa failed. After crossing the first antitank ditch southeast of Luchanino, the Panthers Reg, followed by the Grenadiers Reg. and part of the artillery, advanced to the second anti-tank ditch.

At 17:15 the PR GD reported moving west of Dubrowa. On the left, the PR 39 secured the flank against Soviet forces deployed along the river Pena due north. At 18:10, after overcome extensive barbed wire and minefields in the ravines Olkhovka and Bolschoij, the GD attacked Dubrowa. At 21:00 eastern suburbs of Dubrowa achieved. The division was ordered to establish bridgeheads north of Pena in Luchanino.

Losses of tanks on July 06 amounted to 278, of which 69 mines. On this day the command of the Brigade (PR GD and PR 39) was handed over to Oberst Strachwitz.............................

Sources: http://www.panther1944.de/index.php/de/ ... uppenteile
Panzer Tactics – German Small-Units Armor Tactics in WWII.
U.S. War Department "Handbook On German Military Forces" (Mar'45) TM-E 30-451
Kursk – The German View
MINE AND COUNTERMINE OPERATIONS IN THE BATTLE OF KURSK. Mr. Andrew Remson and Ms. Debbie Anderson.
Scorched Earth-Hitler’s War on Russia. Vol 2.
http://www.military-info.de/wk2/wk2.htm
A MEASURE OF THE REAL-WORLD VALUE OF MIXED MINE SYSTEMS. Dupuy Institute
http://planetarmor.com/forums/showthrea ... 859&page=2
KOSAVE

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; the story follows...................................

The course of the battle - July 07, 1943. Actions.

On this day finally some significant success was achieved. On the right wing of the GD, the Grenadier-Rgt. reported being in Wercheponje, but actually only reached Gremutshy.

At 06:00 hours the tanks of Pz.Brig. (Graf Strachwitz) exceeded the antitank trenches near Dubrowa and after refueling were ready to move forward. At dawn the Panthers Reg reported heavy artillery fire and rockets from the enemy. At 06:30 hours the GD was hit by heavy artillery fire and counterattacked on both sides of the road near Dubrowa.

At 10:00 hours the Panthers Rgt. was 500 meters south of the fork near 254.5. Ten tanks on the heights north of Syrtsewo and Dubrowa in German hands. Syrtsewo defended by strong hostile forces.

At 11:15 the PR GD at 230.1. Syrtsewo in flames. At 16:00 hours a long day of extraordinary struggles came almost to an end. The PR GD claimed the destruction of 30 Soviet tanks. At 16:45 hours tanks of the GD engaged with 29 Soviet tanks on the eastern edge of Syrtsewo. At 20:15 hours came orders to build a defensive line from the suburb of Pokrowka to forests of Sukhaja ​​to Krassnaja Dubrawa.

Tanks losses on July 07 amounted to 197.

Sources: http://www.panther1944.de/index.php/de/ ... uppenteile
Panzer Tactics – German Small-Units Armor Tactics in WWII.
U.S. War Department "Handbook On German Military Forces" (Mar'45) TM-E 30-451
Kursk – The German View
MINE AND COUNTERMINE OPERATIONS IN THE BATTLE OF KURSK. Mr. Andrew Remson and Ms. Debbie Anderson.
Scorched Earth-Hitler’s War on Russia. Vol 2.
http://www.military-info.de/wk2/wk2.htm
A MEASURE OF THE REAL-WORLD VALUE OF MIXED MINE SYSTEMS. Dupuy Institute
http://planetarmor.com/forums/showthrea ... 859&page=2
KOSAVE

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; the story follows...................................

The course of the battle - July 06/07 1943. Two Stories.

A story of Pz.Abt. 52: It was during the preparation for the attack along the road to Dubrova, about 2 kilometers east of Cherkasskoye on the morning of July 6 when I first saw how a commander succumbed to psychological pressure being unable to continue to fulfill his duty. The enemy was firing salvos of heavy artillery at our positions. The mentioned officer literally collapsed and was unable to do anything to remedy the situation. As a result, we remained under artillery fire and no order to take evasive action was given. Then, one of our most experienced company commanders told the commander to take some action. The latter, however, could only respond: "Yes, do something, get us out of here."

