Polish soldiers in the Wehrmacht/Waffen-SS?

Discussions on the foreigners (volunteers as well as conscripts) fighting in the German Wehrmacht, those collaborating with the Axis and other period Far Right organizations. Hosted by George Lepre.
Agadanik
Member
Posts: 157
Joined: 13 Nov 2004 03:38
Location: Canada

Post by Agadanik » 21 Nov 2004 08:25

michael mills wrote:In my comments ...I was talking about real fighting, ie units of armed men on different sides shooting at each other, not actions ... like blowing up the Federal Offices in Oklahoma or killing hostages in Iraq.

I am glad you presented your views in extenso. Now I understand better whom I am talking to.

I am mindful of the guidelines of our hosts and thus reluctant to engage in what would necessarily be a polemic with your opinion piece, in which you cover a rather broad range of subjects, without providing any source references. If you’d like to debate Jan Karski, Jedwabne, “justifiable anti-Jewish sentiments”, collaboration of Jews with the Soviets, or the communist underground in Poland – please divide your comments into specific topics and shift them to the areas designated for such discussion, so that I may respond properly in each case.

Let me address your main subject, or Armia Krajowa’s relations with the Soviets in Western Belorussia.

Since Sept 1939 the area in question was under Soviet occupation, or, to use your expression, - “tyranny”. The Soviets saw these territories as their own and acted accordingly, treating Polish underground groups as enemy organizations and making every effort to eliminate them. Consequently, the AK had limited armed presence in Western Belorussia until the spring of 1943.
http://www.gildia.com/historia/wiek_20/ ... tka_polska

The Soviet partisan movement in the area was stronger and better armed, and already in the summer of 1942 consisted of 2600 partisans. The relations with Poles were generally good and included shared intelligence and joint military operations.

In April 1943, the Soviet partisan forces were consolidated under the command of gen. Chernyshov, whose aim was to take total control of the region. Polish national aspirations were seen as irrelevant at best, and for the most part – as hostile to the Soviets.

On April 25, two weeks after the discovery of the Katyn massacre, Soviet Union broke off diplomatic relations with Poland’s government in exile. On June 22, the CC of Belorussian Comm. Party decided in Moscow to undertake all possible means to combat nationalist underground, or the AK. This included “elimination” of commanders, fragmentation of Polish units and takeover by Soviet officers.
http://www.wspolnota-polska.org.pl/inde ... =h26081943

On August 26, lt. Burzynski-Kmicic of the AK was visiting with his staff officers the Soviet partisan commander, col. Markov, to plan a previously agreed upon joint operation. The relations between the two units were good, and the camps were only 3 km apart. During the meeting Polish officers were arrested and the Soviets surrounded the Polish camp. Burzynski-Kmicic, seven of his officers and 80 of his partisans were shot. This was the beginning of putting into effect the Soviet policy of physical elimination of the Polish underground movement.
http://www.glos.by.ru/608/historia.shtml
It (the AK) did not engage in the same sort of fighting against German armed forces as it did against Soviet partisans in West Belorussia.
That’s simply ignorant. I’ve already given you a source reference, estimating German losses at 150,000 men. For a specific example, see http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.c ... ra%20Brama

As to your comparison of the Polish anti-Nazi resistance to Musa al-Zarqawi, Timothy McVeigh or the IRA activities in Britain, aka murderers of innocent civilians: Since a proper response would undoubtedly result in banning me from this Forum, I prefer to leave it unanswered.

User avatar
Allen Milcic
Member
Posts: 2903
Joined: 09 Sep 2003 20:29
Location: Canada

Post by Allen Milcic » 22 Nov 2004 15:11

Agadanik wrote: As to your comparison of the Polish anti-Nazi resistance to Musa al-Zarqawi, Timothy McVeigh or the IRA activities in Britain, aka murderers of innocent civilians: Since a proper response would undoubtedly result in banning me from this Forum, I prefer to leave it unanswered.
Agadanik:

Why would a 'proper' response get you banned? You seem to have responded well to all other assertions, why not respond in kind to this? A 'proper' response is not one that is rude or personal, but one that is measured, polite and on point, and I am sure you are more than capable of this. This has been a most interesting and informative thread, please continue.

Regards,
Allen/

Agadanik
Member
Posts: 157
Joined: 13 Nov 2004 03:38
Location: Canada

Post by Agadanik » 22 Nov 2004 15:39

Allen Milcic wrote: Why would a 'proper' response get you banned? You seem to have responded well to all other assertions, why not respond in kind to this? A 'proper' response is not one that is rude or personal, but one that is measured, polite and on point, and I am sure you are more than capable of this. This has been a most interesting and informative thread, please continue.

Regards,
Allen/
I appreciate your comment, Allen. Let me explain.

As I understand it, this Forum is primarily devoted to discovery of facts, based on documented and credible evidence. To this end, Michael's comparison of anti-Nazi resistance to al-Zarqawi et al falls outside that area and enters the sphere of moral judgments. A response to Michael's comment would result in a polemic in kind, and not in an analysis of what happened or did not happen.

I am happy to discuss specific occurrences and processes with Michael, but an exchange on value judgments inevitably involves personal opinions of your opponent's moral code. This is something I would rather not engage in.

Again, thanks for your encouragement.

rgds, Agadanik

Obserwator
Banned
Posts: 557
Joined: 01 Aug 2004 18:50
Location: Poland

Post by Obserwator » 22 Nov 2004 15:46

not actions such as those listed by Obserwator, which are more like blowing up the Federal Offices in Oklahoma or killing hostages in Iraq.
Again your lack of historical knowledge is evident Mills.Home Army targeted only military and occupation forces not civilians.Your comparision is flawed because like Oklahoma or Iraq were in independent and democratic countries and aimed at civilians.Home Army instead aimed at military forces who were conducitng a widescale genocide, murdering milions of innocent civilians(3milion polish Jews and 3milion ethnic Poles in total), leveling whole villages, towns and kidnapping children,Home Army never attacked civilian objects-only once was a civilian target attacked by Polish resistence -a cafe visited by German officers in Warsaw but not by Home Army but People's Guard a different organisation.
In West Belorussia, units of the AK engaged Soivet partisan units in battle, using arms and ammunition supplied to them by the Wehrmacht
As true as Naras organisation.
Obserwator did not list any such battles taking place between the AK and German forces prior to the Warsaw Uprising, in which of course open combat did take place.
I already listed the huge resistence actions and quotations from german officials as to ther struggle against the Polish resistence.Also i listed Operation Belt which was such a struggle, but you chose to ignore it.
they devoted their efforts to fighting the Soviet partisans in the area, and to that end entered into a de-facto colaboration with the Wehrmacht.
Nope-Home Army had orders to join forces with Soviet Army, because they were their allies, as the Home Army was part of Allies and under the command of govt. in London. Of course their were later skirmishes with Soviet Army when it started to persecute them, but this was after the German retreat, where Soviet forces ususally took support from Home Army units in battle, only targeting AK after those engaments.They never was a collaboration of AK with Wehrmacht.
In the Generalgouvernement, the AK did undertake verious types of terrorist-type actions against the German occupation, actions that might be compared to those undertaken by the IRA in more recent times against Britain.
I am sorry but AK never staged terrorists attacks. You are in error.It sabogated German genocide and war effort in USSR but this not terrorism.
Jan Kozielewski alias Karski, I hold to my view that he was essentially a phoney
Actually a great hero, he went to concentraion camp and escaped with information about the horrors made there.
, taking material fed to him as the basis for the exciting but fictionalised book "Story of a Secret State", published in 1944
A great documentation of Polish society struggle to resiste extermination efforts by Nazis during the occupation.
The predicts that the Jews will eventually suffer a "bloody revenge" at the hands of the Poles, a prediction that came true in places like Jedwabne.
Again you try to twist his words and actions in a way that is insulting.Karski was great friend of Jews and wanted to stop the Holocaust, the "Jews" you spoke of were aimed at at communist Jews who abused their power not the whole Jew society which after all was not communistic by default.

