Foreign volunteers in battles around Moscow

[Gregory Deych]

There are persistent reports of foreigners (usually called "Finns", though sometimes "Hungarians") fighting in the winter of 41 around Moscow. Does anybody know who that might be?

[Ivan_S]

It seems that also a small contingent ( around a regiment ) of frenchmen were engaged against the red army with lamentable results (high rate of loss, minus results). But it has to be said that they were under-equipped and under-trained and hastily sent into fighting... The name of that unit was the L.V.F or Légion des Volontaires Français (contre le bolchevisme). French Volunteer Legion (against the Bolchevism)... After, the LVF was only engaged against partisans...

[Mikko H.]

About the alleged Finns, see this thread:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=96599

[Armenische_Legionar]

as I know, some Caucasian special group and Turkestani volunteer units were arround Moscow.

[Benoit Douville]

Ivan is right, the L.V.F. (Legion Des Volontaires Francais) participated with the Germans in the Battle of Moscow of 1941. The late Jean Mabire have written a great book about it but only in french I think.

Regards

[tigersqn]

The name of that unit was the L.V.F or Légion des Volontaires Français (contre le bolchevisme). French Volunteer Legion (against the Bolchevism)... After, the LVF was only engaged against partisans...

Wasn't this unit used as the cadre for the "Charlemagne" div ??

[Serbian boy]

Wasn't this unit used as the cadre for the "Charlemagne" div ??

The "Waffen-Grenadier-Brigade der SS Charlemagne" (later division) was formed,when
"Französische SS-Freiwilligen-Sturmbrigade" was merged with L.V.F.

[Ivan_S]

Men of the SS sturmbrigade Frankreich (about one thousand of men) where reunited in the 57th regiment of the SS whereas soldiers of the LVF (1200 men) where mainly added to the 58th rgt... Most of them were experienced eastern front veterans.

They were also members of the kriegsmarine (1500), of the O.T (several hundred men), of the NSKK and 2500 men of the "Milice Française" (previously engaged against french partisans). These guys weren't frontline soldiers...

finally, the division was strong of 7000 men (the size of a brigade!) and its overall combat value was poor due to the very short time allowed for the training...

[Daniel Laurent]

Hi everybody,
Yes, the LVF was near Moscow end 1941.
Thanks to the member who, above, attributes their poor performances to lack of training and equipement, but the lack of non-political officers was also a reason.

About the who went where of the French collaboration armed forces :

Unit Strength (Men) Remarks
1 – Volunteers
LVF (41-44) 6,000 Franzosischer Infantry-Regiment 638
Brigade (43-44) 2,500 Freiwilligen Waffen SS Sturmbrigade
Division Charlemagne (45) 7,000 33 Waffen SS Division Charlemagne
Bezzen Perrot, 43-45 80 Bretonische Waffenverband der SS
21 Panzer Division 230 2nd Werkstattkompanie (logistics, reparation)
Brandenburg Division (43) 180 8th company of the 3rd Regiment
Kriegsmarine (44) 3,200 Mainly in French ports and coastal batteries
Todt organization 2,500 Armed Schutzkommandos
Legion Speer. 500 Drivers for the Arbeitsamt
NSKK (44) 2,500 NSKK Rgt 4, then NSKK Transport Brigade der Luftwaffe
Phalange Africaine (42-43) 200 Company Frankonia, 2nd Battalion, 754. PzG Rgt,
2 – Collaborationists
Milice (44) 30,000 Fought in France, then in Italy or within the SS
Legion tricolore (42) 800 No active military campaign
Flak 6,800 All based in France

Notes:

1. The Waffen SS Division Charlemagne is fully composed of survivors of the LVF, the W-SS Brigade, the Militia, the NSKK and several other units.

2. The “non-volunteers”, such as Alsacians engaged in the Wehrmacht by force, called “malgre-nous” in French, are not accounted.

3. The civilians working for the German military industry, volunteer or forced, are not accounted.

4. Auxiliary police forces, working under French uniform but German command, are not accounted.

5. All figures are averages from several sources. Real exact numbers will never be known.

Source : Me

Regards
Daniel

[Ivan_S]

Rather than "the lack of non-political officers", i would incriminate the insuitability of the Charlemagne leadership... Many losses can be attributed to oberführer Puaud's bad decisions..

That guy, despite his past experiences in french colonial troops, wasn't the right man in the right place... His poor relationship with inspektor Krukenberg didn't ease to solve the problem...

