I have now been able to re-check one of my sources, the book "Die Gestapo im Zweiten Weltkrieg; 'Heimatfront' und besetztes Europe", edited by Gerhard Paul and Klaus-Michael Mallmann (Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 2000).
The editors are German academics who have collaborated on specialised studies of the Gestapo. Gerhard Paul is a professor of history at the University of Flensburg, and Klaus-Michael Mallmann is a lecturer at the University of Essen.
The particular chapter in the book that I drew on was "Auf der Suche nach einer besatzungspolitischen Konzeption; die Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und der SD im Generalgouvernement", by Michael Foedrowitz, a journalist and author living in Hannover who has produced many articles and TV documentaries about the Second World War.
I consider an academic publication of this type to be superior to any number of websites, since it has gone through a process of proper review by qualified experts in the field, whereas there is rarely any quality control of websites.
The main theme of Foedrowitz's chapter is the conflict between the German Security Police (Sipo) commanders in occupied Poland, who sought to modify the German occupation policies and practice in order to achieve a modus vivendi with the anti-Communist parts of the Polish resistance in order to achieve a de-facto collaboration against the Soviet Union, and the Higher SS and Police Leader (HSSPF) in Poland and the SS and Police Leaders (SSPF) subordinate to him, who were responsible directly to Himmler and promoted the most radical policies and practices, rejecting any attempt at collaboration with the anti-Communist resistance.
The thrust of the chapter backs up my original post on this topic, which referred to conflict between different parts of the German security forces in Poland in regard to the attitude to the Polish resistance.
After re-reading the chapter, I can see that what I wrote about Rowecki was basically correct, although I confused some of the details with events surrounding two other high officers of the AK, Colonel Albrecht, the AK Chief of Staff until 1941, and Tadeusz Myslinksi, the leader of the security section of the Delegatura (the representation in Polandof the Government-in-Exile in London).
Here are excerpts from the chapter which support my previous posts (my transaltion from the German):
The security measures from 1939 to 1941 had been directed against those circles of Polish society which, on the basis of their anti-Russian and anti-Bolshevik attitude, should after the commencement of the war against Russia increasingly have become partners in negotiation for a "truce". That blew the possibility of winning the majority of Poles for a fight against the USSR. Even representatives of fascist organisations expressed the view that there could be no question of co-operation since the German side had made several million mistakes too many [source: Czeslaw Madajczyk: Die Okkupationspolitik Nazideutschlands in Polen 1939-1945, Köln 1988, p. 123, note 133].
The above excerpt supports my contention that the German security measures until 1941 were aimed primarily against anti-Soviet Poles. The reason for that was the agreement made with the Soviet Union in 1939,as I stated.
Another excerpt on page 352 underlines the counter-productiveness of German actions such as the AB-Aktion against anti-Soviet Poles:
In a report of the [German] Foreign Office about the AB-Aktion it was stated that there had been numerous pro-German persons among the victims and because of that "any pro-German movement was nipped in the bud".
Back to page 354:
Already in July 1941 the arrest of the Chief of Staff of the resistance movement, Colonel Albrecht, offered the possibility of an arrangement, particularly as Albrecht agreed to the arguments of the Sipo that a defeat of Germany was no longer equivalent to a victory of national Poland. The release of Albrecht from German imprisonment, the offer of a 'modus vivendi' to the leadership of the resistance movement and his forced suicide, for the first evoked great concern not only in the Polish underground itself but also among the Western Allies and the Polish Government-in-Exile [Source: Author's interview with HM on 8 November 1986]. However the first initiative had failed.
The breakthrough in the bungled situation was to be brought about by the Sonderkommando IV AS of the BdS [= Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei = Commander-in-chief of the Security Police], newly established in the summer of 1941. The leader of the Kommando, SS-Hauptsturmführer Spilker, equipped with far-reaching special powers, took up contact with the conspiratorial organisations of the national-Polish Armia Krajowa (AK) and the Government Delegatura, the representation of the Polish Government-in-Exile in London. The aim was to forge an anti-Bolshevik Front by confidence-building measures and to defuse the precarious security situation in the area behind the Eastern Front. Spilker was responsible only to the Leader of Amt IV [Gestapo] and/or the BdS, or to the Desk Officer for Poland at the RSHA. By contrast, orders from higher-ranking KdS [= Kommandeure der Sicherheitspolizei = Commanders of the Security Police] could be suspended if he considered it correct [Source: Information from SK of 5 December 1987; witness statement by GF of 25 January 1961, StA Hamburg, 147 Js 22/69, Bd. 7].