User avatar
Allen Milcic
Member
Posts: 2903
Joined: 09 Sep 2003 20:29
Location: Canada

Post by Allen Milcic » 22 Nov 2004 16:04

Agadanik wrote: I appreciate your comment, Allen. Let me explain.

As I understand it, this Forum is primarily devoted to discovery of facts, based on documented and credible evidence. To this end, Michael's comparison of anti-Nazi resistance to al-Zarqawi et al falls outside that area and enters the sphere of moral judgments. A response to Michael's comment would result in a polemic in kind, and not in an analysis of what happened or did not happen.

I am happy to discuss specific occurrences and processes with Michael, but an exchange on value judgments inevitably involves personal opinions of your opponent's moral code. This is something I would rather not engage in.

Again, thanks for your encouragement.

rgds, Agadanik
Hi Agadanik:

Thank you for your response, and I do see where you are coming from. However, would a (substantiated, naturally) list of targets of the anti-Nazi resistance, indicating that it was military and occupation forces and not civilians that were targeted, not prove Mr. Mills' assertion as invalid, while at the same time keeping the discussion on a high level?

Best regards,
Allen/

Obserwator
Banned
Posts: 557
Joined: 01 Aug 2004 18:50
Location: Poland

Post by Obserwator » 22 Nov 2004 16:22

list of targets of the anti-Nazi resistance, indicating that it was military and occupation forces and not civilians that were targeted, not prove Mr. Mills' assertion as invalid, while at the same time keeping the discussion on a high level?
I already posted such a list
http://www.polishresistance-ak.org/2%20Article.htm
List of confirmed sabotage-diversionary actions of
the Union of Armed Combat (ZWZ) and Home Army (AK)
from 1 January 1941 to 30 June 1944
Source: Bohdan Kwiatkowski, Sabotaż i dywersja, Bellona, London 1949, vol.1, p.21








Sabotage / Diversionary Action Type Totals
1 Damaged locomotives 6 930

2 Delayed repairs to locomotives 803

3 Derailed transports 732

4 Transports set on fire 443

5 Damage to railway wagons 19 058

6 Blown up railway bridges 38

7 Disruptions to electricity supplies in the Warsaw grid 638

8 Army vehicles damaged or destroyed 4 326

9 Damaged aeroplanes 28

10 Fuel tanks destroyed 1 167

Fuel destroyed (in tonnes) 4 674

11 Blocked oil wells 5

12 Wagons of wood wool destroyed 150

13 Military stores burned down 130

14 Disruptions of production in factories 7

15 Built-in faults in parts for aircraft engines 4 710

16 Built-in faults into cannon muzzles 203

17 Built-in faults into artillery missiles 92 000

18 Built-in faults into air traffic radio stations 107

19 Built-in faults into condensers 70 000

20 Built-in faults into (electro-industrial) lathes 1 700

21 Damage to important factory machinery 2 872

22 Various acts of sabotage performed 25 145

23 Planned assassinations of Germans 5 733
Transport and railway disruption were very helpfull towards the USSR as German Army didn't receive supplies or reinforcemnts in time or at all.
Also from the same article :
At the top of the command structure was the Home Army High Command (KG AK) which consisted of seven staff bureaus and miscellaneous specialist units and detachments. The territory of Poland, in its interwar shape, was divided into areas and regions, each of which had its own scaled down version of the KG AK. The chief task of the AK was to prepare and execute a general uprising in Poland coordinated with the Allies in the final phase of the war, which would liberate Poland from the occupant in one fell swoop. The on-going struggle concentrated on self-defence (freeing prisoners and hostages, defence against pacification measures), and striking at the occupant’s apparatus of terror (the physical liquidation of Gestapo and SS functionaries). These activities were conducted by a special combat department known as the Diversionary Directorate (Kierownictwo Dywersji) – Kedyw for short, under the command of Colonel August Emil Fieldorf. Besides this special partisan detachments were created, designed to train soldiers for the coming uprising through small scale on-going skirmishing.
As a result of the unification of the various underground military organisations, the AK finally emerged in 1944 as an umbrella organisation for a national military force of over 350,000 soldiers. The intelligence work of the AK in a wide area of Europe was of capital importance to Allied strategists. Among other achievements, the production centre of the V1 rocket was pinpointed and essential V2 parts were won and passed on to London. Psychological warfare was also waged, in which Action "N" was mounted to create the illusion of an internal German opposition movement to Hitler.
Also :
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kedyw
Kedyw (acronym for Kierownictwo Dywersji, Polish Directorate of Sabotage and Diversion; probably also a play on the Turkish "khedive," which translates into Polish as kedyw): a Polish World War II Armia Krajowa organization that specialized in active and passive sabotage, propaganda and armed action against German forces and collaborators.

Kedyw was created on January 22, 1943, from two pre-existing Armia Krajowa organizations: Związek Odwetu, and Wachlarz. Initially the units were small and town-based. Eventually, as more were formed, some moved into forested areas to begin partisan warfare. Kedyw organized weapon and munition factories, military schools, intelligence, counter-intelligence, field hospitals, and a communication network.

Most members of Kedyw were boy scouts from Związek Harcerstwa Polskiego and its wartime organization, Szare Szeregi. Many of the officers were cichociemni, special agents trained in the United Kingdom and parachuted into occupied Poland. Selected Kedyw groups (patrole) carried out operations all over occupied Poland. Among notable types of operations were:

* the sabotaging of rail lines, bridges and roads
o the burning of trains and fuel depots
* the destruction or damaging of weapon factories working for the Wehrmacht
* the liberation of hundreds of prisoners and hostages
o a famous operation of this type, which took place on March 26, 1943, is known as "Akcja pod Arsenałem"
* executions of Nazi collaborators and traitors sentenced by an underground court
o one of these involved Igo Sym, a Polish actor who had been informing the Germans about Home Army operations
* executions of particularly brutal individuals among the German occupation troops, Gestapo, SS and police
o those executed included SS and police General Franz Kutschera, killed on February 2, 1944, and SS-Hauptscharfuehrer August Kretschmann, commandant of the Gęsiówka concentration camp
* Operation Belt
Also :
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Belt
Operation Belt (Polish Akcja Taśma) was one of the large-scaled anti-German operations of the Armia Krajowa Kedyw during the World War II.
In August 1943 the headquarters of the Armia Krajowa ordered Kedyw to prepare an armed action against German border guarding stations on the frontier between the General Gouvernment and the territories annexed to Germany. Until February 1944 13 German outposts were destroyed with little losses on the Polish side. One of the boy-scouts who fell in the action was Tadeusz Zawadzki Zośka, one of the most popular personalities of the Polish underground.
A good reading is also this document from 1944"THE POLISH GOVERNMENT
AND THE POLISH UNDERGROUND STATE" :
http://www.republika.pl/unpack/1/dok01c.html
(I will post a fragment)
THE POLISH UNDERGROUND STATE
The underground movement in Poland is different from that of every other movement of a like nature in German-occupied countries. This is due to tile different conditions of existence, the different form taken by the German terror, and in particular to tile different principles applied by the Germans to Poland in the course of the war.

No Collaboration with Germans

The Poles are the only nation in Europe who from the beginning have adopted a rigid attitude towards the occupying power and its representatives. This means that in no sphere of political life has there been any collaboration with the German occupying authorities, and that even tile semblance of a stabilization of relations has been at all costs avoided, and so far successfully avoided. Despite more than one attempt on the part of German official sources to stabilize relations with the Poles, and to achieve some degree of political collaboration between the Polish nation and the German authorities, to develop some form of Polish political administration cooperating with tile Germans, the Poles have always resolutely refused. There is not one Pole in the "Government of the General Gouvernement," not one Pole has undertaken to act as a provincial governor or head of county administration, or town mayor. In no sector of political life have the Poles submitted to the occupying authorities.