Another account of the fact: "We stayed longer than necessary in the assembly area at Cherkasskoye for an armored attack. Only after the war I knew the reason for the wait, because the Panzer-Regiment "Großdeutschland" had been unable to arrive on time. Then we suffered a severe enemy artillery fire in that assembly area, and I remember seeing a Panther tank torn apart in a flash by a direct hit from an artillery shell. It was only later that I learned that one of our experienced company commanders, Oberleutnant Gabriel, had taken the initiative. He was hit shortly afterwards and suffered horrific burns. "

Commander of Pz.Abt. 52 that day was Maj. Teepe (replacing Maj. Sievers).

But by example Oberleutnant Gabriel himself said that this action took place on July 7..............................

Sources: http://www.panther1944.de/index.php/de/ ... uppenteile
Panzer Tactics - German Small-Units Armor Tactics in WWII.
U.S. War Department "Handbook on German Military Forces" (Mar'45) TM-E 30-451
Kursk - The German View
Countermine MINE AND OPERATIONS IN THE BATTLE OF KURSK. Mr. Andrew Remson and Ms. Debbie Anderson.
Scorched Earth-Hitler's War on Russia. Vol.2.
http://www.military-info.de/wk2/wk2.htm
A MEASURE OF THE REAL-WORLD VALUE OF MIXED SYSTEMS MINE. Dupuy Institute
http://planetarmor.com/forums/showthrea ... 859 & page = 2
KOSAVE
http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/ubb/Forum ... 00003.html
http://warspot.ru/3055-debyut-panter

Cheers. Raúl M .

[hucks216]

Just an additional - two images from a Soldbuch to a future holder of the Panzer Assault Badge '25' who served in Pz.Rgt 39 and Pz.Rgt von Lauchert at Kursk.

[tigre]

Hello hucks216 ; thanks for sharing it with us . Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; the story follows...................................

The course of the battle - July 08, 1943. Actions.

At 06:45 hours, the GD reported that Soviet resistance was weakening, although the situation was still unclear at Syrtsewo. At 09:00 hours the PR GD was still engaged southeast of Syrtsewo.

By 11:30 hours the assault group on the right wing of the GD had made good progress. Moving east of Syrtsewo the Panther Reg. and one battalion of the GD Gren Reg took the machine and tractor station (MTS) near the western edge of Werchopenje. North of there, the armored regiment was fighting against Soviet tanks arrived from the northwest. The movements of the armored regiment were hampered largely by flanking fire from the hills west of Werchopenje.

The armored group concentrated northeast of Luchanino and planned attack north at 12:00 hours; as soon as the GD crossed the Pena river in Syrtsewo would protect the flank of the div. The high command ordered the 11. Pz and the GD were to attack north toward the Psel river, with the GD veering slightly to Schipy. However, at 14:10 hours the GD was still very committed in the machine and tractor station.

Towards the end of the period, the GD had suffered considerable losses by the intense fire from the west side of the river Pena. In the battles of the day the Panther Reg. and the Stug Abt destroyed 40 Soviet tanks, with not inconsiderable own losses. The Gross Deutschland Division was attacked by the 3rd Mechanized Brigade and the 49th Tank Brigade of the 3rd Mechanized Corps plus the 200th Tank Brigade of the 6th Tank Corps.

First line at the end of the period: Road in 242.1 - Werchopenje - south edge of Werchopenje - E River Pena - part N of Syrtsewo.

Sources: http://www.panther1944.de/index.php/de/ ... uppenteile
Panzer Tactics – German Small-Units Armor Tactics in WWII.
U.S. War Department "Handbook On German Military Forces" (Mar'45) TM-E 30-451
Kursk – The German View
MINE AND COUNTERMINE OPERATIONS IN THE BATTLE OF KURSK. Mr. Andrew Remson and Ms. Debbie Anderson.
Scorched Earth-Hitler’s War on Russia. Vol 2.
http://www.military-info.de/wk2/wk2.htm
A MEASURE OF THE REAL-WORLD VALUE OF MIXED MINE SYSTEMS. Dupuy Institute
http://planetarmor.com/forums/showthrea ... 859&page=2
KOSAVE

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; the story follows...................................

The course of the battle - July 09, 1943. Actions.

