An Evaluation of Allied Intelligence in the Tactical Bombing of German Supply Depots during the Normandy Campaign, 1944

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Andy H
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An Evaluation of Allied Intelligence in the Tactical Bombing of German Supply Depots during the Normandy Campaign, 1944

Post by Andy H » 01 Aug 2020 20:28

Hi

Though the Journal article itself is only accessible to Society members (at present) the table associated with the article are available to all and will hopefully provide some useful information.

https://smh-hq.org/jmh/normandy1944.html

Regards

Andy H

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Sheldrake
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Re: An Evaluation of Allied Intelligence in the Tactical Bombing of German Supply Depots during the Normandy Campaign, 1

Post by Sheldrake » 01 Aug 2020 20:48

Thanks for this.

This looks like air force funded/focused material on the theory that we could have won the war earlier if we applied some super int stuff.

The Germans had other problems. The Heinrich Eberbach the commander of Panzer Group West wrote that he was logistically dependent on 7th Army. As a Panzer Gruppe not an army Panzer Group West lacked logistic units. Eberbach wrote that depots were too far to the rear to be served by the horse transport logistic columns of 7 AOK, and that the motorised supply units of the panzer formations had to support them. The Panzer Gruppe was upgraded to a panzer army after the HQ communications and supply elements of 16 Luftwaffe division were re-purposed as logistic C3.

My research into British artillery in Normandy suggests that German artillery logistics got better during the campaign.

Carl Schwamberger
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Re: An Evaluation of Allied Intelligence in the Tactical Bombing of German Supply Depots during the Normandy Campaign, 1

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 10 Aug 2020 21:50

Sheldrake wrote:
01 Aug 2020 20:48
... The Germans had other problems. The Heinrich Eberbach the commander of Panzer Group West wrote that he was logistically dependent on 7th Army. As a Panzer Gruppe not an army Panzer Group West lacked logistic units. Eberbach wrote that depots were too far to the rear to be served by the horse transport logistic columns of 7 AOK, and that the motorised supply units of the panzer formations had to support them. ...
My first thought is the location of the fuel depots reflected the strategy or expectation to fight the armored forces in the interior, vs near the coast as actually occurred. Rommel was not able to reposition the armored corps to support his beach defense strategy, so the fuel storage remained further in the interior.

My second thought concerns the automotive transport available to provide a logistics transport group for a 'panzer army'. Was there such available, or would it have required robbing vehicles from other units?

Figure 1: Petrol, Oil, and Lubricants (POL) and ammunition depots in and surrounding the Normandy battlefield area, June 1944.
Direct Link: https://www.smh-hq.org/docs//Normandy1944/Figure1.jpg

Marking these locations on my fathers 1944 Michelin road map (US Army reprint) is interesting.

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