The result has been to create a permanent state of martial law, The Poles have been in practice placed outside all law. A Pole can obtain no legal redress against a German, in the sphere of criminal or even of civil law. A Pole may not bring any charge against any German official in any sphere of national, provincial, local, economic or social activity. A Pole may not hold any position of authority over a German.

This state of affairs has in turn provoked a further reaction among the Poles. As early as 1939 Polish leaders realized that if this unique, unyielding attitude to the occupying authorities was maintained, the Polish people could not be left in a state of chaos and internal lawlessness. And this was the basic cause of the development of the underground life which exists in Poland today.

Once the attitude had been adopted that no German prescription, regulation, or order was binding on the Polish nation, it followed ,is an inevitable consequence that the Polish nation must set up its own supreme authority and its own various administrative departments. And as the Polish leaders, supported by the mass of the people, took the attitude that these -,authorities, and institutions could have no relations with the German administration and legal system, they had to be created underground, as a second parallel, but secret, national and local authority.

Underground Organization of the Polish State

From the very beginnings of the organization of the Polish Underground Movement the principle was adopted that the aim to be achieved was not merely the organization of a "patriotic resistance," but that Polish State authorities, departments and institutions must be maintained.

Immediately after the fall of Warsaw on September 27th, 1939, Polish leaders decided that their chief objective must be to prevent any de facto break in the continuity of Polish State sovereignty. From the very beginning the underground movement adopted the principle of State legality, with the corol-lary that for Poles generally the Polish State was officially and legally recognized as still in existence.

This principle, which has been most fruitful in its consequences for all Polish decisions and postulates throughout the war, meant that the Polish State has existed and functioned through all the most essential authorities, departments and institutions of a normal democratic State. More-over, that State with its Administrative machinery has continued to function in all the territories within the Polish State's frontiers as they existed on September 1st, 1939. But the legal, plenipotentiary government of that State, together with all its constitutional titles with relation to the Polish nation, had to exist abroad, for only by functioning in conditions of security and by having the physical possibility of day-to-day collaboration with the rest of the Allied Nations, could that Government effectively pursue Polish policy.

This principle has proved of inestimable value both to the Underground Movement and to the Polish Government. It is of value to the Underground Movement because it gives that movement authority in relation to the Polish people, and because it underlines its official character, its character as a function of State. And the principle is also of inestimable value to the Polish Government because it entitles it to speak and to conduct policy not simply in the name of the Polish emigres living abroad but in the name of the entire Polish community.

A closer analysis of this situation brings out all its importance. For instance, the underground authorities have long possessed the right to call upon individual Poles to take part in the administrative machinery of the Government's Delegate authority, or above all in the Underground Army. Most fre-quently Poles are called up or mobilized to work or fight in the Underground Movement. In most cases the decision rests not with the individual person but with the underground authorities. Naturally, in practice only the best and most reliable individuals are so mobilized, and a free hand is left to those who either do not possess the technical and psychological qualifications for conspiratorial activities or are not absolutely indispensable.

Obviously this degree of authority could not be achieved easily or automatic-ally. The extent and degree to which the principle was put into practice can be very well judged from the methods of enrolling new members of the Underground Movement. In 1939 or the beginning of 1940 when a patriotic Pole was asked to collaborate in the Underground Movement he was invited in terms rather of sentiment and patriotism. But when a representative of the Government's Delegate or an officer of the military authorities applies to any Pole today lie no longer does so in such terms: they are obvious and are taken for granted. He notifies the man or woman that he or she has been summoned by the Delegate of the Polish Government or the Commander of the National Army to service, and that he or she is allocated a certain definite task. In such conditions only obstacles of a technical nature can be accepted as motives for refusal. If such do not exist, and the given individual refuses to carry out the order or instruction, it would mean that he does not recognize the official State authority of the underground organization. Such instances are very rare.

THE PARADOX IN THE SITUATION IN POLAND

The occupying authorities' specific system of terrorization, of the Situation which is calculated to achieve the object of frightening and in Poland reducing to passivity the entire nation, has produced a cer-tain kind of paradox in Poland. It is that the chief victims of German ruthlessness and brutality are most frequently the masses of tile people who are not engaged in the underground movement. The fact that while the occupying authorities methods of terrorization are highly ruthless, they are also automatically bureaucratic, enabling the underground organizations to avoid suppression and sacrifice, while a high standard of conspiracy is achieved.

This is neither the place, nor the time, to make public the methods which the underground movement employs in order to avoid the occupying authorities' attempts to break it up, but the fact remains that the losses in the movement are incomparably lower than those suffered by the people as a whole. It is easier for the Germans to arrest and destroy a hundred innocent people than to capture and render harmless a single member of an official underground organization. This leads to the strange situation that membership of the Underground Movement entails greater chances of remaining in freedom, even in everyday life, than if one relies only on being "innocent" in regard to the occupying authorities.

From time to time steps are taken to draw quite a number of people into the Underground Movement, not so much because of their immediate utility in this regard, as in order to protect them and save them from the everyday dangers arising from the German occupation.

Why There is No Polish Quisling

Working in accordance with the foregoing principles, the Underground Movement built up a preliminary organizational structure very early, in the first few months of 1940, and that structure was almost completely organized in its final form soon after the fall of France.

One of the most important and essential things to be said about that structure is that it constitutes a normal Polish State organization. All the most important authorities, departments and institutions characteristic of a normal democratic State, have been organized and restored as far as possible, though of course in a more restricted sphere, within the framework of the Underground Movement. This constitutes a fundamental difference between the Polish Underground Movement and those of other nations, whom the Germans have temporarily conquered.

In every other country of Europe there are normal administrative authorities, local government authorities, economic authorities, normal educational institutions, and almost always a more or less legal constitutional government, co-operating with the German occupying authorities or set up within the frame-work of the occupying administration. Of course the majority of the citizens of the country realize that the only moral authoritative and patriotic factor of national policy is the Government abroad.
None the less, the fact that official State authorities, departments and institutions are functioning inside the country within bounds laid down and allowed by the occupying power by no means facilitates the organization of the underground movement on a constitutional and State scale. And it provides the answer to the question why the Under-ground Movement watches so thoroughly and effectively over the principle that no Pole should take any part whatever in the German occupying administra-tion who is in any way the political representative of even the smallest section of the Polish people. Unfortunately, people abroad do not sufficiently appre-ciate the significance of the fact, unique in the war, that not one Polish politi-cian occupies any position whatever in the official German politico-organizational system established for the "General Gouvernement."


This question is not to be explained exclusively in terms of the problem of the relentless struggle against the occupying authority. And there is no need to conceal the fact that this is so. For any violation of this principle would menace the most essential principle of the structure of underground life. It would undermine that structure, and would complicate the question of Polish State existence.
Not for one moment could a situation be allowed in which any Pole, even the humblest member of the community, could feel any doubt on the fundamental issue of State unity, legality and distinctive existence. Not for one moment could a situation be allowed to develop, in which any Pole was confronted with the existence of another Polish authority and another Polish administration apart from the authority and administration of the Underground Movement within Poland and of the Polish Government abroad.

This position has cost Poland a great deal, and the world knows or should know it. But at the same time, owing to this relentlessness and refusal to be deterred even by the most painful sacrifices, the Polish Underground Move-ment has maintained the purity of the State doctrine and the unchallenged authority and sway of the organs of the Polish Underground Movement over every Pole. The fact that there is no cooperation whatever with the occupy-ing power on any sector of political life means not only that Poles have been able to hold the standard of Polish honor as high as former generations of Poles have held it in times of adversity, but that they have been able to avoid any kind of rivalry for authority over the nation.

And this attitude has consequences equally significant for the future. So long as this war lasts there will be no political cooperation in Poland with the Germans. There will be no traitors in Poland. The Underground Movement will not allow such a situation to happen, even if mechanical methods of prevention have to be applied, even if the necessity arises of applying such methods.
But, in fact, there is no need to fear such a development. The most characteristic and most honorable testimony that can be paid to the Polish nation in this war is the fact that not once has the necessity arisen to eliminate any outstanding Polish figure for being ready to collaborate with the occupying authorities.
The few dozen cases in which the Underground Movement has found it necessary to order the elimination of Poles who proved disloyal to Poland, have been exclusively concerned with persons of the least importance and having no political standing, such as petty agents, small-scale agents provocateurs, cowardly Volksdeutsche and similar small fry to be found everywhere.

