Patton .................

[Richard Anderson]

Early May... That's when operations had stopped for at least 3 armies (1st Can, 9th US, 1st US) and were of limited nature for 2 more (2nd Br, 3rd US). Only US 7th army and French 1st still had large areas to move into.

Naturally, your point about the length of the supply system is valid: the longer the more difficult to supply advanced units. But can't see any impact on operations... because these limits in the supply system appeared after operations were by and large over. In other words, the supply system was adequate

Is that a horse-cart or a carthorse?

Moreover, this efficiency (or adequacy) should be in relation to the number of troops involved. And in April 1945, there were many more than in September 1944.

Indeed, and the means to support them had grown as well.

Didn't food shortage had another root cause, namely the huge number of PoW and displaced persons?

And feeding civilians in liberated areas...but that has little to do with delivering prepared rations to troops. Meanwhile, we don't want to get into the attitude developed WRT feeding POW.

Can't fight the facts, but you take the worst example among the 7 armies. The root cause of TUSA having its depot still in Trier has little to do with the supply system; more with the problematic approach given to this army compared to all the others, and/or with the inability of Patton to make significant progress in his area during the previous 2 months... (hey, back on the Patton topic here!)

The root cause of TUSA having its depot in Trier was mirrored by the other armies and was part of the end war assessments...they could not simultaneously sustain a pursuit as well as move depots forward to reduce the transportation distances. They thought they could at the beginning of the operation, by quickly laying track, building rail bridges and moving things forward to and then over the Rhine by rail, but it didn't work that way. Rail congestion at the Rhine slowed movements and then the armies quickly figured out that trains made nice movable magazines...I think it was mid-April when COMZ realized that 12,000 cars sent east of the Rhine had never returned.

BTW, the Rhineland Campaign was insignificant progress?

That said, thanks for pointing the various figures, and, more important, the overall approach to the question.

There is a lot of data out there, distilling and understanding it is the problem. The General Board Reports on theater supply and the Transportation Corps are valuable.

[Aber]

The postwar assessment made was that by the first week in May, despite operations slowing, the fuel situation was poor and threatening to become a crisis. Simply put, the same problems appeared as were in evidence in France during the pursuit: lack of transport for fuel to the front line, sporadic appearance of tank cars, inability to return enough empty jerricans, temporary loss of jerricans, permanent loss of jerricans, and the loss of time moving decanting operations further forward. All contributed to the problem and that was despite extending a working pipeline system across the Rhine. By late April, ten months of combat experience gave an average POL consumption figure of 177 tons/day/divisional slice versus the 153 tons, which was the pre-invasion estimate. Food shortage at the front also appeared during April, mimicking the problems of the previous pursuit. Figures from 6th and 12th Army Groups also indicate the decline in operational readiness rates of general purpose vehicles and the overall continued shortfall to requirements January-March 1945. The Rhine itself didn't help. By 1 April, increasing congestion on the Rhine bridges and increasing distances meant trucks moving from Trier to Third Army rear areas were taking 36 hours. Thirty-six hours to do 110 to 120 miles, under 3.5 MPH versus an expected 25. The overall performance of the supply system was superior to that during the pursuit across France, but it still ran into the same built in limitations.

The flip side of that is that the advance in April 1945 was far faster than the logistic planners had allowed for, with all the problems of not being able to move railheads forward fast enough.

IIRC somewhere in Ruppenthal is the suggestion that the armistice line was where they expected to be in July.

EDIT:p377; line Lubeck-Magdeburg-Regensburg-Munich in mid-July.

[Mori]

BTW, the Rhineland Campaign was insignificant progress?

Veritable-Grenade was the one operation which broke the German defense in the West, as you know.

About logistics: all armies had a significant break before crossing the Rhine and being in pursuit, except for TUSA. The 3 armies in 21 AG could organize their post-Rhine logistics for 2-3 weeks. FUSA did so, albeit involontary, after taking the Remagen bridge. and SUSA and the French had been on the Rhine for quite some time.

So the Patton/TUSA situation is the exception not the rule. TUSA is the last to reach the Rhine, and only gets there after all that counts as German on their front is annhilitaed by the operations further north. (This explains why Patton moves so fast along the Moselle). As Patton does not stop once he is on the Rhine but moves on with Undertone, then crosses the river, then keeps rushing east, his army does not get the opportunity to rearrange its depot.

