There was the controversy over air support at the battle of the Tebaga Gap.
Possibly what galled the most was how Monty was feted like a film star when he came back to blighty.
There was the controversy over air support at the battle of the Tebaga Gap.
"Managing" your boss is a very important skill especially for example when he has suggestions about the use of airborne troops.Richard Anderson wrote: ↑27 Oct 2020, 19:31Eisenhower was "in charge" as CG, ETOUSA, and as SCAEF, but only so within the parameters of those jobs. He certainly was not "managing" Marshall since Marshall, as Army Chief of Staff, was "in charge" of Eisenhower rather than the other war round.
Very interesting paper. Key quote from Tedder in the Western Desert in mid 1942Michael Kenny wrote: ↑28 Oct 2020, 08:01I believe it nothing more than a fight over who 'won the war'.
This paper has a lot of the personal invective https://www.raf.mod.uk/what-we-do/centr ... -normandy/
‘You should know that the RAF in the Desert realise that they have saved the Army, both in the recent advance and the withdrawal, and naturally resent any suggestion that the Army should control them.’ The spirit of the RAF personnel was ‘give us some tanks and we will stop this retreating if the Army does not wish to fight.’
About every commander I remember working for & most of my peers had to give such remainder. Every leader worth a damm pushes boundaries. They must be reminded when they are at a hard boundary. Its business as usual.
Carl,Carl Schwamberger wrote: ↑29 Oct 2020, 17:13About every commander I remember working for & most of my peers had to give such remainder. Every leader worth a damm pushes boundaries. They must be reminded when they are at a hard boundary. Its business as usual.
For the CIGS was also sharply aware, as he had been from the days when he had firmly commanded in his Corps this gifted, energetic and idiosyncratic soldier, that Montgomery possessed a powerful strain of egocentricity and an assurance which was indispensable when well-directed but which could appear provocative and ill-mannered when not. So it continued. ‘Monty still requires the occasional kick on the backside’, Brooke wrote to Wavell about their fellow Field-Marshal as late as 1944, ‘and I am trying to make certain he gets it!’ [Note 25: Alanbrooke Papers (section 12).]
Saw it and to me it sums up the problems that Tedder ( The RAF?) had with Monty. It appears he thought 'The Army' forgot they were just there to move forward and secure the area after the Germans fled when air-power destroyed their Armies. I think Tedder believed 21 AG was attached to The RAF RegimentAber wrote: ↑29 Oct 2020, 10:13Key quote from Tedder in the Western Desert in mid 1942
‘You should know that the RAF in the Desert realise that they have saved the Army, both in the recent advance and the withdrawal, and naturally resent any suggestion that the Army should control them.’ The spirit of the RAF personnel was ‘give us some tanks and we will stop this retreating if the Army does not wish to fight.’
Correct so it is puzzling that you feel the need to state it. The 'Plan' was to land, consolidate the beaches and then the US Army heads west to open the Atlantic ports so reinforcements and supplies could be landed direct from the USA whilst the Commonwealth dealt with the arriving German reinforcements. The Allies would then pause and consolidate in western France before a general advance east. It was never expected that this 'hinge' would be as far north as Caen. Circumstances dictated the 'Caen' fixation and instead of being a Monty setback that delayed the advance the decisive battle that was expected to be fought in central France was fought Caen/Falaise and the eventual Allied victory was achieved months ahead of the most optimistic forecastsSean Oliver wrote: ↑30 Oct 2020, 03:51It does not mention or suggest American breakouts rolling up the Wehrmacht all the way to Paris while the British 'protect' them, beyond the issue of the US moves to take the ports.
No one honestly believes it but their is a large number of dishonest people who see the campaign as two competing Armies where only one can 'win the war' and the other then relegated to an also-ran who was more of a hinderance than a help.Sean Oliver wrote: ↑30 Oct 2020, 03:51Does anyone honesty think Montgomery would gather all of his commanders months before D-Day and explain to them that his masterplan calls for the British troops under his command to remain stuck at Caen for 3 bloody and demoralizing months of positional warfare against a dozen German Panzer divisions so that Patton and the Americans can get all the glory and credit for smashing the Germans as they drive around the flank and into Paris?
Well not quite, as for most of this period First US Army was part of 21 Army Group.Sean Oliver wrote: ↑30 Oct 2020, 03:51As the Jan 44 notes indicate by the US objectives of Cherbourg and Brittany, the 'masterplan' of the initial Normandy campaign required 21 Army Group 's deployment around Bayeux-Caen to - among other things - prevent any German counterattack from threatening the Americans' flank and rear as they drove north toward the port of CHERBOURG and west towards the ports of BRITTANY. This role for 21 AG was necessary only insofar as the Americans were driving north and west, and the Germans tried to interfere with this. Seizing those ports quickly was considered by Montgomery to be the first important priority of the whole campaign, which is why 21 AG was designated to help ensure their capture.
True, but then again the objective of Operation 'COBRA' wasn't Paris.Sean Oliver wrote: ↑30 Oct 2020, 03:51This is the extent of Montgomery's pre-D-day masterplan. It does not mention or suggest American breakouts rolling up the Wehrmacht all the way to Paris while the British 'protect' them, beyond the issue of the US moves to take the ports.
Which contradicts your opening statement about the British Commonwealth forces shielding the US forces whilst they captured both Cherbourg and the Brittany ports.Sean Oliver wrote: ↑30 Oct 2020, 03:51But once Cherbourg was taken there was no need for 21 AG to 'protect' the Americans. 21 AG could be free to go all the way to Germany.
And finally,Dempsey Diary
TUESDAY - 25 JUL 44
1730
Flew to Headquarters 21 Army Group and saw C-in-C. In order to give even more help to the First Army operation, he wishes Second Army to carry out an operation at the beginning of August, either EAST or WEST of R ORNE. It will have no geographical objective, but will be a continuation of the policy which has held good the whole time - that Second Army shall deal with the main enemy force while First Army swings forward with its RIGHT.
Who cares about Patton and glory, this thread is trying to be about 'history'.Sean Oliver wrote: ↑30 Oct 2020, 03:51so that Patton and the Americans can get all the glory and credit for smashing the Germans as they drive around the flank and into Paris?
Sounds like light work arbitrating that. This is dealing tired old men in late middle age. Try it with a room full of 28 y/o testosterone charged Captains with the egos of youth.... Saw it and to me it sums up the problems that Tedder ( The RAF?) had with Monty. It appears he thought 'The Army' forgot they were just there to move forward and secure the area after the Germans fled when air-power destroyed their Armies. I think Tedder believed 21 AG was attached to The RAF Regiment
Top.
Agree that reminding your subordinates who is in charge is normal; Eisenhower was having to tell Marshall that it was his plan (not Montgomery's). That was probably due to reactions from US population, press and politicians about coverage of the campaign. Alexander probably had the same issues in North Africa.Carl Schwamberger wrote: ↑29 Oct 2020, 17:13About every commander I remember working for & most of my peers had to give such remainder. Every leader worth a damm pushes boundaries. They must be reminded when they are at a hard boundary. Its business as usual.
I'm sure I've seen quotes from senior RAF leaders that victory at Alamein was so certain "my chief of staff could have won it".Michael Kenny wrote: ↑29 Oct 2020, 23:42Saw it and to me it sums up the problems that Tedder ( The RAF?) had with Monty. It appears he thought 'The Army' forgot they were just there to move forward and secure the area after the Germans fled when air-power destroyed their Armies.