Agadanik
Member
Posts: 157
Joined: 13 Nov 2004 03:38
Location: Canada

Post by Agadanik » 24 Nov 2004 03:38

More on AK and the Soviets in Western Belorussia 1943-44.


Michael Mills wrote above:
As for the Armia Krajowa collaboration with the Wehrmacht in Belorussia against Soviet partisans, it was not a trifle. The AK formations were engaged in real fighting, supported logistically by the Wehrmacht…
The degree of collaboration, whether overt or de facto, between the German occupation authorities and rightist Polish elements was much greater than generally believed…
There were Polish political elements that were prepared to consider it [collaboration]…



By the summer of ’43, the relations between Polish and Soviet partisan units in Western Belorussia have worsened. As the number of armed men in the area was increasing quickly, conflicts over provisions became a part of everyday life, and with the defeat of Germany becoming more and more realistic, both sides were determined to stake claim to the contested territory. The August ‘43 murder of Burczanski-Kmicic and 80 of his men by the Soviet commander Markov escalated the conflict to a new level. Still, at least some Polish and Soviet unit commanders maintained operational contacts. In the Fall of 43, 22 Soviet partisan brigades in the area consisted of approx. 9000 men and outnumbered Polish partisans by an approx. 3:1 ratio. The Soviets were also significantly better equipped, with steady supply flow ensured by the Russian Central Partisan Command.

On Dec. 1, 1943, Polish officers from the Stolpce unit were invited to an operational meeting by a Soviet commander. Five men were ambushed on the way (some sources say they were murdered), and Soviet units in the area began an open campaign of attacking and disarming Polish partisans. As the number of firefights increased, an order of the Soviet Partisan Command was found on the body of a killed Soviet officer, with instructions to disarm all Polish partisans unwilling to join Soviet units.

By mid-December, an elder of a local village delivered a letter left with him by the Germans to a 27 yr old lt Jozef Swida-Lech, who commanded a Polish partisan unit in the area. The letter was signed by a member of the staff of Operationsgruppe Minsk, who was aware of Swida-Lech’s armed conflict with the Soviets. It offered Polish partisans supplies of German arms and ammunition and requested a written response. Swida-Lech arranged a meeting in the nearby town of Lida, where he reached an agreement with the Germans. In January ’44 he received from them the first lot of arms.

The story spread quickly, since Swida-Lech advised other unit commanders of his arrangements with the Germans. AK regional commander, mjr Szlaski-Prawdzic, notified the General Command in Warsaw, which viewed Swida-Lech’s actions as treason. On Jan. 8, CIC of Polish Armed Forces in London, gen Sosnkowski, issued instructions to cease all contacts with the Germans at once and to punish all guilty of such contacts.

In mid-February, a unit of Swida-Lech’s force left his command in protest against his dealings with the enemy. On Feb 20, AK’s Chief of Operations in Warsaw sent his personal representative, mjr Kotwicz, to Western Belorussia, with absolute authority over all Polish partisan forces in the territory. Swida-Lech was ordered to discontinue all dealings with the Germans and to cease attacking the Soviets. He refused. German supplies to him continued until March ’44.

Upon his arrival in the region, mjr Kotwicz relieved the regional commander, mjr Szlaski-Prawdzic, of his command. In early March, lt Swida-Lech was court martialed by a specially convened Polish military court. He was sentenced to death. His sentence was commuted and he was ordered to leave the region, with an opportunity to rehabilitate himself through future military actions in other territories.

Another local commander, lt Pilch-Gora, also had contacts with the Germans (the sources I looked at are unclear as to whether he actually received any supplies). He was ordered to leave the region. With the front rolling through Western Belorussia, Pilch-Gora took his unit west and eventually reached Warsaw, where he fought in the 1944 uprising and was given Poland’s highest military decoration, Virtuti Militari, by gen Bor-Komorowski, AK’s CIC.

These were the only documented cases of AK’s collaboration with the Germans I was able to find. I didn’t look at all available sources, so some details could have been overlooked, but one of the documents I found is a primary source – a personal testimony of lt Swida-Lech written in 1985. I believe the above story is accurate in a broad outline.

In 1944, AK had several hundred thousand partisans under its command. Its units, ordered to cooperate with the incoming Red Army and to identify themselves to the Soviets, were being disarmed and thousands were shot, imprisoned, or deported to Siberia.

Sources: Jozef Swida, Wyjasnienie dot. 1943/1944 roku, Zeszyty Historyczne vol 73, Paris 1985, pp 74-80
http://www.gildia.com/historia/wiek_20/ ... tka_polska
http://wilk.wpk.p.lodz.pl/~whatfor/biog_pilch.htm
http://www.glos.wschod.org/635/zpb.shtml
http://www.ipn.gov.pl/a_050704_spot_waw ... ewski.html
Last edited by Agadanik on 02 Dec 2004 06:40, edited 1 time in total.

michael mills
Member
Posts: 9000
Joined: 11 Mar 2002 12:42
Location: Sydney, Australia

Post by michael mills » 24 Nov 2004 05:34

I have now been able to re-check one of my sources, the book "Die Gestapo im Zweiten Weltkrieg; 'Heimatfront' und besetztes Europe", edited by Gerhard Paul and Klaus-Michael Mallmann (Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 2000).

The editors are German academics who have collaborated on specialised studies of the Gestapo. Gerhard Paul is a professor of history at the University of Flensburg, and Klaus-Michael Mallmann is a lecturer at the University of Essen.

The particular chapter in the book that I drew on was "Auf der Suche nach einer besatzungspolitischen Konzeption; die Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und der SD im Generalgouvernement", by Michael Foedrowitz, a journalist and author living in Hannover who has produced many articles and TV documentaries about the Second World War.

I consider an academic publication of this type to be superior to any number of websites, since it has gone through a process of proper review by qualified experts in the field, whereas there is rarely any quality control of websites.

The main theme of Foedrowitz's chapter is the conflict between the German Security Police (Sipo) commanders in occupied Poland, who sought to modify the German occupation policies and practice in order to achieve a modus vivendi with the anti-Communist parts of the Polish resistance in order to achieve a de-facto collaboration against the Soviet Union, and the Higher SS and Police Leader (HSSPF) in Poland and the SS and Police Leaders (SSPF) subordinate to him, who were responsible directly to Himmler and promoted the most radical policies and practices, rejecting any attempt at collaboration with the anti-Communist resistance.

The thrust of the chapter backs up my original post on this topic, which referred to conflict between different parts of the German security forces in Poland in regard to the attitude to the Polish resistance.

After re-reading the chapter, I can see that what I wrote about Rowecki was basically correct, although I confused some of the details with events surrounding two other high officers of the AK, Colonel Albrecht, the AK Chief of Staff until 1941, and Tadeusz Myslinksi, the leader of the security section of the Delegatura (the representation in Polandof the Government-in-Exile in London).

Here are excerpts from the chapter which support my previous posts (my transaltion from the German):

Page354ff
The security measures from 1939 to 1941 had been directed against those circles of Polish society which, on the basis of their anti-Russian and anti-Bolshevik attitude, should after the commencement of the war against Russia increasingly have become partners in negotiation for a "truce". That blew the possibility of winning the majority of Poles for a fight against the USSR. Even representatives of fascist organisations expressed the view that there could be no question of co-operation since the German side had made several million mistakes too many [source: Czeslaw Madajczyk: Die Okkupationspolitik Nazideutschlands in Polen 1939-1945, Köln 1988, p. 123, note 133].
The above excerpt supports my contention that the German security measures until 1941 were aimed primarily against anti-Soviet Poles. The reason for that was the agreement made with the Soviet Union in 1939,as I stated.