At 0010 on 9 July the div received orders to commence its attack to capture the N part of Werchopenje by 0400. However the div did not jump off until 0530. According to a radio message the Panther Reg did not plan to jump off until 0800. The Pz Regt, supported by assault guns, jumped off from the MTS and advanced toward the N part of Werchopenje, but the attack made little progress because of heavy flanking fire from the W. At 0720 tanks of the Panther Reg were still in their assembly areas.

By 0840 the Panther Reg had finally attacked and penetrated into the N part of Werchopenje, and the Recon Bn and Assault Gun Bn had reached the road from Werchopenje to 242.1 on the highway. The Panther Reg was ordered to immediately move all its tanks not already committed in Werchopenje to Hill 260.8. At 0910 it was reported that the Panthers moving toward 260.8 were making little progress through the open terrain W of the road because of strong Soviet tank forces.

After a bit of regrouping GD got its attack going by 0930 with both the Pz Regt and the Panther Reg moving briskly toward 260.8. The leading panzers reached Hill 260.8 about 1000, with the infantry following. The continuing attack met with dug-in tanks S of Nowosselowka and strong Soviet counterattacks from the NW and NE hit the advancing Panther Reg at the same time.

By 1300 the GD Pz Regt, advancing now at a good pace, had broken Soviet resistance at Nowosselowka and captured the town, destroying many Soviet tanks. The Regt continued to advance N and at 1400 reached the road fork 3 km N of Nowosselowka, and was scouting toward 232.8. At 1450 the Corps ordered GD to turn off immediately to the SW toward the road fork at 258.5, with objective of Dolgij and the hills N of it, in order to block retreating Soviet forces. At 1545 the Pz Regt reached 244.8, N of Hf at the road fork. At 1600 the Panther Reg was ordered to advance via Nowosselowka S of Kalinowka toward Hill 258.5.

Obst: Large minefield 1 km S of 237.6. Thick minefield in front of 234.8. "Well-constructed" emplacements in the W part of Beresowka. Bunkers on the S edge of Beresowka.

Sources: http://www.panther1944.de/index.php/de/ ... uppenteile
Panzer Tactics – German Small-Units Armor Tactics in WWII.
U.S. War Department "Handbook On German Military Forces" (Mar'45) TM-E 30-451
Kursk – The German View
MINE AND COUNTERMINE OPERATIONS IN THE BATTLE OF KURSK. Mr. Andrew Remson and Ms. Debbie Anderson.
Scorched Earth-Hitler’s War on Russia. Vol 2.
http://www.military-info.de/wk2/wk2.htm
A MEASURE OF THE REAL-WORLD VALUE OF MIXED MINE SYSTEMS. Dupuy Institute
http://planetarmor.com/forums/showthrea ... 859&page=2
KOSAVE

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; the story follows...................................

The course of the battle - July 10, 1943. Actions.

At 03:30 hours GD attacked toward Hill 258.5. The Panther Reg went first. Shortly after starting out the lead Panthers encountered strong Soviet tank forces at 243.0. Because of this situation only the Panther Reg had been able to turn to the SW, and SW of Nowosselowka the unit encountered Soviet tanks. At 07:00 hours the Panzer Bde had already destroyed 7 Russian tanks N of 243.0 and hoped to gain ground to the SW, the objective being 258.5. Col. Strachwitz, commander of the Bde, injured his arm on a tank gun and had to be evacuated; his place was taken by Col Decker.

Despite a promising start, by 09:00 hours GD had gained little ground. A tank battle was raging around 243.0; more than 20 Soviet tanks were claimed destroyed. GD reported that it was impossible to advance further toward the SW until flanking fire from 232.8 and Kalinowka was eliminated. At 12:30 hours GD was ordered to mop up the W bank of the Pena at Werchopenje while the 3d PzD advanced across the highway, passing S of Werchopenje toward the ridge to the S. At 13:00 hours the Panzer Bde started toward 258.5.

At 13:20 hours the Panzer Bde was 2 km W of 243.0, engaged in hard combat with Soviet tanks and AT guns from the N and W. Fierce fighting in the GD sector continued at 16:30 hours in the Kalinowka area and NE of 258.5. At 18:45 hours the GD Pz Bde captured Hill 258.5 after destroying 5 Russian tanks. The Bde immediately began organizing an all-around defense just N of the hill. Because of the heavy combat, GD reported still operational only six Panthers, three Tigers, and about eleven Mk IIIs and Mk IVs (long).