To be sure, the mass graves of Katyn could be discovered at the beginning of 1943 on the basis of investigations by Sonderkommando IV AS, but the great propaganda effect was not achieved in the face of routine German crimes even in the territory of the Reich [Source: Reports from the Reich Nr 377 of 19 April 1943, in: Heinz Boberach (Hrsg.): "Meldungen aus dem Reich", Herrsching 1984, Vol. 13, p. 5145]. Even so, Spilker succeeded in penetrating the underground centres by clever management of his agents, especially as the new head of the Poland Office at the RSHA, SS-Sturmbannführer Harro Thomsen, supported the course of an apparent German-Polish arrangement [Source: Compare the witness statement of H. Thomsen of 24 September 1968, Public Prosecutors Office Wiesbaden, 8 Js 0127/80, Vol. XLI; witness statement of the same person of 1 March 1967, HStAD, process against Best et. al. (Note 7), Vol. 18]. But this variant in no way contradicted the concept of a brutal occupation terror, but rather complemented it in an effective way, since no-one in a laeding position was prepared to give up terror, murder and deportation in total as instruments of security policy in the Generalgouvernement [Source: Foedrowitz, "Die deutschen Sicherheits- und Exekutivorgane in 'Generalgouvernement' in Bezug auf die Bekämpfung der polnischen Widerstandsbewegung 1939-1945", Ms. Hannover 1991, p. 27f]. Even so, the Sipo thereby gained through approaching the Polish 'opponent' that political dimension which had its effects not only in its[ the Sipo's] area of activity but also in the camp of the Allies and thereby weighed upon the most sensitive point of the anti-Hitler coalition.
However these far-ranging ambitions were constantly impeded or nullified by the HSSPF or the subordinate SSPFs. The consequences were considerable tensions and conflicts. The chief culprit among others was the SSPF in the Lublin District, Odilo Globocnik, who gave priority to purely executive work. The conflict between him andthe KdS Lublin smouldered from the beginning. KdS Walter Huppenkothen, who quarreleed with the SSPF over questions of competence, turned directly to Heydrich, who came to Lublin personally - and decided in favour of Globocnik.
Another excerpt from page 358 on, detailing the de-facto German-Polish collaboration:
Searching for Allies
Under the impression of the mass-graves of Katyn, there appeared undergound-fighters in the rightist resistance who were ready to establish an anti-Bolshevik legion and lead it in the fight against the USSR. Among them were the two leading forces of Miecz i Plug (MiP), a resistance organisation financed for the most part by the Sipo. Under the mediation of Spilker a memorandum by MiP leaders was conveyed to the Reich Chancellery, but the suggestion for a common fight presented in it was rejected [Source: CdS Kaltenbrunner to Lammers June 1943, BAK, NS 19/946; witness statement by J. Deumling of 30 October 1967, HStAD, Process against Best et al., Vol. 29551-4/76]. Schöngarth [BdS im GG until 15 June 1943] by contrast presented the view that the course in Poland would finally have to be radically changed "if the German leadership in this area was to develop successfully in the long term" [Source: Frank to Lammers on 20 April 1943, AGK, NTN 257, Bühler Trial B-38]. Even son no action has become known which corresponded to that demand. With the change to Bierkamp [the new BdS im GG] many new KdS who shared his rigorous course came to the Generalgouvernement.
..................................................(A paragraph describing various examples of the collapse of German security in the Generalgouvernement in 1943, caused by Jewish escapees, the Ukrainian uprising, the penetration of Soviet partisan forces such as those of Kovpak).
The obvious failure of anti-partisan campaign by the Sipo and the SS did not however lead to the proclamation of a State of Emergency, but only to the declaration of the Generalgouvernement on 21 June 1943 as an "area of conflict with bandits", an obvious concealment of the failure of the RFSS as the chief of "combatting bandits". From 1943, according to the BdS, "bandits were deployed against bandits", that "would spare German blood" [Source: Werner Prag / Wolfgang Jacobmeyer (Hrsg.): "Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939-1945", Stuttgart 1975, p. 804]. The most serious incident occurred on 9 August 1943 in the village Borow, where members of the rightist Narodowe Sily Zbrojne killed 26 Communists and four peasants with axes - cause for Stalin to intervene with Churchill at Teheran [Source: Zbigniew Siemaszko: "Narodowe Sily Zbrojne", London 1982, p. 96; Alexander Fischer (Hrsg.):"Teheran, Jalta, Potsdam", Köln 1968, p. 182].
In 1944 the Sipo had completely lost control over the open countryside, in the Lublin District a partisan republic had even been proclaimed. "Combatting bandits" was now only possible with Wehrmacht formations and Police regiments. In addition, in the middle of 1944 bandit interception lines had to be set up, since besides the 800 escaped Russian POWs who were fighting as partisans in the Generalgouvernement, there now came partisan formations operating from the Soviet areas, which were swept into the Generalgouvernement in front of the retreating Wehrmacht like a bow-wave.
