Differing views of Overlord

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Richard Anderson
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Re: Differing views of Overlord

Post by Richard Anderson » 26 Jun 2020 17:05

Mori wrote:
26 Jun 2020 16:24
I'm not too sure, and forgive me if this is plain wrong: it seems calling to usual scientific concepts (e.g., importance of random samples in statistical analysis, assessing what's significant in a measurement vs. useless over-precision) are not what you are most familiar with. Nothing wrong, of course, and do not see that as criticism. It may just explain why we seem to misunderstand each other.
I wish I had a million dollars. That wish has precisely as much relevance as your wishes in this case. That you fail to accept the simple fact that the issue is not my "familiarity" or lack thereof of the "usual scientific concepts", but that it was not possible to achieve under the parameters of the database creation.

Since this has been explained to you over and over again without any apparent impact, it has become apparent to me you are unacquainted with something called "reality" and instead live in a academic bubble. This discussion will obviously only continue to be a series of circular wished from your part, so I cannot see any reason to waste my time with you. Bye.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: Differing views of Overlord

Post by Richard Anderson » 26 Jun 2020 17:22

Aber wrote:
26 Jun 2020 16:56
From what I can tell from Numbers, Predictions and War the data does not have to be very precise.

For example the theoretical value of a 105mm howitzer is given as 239.0. However modifiers for Terrain, Weather, Season, Air Superiority, Posture, Leadership, Training/Experience, Morale, Logistics are shown to modify this to a range which covers 56.9 to 527.0. Therefore the qualitative judgements about these factors will probably more than outweigh small inaccuracies in the data.
True enough, but then the OLI was an effort to quantify a weapons value that did not depend on a WAG or BOGSAT. If all the weapons systems are scored using the same formula is that better or worse than a SME declaring that a 105mm howitzer is "6" and a Abrams tank is a 10? Or how about WEI/WUV scores? The same holds true for the various "modifiers" (BTW, "logistics" is not modeled, but may be a part of what is lumped into "CEV", so are leadership, training/experience (to a degree) and morale). All of those modifiers were developed in response to model "failures" through various studies, starting with the interdiction studies that developed the values for air superiority. On the other hand, you BOGSAT.
These days when you can do complex calculations in spreadsheets it should be possible to analyse sensitivities to see what the key factors are that drive the model results.
Why yes, of course, if it were possible to start all over again from scratch, with modern computing capability, and with an unlimited budget, then it would likely be a very different end state.

Except, again of course, it isn't possible and wasn't done that way. Again, I wish I had a million dollars, but railing against the injustice that wish is not fulfilled does not net me a million dollars. :D
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

Mori
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Re: Differing views of Overlord

Post by Mori » 26 Jun 2020 17:48

Richard Anderson wrote:
26 Jun 2020 16:56
Mori wrote:
26 Jun 2020 08:14
Certainly with as good a reliability as what was done for the other NW Europe engagements in the database.
Really? How do you know that? Since you will not describe what the documentary "sources"you have found are.
Oh, am I reading you would like a description of the sources I saw?

Well, let me quote you:
Richard Anderson wrote:
24 Jun 2020 18:13
The "resources" are open to the public. You are as free as anyone to got to NARA, TNA, BAMA, and TsMAO and do the work needed. Please don't expect me or others to do the work for you. :lol:

Mori
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Re: Differing views of Overlord

Post by Mori » 26 Jun 2020 18:04

Richard Anderson wrote:
26 Jun 2020 17:05
That wish has precisely as much relevance as your wishes in this case. That you fail to accept the simple fact that the issue is not my "familiarity" or lack thereof of the "usual scientific concepts", but that it was not possible to achieve under the parameters of the database creation.
I understand.

Why, then, did Dupuy make so far-reaching statements on German effectiveness, going far beyond the "parameters of the database creation"? Dupuy did not limit his conclusions to "the 4 weeks of the battle of the Bulge" but made sweeping generalisations:
On a man for man basis, German ground soldiers consistently inflicted casualties at about a 50 percent higher rate than they incurred from the opposing British and American troops under all circumstances.
Dupuy's "combat effectiveness" created a myth, which took years to debunk. His work - all cloacked under pseudo-scientific arguments - is nuisance to serious history Your turn to prove you can understand that there is an issue in Dupuy and al. Because so far, you are stuck in denial.