Another excerpt on page 352 underlines the counter-productiveness of German actions such as the AB-Aktion against anti-Soviet Poles:
In a report of the [German] Foreign Office about the AB-Aktion it was stated that there had been numerous pro-German persons among the victims and because of that "any pro-German movement was nipped in the bud".
Back to page 354:
Already in July 1941 the arrest of the Chief of Staff of the resistance movement, Colonel Albrecht, offered the possibility of an arrangement, particularly as Albrecht agreed to the arguments of the Sipo that a defeat of Germany was no longer equivalent to a victory of national Poland. The release of Albrecht from German imprisonment, the offer of a 'modus vivendi' to the leadership of the resistance movement and his forced suicide, for the first evoked great concern not only in the Polish underground itself but also among the Western Allies and the Polish Government-in-Exile [Source: Author's interview with HM on 8 November 1986]. However the first initiative had failed.

The breakthrough in the bungled situation was to be brought about by the Sonderkommando IV AS of the BdS [= Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei = Commander-in-chief of the Security Police], newly established in the summer of 1941. The leader of the Kommando, SS-Hauptsturmführer Spilker, equipped with far-reaching special powers, took up contact with the conspiratorial organisations of the national-Polish Armia Krajowa (AK) and the Government Delegatura, the representation of the Polish Government-in-Exile in London. The aim was to forge an anti-Bolshevik Front by confidence-building measures and to defuse the precarious security situation in the area behind the Eastern Front. Spilker was responsible only to the Leader of Amt IV [Gestapo] and/or the BdS, or to the Desk Officer for Poland at the RSHA. By contrast, orders from higher-ranking KdS [= Kommandeure der Sicherheitspolizei = Commanders of the Security Police] could be suspended if he considered it correct [Source: Information from SK of 5 December 1987; witness statement by GF of 25 January 1961, StA Hamburg, 147 Js 22/69, Bd. 7].

To be sure, the mass graves of Katyn could be discovered at the beginning of 1943 on the basis of investigations by Sonderkommando IV AS, but the great propaganda effect was not achieved in the face of routine German crimes even in the territory of the Reich [Source: Reports from the Reich Nr 377 of 19 April 1943, in: Heinz Boberach (Hrsg.): "Meldungen aus dem Reich", Herrsching 1984, Vol. 13, p. 5145]. Even so, Spilker succeeded in penetrating the underground centres by clever management of his agents, especially as the new head of the Poland Office at the RSHA, SS-Sturmbannführer Harro Thomsen, supported the course of an apparent German-Polish arrangement [Source: Compare the witness statement of H. Thomsen of 24 September 1968, Public Prosecutors Office Wiesbaden, 8 Js 0127/80, Vol. XLI; witness statement of the same person of 1 March 1967, HStAD, process against Best et. al. (Note 7), Vol. 18]. But this variant in no way contradicted the concept of a brutal occupation terror, but rather complemented it in an effective way, since no-one in a laeding position was prepared to give up terror, murder and deportation in total as instruments of security policy in the Generalgouvernement [Source: Foedrowitz, "Die deutschen Sicherheits- und Exekutivorgane in 'Generalgouvernement' in Bezug auf die Bekämpfung der polnischen Widerstandsbewegung 1939-1945", Ms. Hannover 1991, p. 27f]. Even so, the Sipo thereby gained through approaching the Polish 'opponent' that political dimension which had its effects not only in its[ the Sipo's] area of activity but also in the camp of the Allies and thereby weighed upon the most sensitive point of the anti-Hitler coalition.

However these far-ranging ambitions were constantly impeded or nullified by the HSSPF or the subordinate SSPFs. The consequences were considerable tensions and conflicts. The chief culprit among others was the SSPF in the Lublin District, Odilo Globocnik, who gave priority to purely executive work. The conflict between him andthe KdS Lublin smouldered from the beginning. KdS Walter Huppenkothen, who quarreleed with the SSPF over questions of competence, turned directly to Heydrich, who came to Lublin personally - and decided in favour of Globocnik.
Another excerpt from page 358 on, detailing the de-facto German-Polish collaboration:

Searching for Allies

Under the impression of the mass-graves of Katyn, there appeared undergound-fighters in the rightist resistance who were ready to establish an anti-Bolshevik legion and lead it in the fight against the USSR. Among them were the two leading forces of Miecz i Plug (MiP), a resistance organisation financed for the most part by the Sipo. Under the mediation of Spilker a memorandum by MiP leaders was conveyed to the Reich Chancellery, but the suggestion for a common fight presented in it was rejected [Source: CdS Kaltenbrunner to Lammers June 1943, BAK, NS 19/946; witness statement by J. Deumling of 30 October 1967, HStAD, Process against Best et al., Vol. 29551-4/76]. Schöngarth [BdS im GG until 15 June 1943] by contrast presented the view that the course in Poland would finally have to be radically changed "if the German leadership in this area was to develop successfully in the long term" [Source: Frank to Lammers on 20 April 1943, AGK, NTN 257, Bühler Trial B-38]. Even son no action has become known which corresponded to that demand. With the change to Bierkamp [the new BdS im GG] many new KdS who shared his rigorous course came to the Generalgouvernement.

..................................................(A paragraph describing various examples of the collapse of German security in the Generalgouvernement in 1943, caused by Jewish escapees, the Ukrainian uprising, the penetration of Soviet partisan forces such as those of Kovpak).

The obvious failure of anti-partisan campaign by the Sipo and the SS did not however lead to the proclamation of a State of Emergency, but only to the declaration of the Generalgouvernement on 21 June 1943 as an "area of conflict with bandits", an obvious concealment of the failure of the RFSS as the chief of "combatting bandits". From 1943, according to the BdS, "bandits were deployed against bandits", that "would spare German blood" [Source: Werner Prag / Wolfgang Jacobmeyer (Hrsg.): "Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939-1945", Stuttgart 1975, p. 804]. The most serious incident occurred on 9 August 1943 in the village Borow, where members of the rightist Narodowe Sily Zbrojne killed 26 Communists and four peasants with axes - cause for Stalin to intervene with Churchill at Teheran [Source: Zbigniew Siemaszko: "Narodowe Sily Zbrojne", London 1982, p. 96; Alexander Fischer (Hrsg.):"Teheran, Jalta, Potsdam", Köln 1968, p. 182].

In 1944 the Sipo had completely lost control over the open countryside, in the Lublin District a partisan republic had even been proclaimed. "Combatting bandits" was now only possible with Wehrmacht formations and Police regiments. In addition, in the middle of 1944 bandit interception lines had to be set up, since besides the 800 escaped Russian POWs who were fighting as partisans in the Generalgouvernement, there now came partisan formations operating from the Soviet areas, which were swept into the Generalgouvernement in front of the retreating Wehrmacht like a bow-wave.

In May 1944, members of the KdS Warsaw and of Sonderkommando IV AS compose a memorandum which went directly to Gestapo chief Müller in the RSHA and the BdS. Among other things, it was proposed to set up a Polish army with 50,000 men armed with German weapons, under the command of the Gestapo agent and resistance leader Henryk Borucki [Source: witness statement by A. Otto of 9 October 1950, AGK, SWMW 891]. In the framework of these efforts, the captured leader of the security section of the Polish Government Delegatura in the country, Tadeusz Myslinski, conferred with Spilker, Bierkamp and Schindhelm [an officer of Amt IV of the BdS] for the purpose of discussing the possibilities of combined anti-Bolshevik action, including the release of captured AK-members in exchange for Communists in the ratio of 1:8. There were also discussions about sending Myslinski to the Polish Government-in-Exile in London to present a standstill agreement. The further struggle of the resistance movement against the occupying power was to be camouflaged by dummy actions [Source: witness statement by A. Otto of 22 September 1950; Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnetrznych (Eds.):"Walka Armii Krajowej i Delegatura Rzadu z ruchem lewicowym 1939-1944", Warsaw 1974, p. 164ff].