Last but not least, it appears that the officers of the "milice française" were granted many important responsabilities in the division... In spite of the fact that these guys had no east-front fighting experience!

Adding this to the fact that the Charlemagne was engaged without its heavy weapons, facing one of the most powerful soviet offensive and you get the result! A military disaster...

[Daniel Laurent]

Hi Ivan,
The OP was talking about the LVF not the Charlemagne.

Bashing the military capacities of Edgar Puaud is a-time old stuff on which I disagree.

This legend was initiated by the late Jean Mabire, influenced by the testimonies of the most hard-liner veterans. Later on, after having met many more veterans he admitted that his first book on the Charlemagne would have been slightly different if...

The sole real disaster of the French Volunteers on the Eastern Front was in front of Moscow in 1941.

The LVF of 1942, the Sturmbrigade and the Charlemagne were indeed weak as far as heavy equipment and number are concerned, but performed as well as they could and were several time praised by the german officiers in charge.

Concerning the "advantages" given to the former Miliciens when they were incorporated into the W-SS, it is also an exageration. In those time of hardship, end 44 early 45, the political tones were not anymore of importance.

As you post from France, you must be speaking French. Please have a look at the French version of my pages about them :
THERE

They are much more detailed and complete than the one I have at Axis History Factbook.

Have a look at the organigram of the Charlemagne, ex-Militia officers are far to be so numerous.
Sorry, I must update my english pages, but time, time

[tigre]

Hello to all ; a little complement.................................

LVF around Moscow - Winter 1941.

When the French volunteers reached the assigned area of ​​operations they were about 60 kilometers from Moscow in a straight line, but the German army to which they had joined was no longer even the shadow of the one that had started Unternehmen Barbarossa on June 22, 1941 Thus the Bavarian 7. ID under General Eccard Freiherr von Gablenz, from which they became part as of November 19, 1941 as the Infanterie Regiment 638, had suffered 4,000 casualties (28% of its strength) from the Bug at the beginning of the campaign. The same IR 638 had suffered more than 400 casualties and without even entering combat due to the extremely harsh conditions of the Russian climate. Besides only a few days before entering combat, the Maj. Louis Leclercq and his second, Hptm Catteau, of the 2nd Companyhad been licensed, together with the Chiefs of the 1st and 3rd Companies. According to the author K. Bene this was due to a maneuver by Oberst Labonne to remove the conspiratorial officers who wanted to get him out of the way and put a more apt leader in charge ............ ..................

Sources: Experiencia de guerra y colaboracionismo político-militar. D. Lorenz.
http://did.panzer.pagesperso-orange.fr/Signal5.html
https://reibert.info/threads/638-j-fran ... 196/page-9

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; a little complement.................................

LVF around Moscow - Winter 1941.

As we saw earlier, the Legion had lost some of the most important cadres and this fact, shortly before go into action, was not recommended at that time because of the impact it had on cohesion and morals. On the other hand, they soon had an idea of ​​what was to come when they relieved the front-line German soldiers, who presented a disastrous aspect; "frozen, with old dirty beards and eyes at the bottom of the orbits"
..................................

After some days in which the French volunteers tried to recover as best they could from the long march under intense cold and constantly bombarded by the Soviet artillery in its too exposed positions, added to an enemy raid successfully rejected on November 27, 1941 came the order to go on the offensive. Indeed, to allow the two armored columns (the 2nd Armored Army of Guderian which advanced from the south and the 3rd and 4th Armored Armies of Reinhardt and Hoepner from the north) could close the pincers on Moscow, the 4th Army of General Kluge had orders to attack frontally to attract and hold on to the greatest number of enemy forces. On December 1, 1941, while the 2nd Battalion of IR 638 (LVF) remained in reserve in the village of Arkangelsk, General von Gablenz (7. ID) ordered the 1st Battalion to take the town of Djukowo, on the lake of the same name, and establish a defensive position there.

Meanwhile in that brief period there had already been numerous casualties, to which was added the daily breakdown of communications due to enemy artillery fire. Worse still, the very morning that they had to go into action a shell hit the ammunition dump, destroying it completely. As one French volunteer recalls, "I was bearded, dirty, covered in mud, hungry, but happy, the goal was less than 20 kilometers away." There was a lot of optimism, even among the Germans, and one example of this was the fact that when they arrived in Golovkovo, a RV point in the assigned sector, they were ordered to leave all the personal effects in the stores. A rumor ran between the combatants at that time and it was that they would spend New Year in the Soviet capital ............