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Re: Differing views of Overlord

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 26 Jun 2020 19:36

Mori wrote:
26 Jun 2020 18:04


Dupuy's "combat effectiveness" created a myth, which took years to debunk. His work - all cloacked under pseudo-scientific arguments - is nuisance to serious history
I not understand.

How was studys by Dupuy nuisance to serious history when was be debunk many years?
Mori wrote:
25 Jun 2020 18:51

And, if we go back to what started the discussion, I believe this is why Dupuy and al. have been gradually ignored by authors of military history.
How was studys by Dupuy nuisance to serious history when was be ignore by authors?

When was debunk and was ignore was not be nuisance.

Depuy work have almost no relevance for historys. In very small topics when Dupuy work is relevant all serious authors can for to mention his work and then for to explain why not valid.

What is problem?

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Re: Differing views of Overlord

Post by Mori » 27 Jun 2020 12:13

Let me precise: Dupuy was a nuisance for a period of more or less 20 years until it wasn't taken seriously anymore. Fighting Power, by Martin van Creveld, a book which had some influence, heavily drew on Dupuy.

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Re: Differing views of Overlord

Post by Richard Anderson » 27 Jun 2020 21:45

Richard Anderson wrote:
22 Jun 2020 17:09
Not Hart, French of course, but I just went to look and can't find it now in either?
Because it was French of course, Raising Churchill's Army, pp. 4, 8-9. The argument was,

"This book will suggest that although these explanations of the limitations of the British army's combat capabilities are not wrong, they are in some respects superficial, incomplete, and based upon a limited analysis of the available evidence."

He then demonstrates that his understanding of the data is in some respects superficial, incomplete, and based upon a limited analysis of the available evidence. :D

Seriously, he notes, without details, the remarks of Hargest, Hastings, Horne, and Wilmot, which reflect much of what is apparent from the data in Trevor's analysis. He then holds up John Sloane Brown and Draftee Division, in rebuttal, but without substantive context...Brown's argument essentially was that since the 88th Division was "average" and did well, then Trevor was wrong. The problem is the analysis shows that the 88th Division was actually far above average. Worse, Brown then demonstrates why the 88th Division was actually better than average, explaining just what the problems were that afflicted the other divisions and, by inference, some of those that affected the British as well.

The other "rebuttal" is of course Sydney Jary...as if the experience of a single platoon leader and a single platoon was "consistent" with the actual capabilities of the American or British armies.

Then in some detail he attempts to rebut the analysis by:

First, he correctly states the data sample is biased towards the Italian campaign and to six British divisions. Excellent, except that Trevor never claimed that the findings were not consistent for anything other than that data set. He might have inferred that was true, based upon strong evidence, but that is different.

Second, he the relies on the old technique of identifying the typos in the 1985 edition of NPW. "There was no 7th British Infantry Division engaged at Italy" he notes, which is of course true. The engagements in question were the 7th Armoured Division, which he should have easily realized in context of when and where. Ditto the presence of the 50th British Division at Monte Grande, which is of course also correct, it was the 56th Division. There too he should have realized the simple typo. At least he didn't get caught by the "Big Red One" at Anzio.

Third, he relies on the "the engagements are all German Panzer and Panzergrenadier divisions, which is also both somewhat true, but misses the point...for much of the period in question that was what the Germans fought with...it's rather difficult to create engagements with German divisional types that were not well-represented in battle. Of course, he then states why that was important, because - of course - the German infantry divisions were crap "foot-marching infantry" (that makes them crap?) without the "lavish scales of equipment" of the Panzer and Panzergrenadier divisions...and of course implying that the German mechanized formations were"better". Of course, that ignores that the German Panzer and Panzergrenadier divisions deployed to Italy were simply not that at all. Except for 16th Panzer Division, when the allies landed in Italy, the German mechanized formations in Italy were wrecks. HG had nearly zero scales of equipment, let alone "lavish" ones and was a conglomeration of replacement battalions backed by a reasonably strong Flak regiment, not really a complete division at all. 29. Panzergrenadier and 2. FJD were recovery from the drubbing on Sicily. 26. Panzer operated mostly separate from its Panzer Regiment, which also was not "lavishly equipped". They all functioned well despite the lack of "lavish equipment", not because of it. He also misses that the better equipped - complete of not "lavish" 3. Panzergrenadier Division was chronically poor in its performance, according to its commander because of the poor quality manpower and too many Volksliste III personnel.

