Hey, wadda'ya want? My oldest son was Hobbes and my number two son was Calvin.ChristopherPerrien wrote: "Calvin and Hobbes"
Sorry, but that has nothing to do with Rommel's "change in strategy" (which BTW, wasn't a "change" at all,nor was it a crust defense). Quite simply, going back to the initial COSSAC planning, the Allied assumption was that once they were established on the continent the Germans would withdraw to the Seine. And it was the logical move, except that Hitler wouldn't hear of it (and he ma in some ways have been right). What you are confusing is that the assault, consolidation, expansion, and exploitation were all distinct phases with slightly different strategies and tactics by both sides.Perhap the Allies failed to realize Rommel's change in strategy, to a crust or beach defense, led to a much greater chance that the Germans would end up trying to throw us off the beach wherever we landed rather than withdrawing and throwing us back in the sea later.
Er, do you mean "hammer on an eggshell"? But either way that makes little sense. Should the Allies have used less force and risked greater casualties and a greater chance of failure? And if they should have used "more" force where would they have gotten it from?But as I have maintained in many posts and topics , I stand by my belief that Overlord as far as the landing goes , was an eggshell on a hammer , and too much one-day thinking and planning to just get across the beach , works against you afterwards. Or even during the ONE DAY since Caan was a first day objective.
As to the latter opinion the real problem was that in focusing on the assault they failed to "visualize the battlespace" and di not allocate resources to likely contingencies, they more or less depended on the effect of their assumed superiorities.
Huh? I confess you lost me there?In a way , there might be something to comparing the "Atlantic Wall" to "Operation Fortitude" in terms what they actually were and what they accomplished in causing errors in thinking and actions on the others' side.I may make this into a topic of its own.
Uh, yes, in fact FORTITUDE was solely a deception. No it wasn't going to be a Thrid Army landing in the Pas de Calais if OVERLORD failed. Whatever the heck is giving you that notion?And maybe
Is it a certainty that "Fortitude was solely a deception"?, perhaps it might have become a second landing by the 3rd Army at Pas de Calaise if Overlord/Normandy had turned out different.
Er, it was an amphibious op, it is rare that LCT capsize and sink due to weather conditions during river crossings AFAIK? It is also rare that gunfire support for river crossings is provided by battleships, cruisers, and destroyers AFAIK?All this goes to show I think, is that much of the planning and execution of Overlord suggests alot of "people" believed it was more an amphibiuos assault rather than a wide river crossing. Too much thinking and effort was done on how and when and where to just get ashore, in that case we should have used more LTV's and Marines and specialist armor and brought beach chairs . My view is it was a large scale river crossing and all you needed was standard army units and a few boat-loads of signs with arrows saying which way Paris and Berlin are , so the troops have some "direction" and a "goal" after hitting the beach.
And are you seriously implying that less thought should have gone into NEPTUNE? And that it could have been accomplished by only using "standard army units"?
Are you truly that delusional?
Oh please, don't stop now, it's just starting to get interesting again, if not more than a little surreal.Oh well, I think we have got all we can out of this off- topic of course, I appreciate your clarifications and info about some of the things discussed.
Unless someone asks me to reply to something I am going to take my leave of this topic, and let it get back to LTV's and D-Day.
Regards to all,