At 20:00 hours the GD Pz Bde, in its hedgehog defense N of 258.5, began taking extremely heavy fire from the Tolstoye Woods, where some 50 Soviet tanks were said to be hidden.

Supported by the efforts of the Luftwaffe the "Gross Deutschland" made a highly successful advance; heights 243.0 and 247.0 were taken, and Russian infantry and armor fled before the panzers and sought refuge in the wood north of Beresowka.

The 10th Tank Corps was already arriving opposite the XLVIII Panzer Corps along the Oboyan road. In addition, the 204th and 184th Rifle Divisions, a tank brigade, three tank destroyer regiments, and four rocket launcher regiments were transferred from the Voronezh Front reserve to the Oboyan road sector.

After the thundershowers on July 4 and 5, the weather had been hot and dry on the southern face of the salient. On July 10, however, there was a sharp change -- the weather was cloudy with frequent heavy thunderstorms. The roads were muddy and mostly impassable except for horses and tracked vehicles. The muddy conditions slowed activity on the ground, and the clouds and rain reduced the activity in the air.

In the evening, the strength of Pz.Rgt. v Lauchert initially reported as follows:

10 Panther ready
25 Panther total loss
165 Panther in the J-services (including about 40 already repaired again and on the march to the front).

A second report at 24:00 reported some other numbers:

38 Panther ready (including 2 Pz.Bef.Wg.)
31 total loss
131 Panther in the J-services (including 8 Pz.Bef.Wg.)
4 Panther without tower (recovery) ready
2 Sd.Kfz. 250/1 ready
4 Sd.Kfz. 251/8 ready

Sources: http://www.panther1944.de/index.php/de/ ... uppenteile
Panzer Tactics – German Small-Units Armor Tactics in WWII.
U.S. War Department "Handbook On German Military Forces" (Mar'45) TM-E 30-451
Kursk – The German View
MINE AND COUNTERMINE OPERATIONS IN THE BATTLE OF KURSK. Mr. Andrew Remson and Ms. Debbie Anderson.
Scorched Earth-Hitler’s War on Russia. Vol 2.
http://www.military-info.de/wk2/wk2.htm
A MEASURE OF THE REAL-WORLD VALUE OF MIXED MINE SYSTEMS. Dupuy Institute
http://planetarmor.com/forums/showthrea ... 859&page=2
KOSAVE

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; the story follows...................................

The course of the battle - July 11, 1943. Actions.

The weather forecast for July 11 predicted better weather, and the Germans hoped for better air support. However, the day began with heavy rains that grounded most aircraft, turned the roads into mud, and made movement virtually impossible except for tracked vehicles. The Panzergrenadier Division Grossdeutschland and the 3rd Panzer Division spent most of the day clearing up resistance in the Verchopenoye-Berezovka area. This heavily mined and fortified area was serving as a base from which the Soviet 5th, 10th, and 6th Tank Corps could launch attacks on the west flank of the penetration.

The main force of the div attacked at 0600 according to plan. At the same time the Panther Bde pushed S from 258.5 and inflicted heavy casualties on Soviet troops retreating W from Beresovka. A secondary attack from the woods SE of 258.5 was repulsed.

By 0900 the Pz Bde encountered a large minefield about 1 km S of 237.6. (The div's front line was 1.5 km S of contour line 230.) This minefield was cleared by 0915, and its lead units reached Pt 1.5 W of Beresowka. Another thick minefield delayed a further thrust over Hill 234.8 toward Rakovo.

Soviet resistance was increasing in the Tolstoye Woods W of 258.5. There were not enough troops available to clean out the Tolstoye Woods. By 1610 the difficult mopping-up operations of GD and the 3d PzD in the Beresovka area were completed. They used Panthers and shock troops of the Fusilier Regt to capture the bunkers on the S edge of the town, whose defenders offered fierce resistance to the last, and from the area on both sides of the highway.

By the same time, the GD Pz Regt had captured Hill 243.8 and barely cleared the minefield S of it, and combat recon toward Tschapayev was in progress. At 2000 the div received orders to clear out the Tolstoye Woods during the night of 11/12 July.