Fourth, he claims the evidence cannot be correct because the Germans were not impartial observers in their postwar writings. That in and of itself is of course correct, but has little importance to data collected not from postwar narratives, but from wartime numerical records.

At that point he goes off on a very good description of problems in Raising Churchill's Army, many of which simply reflect the data and the conclusions drawn from them.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: Differing views of Overlord

Post by Mori » 27 Jun 2020 22:07

Richard Anderson wrote:
27 Jun 2020 21:45
First, he correctly states the data sample is biased towards the Italian campaign and to six British divisions. Excellent, except that Trevor never claimed that the findings were not consistent for anything other than that data set.
Unfortunately, Dupuy did claim that his findings were relevant for all circumstances. Let me quote Dupuy a third time:
On a man for man basis, German ground soldiers consistently inflicted casualties at about a 50 percent higher rate than they incurred from the opposing British and American troops under all circumstances. This was true when they were attacking and when they were defending, when they had a local numerical superiority and when, as was usually the case, they were outnumbered, when they had air superiority and when they did not, when they won and when they lost.
That quote is so embarassing that you carefully ignored it.

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Re: Differing views of Overlord

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 28 Jun 2020 21:03

Mori wrote:
27 Jun 2020 12:13
Let me precise: Dupuy was a nuisance for a period of more or less 20 years until it wasn't taken seriously anymore. Fighting Power, by Martin van Creveld, a book which had some influence, heavily drew on Dupuy.
Ok.

So all your posts are complain for problem what was in past. Nobody have problem now. Maybe you have problems still.
Mori wrote:
27 Jun 2020 22:07

Unfortunately, Dupuy did claim that his findings were relevant for all circumstances. Let me quote Dupuy a third time:
On a man for man basis, German ground soldiers consistently inflicted casualties at about a 50 percent higher rate than they incurred from the opposing British and American troops under all circumstances. This was true when they were attacking and when they were defending, when they had a local numerical superiority and when, as was usually the case, they were outnumbered, when they had air superiority and when they did not, when they won and when they lost.
That quote is so embarassing that you carefully ignored it.
Under all circumstances is not same as in all instances.

You was complain many times Dupuy was not include in datas bases and analysises many instances. Example you was write he was not include battles for Veritable-Grenade.

It seems to me under all circumstances mean attack and retreat defense and offense big and small summer and winter urban and country etc etc Circumstances was be about type of battles

I not think it mean Germany army was better in all instances.

Consistently not mean always

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Re: Differing views of Overlord

Post by Mori » 28 Jun 2020 21:59

Ружичасти Слон wrote:
28 Jun 2020 21:03
So all your posts are complain for problem what was in past. Nobody have problem now.
Fair point.
Under all circumstances is not same as in all instances.

You was complain many times Dupuy was not include in datas bases and analysises many instances. Example you was write he was not include battles for Veritable-Grenade.

It seems to me under all circumstances mean attack and retreat defense and offense big and small summer and winter urban and country etc etc Circumstances was be about type of battles

I not think it mean Germany army was better in all instances.

Consistently not mean always
Richard Anderson already lectured me on English, and I believe that was enough. And lessons of English language from a non-native English speaker are not appropriate.

That Dupuy wrote that Germans were better whatever the situation is pretty clear. Maybe that's not what he meant, but that's what he wrote, and that's also how it was understood by everyone who read it. He did not correct his statements thereafter.

Check this [url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/ ... 6f6382dbd/]1985 review[/quote] published in the Washington post, you will get a sense of how Dupuy was perceived.

Also have a look at this [url=https://www.samizdata.net/2015/08/what- ... -military/]synthesis[/quote] of Dupuy's book: you will not see anything like "conclusions limited to the dataset" or "database may not be representative" etc.