That's why I wouldn't take TUSA as representative, but as the anomaly among the 7 Allied armies.

[Mori]

Is that a horse-cart or a carthorse? .

Gosh, reaching ESL limits

[Gooner1]

Except VII Corps, which had Aachen and the so-called "Aachen-gap" and "Stolberg Corridor" in its zone attempted to do just that and failed. The "reconnaissance in force" of 12 September failed.

What changes that allows FUSA to take "Aachen for nothing and be halfway through the Siegfried line"? The forces cannot change measurably and consist of the 1st ID and 3d AD with 9th ID in corps reserve. There is virtually no corps artillery for support, since they have been mostly grounded to provide the trucks to move up the gas that got VII Corps to where it is. Artillery ammunition is short for the same reason. If you want to bring up more troops, then they require more truck and more fuel, which are already short. You also have to force them down the same routes potentially clogging them more.

More gas and ammunition and .. for First Army, because Third Army grounded. The ‘reconnaissance in force’ becomes a proper thrust.
Gerhard von Schwerin, the German commander in the area, was ready to surrender Aachen but the threat on Aachen fizzled out.

Nor is there really a "gap" or a "corridor". This is what VII Corps faced:

"Averaging six to seven miles in depth and traversed by few roads other than muddy, easily-blocked trails and firebreaks, the forest barrier marks the northern reaches of the Eifel and includes, south of Eupen, the Hertogenwald, and southeast of Aachen, the Roetgen, Wenau, and Huertgen Forests. Once past the Hertogenwald, a semblance of a corridor avoiding the greatest stretches of forest runs northeast to Dueren from the vicinity of the villages of Lammersdorf and Rollesbroich; but the only real avenue in the entire area skirts the northern and northwestern edges of the forest barrier. This avenue is the Stolberg corridor. On its western approaches the Stolberg corridor presents hilly terrain readily adaptable to defense, particularly in the sharp valleys of the upper Inde and Vicht Rivers."

Also: "Aachen Gap is a historic gateway into Germany dating from early Christendom. <> Its military value lies in the roads that spread out from the city in all directions."
“The terrain is relatively open, particularly beyond Aachen on the Cologne plain.”
And in XIX Corps area "“once past the Wurm, the terrain is open plain studded by mining and farming villages and broken only by the lines of the Roer and Erft Rivers.”

Sorry, but argumentum ad verecundiam is hand-waving of the worst sort. Your "plan" is to force the entire Second British Army and First U.S. Army, some dozen divisions, into a 35 mile-wide zone, then across the Roer plain, then drop FAAA across the Rhine, and thus win the war? Did you happen to notice how much of a problem XXX Corps had getting two divisions from Eindhoven to Arnhem?

Sorry, that is incorrect. I am not calling for support from a higher authority for my plan. I am giving my support to the higher authority/ies for his/their plan. Or rather conception. He/they knew a lot more about fighting and beating Germans than any of us.
Eindhoven to Arnhem is about the same distance as Aachen to Dusseldorf.

Sorry, but no. On 18 September 4th Para Brigade was lifted into the 1st Airborne Division perimeter and was shot to pieces. Graebner made his attempted coup de main and failed. The Polish lift was on 19 September, only delayed, their drop zone was hemmed in by the 10. SS-PAA at the brickworks south of the river to their west and by the remnants of 9. SS-PAA to their south. Also immediately in their vicinity were the various reinforcements crossing the ferry east of Arnhem and heading to Nijmegen. The results for the Poles were the same as for 4th Para.

4th Para Brigade were shot to pieces attacking into Arnhem only on the 19th. Particularly galling for them was the German fire from the brickworks … The Pannerden ferry is miles to the east and any diversion of reinforcements that were headed to Nijmegen to tackle the Poles is a win, especially considering Gavin now has two fresh infantry battalions to throw into the fight there.

[Richard Anderson]

Veritable-Grenade was the one operation which broke the German defense in the West, as you know.