Even so there was strong resistance to this rapprochement, as the NS leadership assessed it as appropriate that in view of the war situation an alliance with Poles was not possible and such efforts would only be assessed as a weakness of the German side; besides, on the German side there were never any serious intentions of making political concessions to the Polish side beyond local tactical agreements.

The Warsaw Uprising

After everything that had happened, an uprising in the Generalgouvernement seemed inevitable to the Sipo. Already at the beginning of 1943 important plans for an uprising had fallen into German hands and reports of an armed insurrection grew increasingly stronger. As that development could no longer be staved off, there remained only the hope of being able to have an influence on the determination of the time and place of the insurrection.

With the inadvertent capture of the AK-chief Stefan Rowecki in June 1943 the Sipo had suffered a serious defeat, which could not be made good through strenuous counter-measures. To be sure, Himmler could be persuaded to suggest to Hitler a neutralising employment of Rowecki for the purpose of avoiding an uprising, but Hitler rejected the enterprise as too dangerous [Source: Filenote RFSS of 10 July 1943, Institut für Zeitgeschichte München, Microfilm T-175, Film 58]. Instead, on the outbreak of the Warsaw Uprising on 1 August 1944 Rowecki together with other high-ranking Polish negotiating partners in German custody were murdered on Himmler's orders in order to get rid of witnesses to compromising coalition talks [Source: Foedrowitz, op. cit., p. 446]. On 8 May 1944, BdS Bierkamp correctly guessed that plans for an uprising would be co-ordinated with a landing of the Western Allies and the opening of the Soviet mass-offensive in the East [Source: entry of 8 May 1944, DTB Frank, Vol. 35a/2]. The successful interventions of the Sipo in Spring 1944 considerably weakened the readiness of the Poles for an uprising. At the same time, the Wehrmacht and Sipo continued to try to get in touch with leading forces of the AK, in particular with AK-chief Komorowski [Source: report by K. Geppert of 20 November 1986 on the intelligence work of the Sipo; author's interview with SF on 3 January and 21 March 1985; Michael Foedrowitz, "Mit Feuer und Rauch", in: Die ZEIT Nr. 31 of 29 July 1994].

After the defeat of the uprising, charges were pressed against Bierkamp and his superior Koppe among others [Source: Wilhelm Koppe on 17 December 1964 to the Investigating Judge at the Landgericht Flensburg, Pub;lic Prosecutors office Flensburg, 147 Js 22/69, Vol. 112]. An investigation was also undertaken against the Wehrmacht commander Haenicke, who diverted the sole responsibility to the SS and Police; in any case Himmler had united the whole combat against partisans in his hands since 28 July 1942 [Source: Miltary District Commander Haenicke to OKW-chief Keitel on 4 September 1944, BA-MA, RH 53-23/59]. There were no consequemces for Himmler; he was appointed the commander of the Reserve Army and commander-in-chief of the Army Group Vistula.
So there we have it.

The arrest of Rowecki was "inadvertent". The Sipo commanders wanted to leave him at liberty so that they could reach an understanding with him, but some bumbling lower-level Gestapo officers who were unaware of what was going on jumped at the chance of gaining kudos by arresting him when his identity and hiding place were betrayed to them.

Furthermore, while Rowecki was in captivity, the negotiations with him and other captured resistance leaders continued, obviously with the blessing of Himmler, who had been influenced by the Sipo commanders in the Generalgouvernment.

The reason why the negotiations did not get anywhere was not due to any "heroic resistance" by Rowecki, but rather because Hitler rejected the use of Rowecki as an agent (presumably Hitler thought that Rowecki, once released, would double-cross the Germans).

Once the Warsaw Uprising had begun, there was no further use for Rowecki and the other high-ranking Polish prisoners as partners for negotiations. Furthermore, they were witnesses to the fact that high-ranking Germans had been prepared to negotiate with them, which in the changed situation would have been dangerous for the latter, incriminating them in the eyes of a furious and suspicious Hitler. That is the reason Rowecki and the others were quietly done away with, not because of any "heroic resistance".

*Personal remarks/insults deleted by Moderator*
[Mr. Mills, please refrain from posting these types of comments.]

Agadanik
Member
Posts: 157
Joined: 13 Nov 2004 03:38
Location: Canada

Post by Agadanik » 24 Nov 2004 12:57

michael mills wrote:
I have now been able to re-check one of my sources

Michael, it doesn't work. What is more, your quotes contradict the statements and theories you've offered here before.

In a report of the [German] Foreign Office about the AB-Aktion it was stated that there had been numerous pro-German persons among the victims and because of that "any pro-German movement was nipped in the bud".
All this says was that the Germans in Poland murdered indiscriminately, which is consistent with everything we know. Of course there were pro-German elements in Poland - nothing new about that.

No-one in a leading position was prepared to give up terror, murder and deportation in total as instruments of security policy in the Generalgouvernement

Herein lies the problem you don't seem to be able to circumvent. The Nazis wanted to continue murdering, and at the same time to form an anti-Soviet alliance. Doesn't work. I refer to your "several million mistakes too many” quote from Madajczyk’s book.

Searching for Allies
Among them were the two leading forces of Miecz i Plug (MiP), a resistance organisation financed for the most part by the Sipo.
We know that the Nazis created an extensive network of agents provocateurs in Poland, as they have in every other occupied territory.

The obvious failure of anti-partisan campaign by the Sipo and the SS… In 1944 the Sipo had completely lost control over the open countryside
On Nov. 18, you wrote: “The AK did not do any real fighting against German forces until the Warsaw Uprising of 1944, when they struck at the German forces that had already been beaten by the Red Army.” Don’t you think your quote above contradicts that statement? Or do you think that it was the 10,000 communist partisans that the Germans couldn’t cope with?

On November 17, refering to the book you’re now quoting, you wrote:
That chapter shows that the leader of the Armia Krajowa, Grot-Rowecki, had entered into negotiations with the German authorities on a de-facto collaboration.
Despite previous requests, you haven’t come up with a proof of that statement and I don’t see anything in your quote to substantiate that.

What I do see are repeated attempts by some elements within the Nazi administration to convince Poles to join forces in an anti-Soviet crusade. For a number of reasons, beginning with indiscriminate and uninterrupted slaughter of its population, Poland’s underground authorities and its political class consistently rejected those offers. That’s the verdict of history, and you cannot change it.

Finally, that’s not to say that there weren’t collaborators in Poland, or those ready to shake hands with the devil, or those who applauded the annihilation of Jews, or those who profited from the war and wanted it to continue. There were, and a complete list would be very, very long. But during WW2, Poland’s political class, despite its deep ideological divisions and the tortured complexity of Polish-Soviet relations, has shown remarkable consistency in its loyalty to the Allied cause. Whatever Poland’s nationalistic myths and chest thumping, that record will stand.

Obserwator
Banned
Posts: 557
Joined: 01 Aug 2004 18:50
Location: Poland

Post by Obserwator » 24 Nov 2004 14:54

Mills-the quoted text gives evidence to the fact that Poles didn't work with Germany not otherwise and in fact contradicts everything you said.

Agadnik-thanks for the information about the treason of one of AK members-Mills has continously described AK as working with Wehrmacht, I am glad that will be over with your post.

User avatar
Ogorek
Member
Posts: 736
Joined: 17 May 2002 23:23
Location: USA

Post by Ogorek » 24 Nov 2004 23:02

Again Mr. Mills has used academic smoke and mirrors, and of course his opinions of Poles as "criminals" during 1918-39, where just rabid nationalists were executed and sent to Auschwitz, Karski the opportunist, cooperation in Byelorussia, nice warm beds in German hospitals.... And of course the NSZ (oh, i'm sorry, that should be the "anti-semetic NSZ") , please forgive me, managed to wrangle a "you don't touch me, I don't touch you" agreement with German forces so they could make their way to the west....

and recourse to hiding behind academic robes.... (after all they are juried by "peers,"..... ad nauseum....

Hell, I wasn't there, but I grew up with those people..... Yes, Pilch was in a tight spot, yes, the situation in Lida got out of hand.... But wasn't everything during the Soviet advance? But then again, according to Mr. Mill's world view as the Polish Byelorussian were behind the Curzon Line, what right did the Polish "minorities" have to defend their homes there against the Soviets?

