I disagree with your statement because it implies that Flemish automist aspirations cannot be understood but only felt; if you're not part of the "volksgemeinschaft" so to speak, you won't get it. If a political platform, however complex, can't be explained cogently, then I'd argue it isn't much of a political platform. And certainly many AHF audience members here - myself included - have read books like Littlejohn's The Patriotic Traitors or Stanley Payne's A History of Fascism, 1914–1945 and have a greater-than-average understanding of European politics of the 1930's-40's.I fully second Wim but have to add some remarks. Our main problem (I am Flemish too) is that our political situation is so complex and not undertandable by anyone who is not Flemish.
Which illustrates the point that the Third Reich had absolutely no interest in fostering the nationalist ambitions of any of their conquered subjects.Even the German military Government did not understand (or even did not try to cope with) the "Belgian" situation during their occupation.
Take Otto Abetz - the Ambassador to Occupied France - for example. His diplomatic plan, endorsed by Hitler in September 1940, was to deliberately foster infighting between the Vichyites and the various "Paris Front" fascist parties. Deat, Deloncle, Darnand, Laval et. al. were pitted against each other as a means for the Germans to maintain control. Such political mechanizations existed throught the Occupation, such as when the SS combined the Flemish and Walloon volunteer family assistance programs in the spring of 1943 and essentially fired Mme Degrelle from her job as head of the Walloon welfare organization.
George Stein in book The Waffen-SS: Hitler's Elite Guard at War on pp.140-41 references a similar study:My main point: recently, a Flemish historian, Aline Sax, published an excellent study about the reasons and motivations of the Flemish Voluntary collaborating (in different German organisations and on different levels). She used an awful lot of personal files (still hidden in the vaults of the belgian Ministry of Justice) and studied the mail (Feldpost) contained in these files.
And her conclusions are fascinating! It is certainly╩NOT╩the "Yes / No" or "Good / Bad" discussion as in the previous posts but really very differentiated. The reasons and motivations of these volunteers are a broad spectrum, ranging from pure ideological to even personal, economical and irrational ones... Just a pity that the book is published in Flemish language.
Concerning Degrelle, you wrote:"...In 1948 a Dutch psychologist, Dr. A. F. G. van Hoesel, published the results of a study he had made of 450 young Netherlanders who had been arrested for military collaboration with the Germans. Most of the men had served in the Waffen-SS. After personally interrogating them, interviewing their parents and friends, and screening their court records, van Hoesel concluded that the vast majority had been motivated to volunteer by such factors as a desire for adventure, better food, the prestige of wearing an SS uniform, sheer boredom, desire to avoid the unglamorous compulsory labor service, and a variety of personal factors which included, in some instances, a wish to avoid prosecution for juvenile delinquency or petty criminality. In any case, few of the youths who made up the bulk of the Dutch SS volunteers were motivated by any form of political or ideological idealism.(see also footnote 12)"
Absolutely!But another reason that, in my point of view is even more detestable, is the fact that the real (political) leader of the walloon volunteers, Leon Degrelle, could not cope with the fact that his volunteers were considered as "second category" and only served as a Wehrmacht bataillon, underwent all possible steps and making up stories to convince the RFSS and the RSHA that the walloons somewhere in the ancient times detained Germanic blood. So, by his own choleric character and endless efforts, he made it possible for "his guys" to change uniform and enter the rangs of the Waffen-SS in Summer 1943. And to continue this discrepancy, the walloons continued to bear the BELGIAN colours (black / yellow / red) as an opposition against the Flemish, historically more correctly, bearing the Flemish colours and heraldic symbols. Entering the Waffen-SS was for Degrelle more a political step and an individual satisfaction to his own ego than a rational one. With even consequences up to today.
Narcissism and self-aggrandizement were Degrelle's primary characteristics. Even in the 1930's, the Rexist political platform was a muddle and was little more than a vehicle for Degrelle's attempts to fashion himself as a Belgian Mussolini. The Rexists were basically washed up after the 1937 elections. Even in 1940, the German occupation authorities considered the Rexists too insignificant to play a major collaborationist role, although clearly Degrelle has his uses.
With the encouragement of German Ambassador to France Otto Abetz and Operation Barbarossa, Degrelle saw that the only way he and his Rexist cohorts could work their way up in the New Order was to win some spurs on the battlefield. Remember, it wasnt so much the Nazis asking for foreign volunteers against "Judeo-Bolshevism" as the collaborationists first offering themselves up. The Germans clearly recognized that such volunteer units would be a very useful tool to encourage compliance and collaboration among the occupied nations.
Clearly Degrelle recognized the power of the "SS State" within Nazi Germany and attached himself and his unit to the Waffen-SS in an effort to be closer to the levers of power. But such a move was an effort to win more prestige for himself; it certainly had no effect on mitigating German occupation policy. He may have talked about Belgium, or perhaps more accurately Wallonia, but all he really cared about was Degrelle.
There seems to be an implied assumption in several of these responses that these volunteer units such as the Walloon Legion were big, popular and militarily proficient.
This is false. In terms of manpower, they were insignificant. (a battalion of Walloon volunteers compared to what - a thousand odd German Army battalions on the Eastern Front?) In terms of popularity, their supporters were few. (By 1942 Degrelle was scraping the bottom of the Rexist manpower pool) In terms of military prowess, they were poorly lead, poorly trained and, frankly, frequently incompetent. (For example, see Stein p.156: "...Poorly trained, ill-equipped, partially demoralized, and sent into action piecemeal, the legionnaires were badly mauled during the winter's fighting." - that's something you won't read from Richard Landwehr!)