It was? I do? I guess I'm confused. VERITABLE-GRENADE-BLOCKBUSTER closed up 21st Army Group and the attached Ninth U.S. Army to the Rhine by the first week of March. LUMBERJACK followed, closing First U.S. Army up to the Rhine as well, but it and Third Army had battled throughout January and early February to clear the Westwall and cross the Saar. In all cases the German forces fell back across the Rhine as best they could and took up new defenses there. However, in UNDERTONE the Third Army annihilated the German 7. Armee, capturing 81,692 alone 13-21 March, while Seventh Army captured 20,000 in a similar period. VERITABLE-GRENADE-BLOCKBUSTER-LUMBERJACK between them netted some 71,000 prisoners combined.

So I would say those operations broke the German defense west of the Rhine, but it was the operations of Third and Seventh U.S. Army in UNDERTONE that left a gaping hole in the German defenses, exploited by the capture of the Remagen bridge, the assault crossing at Oppenheim, and VARSITY, which finally broke the German defense in the west.

About logistics: all armies had a significant break before crossing the Rhine and being in pursuit, except for TUSA. The 3 armies in 21 AG could organize their post-Rhine logistics for 2-3 weeks. FUSA did so, albeit involontary, after taking the Remagen bridge. and SUSA and the French had been on the Rhine for quite some time.

So the Patton/TUSA situation is the exception not the rule. TUSA is the last to reach the Rhine, and only gets there after all that counts as German on their front is annhilitaed by the operations further north. (This explains why Patton moves so fast along the Moselle). As Patton does not stop once he is on the Rhine but moves on with Undertone, then crosses the river, then keeps rushing east, his army does not get the opportunity to rearrange its depot.

Indeed, 21st Army Group had some 19 days to stock its railheads west of the Rhine, in preparation for operations east of the Rhine. However, its main advantage was its railheads - its depots - were close to the initial operations in the Gennep-Kleve-Nijmegen area. Trier, the Third Army railhead, was simply further away, which distance, combined with the congestion at the Rhine bridges, caused the slow truck movements I alluded to.

BTW, I'd be curious to have you demonstrate how the Germans on Third Army's front were annihilated by operations further north?

That's why I wouldn't take TUSA as representative, but as the anomaly among the 7 Allied armies.

Actually, Second British and First Canadian armies were the anomalies, since they had their depots at the doorstep of their operations.

[Richard Anderson]

More gas and ammunition and .. for First Army, because Third Army grounded. The ‘reconnaissance in force’ becomes a proper thrust.

Sorry, you must not have been paying attention. Third Army would have needed to have been grounded much earlier than it was to have any effect on the operations of First Army. Say before it crossed the Seine?

Gerhard von Schwerin, the German commander in the area, was ready to surrender Aachen but the threat on Aachen fizzled out.

I see, so what Schwerin decided on 13 September now affects events on 11 September? How curious. Schwerin was not the "German commander in the area" until 0600 hours 13 September.

Also: "Aachen Gap is a historic gateway into Germany dating from early Christendom. <> Its military value lies in the roads that spread out from the city in all directions."
“The terrain is relatively open, particularly beyond Aachen on the Cologne plain.”
And in XIX Corps area "“once past the Wurm, the terrain is open plain studded by mining and farming villages and broken only by the lines of the Roer and Erft Rivers.”

Why yes, XIX Corps did most directly face the classic "Aachen Gap", but it was also the weakest and most gas shortage delayed of the the three corps. So now, in addition to the hindsight about grounding the Third Army prior to crossing the Seine, we now add the hindsight that the XIX Corps should get the most gas and be reinforced.

Sorry, that is incorrect. I am not calling for support from a higher authority for my plan. I am giving my support to the higher authority/ies for his/their plan. Or rather conception. He/they knew a lot more about fighting and beating Germans than any of us.
Eindhoven to Arnhem is about the same distance as Aachen to Dusseldorf.

So in denying you made an appeal to authority you make an appeal to authority in order to validate your reasoning? That seems vaguely incestuous somehow.

4th Para Brigade were shot to pieces attacking into Arnhem only on the 19th. Particularly galling for them was the German fire from the brickworks … The Pannerden ferry is miles to the east and any diversion of reinforcements that were headed to Nijmegen to tackle the Poles is a win, especially considering Gavin now has two fresh infantry battalions to throw into the fight there.