I have seen actual leaflets post-Uprising urging the AK to join the Wehrmacht in fighting the Soviets "FOR POLAND," - - - - - - -

But despite Mr. Mill's wishful thinking, it DIDN'T happen in any meaningful way.....

But rather, it is another attempt to paint the Poles as responsible for the World War, the Holocaust, the hated Diktat, etc., etc., because those Poles were SO UNREASONABLE....

Now we have the Academics painting the SIPO's brave efforts to bring reason to the Poles (apparently they kissed Himmler's Totenkopf ring and were granted permission) and not a matter Rowecki's "heroic resistance" (how many times did you quote that????)

But now we have "JURIED ACADEMICS" sitting around in their robes and slippers using fragmentary documentation to try to explain what had happened to Rowecki during his captivity.... GIMMEE A BREAK....

Yes, maybe someday I might see reason, and a beacon of light will lead me through the smoke and mirrors of what the various Security and Intelligence agencies had in mind over 60 years ago....

You have an interesting world view Mr. Mills, maybe someday I might get to drink from the fountain of reason.....

But that is my problem, I remember too too much from what was discussed around the kitchen table for decades by participants...

But as a Pole, and somebody who has eschewed "higher eucation," I guess that I will have to continue to apologize for our many sins until someone beats some reason into me..... as it is, as can be seen for many centuries..... those "Verdamt Polacken" just don't get it.....

michael mills
Member
Posts: 9000
Joined: 11 Mar 2002 12:42
Location: Sydney, Australia

Post by michael mills » 25 Nov 2004 00:22

Agadanik wrote:
All this says was that the Germans in Poland murdered indiscriminately, which is consistent with everything we know. Of course there were pro-German elements in Poland - nothing new about that.
No, German measures were not indiscriminate.

They were aimed against two specific elements of the Polish political class:

1. Against members of avowedly anti-German political groups, particularly in the western part of Poland. These were groups that had been in existence from before the First World War. In the period 1918-21, many members of those groups had been involved in acts of violence against ethnic Germans living in East Prussia, West Prussia (Pomorze), Posen (Poznan) and Silesia. The German suppression of those groups in late 1939 and early 1940 was partly revenge for the earlier acts of anti-German violence committed by them, and partly pre-emptive action to head off resistance activity. The groups involved were the National Democratic Party (Endecja), the Union for the Defence of the Western Districts (Zwiazek Obrony Kresow Zachodnich), the Insurgents' Union (these were men who had definitely committed acts of violence), and various paramilitary youth groups such as Sokol and the so-called "scouts".

2. Against persons who were known for their anti-Soviet attitudes. Suppression of such persons was clearly counter-productive from the German point of view, but was carried out by the German security forces out of loyalty to the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, under which Germany had undertaken to suppress any anti-Soviet political manifestations in its Zone of Occupation.

The German suppressive actions undertaken after the defeat and occupation of Poland stand in stark contrast to the policy of detente and conciliation toward Poland pursued by Hitler ever since he came to power and maintained by him right up until the Polish Government wangled the "blank check" out of Britain at the end of March 1939.

Hitler had hoped that the influence of Pilsudski would counteract the rabid anti-Germanism of the Dmowski wing of Polish nationalism, and allow German-Polish co-operation against the Soviet Union. When Pilsudski died in 1935, Hitler hoped that his cronies, the former Legionaries, the "colonels", would continue Pilsudski's policies.

However, by early 1939 it had become clear to Hitler that the feckless successors to Pilsudski, worthless characters of the ilk of Ridz-Smigly and Beck, had become contaminated by the anti-Germanism of Dmowski (even they had kept the latter and his party out of power), and that therefore they would have to be crushed.

Obviously, Hitler did not want to crush the anti-Soviet wing of Polish nationalism, since it was precisely those elements of the Polish political class who were his potential future allies in a confrontation with the Soviet Union. But he was forced to agree to crush them in order to ensure Stalin's neutrality.

Once Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, the surviving elements of the Polish political class in the former Soviet Zone of Occupation, that is those that had survived the harsh Soviet rule, were treated reasonably well by the German occupation authorities, who hoped to use them as de-facto allies in the anti-Soviet campaign. A certain measure of success was achieved in that aim, at least to the extent that in West Belorussia the ethnic Polish population remained generally loyal to the German authorities and did not cause any trouble.

Obserwator
Banned
Posts: 557
Joined: 01 Aug 2004 18:50
Location: Poland

Post by Obserwator » 25 Nov 2004 03:13

Against members of avowedly anti-German political groups, particularly in the western part of Poland. These were groups that had been in existence from before the First World War. In the period 1918-21, many members of those groups had been involved in acts of violence against ethnic Germans living in East Prussia, West Prussia (Pomorze), Posen (Poznan) and Silesia. The German suppression of those groups in late 1939 and early 1940 was partly revenge for the earlier acts of anti-German violence committed by them, and partly pre-emptive action to head off resistance activity..
They were targeted at innocent civlilans, artists, intelecutals, businessmen, politicians, priests and anybody considered by German Nazis to be elite.In fact being an intelectuall was considered "anti German" becuse it was the destiny of the German Race to rule animal Slavs in the Reich.It was neither revenge nor pre-emptive action as whole villages of innocent children, elderly were slaughtered by Selbstschulz, Wehramcht exectuions etc:
Here is one desciption of what was in "Mill's words "pre-emptive action"
http://www.kki.net.pl/~museum/rozdz3,2.htm
Third group of concentration camps were camps organised or inspired if not created by permission of police and ocupation authorites by police like organisation called Selbstschutz. Occasionly they were founded on place were Wehrmacht or police organised concentration camp.There were 19 such camps in following places:Bydgoszcz, Brodnica, Chełmno, Dorposz Szlachecki, Kamień Krajeński, Karolewo, Lipno, Łobżenica, Nakło, Nowy Wiec near Skarszew, Nowe over Wisla, Piastoszyn, Płutowo, Sępolno Krajeńskie, Solec Kujawski, Tuchola, Wąbrzeźno, Wolental near Skórcza, Wyrzysk.Poles imprisoned in those camps (men, women and youth) in majority were muredered in cruel way.The description of conditions made by those few who escaped by miracle chill the very blood.
People shot were finished by blows from shovels, or by beating with rifles, sometimes they were buried alive.Mothers were forced to place their children in mass graves where they were shot together afterwards.Before executions women and girls were raped.Polish accounts of those atrocites are reflected in german documents from that time.Some German soldiers were terrified at what they saw in the camps.For example-about the atrocites in October 1939 in Świec conducted on both Jews and Poles we know, because two Wehrmacht soldiers made a report to their superiors outraged at the atrocites they saw.Some people responsible for most sadistic crimes like those in Starogard and Lobieżnica were put before trials and sentenced but received amnesty from Hitler at the end of 1939.[/
quote]
The groups involved were the National Democratic Party (Endecja), the Union for the Defence of the Western Districts (Zwiazek Obrony Kresow Zachodnich), the Insurgents' Union (these were men who had definitely committed acts of violence), and various paramilitary youth groups such as Sokol and the so-called "scouts"
Jesus Christs-you call "scouts" a paramilitary violent organisation ?! This was for teenage boys in age of 12-17 that learned about wilderness, survival ! Also you miss what the Operation Tannenberg was really about :

http://www.holocaustchronicle.org/stati ... 9.html#Top
September 1-October 25, 1939: Operation Tannenberg, carried out by SS Einsatzgruppen (mobile kill squads), leads to the murders of Polish Jews and Catholic intellectuals and to the burnings of synagogues in Poland.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Tannenberg
Operation Tannenberg was codename for one of extermination actions directed at Polish intelligentsia during World War II. Nazis prepared lists, so called Sonderfahndungsbuch Polen, which listed more than 60,000 Polish activists, intelligentsia, actors, former officers, etc.