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Re: Differing views of Overlord

Post by Duncan_M » 29 Jun 2020 18:48

Richard Anderson wrote:
27 Jun 2020 21:45
Seriously, he notes, without details, the remarks of Hargest, Hastings, Horne, and Wilmot, which reflect much of what is apparent from the data in Trevor's analysis. He then holds up John Sloane Brown and Draftee Division, in rebuttal, but without substantive context...Brown's argument essentially was that since the 88th Division was "average" and did well, then Trevor was wrong. The problem is the analysis shows that the 88th Division was actually far above average. Worse, Brown then demonstrates why the 88th Division was actually better than average, explaining just what the problems were that afflicted the other divisions and, by inference, some of those that affected the British as well
How do you figure the 88th performed far above average? What divisions are you comparing it to? If only very poor divisions during their worst, like the 90th in Normandy or the 104th in the Bulge, then I guess its true.

But the 88th did not perform very well during in its first major offensive during OP Diadem, it only made solid progress once the German rear was cracked and they were in retreat. Brown gives the rah rah approach because grandpa commanded it and he has a lot of respect for it, but he still didn't hide that their casualty rates were enormous and most objectives were not achieved.

They did better during the attacks against the Gothic Line but still suffered very heavy casualties to the point even Sloan states their overall fighting quality dropped after that, that they never recovered.* Despite that claim (where Sloan used it to attack the US Army's individual replacement system) the 88th still performing very well during the Po campaign, which was due more to better terrain for maneuver compared to assaulting prepared positions in mountainous terrain by way of limited and heavily defended avenues of approach.**

The only benefit the 88th had compared to some other divisions was that it was not stripped for replacements like quite a few divisions did face. But quite a few didn't face that issue either, the 88th was not unique in that. And despite that, it still performed rather poorly in its first big offensive use, though that had less to do with its abilities than the situation as a whole (any good division would have gotten mauled conducting frontal assaults against prepared and ready positions). And even for divisions that were stripped and suffered heavily for the instability it caused, like the 90th, while they performed poorly initially they sorted themselves. For instance, the 90th was later called one of the best divisions in the theater.



*A major benefit that Fifth Army units had over those of the ETO during late summer early fall 1944 was that, because the ETO became the main effort in summer fall 1944, because logistics were iffy, and a lot of veteran units were pulled away and new ones added, Clark pumped the brakes on the offensive north and allowed nearly all his divisions to be pulled from the line to rest and recuperate, including allowing two months of training time before the attack on the Gothic Line commenced. Despite this ample training time to take in and train the replacements gained after Diadem and the pursuit to the Gothic Line, it still was not a major factor in performance, especially since after taking the casualties at the Gothic Line they were still good enough to fight an effective battle of maneuver in the Po Valley in 1945.


**In the appendix of Draftee Division Sloan wrote extensively about Dupuy and claimed his s formula did not factor US Army being on the offensive, Germans being primarily on the defensive, nor factoring in the difference between hasty, prepared, and fixed defense protective postures. I'm just repeating what he wrote, I have no idea if its true or false, so don't shoot the messenger.

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Re: Differing views of Overlord

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 29 Jun 2020 19:41

Richard Anderson wrote:
27 Jun 2020 21:45
Because it was French of course, Raising Churchill's Army, pp. 4, 8-9. The argument was,

"This book will suggest that although these explanations of the limitations of the British army's combat capabilities are not wrong, they are in some respects superficial, incomplete, and based upon a limited analysis of the available evidence."

He then demonstrates that his understanding of the data is in some respects superficial, incomplete, and based upon a limited analysis of the available evidence.

Seriously, he notes, without details, the remarks of Hargest, Hastings, Horne, and Wilmot, which reflect much of what is apparent from the data in Trevor's analysis.
Rich,

Apologies if this drags you away from work and your next million dollars... :thumbsup:

I note that none of Hargest, Hastings, Horne or Wilmot commented on the actual Salerno or Anzio "battles" that are covered in the database. Or am I wrong - to be fair that does happen a lot. :D

Hargest was strictly about Normandy as far as I know. Hastings would be his Overlord I guess? Horne - Monty: The Lonely Leader - nothing about Salerno other than it happened! Wilmot doesn't describe Salerno either.