Fair that, estimates of the losses on the drop were about 32 killed and an unknown number of wounded. So then, the assumption is the 4th lands as it did on 18 September, the Poles land as scheduled on 19 September...and that somehow eliminates the Germans in the brickworks and south of the bridge? While landing two battalions south of Nijmegen means the bridge gets captured on the 19th? I'm not sure I'm following the reasoning.

[Aber]

Why yes, XIX Corps did most directly face the classic "Aachen Gap", but it was also the weakest and most gas shortage delayed of the the three corps. So now, in addition to the hindsight about grounding the Third Army prior to crossing the Seine, we now add the hindsight that the XIX Corps should get the most gas and be reinforced.
.

Not losing 79th Division would be a start.

Pre-invasion, as you know, the Aachen Gap was the preferred route into Germany, so there is no hindsight involved in the opinion that the Corps attacking through the Aachen Gap should be the strongest and best supplied.

[Mori]

It was? I do? I guess I'm confused. VERITABLE-GRENADE-BLOCKBUSTER closed up 21st Army Group and the attached Ninth U.S. Army to the Rhine by the first week of March. LUMBERJACK followed, closing First U.S. Army up to the Rhine as well, but it and Third Army had battled throughout January and early February to clear the Westwall and cross the Saar. In all cases the German forces fell back across the Rhine as best they could and took up new defenses there. However, in UNDERTONE the Third Army annihilated the German 7. Armee, capturing 81,692 alone 13-21 March, while Seventh Army captured 20,000 in a similar period. VERITABLE-GRENADE-BLOCKBUSTER-LUMBERJACK between them netted some 71,000 prisoners combined.

So I would say those operations broke the German defense west of the Rhine, but it was the operations of Third and Seventh U.S. Army in UNDERTONE that left a gaping hole in the German defenses, exploited by the capture of the Remagen bridge, the assault crossing at Oppenheim, and VARSITY, which finally broke the German defense in the west.

Nope

That's a theme I had the opportunity to study quite in depth. I then realized there wasn't any book giving a holistic perspective on the 1945 campaign, especially of the relative importance of the various operations.

Veritable-Grenade (let's admit Blockbuster is part of Veritable) sucked in all the Germans had as mobile reserves and destroyed them all. After that, there wasn't any possibility for the Germans to build a defense, and they were doomed. The units V-G defeated were the valuable ones, which can't be compared to those manning the West wall against SUSA or to the troops overrun by Patton on both sides of the Moselle. There were cases when Patton "defeated" weaponless troops, and no such thing ever happened during V-G...

I'm not sure where you get the 71,000 casualties inflicted by V-G because the figure usually quoted is ca. 89,600. This is the Allied estimate. Taking the German sources gives something above 120,000. Hence... V-G also had a major impact in quantitative terms.

In operational terms, by attracting and destroying the bulk of the German reserves, V-G enabled a little-opposed advance by FUSA and by TUSA to the Rhine. It was a domino effect really. None of the two could have taken place without V-G, and it wasn't because they did not try. On the contrary, FUSA and TUSA tried hard in Jan-Feb and could not success.

[Richard Anderson]

Nope

That's a theme I had the opportunity to study quite in depth. I then realized there wasn't any book giving a holistic perspective on the 1945 campaign, especially of the relative importance of the various operations.

Veritable-Grenade (let's admit Blockbuster is part of Veritable) sucked in all the Germans had as mobile reserves and destroyed them all. After that, there wasn't any possibility for the Germans to build a defense, and they were doomed. The units V-G defeated were the valuable ones, which can't be compared to those manning the West wall against SUSA or to the troops overrun by Patton on both sides of the Moselle. There were cases when Patton "defeated" weaponless troops, and no such thing ever happened during V-G...

Okay...