On July 11, 1943 the XXXXVIII Pz Korps issued orders for the units of the GD to be relieved by the 3. Pz during the night; GD was to assemble astride the road south of Height 260.8 and stand by for an advance to the north. In view of the breakdown of the Model's attack, a successful advance on this part of the front offered the only hope of a victory.

Sources: http://www.panther1944.de/index.php/de/ ... uppenteile
Panzer Tactics – German Small-Units Armor Tactics in WWII.
U.S. War Department "Handbook On German Military Forces" (Mar'45) TM-E 30-451
Kursk – The German View
MINE AND COUNTERMINE OPERATIONS IN THE BATTLE OF KURSK. Mr. Andrew Remson and Ms. Debbie Anderson.
Scorched Earth-Hitler’s War on Russia. Vol 2.
http://www.military-info.de/wk2/wk2.htm
A MEASURE OF THE REAL-WORLD VALUE OF MIXED MINE SYSTEMS. Dupuy Institute
http://planetarmor.com/forums/showthrea ... 859&page=2
KOSAVE

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; the story follows...................................

The course of the battle - July 12, 1943. Actions.

On the night of July 11 to 12, 1943 the Units of the GD were relieved by the 3. Pz according to the plan. On the morning of July 12, 1943 GD was assembled and concentrated astride the road south of Nowosselowka, waiting to launch the decisive thrust to the north at first light on July 13, 1943. This would be they first day without fighting.

But on July 12 the Soviet Voronezh Front launched a massive, Front level counteroffensive. the main effort was by the 5th Guards Tank Army southwest of the agricultural town of Prokorovka (which was also called Alexandrovka). The mission of 5th Guards Tank Army was to attack to the southwest, destroy the German II SS Panzer Corps, and seize Krasnaya Dubrava and Yakovlevo. If successful, this attack would also cut the line of supply to XXXXVIII Panzer Corps and force 4th Panzer Army to withdraw.

In the sector of XXXXVIII Pz K the 3rd Soviet Mechanized Corps and the 31st Tank Corps hit the 3rd Panzer Division with an attack toward Novoselovki. Further to the south the 10th Tank Corps and the 204th and 309th Rifle Divisions attacked southwest of Kalinovka. Therefore instead of attacking to the north, the remainder of the Grossdeutschland Division spent the day beating off attacks on both sides of the Oboyan Road by the 204th and the 309th Soviet Rifle Divisions supported by tanks.

A massive Soviet attack struck XXXXVIII PzK about 14:30 hours, breaking through the 3. Pz defenses at 258.5 near Verchopenye. At 14:50 hours Corps ordered GD to send its Pz Bde SW immediately, in the direction of 258.5. Heavy Soviet concentrations were reported at Kalinovka at 15:00 hours.

At 20:30 hours the Panther Reg launched a counterattack against Hill 258.5 and the woods W of it. By 21:00 hours the situation had eased somewhat, and Corps began replanning the attack that had been scheduled for 12 July. GD had eliminated the penetration at Kalinovka, destroying 12 Soviet tanks near that village. However, units on the left wing of the Gren Regt suffered heavy casualties. The GD Panzer Bde regrouped during the night.

The GD reported to have operational at the end of the period 20 Mk IIIs and Mk IVs, 2 Tigers, and 25 Panthers, plus 24 assault guns, 17 heavy 75mm SP AT guns, and 20 heavy towed AT guns.

Sources: http://www.panther1944.de/index.php/de/ ... uppenteile
Panzer Tactics – German Small-Units Armor Tactics in WWII.
U.S. War Department "Handbook On German Military Forces" (Mar'45) TM-E 30-451
Kursk – The German View
MINE AND COUNTERMINE OPERATIONS IN THE BATTLE OF KURSK. Mr. Andrew Remson and Ms. Debbie Anderson.
Scorched Earth-Hitler’s War on Russia. Vol 2.
http://www.military-info.de/wk2/wk2.htm
A MEASURE OF THE REAL-WORLD VALUE OF MIXED MINE SYSTEMS. Dupuy Institute
http://planetarmor.com/forums/showthrea ... 859&page=2
KOSAVE
http://www.network54.com/Forum/47207/me ... Kursk+1943

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; the story follows...................................