First, in August 1939 about 2,000 activists of Polish minority organisations in Germany were arrested and murdered. The second part of the action started September 1, 1939 and ended in October resulting in at least 20,000 murdered in 760 mass executions by special units, so-called Einsatzgruppen, in addition to regular Wehrmacht units and SS.
Anyone who represented polish culture, polish arts, polish science was target of executions.Nazis didn't want their slave to be anything more then what they considered them to be:animals.And this was the goal of this operation.To destroy and eredicate anyone that could be a threat ot enslaving a whole nation.

Besides the fact that children, mothers, elderly were killed in the maddnes of the Nazi slaughter-your idea is that if one belonged to a Polish party that upholded the rights of people in Posen then it is quide ok to have him beaten up by shovel to death or be
buried alive because by just being a part of polish party is "anti German"
How could one not be anti-German in the view of Nazis if their belief was that a good Pole was only good when he was a slave.





No, German measures were not indiscriminate.

They were aimed against two specific elements of the Polish political class
Yes.6 milion people belonged to that class, including childen and pregnant women. How indiscriminate indeed.
t was difficult to pass, the road being full of wire, cable, remains of barricades, corpses, and rubble. Houses were burning on both sides of the street; I reached the "Ursus" work's with great difficulty. Shots, cries, supplications and groans could be heard from the factory yard. We had no doubt that this was a place for mass executions. The people who stood at the entrance were led, no, pushed in, not all at once but in groups of 20. A boy of twelve, seeing the bodies of his parents and of his little brother through the half-open entrance door, fell in a fit and began to shriek. The Germans and Vlassov's men beat him and pushed him back, while he was endeavouring to get inside. He called for his father and his mother. We all knew what awaited us here; there was no possibility of escape or of buying one's life; there was a crowd of Germans, Ukrainians (Vlassov's men), and cars. I came last and kept in the background, continuing to let the others pass, in the hope that they would not kill a pregnant woman, but I was driven in with the last lot. In the yard I saw heaps of corpses 3 feet high, in several places. The whole right and left side of the big yard (the first yard) was strewn with bodies. (A sketch of the yard was made by the deponent.) We were led through the second. There were about 20 people in our group, mostly children of 10 to 12. There were children without parents, and also a paralysed old woman whose son-in-law had been carrying her all the time on his back. At her side was her daughter with two children of 4 and 7. They were all killed. The old woman was literally killed on her son-in-law's back, and he along with her. We were called out in groups of four and led to the end of the second yard to a pile of bodies. When the four reached this point, the Germans shot them through the backs of their heads with revolvers. The victims fell on the heap, and others came. Seeing what was to be their fate, some attempted to escape; they cried, begged, and prayed for mercy. I was in the last group of four. I begged the Vlassov's men around me to save me and the children, and they asked if I had anything with which to buy my life. I had a large amount of gold with me and gave it them. They took it all and wanted to lead me away, but the German supervising the execution would not allow them to do so, and when I begged him to let me go he pushed me off, shouting "Quicker!" I fell when he pushed me. He also hit and pushed my elder boy, shouting "hurry up, you Polish bandit". Thus I came to the place of execution, in the last group of four, with my three children. I held my two younger children by one hand, and my elder boy by the other. The children were crying and praying. The elder boy, seeing the mass of bodies, cried out: "they are going to kill, us" and called for his father. The first shot hit him, the second me; the next two killed the two younger children. I fell on my right side. The shot was not fatal. The bullet penetrated the back of my head from the right side and went out through my cheek. I spat out several teeth; I felt the left side of my body growing numb, but I was still conscious and saw everything that was going on around me. I witnessed other executions, lying there among the dead. More groups of men were led in. I heard cries, supplications, moaning, and shots. The bodies of these men fell on me. I was covered by four bodies. Then I again saw a group of women and children; thus it went on with group after group until late in the evening. It was already quite, quite dark when the executions stopped
It seems the pregnant women was "contaminated by the anti-Germanism of Dmowski" as you described.
Just as the 6milion more murdered, including those gassed alive in concentration camps.

Agadanik
Member
Posts: 157
Joined: 13 Nov 2004 03:38
Location: Canada

Post by Agadanik » 25 Nov 2004 04:34

michael mills wrote:
No, German measures were not indiscriminate.
They were aimed against two specific elements of the Polish political class:
1. Against members of avowedly anti-German political groups…
2. Against persons who were known for their anti-Soviet attitudes…
Didn’t you miss someone here, Michael? Another group? The Jews? Or do you believe they don’t count?

To close the subject: the Nazis murdered in Poland everyone and all, individuals and groups, day and night, in cities and villages, men, women and children. Norman Davies writes that of the 6 million Polish citizens who lost their lives during the war, 90% or 5.4 million ”were killed in executions, in pacifications, and above all in the camps.” They murdered from the first days of the war until the very last hour of their presence on Polish soil. They murdered clergy and clerks, peasants and professors, teachers and tailors. They murdered by shooting and by starvation, by gassing and by hanging, by torture and by any other method they could come up with. Nothing you or your ideological cohorts can say is going to change that, so please think twice before you address the subject again.

The German suppressive actions undertaken after the defeat and occupation of Poland stand in stark contrast to the policy of detente and conciliation toward Poland pursued by Hitler ever since he came to power…
I believe we all know about Hitler’s policies of “détente and conciliation”. Take a trip to Eastern Europe, you can still see some nice monuments of that détente.

Hitler had hoped that the influence of Pilsudski would counteract the rabid anti-Germanism of the Dmowski wing of Polish nationalism…
Really, I don’t think you know what you’re talking about. It was Pilsudski who signed the Polish-Soviet non-aggression pact in July ’32, and it was he who a year later stood firm against the Germans on the Gdansk issue, increasing Polish garrison in Westerplatte. It was Pilsudski who sent a delegate to Moscow in ’33 to assure the Soviets that Poland will not enter into an anti-Soviet alliance with Nazi Germany. It was he who dispatched emissaries to Paris in '34 to consult the French on a preventive war against Germany. In short, Pilsudski saw through Hitler earlier than most other European politicians. (See Andrzej Albert, Najnowsza historia Polski 1918-1980, London 1989.)

However, by early 1939 it had become clear to Hitler that the feckless successors to Pilsudski, worthless characters of the ilk of Rydz-Smigly and Beck, had become contaminated by the anti-Germanism of Dmowski (even they had kept the latter and his party out of power), and that therefore they would have to be crushed.
Isn’t this from one of der Führer’s speeches? The language, and the affinity for adjectives in particular, sound vaguely familiar. Could you perhaps quote in the original version? Vernichten sounds so much better than crushed...

michael mills
Member
Posts: 9000
Joined: 11 Mar 2002 12:42
Location: Sydney, Australia

Post by michael mills » 25 Nov 2004 23:17

I believe we all know about Hitler’s policies of “détente and conciliation”. Take a trip to Eastern Europe, you can still see some nice monuments of that détente.
Talking about monuments, there is one that is missing.

In October 1938, the Polish ambassador in Berlin, Jozef Lipski, had a meeting with Hitler, at which Germany's policies in regard to Eastern Europe were discussed. Lipski sent a report on the meeting back to Beck; the report is still extant, so we know what was said (it is in the book "Diplomat in Berlin", by Jedrzejewicz).

At the meeting, Hitler told Lipski that he was prepared to assist Poland, Hungary and Romania to solve the Jewish problem in their countries.

Lipski reported to Beck that he thereupon replied to Hitler that if he (Hitler) succeeded in solving the Jewish problem in Poland, the Polish people in gratitude would erect a monument to him in the most beautiful part of Warsaw.

It is a historical fact that Hitler kept his side of the deal. So where is the monument Agadanik?

It seems to me that the Polish people has reaped all the benefits of the elimination of the Jewish socio-economic class that was clogging up the system and preventing the move of surplus Polish peasants into urban occupations, but is reluctant to give due recognition to the man who did for them something they were too incompetent to do for themselves.

Return to “Foreign Volunteers & Collaboration”