2. Panzer Division? Nope, engaged in the Eifel against First and Third Army, in the area Prüm-Neuerburg-Bitburg until March when it was engaged against Third Army during the retreat down the Mosel and in the Hunsrück.
9. and 11. Panzer Division? Okay, engaged in the Eifel and Saar against Third Army and Seventh Army, then the 11. thrown into NORDWIND, before they were withdrawn into reserve, only to be sent north to defend the Rhine, then sent to Remagen.
21. Panzer? Nope, sent to the East before all the kerfluffle.
116. Panzer? Well, in a sense, since it was already sent to the Netherlands 1. Fallschirmarmee in early February.
Lehr? Sure, also with 1. Fallschirmarmee.
3. Panzergrenadier? In the Ardennes, then sent off to oppose Ninth Army and the Remagen crossing.
15. Panzergrenadier? Yep, in the Netherlands with 1. Fallschirmarmee.

As far as I can see the only troops "sucked" in were 11. Panzer and 3. Panzergrenadier. 9., 116., Lehr, and 15. Panzergreandier were already there. Again I think we may be talking carthorse and horse-cart here. The advances of the Allied armies reached the Rhine, despite any German attempts to stop them, by "mobile reserves" or "less mobile reserves".

I'm not sure where you get the 71,000 casualties inflicted by V-G because the figure usually quoted is ca. 89,600. This is the Allied estimate. Taking the German sources gives something above 120,000. Hence... V-G also had a major impact in quantitative terms.

Um, the figures I quoted are POW, which are the only accurate ones, since killed and wounded are allied estimates. "German sources" give total losses for VERITABLE-GRENADE period (10 February-10 March) as:

1. Fallschirmarmee - 16,171
15. Armee - 6,598
5. Panzerarmee - 18,577
7. Armee - 12,441

For the latter period before VARSITY (11 March-20 March) it was:

1. Fallschirmarmee - 880
15. Armee - 3,523
5. Panzerarmee - 8,789
7. Armee - 4,946

Of course, there were huge holes in the German reporting, but I'm not sure how you can derive "something above 120,000" from that?

In operational terms, by attracting and destroying the bulk of the German reserves, V-G enabled a little-opposed advance by FUSA and by TUSA to the Rhine. It was a domino effect really. None of the two could have taken place without V-G, and it wasn't because they did not try. On the contrary, FUSA and TUSA tried hard in Jan-Feb and could not success.

Except the bulk of the German reserves were already attracted there...and in any case, the idea that reserves being drawn off equals a lack of forces and a "little-opposed" advance is a bit of a non sequitur.

BTW, what FUSA and TUSA were trying in January, through 25 January at least, was recovering from the Bulge battles and repositioning for the next. The "lack of success" by Third Army in February included the crossing of the Saar, elimination of the Vianden bulge, and the penetration of the Orscholz Switchline, all of which were ultimately successful and set up the possibilities for success in March.

[Carl Schwamberger]

...
The flip side of that is that the advance in April 1945 was far faster than the logistic planners had allowed for, with all the problems of not being able to move railheads forward fast enough.

IIRC somewhere in Ruppenthal is the suggestion that the armistice line was where they expected to be in July.

EDIT:p377; line Lubeck-Magdeburg-Regensburg-Munich in mid-July.

Move fast than planned? Thats never happened before.

[Richard Anderson]

Not losing 79th Division would be a start.

It's a bit of an oddity. The 79th ID was assigned to Third Army on 18 April and was only attached to First Army 29 May...but only until 24 August when it was reassigned to First Army, only to be reassigned back to Third Army on 7 September, then attached to Seventh Army on 29 September. Part of it was due to the battle of the Falaise Pocket. XV Corps with the 79th ID, 90th ID, 2d French AD, and 5th AD split with part turning north, while part continued to advance with the Third Army main body. The 79th crossed the Seine at Mantes under XV Corps, while the rest stayed behind at Chambois, attached to First Army. Then when the inter-army boundary was changed XV Corps and the 79th ID got attached to First Army. The reason the 79th then got tapped to join XIX Corps for the drive into Belgium was simple...it was fully motorized. So it was opportunity more than anything else. It reached the Belgian border NW of Valenciennes on 1 September and remained grounded there until 5 September, when it was given the mission of heading south to protect Third Army's southern flank from 19. Armee.

Pre-invasion, as you know, the Aachen Gap was the preferred route into Germany, so there is no hindsight involved in the opinion that the Corps attacking through the Aachen Gap should be the strongest and best supplied.