The course of the battle - July 13, 1943. Actions.

On July 13, the commanders of both German Army Groups were summoned to a conference at Hitler's Headquarters in East Prussia. Hitler opened the conference by announcing that the Allies had landed in Sicily, and the situation there was already serious. Field Marshal von Manstein, however, recommended continuing the offensive.

XXXXVIII Panzer Corps orders for both July 13 and 14 were the same: "To defend the line of its northern front and destroy the armored forces opposite its western front by an enveloping attack." The GD Div began receiving heavy artillery fire directed at its defensive positions at Kalinovka at 04:15 hours. During the night the Tolstoye Woods filled with Russian troops. A dispute developed between the GD Panther Reg and the Pz Reg of 3d PzD. Both claimed to have gone on the attack and to be fighting alone against heavy AT forces and 100 Russian tanks.

The GD Pz Regt (other report says the Panther Bde) became engaged with Soviet tanks and AT guns just NE of Hill 258.5 and in the woods to the W around 06:00 hours. At 06:45 hours a Corps observer, accompanying the panzer group in an armored troop carrier, reported that the Panther Bde had not yet started its attack.

The Panther Reg commander reported to the division that there was no way the attack could be made as planned. The Soviets had taken up favorable positions, and were waiting for the Germans to attack so they could be destroyed "one by one."

By 09:00 hours it was clear that the Soviets had used the Tolstoye Woods as a staging area for a large attack to recapture Verchopenye and Beresovka. By 10:00 hours 3d PzD was calling for GD to cut off the approach roads from Kruglik and Novenkoye by attacking to the W, to prevent the Soviets from receiving reinforcements. At 10:10 hours GD was slowly approaching Hill 258.5, and scouting the N portion of the Tolstoye Woods.

On the afternoon, the Corps Commander, General von Knobelsdorff, appeared at the GD's battle HQ and gave orders which left no hope for any advance to the north, in fact the division was again to attack westwards.

The Corps directed that the GD Pz Bde move SE of the forest via Beresowka. After concentrating behind the 332. ID it was to attack from the area between Beresovka and Tschapayev to the N or NW. This was to take place by 15:00 hours. The GD Panther Bde began assembling at 12:00 hours. By 14:00 hours, however, it had not yet passed through Werchopenje and was taking a disproportionately long time for preparation. The Bde CO, Oberst Decker, was told that speed was of the essence; he replied that it would be impossible to start before 16:00 hours.

At 16:25 hours the Panther Bde arrived in Beresovka, having been requested by the 332. ID to help resist a Soviet attack on the town, but arrived after the attack was over. The brigade assembled in the center of Beresovka for a limited objective attack in order to allow the 332. ID to regain its position. Rain further delayed the bde's advance. The division had still not started its attack at the end of the period.

By 18:50 hours the GD Panther Bde still had not started its attack, in spite of urging by Corps for an early attack. Decker responded that this was not possible before 19:30 hours, meaning the attack would have to be at night and the Soviets would receive advance warning of the German intentions. At that, Corps canceled the plans for an attack on 13 July, but ordered that GD must attack on 14 July.

GD reported having operational 8 Pz Kw III long tanks, 12 flamethrower tanks, 13 Pz Kw IV shorts, 19 Pz Kw IV longs, 8 Tigers, 43 Panthers, and 25 assault guns.

Sources: http://www.panther1944.de/index.php/de/ ... uppenteile
Panzer Tactics – German Small-Units Armor Tactics in WWII.
U.S. War Department "Handbook On German Military Forces" (Mar'45) TM-E 30-451
Kursk – The German View
MINE AND COUNTERMINE OPERATIONS IN THE BATTLE OF KURSK. Mr. Andrew Remson and Ms. Debbie Anderson.
Scorched Earth-Hitler’s War on Russia. Vol 2.
http://www.military-info.de/wk2/wk2.htm
A MEASURE OF THE REAL-WORLD VALUE OF MIXED MINE SYSTEMS. Dupuy Institute
http://planetarmor.com/forums/showthrea ... 859&page=2
KOSAVE
http://www.network54.com/Forum/47207/me ... Kursk+1943

Cheers. Raúl M .