If Rommel shared Hitler's views,why were the reserves not close at hand ?Sheldrake wrote: ↑19 Jul 2021 10:14Returning to the topic itself.
The question of whether Hitler was woken over the night of 5-6 June is important.
In case anyone has forgotten, Hitler was unhappy with the proposals made by Rundstedt and his staff for a defence inland. He appointed Erwin Rommel to command a new Army group to command the troops on the likely invasion front, removing Rundstedt from direct command. Rommel's shared Hitler's views about the importance of defeating the allies on the coast. All weapons pointing at landing beaches. All reserves close at hand for rapid counter attacks - except where they could only be released by OBWest or OKW
Everything in Rommel's concept depended on prompt effective actions on D Day - hence the name of the book and film - "The Longest Day."
So it really mattered that the Germans identified when and where D Day was happening. Everyone needed to be awake and at their posts
It was a risky strategy selected by Hitler which failed when tested. Lots of predictable problems had not been thought through.
1. There is no evidence of test exercises to check response times or identify problems in reporting "D Day" During the cold war NATO responses depended on political leaders being made rapidly aware of Warsaw Pact aggression. This was tested in annual communication exercises. Nothing seems to have been done to test what might happen on the eve of D Day.
2. There was no contingency Army Group B plan for what would happen if there was a D+1. ARKO 1st SS Panzer Corps artillery said that there was no prior survey of possible artillery positions or provision of 1:25,000 scale maps.
3. The assumption that the allies would not attack in poor weather allowed Rommel to absent himself from his HQ at the critical moment to visit his family.
Like much of the Third Reich the Atlantic Wall was bluff and wishful thinking. It should be no surprise that the plans to respond to a cross channel assault were also bluff. Whether it was Hitler or his staff who decided not to intervene promptly is irrelevant.
PzL was more than 150 km away
The first units of 12 SS arrived at Evrecy at 22.00H 6 June,and Evrecy is 15 km away from Caen,which is 15 km away from the Channel .15th Army had asked at 1.45 H the commitment of 12 SS,but this was refused ..by Speidel.
About your first point : you can't compare what happened 76 years ago to the means of communication of NATO during the Cold War .There was no AWACS in 1944 .
About point 3 : Rommel's absence was irrelevant : Overlord would not have failed if Rommel was not absent .