For pretty much a few centuries it was the preferred route. Which is part of the reason it was fortified. Meanwhile, two corps advanced on Aachen, one from the northwest and one from the southwest...with whatever forces they could get forward. I suspect that could have been more if the 79th ID remained grounded at Valenciennes, but then who watches the 19. Armee, which was assessed as a potential threat at the time.

[Mori]

Hello Richard,

Here only about sources.

I'm not sure where you get the 71,000 casualties inflicted by V-G because the figure usually quoted is ca. 89,600. This is the Allied estimate. Taking the German sources gives something above 120,000. Hence... V-G also had a major impact in quantitative terms.

Um, the figures I quoted are POW, which are the only accurate ones, since killed and wounded are allied estimates.

I'm still not sure where you get the 71,000 PoW from, since Allied sources give ca. 51,600 PoW, and add 38,000 KIA and WIA to get to 89,600. Would you mind mentioning the source? My figures are from the Int Sum dated March, 18 1945.
(I have seen the figures from this document quoted in several books, usually without mentioning where they came from.)

By the way, this doesn't account for the casualties inflicted by VII Corps, although this unit is part of Grenade for the first week. It would add ca. 8,500 losses, for a grand total of ca. 98,000.

"German sources" give total losses for VERITABLE-GRENADE period (10 February-10 March) as:

1. Fallschirmarmee - 16,171
15. Armee - 6,598
5. Panzerarmee - 18,577
7. Armee - 12,441

That sum up to 53,787, which is about the number of PoW from the Allied documents (maybe a confusion on "PoWs" vs. "losses". That said, would you mind also sharing the source?).

Of course, there were huge holes in the German reporting, but I'm not sure how you can derive "something above 120,000" from that?

Well, you can still find a detailed status of manpower at division level dated Feb, 10th, and this gives the starting point. The same type of document gives an order of magnitude of the replacements received during the month of fight.

For the end point, especially valuable is a HG G report listing the manpower by unit on Feb 28th. It shows 50% losses since beginning of Veritable. There still exists the medical diary of 2nd PARA corps, with daily losses. And for some units you can get an order of magnitude of the casualties through the number of hand weapons before and after.

Add to that a systematic analytical effort.

By the way, when I started this work, my working hypothesis was that the Allied estimate were exagerated (you know, like all the destruction claims from the air force) and I was genuinely surprised to derive higher numbers from the study of German sources.

[Mori]

Then on content. There are 3 levels of comments.

Forgive my ESL...

1) Detailed approach

Okay...

2. Panzer Division? Nope, engaged in the Eifel against First and Third Army, in the area Prüm-Neuerburg-Bitburg until March when it was engaged against Third Army during the retreat down the Mosel and in the Hunsrück.
9. and 11. Panzer Division? Okay, engaged in the Eifel and Saar against Third Army and Seventh Army, then the 11. thrown into NORDWIND, before they were withdrawn into reserve, only to be sent north to defend the Rhine, then sent to Remagen.
21. Panzer? Nope, sent to the East before all the kerfluffle.
116. Panzer? Well, in a sense, since it was already sent to the Netherlands 1. Fallschirmarmee in early February.
Lehr? Sure, also with 1. Fallschirmarmee.
3. Panzergrenadier? In the Ardennes, then sent off to oppose Ninth Army and the Remagen crossing.
15. Panzergrenadier? Yep, in the Netherlands with 1. Fallschirmarmee.

Veritable-Grenade defeated a total of 20 divisions, supported by plenty of non-divisional troops, of which we should note 2 panzerjaeger brigades (655, 741) and 2 artillery corps. These brigades were a significant armor reserve for the Western front.

The mecanized units defeated during V-G are Pz Lehr, 9 Pz-Div, 11 Pz-Div, 116 Pz-Div, 15 PGD and the brigades. As you so rightly list, these are 5 of the 8 [if adding 17 SS PGD] mecanized division of the theater. The ratio is even more impressive if you count the number of armored vehicles instead of the number of units. That's the bulk of what was available.
(and yes, some were partially involved only, but not because the Germans retained them, just because the operation was too fast for them to bring them in completely).

Also the non-mecanized divisions are worth a look, because some like 6. FS and 2. FS are full strength units early February. They are pretty much the only full strength units of the theater, and the same applies to 116 Pz-Div. Others like 7. FS, 180 ID and 346.ID have more than 10,000 personnel, which is many compared to the typical units in the Eifel against Patton or in the West Wall against Patch.