Sources: Experiencia de guerra y colaboracionismo político-militar. D. Lorenz.
http://did.panzer.pagesperso-orange.fr/Signal5.html
http://www.maxafiero.it/lvf.htm
https://reibert.info/threads/638-j-fran ... 196/page-9

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; a little more.................................

LVF around Moscow - Winter 1941.

The attack, in which the first two companies of the I. / IR 638 took part, began on December 1, 1941, past noon and in the middle of a snowstorm, with only four hours of light ahead and the thermometer marking 22º C below zero. There were a total of about 240 men, while the rest of the battalion remained in reserve. Soon the maps available to the attackers proved to be false or at least incorrect. something that had already happened to other units of the Wehrmacht, now it was the turn of the French to suffer the consequences of being part of an army that was on the edge of its capabilities. The situation would be further aggravated by the absolute lack of armored and artillery support. However, the artillery support was coordinated and thus was included in the order of operations of the 7. ID, but the regimental commander never requested this support (*).

In this way this grave error left the attacking troops fully exposed to the strong positions defended by the Soviets, constituted by embankments and fortified works covered by machine-gun fire. To this was added the overwhelming Soviet artillery and mortar fire that swept the open terrain where the French advanced after leaving the wooded area that provided protection during their initial displacements. In front of the volunteers were the soldiers of the 32. Rifle Division of Siberia, trained, prepared and equipped to fight in cold climates, as were the prevailing weather conditions at that time. It should be noted that during the action there were disorders and episodes of indiscipline, mainly because of fear and unforeseen events, since no previous patrols had been carried out to adequately recognize enemy positions. (My view: as you can see nothing new when newcomer troops came into action and in extreme weather, badly trained, poorly equipped and badly supported - the opposite of the Siberians) ....................

(*) In spite of what is indicated in the text extracted from the source, the images below indicate that at least they had infantry support weapons (at the regiment level) although I do not have information on how they employed them and if the support was effective. ..........................

Sources: Experiencia de guerra y colaboracionismo político-militar. D. Lorenz.
http://did.panzer.pagesperso-orange.fr/Signal5.html
http://www.maxafiero.it/lvf.htm
https://reibert.info/threads/638-j-fran ... 196/page-9

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; a little more.................................

LVF around Moscow - Winter 1941.

A corporal of the LVF recalled the thoughts prior to entering combat, when each combatant tries to remove those fatal from his mind, most of the time without success and tries to project what will come: "each one imagines the assault and each one is sure to get out alive ... but nothing is clear ". In general, everyone imagines an ideal scenario where they will survive and save the comrade confident that everything will go according to plan ...........................

After a bitter fight, the French of the I. / IR 638 managed to advance about 1,500 meters and taking twelve casemates in the first Soviet defensive line, but without reaching its final goal, the town of Djukovo that was located about 2 kilometers from its position of departure, but defended tenaciously by the Siberian troops. Another combatant of the LVF recalled the rapid advance of the first 500 meters under the protection of the forest. Shortly before arriving at the edge of the wooded area the men advanced bent by jumps and ready to throw themselves to earth at the slightest sign of danger. In that moment hell broke loose and the situation broke into a succession of disconnected and chaotic images. "The treetops are illuminated in broad daylight, they looked like fireworks embracing the tops, from the foot of the trunks came other flashing lightning bolts" ...............

A volunteer who performed liaison duties between the regiment and the company of Lieutenant Dupont recalled that the wind went into the forest in a sinister way and gave the feeling of being the calling of the death. Fear gripped the French as they were subjected to the intense fire of Soviet heavy machine guns and helpless because they could not detect them in the snow-covered hills. Fear and paralysis seized the French soldiers and the importance of the initiative, individual courage and command capacity in combat was evident here ................

This was evidenced when the own Dupont jumped out running under the fire to drag his paralyzed comrades. This fact galvanized the first group that deployed again, this attracted the attention of the other sections, whose leaders understood that there was no point in remaining there lying and motionless .................

Sources: Experiencia de guerra y colaboracionismo político-militar. D. Lorenz.
http://did.panzer.pagesperso-orange.fr/Signal5.html
http://www.maxafiero.it/lvf.htm
https://reibert.info/threads/638-j-fran ... 196/page-9

Cheers. Raúl M .