I've just looked briefly at Horne and now remember why I haven't opened it for so long.

A look at Jonathon Fennell's Fighting the People's War shows just how variable stuff like morale could be. The ups and downs of 8th Army's morale in 1942 being an ideal case in point.

When 56th Infantry Division were sent - in bits and pieces - to Anzio having just taken part in the Garigliano crossings and bitter fighting that followed there appears little doubt that they thought themselves very hard done by and this, I expect, had some impact on their willingness to fight to the death on arrival on yet another beachhead.

Regards

Tom

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Re: Differing views of Overlord

Post by Richard Anderson » 29 Jun 2020 22:11

Duncan_M wrote:
29 Jun 2020 18:48
How do you figure the 88th performed far above average? What divisions are you comparing it to?
To the other divisions in Italy analyzed in the data base as explicated in NPW, Understanding Defeat, Understanding Victory, Attrition, et cetera.
If only very poor divisions during their worst, like the 90th in Normandy or the 104th in the Bulge, then I guess its true.
Um, I think you mean the "106th in the Bulge", not the 104th.

That leads to a question though, how do you judge the 90th or 106th ID as "very poor divisions"? You must have some standards/method of analysis to arrive at that conclusion? You then need to be able to show how those "very poor divisions" could have been "better" or how other divisions in the same circumstance could have performed better. The problem is, you are judging them I suspect based upon very poor outcomes, both of which circumstances are pretty poorly understood by many.

Here's a deep dark secret. Neither the 90th or the 106th performed poorly as divisions. They did pretty much exactly what their doctrine and training told them to do and they pretty much did them well. So the question is then, what were the circumstances that led to the poor results.

Both divisions were completely inexperienced.
Both divisions experienced major command failures, the 90th of its division commander and the 106th of its division, corps, army, and army group commanders.
Both divisions were inexperienced. The 90th suffered through a slightly longer learning curve than most of thee other divisions in Normandy, but virtually all divisions deployed to Europe suffered similar, sometimes drastic learning curves.
But the 88th did not perform very well during in its first major offensive during OP Diadem, it only made solid progress once the German rear was cracked and they were in retreat. Brown gives the rah rah approach because grandpa commanded it and he has a lot of respect for it, but he still didn't hide that their casualty rates were enormous and most objectives were not achieved.
There are five - IIRC - 88th ID engagements in the data base, the first being Santa Maria Infante, which was a bit of a cock-up. Brown may have given a "rah rah" approach to the engagements, but I assure you Trevor did not, which was probably the source of their later conflict. JSB actually worked as a consultant for Trevor on the study of the 88th ID.
They did better during the attacks against the Gothic Line but still suffered very heavy casualties to the point even Sloan states their overall fighting quality dropped after that, that they never recovered.* Despite that claim (where Sloan used it to attack the US Army's individual replacement system) the 88th still performing very well during the Po campaign, which was due more to better terrain for maneuver compared to assaulting prepared positions in mountainous terrain by way of limited and heavily defended avenues of approach.**
Sadly I never got a chance to look at the Gothic Line engagements, all the 88th ID engagements are from the Rome campaign.

Yes, Sloan, like so many others, attacked the Army's long-standing individual replacement policy. The alternate, unit replacement, has been tried in the Never-ending War on Terrorism and has been found wanting as well, just as the Germans discovered.
The only benefit the 88th had compared to some other divisions was that it was not stripped for replacements like quite a few divisions did face. But quite a few didn't face that issue either, the 88th was not unique in that. And despite that, it still performed rather poorly in its first big offensive use, though that had less to do with its abilities than the situation as a whole (any good division would have gotten mauled conducting frontal assaults against prepared and ready positions). And even for divisions that were stripped and suffered heavily for the instability it caused, like the 90th, while they performed poorly initially they sorted themselves. For instance, the 90th was later called one of the best divisions in the theater.
Um, the 88th ID endured no personnel turmoil whatsoever according to the AGF study, Zero. Zip. Nada. It was the only infantry division deployed after the 34th ID went to England, that did not suffer any turmoil. In the 14 infantry divisions deployed between the 34th ID and the 88th ID, an average of 11 months of training time was assessed as lost to such turmoil. In the 41 infantry divisions deployed after the 88th, an average of 9 months was lost.