In other words, V-G defeats what remained as prime units, in quantity and in quality.

Finally, note that only 15 PGD was in the area when the operation began. All the other units were brought in later, including 116 Pz-Div, which was further south early February.

2) How much does manpower matter?

One striking thing about the German army as a whole in 1945 is that it never lacks manpower. We all know that, because we've heard of the millions of PoWs in the Allied cages in May 1945. Millions, not 100,000s like you'd get in the first quarter of the year.

But manpower here is just that: men. It does not mean fit, motivated, trained men, but just men. Do they have weapons? Well, "that's complicated". Can they fight? Well...

Between Veritable-Grenade and Plunder-Varsity, the Germans enjoy a couple of weeks of rest to prepare against the Rhine crossing. They receive enough replacement to fill most of their infantry-type units. But the number of weapons is wholly inadequate. And the value of the replacements (men previously unfit for duty, untrained, not motivated) is terribly low.

So when it comes to 1945, it's often more relevant to track the most professional units (some of the ID, some of the para units - but not 3rd FS, for example, it's worthless at this stage - and some of the Pz/PGD) than to take the total manpower as a gauge of effectiveness. These units are the muscle, the ones that count at operational level.

3) Emotional approach

There an elephant in the room. The major hurdle to making an unpassionate assessment of Veritable-Grenade is one name: Montgomery.

Investigating V-G points to a difficult but inexorable victory. 21 AG puts the Germans in a situation they can't win, however hard they try. And this was precisely what everyone had been looking for since September 1944. Being lucky is not necessary for V-G: the whole operation is so conceived that weather, extra losses, mistakes by Allied commanders or extra German reinforcements don't change its output. Think of it: creating such situation is mastery military art.

But this is embarassing to many authors because it would mean praising Montgomery. Since writing on Veritable-Grenade leads to inescapable conclusion it broke the German resistance in the West, several authors - and some of the most famous, of the most serious - just mention it as a footnote to March moves by Patton. Yes, inversing the chronology: first writing pages on Patton in March, then mentioning as a side remark that some other things had been happening way up north.

There is a little bit of that in your comments about the Vianden budge or the Orscholtz triangle. These are truly insignificant operations which have no impact whatsoever on the campaign. One could also say they were quite a waste of American lives. Yet, they pop up to counterbalance V-G...

[Gooner1]

Sorry, you must not have been paying attention. Third Army would have needed to have been grounded much earlier than it was to have any effect on the operations of First Army. Say before it crossed the Seine?

I fail to see how grounding Third Army in early September will not have an effect on First Army a week-ten days later.

I see, so what Schwerin decided on 13 September now affects events on 11 September? How curious. Schwerin was not the "German commander in the area" until 0600 hours 13 September.

Eh? Well if VII Corps can capture Aachen before 13 September that's all well and good.

Why yes, XIX Corps did most directly face the classic "Aachen Gap", but it was also the weakest and most gas shortage delayed of the the three corps. So now, in addition to the hindsight about grounding the Third Army prior to crossing the Seine, we now add the hindsight that the XIX Corps should get the most gas and be reinforced.

Well XIX Corps shouldn't still be short of gas with Third Army halted on the Meuse .. or rather they should be short of gas for less time.
If British 2nd Army is attacking in a similar direction, XIX Corps frontage is likely to be less extended.

Fair that, estimates of the losses on the drop were about 32 killed and an unknown number of wounded. So then, the assumption is the 4th lands as it did on 18 September, the Poles land as scheduled on 19 September...and that somehow eliminates the Germans in the brickworks and south of the bridge? While landing two battalions south of Nijmegen means the bridge gets captured on the 19th? I'm not sure I'm following the reasoning.

I wasn't making an assumption, just a link that came to me. Could work out nicely though. Still ideally, the weather behaves as forecasted and 4th Parachute Brigade (+) would have been attacking towards the bridge about 18 hours earlier than they did. They may well have made it.
I'd say with the addition of 325th GIR into the fighting at Nijmegen then yes, there is a good chance it falls on the 19th.