In May 1944, members of the KdS Warsaw and of Sonderkommando IV AS compose a memorandum which went directly to Gestapo chief Müller in the RSHA and the BdS. Among other things, it was proposed to set up a Polish army with 50,000 men armed with German weapons, under the command of the Gestapo agent and resistance leader Henryk Borucki [Source: witness statement by A. Otto of 9 October 1950, AGK, SWMW 891]. In the framework of these efforts, the captured leader of the security section of the Polish Government Delegatura in the country, Tadeusz Myslinski, conferred with Spilker, Bierkamp and Schindhelm [an officer of Amt IV of the BdS] for the purpose of discussing the possibilities of combined anti-Bolshevik action, including the release of captured AK-members in exchange for Communists in the ratio of 1:8. There were also discussions about sending Myslinski to the Polish Government-in-Exile in London to present a standstill agreement. The further struggle of the resistance movement against the occupying power was to be camouflaged by dummy actions [Source: witness statement by A. Otto of 22 September 1950; Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnetrznych (Eds.):"Walka Armii Krajowej i Delegatura Rzadu z ruchem lewicowym 1939-1944", Warsaw 1974, p. 164ff].
Even so there was strong resistance to this rapprochement, as the NS leadership assessed it as appropriate that in view of the war situation an alliance with Poles was not possible and such efforts would only be assessed as a weakness of the German side; besides, on the German side there were never any serious intentions of making political concessions to the Polish side beyond local tactical agreements.
The Warsaw Uprising
After everything that had happened, an uprising in the Generalgouvernement seemed inevitable to the Sipo. Already at the beginning of 1943 important plans for an uprising had fallen into German hands and reports of an armed insurrection grew increasingly stronger. As that development could no longer be staved off, there remained only the hope of being able to have an influence on the determination of the time and place of the insurrection.
With the inadvertent capture of the AK-chief Stefan Rowecki in June 1943 the Sipo had suffered a serious defeat, which could not be made good through strenuous counter-measures. To be sure, Himmler could be persuaded to suggest to Hitler a neutralising employment of Rowecki for the purpose of avoiding an uprising, but Hitler rejected the enterprise as too dangerous [Source: Filenote RFSS of 10 July 1943, Institut für Zeitgeschichte München, Microfilm T-175, Film 58]. Instead, on the outbreak of the Warsaw Uprising on 1 August 1944 Rowecki together with other high-ranking Polish negotiating partners in German custody were murdered on Himmler's orders in order to get rid of witnesses to compromising coalition talks [Source: Foedrowitz, op. cit., p. 446]. On 8 May 1944, BdS Bierkamp correctly guessed that plans for an uprising would be co-ordinated with a landing of the Western Allies and the opening of the Soviet mass-offensive in the East [Source: entry of 8 May 1944, DTB Frank, Vol. 35a/2]. The successful interventions of the Sipo in Spring 1944 considerably weakened the readiness of the Poles for an uprising. At the same time, the Wehrmacht and Sipo continued to try to get in touch with leading forces of the AK, in particular with AK-chief Komorowski [Source: report by K. Geppert of 20 November 1986 on the intelligence work of the Sipo; author's interview with SF on 3 January and 21 March 1985; Michael Foedrowitz, "Mit Feuer und Rauch", in: Die ZEIT Nr. 31 of 29 July 1994].
After the defeat of the uprising, charges were pressed against Bierkamp and his superior Koppe among others [Source: Wilhelm Koppe on 17 December 1964 to the Investigating Judge at the Landgericht Flensburg, Pub;lic Prosecutors office Flensburg, 147 Js 22/69, Vol. 112]. An investigation was also undertaken against the Wehrmacht commander Haenicke, who diverted the sole responsibility to the SS and Police; in any case Himmler had united the whole combat against partisans in his hands since 28 July 1942 [Source: Miltary District Commander Haenicke to OKW-chief Keitel on 4 September 1944, BA-MA, RH 53-23/59]. There were no consequemces for Himmler; he was appointed the commander of the Reserve Army and commander-in-chief of the Army Group Vistula.
So there we have it.
The arrest of Rowecki was "inadvertent". The Sipo commanders wanted to leave him at liberty so that they could reach an understanding with him, but some bumbling lower-level Gestapo officers who were unaware of what was going on jumped at the chance of gaining kudos by arresting him when his identity and hiding place were betrayed to them.
Furthermore, while Rowecki was in captivity, the negotiations with him and other captured resistance leaders continued, obviously with the blessing of Himmler, who had been influenced by the Sipo commanders in the Generalgouvernment.
The reason why the negotiations did not get anywhere was not due to any "heroic resistance" by Rowecki, but rather because Hitler rejected the use of Rowecki as an agent (presumably Hitler thought that Rowecki, once released, would double-cross the Germans).
Once the Warsaw Uprising had begun, there was no further use for Rowecki and the other high-ranking Polish prisoners as partners for negotiations. Furthermore, they were witnesses to the fact that high-ranking Germans had been prepared to negotiate with them, which in the changed situation would have been dangerous for the latter, incriminating them in the eyes of a furious and suspicious Hitler. That is the reason Rowecki and the others were quietly done away with, not because of any "heroic resistance".
*Personal remarks/insults deleted by Moderator*
[Mr. Mills, please refrain from posting these types of comments.]