The 90th ID suffered somewhat less turmoil, 8 months according to the AGF. Its problems though are pretty easy to identify:

Dubious tactics.
Poor division commanders.
Regimental and battalion-level unit cohesion wrecked by extremely severe casualties in its opening engagements.
Lack of experience.

Anyway, yes the 90th ID was sorted out, as was the 88th, which performed well, compared to other divisions in Italy, despite its relatively poor performance at Santa Maria Infante.
*A major benefit that Fifth Army units had over those of the ETO during late summer early fall 1944 was that, because the ETO became the main effort in summer fall 1944, because logistics were iffy, and a lot of veteran units were pulled away and new ones added, Clark pumped the brakes on the offensive north and allowed nearly all his divisions to be pulled from the line to rest and recuperate, including allowing two months of training time before the attack on the Gothic Line commenced. Despite this ample training time to take in and train the replacements gained after Diadem and the pursuit to the Gothic Line, it still was not a major factor in performance, especially since after taking the casualties at the Gothic Line they were still good enough to fight an effective battle of maneuver in the Po Valley in 1945.
Um, the ETOUSA did much the same in February 1945.
**In the appendix of Draftee Division Sloan wrote extensively about Dupuy and claimed his s formula did not factor US Army being on the offensive, Germans being primarily on the defensive, nor factoring in the difference between hasty, prepared, and fixed defense protective postures. I'm just repeating what he wrote, I have no idea if its true or false, so don't shoot the messenger.
Indeed, I know very well what Sloan's arguments were; I wrote parts of the rebuttal to his assessment in Zetterling's Normandy 1944. Among the more amusing gaffes he made was to recommend using the factor ascribed for hardened installations under nuclear attack as a defensive factor. :D

Fundamentally, the arguments against Dupuy always circle back to "we won, how could we if the Germans were better (with the underlying inference that he was a traitor to the U.S. Army)" and other assorted similar red herrings and straw men.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: Differing views of Overlord

Post by Richard Anderson » 29 Jun 2020 22:23

Tom from Cornwall wrote:
29 Jun 2020 19:41
Apologies if this drags you away from work and your next million dollars... :thumbsup:

I note that none of Hargest, Hastings, Horne or Wilmot commented on the actual Salerno or Anzio "battles" that are covered in the database. Or am I wrong - to be fair that does happen a lot. :D
Um, yes Tom, I know, but then I didn't actually say anything of the sort, did I?

Hargest, et al, commented on finding many of the same problematic factors identified by Trevor in the data from Italy (et all, they are not all "Italian" engagements). Hargest was pretty much strictly about problems in the RAC and RTR IIRC. Wilmot of course was trying to slag various people because he was a journo and that's what they do. :lol: Hastings was keying off Trevor second-hand...and is also a journo at heart, so... :lol: And I think French included Horne in the mix because he wrote about Monty with Monty's nephew (I think it was?) so Britannia Rules the Waves.

{quote]I've just looked briefly at Horne and now remember why I haven't opened it for so long.[/quote]

Exactly. :lol: French included him as one of those seduced by the Dark Side for some reason.
A look at Jonathon Fennell's Fighting the People's War shows just how variable stuff like morale could be. The ups and downs of 8th Army's morale in 1942 being an ideal case in point.
Indeed, you might find the disciplinary reports of Eighth Army revealing. I wish I still had them to hand.
When 56th Infantry Division were sent - in bits and pieces - to Anzio having just taken part in the Garigliano crossings and bitter fighting that followed there appears little doubt that they thought themselves very hard done by and this, I expect, had some impact on their willingness to fight to the death on arrival on yet another beachhead.
Well, yeah, and no doubt the 1st ID (the US one :lol: ), 9th ID, 2d AD, 7th Armoured Division (not the "7th Division" :lol: ) felt the same.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

Aber
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Re: Differing views of Overlord

Post by Aber » 30 Jun 2020 12:57

Richard Anderson wrote:
29 Jun 2020 22:11

To the other divisions in Italy analyzed in the data base as explicated in NPW,
How much difference did revisiting the underlying data make to the Italian engagements listed in NPW?

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