Seelöwe - let's discuss barges sunk by bombers

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fredleander
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Re: known phenomenon

#46

Post by fredleander » 14 May 2007, 12:02

Ostkatze wrote:Poor accuracy of high level bombing, losses to AAA in low level attacks, lack of larger bombs and non-exploding bombs of this period are, I believe, at this stage of our debate "known phenomena".

More to the point, your closing quote included "...had to be withdrawn...". The sense would appear to be of ongoing ( ie non Seelowe ) operations. It is hardly a revolutionary statement to make that units suffering losses need a rest to work up replacements, the larger the losses the more the threat of breaking the experienced cadre's ability to assimilate rookies without losing the elan of a front line unit. This would be a truism of "ongoing operations".

Your bringing this up in a discussion of a possible Seelowe, leandros, I find typical. Are you trying to suggest that such squadrons would have been removed to Scotland or Canada after a couple of bad days? As if they were the AASF after Sedan? This has been toyed and hinted at here before. Would you care to expand on the "breaking point" of the RAF during Seelowe? prosit. Neil.
This is the section of what bombers could do against the invasion fleet - barges. Is it not? How can this then not be relevant....?......the Vorposten-boote was a part of their air defense.

What it is indicating is that the Seelöwe fleet had a proper AA capacity which would yield results on low-flying bombers........ :)

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#47

Post by Andreas » 14 May 2007, 12:56

Different targets altogether, hence not possible to draw conclusions.

All the best

Andreas


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#48

Post by fredleander » 14 May 2007, 14:01

Andreas wrote:Different targets altogether, hence not possible to draw conclusions.

All the best

Andreas
So you mean to say that the eventual AA capacity of the barge fleet and its escorts (inclusive of Herbert-mounted 88's) is a factor not to be used when considering the effect - accuracy - of high-level RAF bombing on the invasion fleet (barges)?

Do I understand you correctly - your aim is more to evaluate what a direct bomb hit, or a near-miss, results in - on a barge.......sort of Billy Mitchell operation.... :)

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#49

Post by Andreas » 14 May 2007, 14:49

No, what I mean to say is that there is a difference between a convoy of a few steamers and one of masses of towed barges.

All the best

Andreas

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#50

Post by Ostkatze » 15 May 2007, 04:49

At the risk of adding to leandros' bunker mentality, which I would guess is his main joy in here - my point was not the ability to get hits on the invasion fleet or the incoming bombers. It was leandros' bringing up of bomber squadrons' losses causing a " had to be withdrawn " situation. Which leandros sidestepped / ignored / ridiculed, as usual.

Also noticed leandros' defense of his continual habit of re-spewing the prior posting in full; that he has been jumped upon for quoting out of context. Amusing - in that it was leandros who recently accused me of quoting a 2yr old statement of his " a little bit out of context ". A statement on RAF strafing by leandros which I had typed in as a full sentence.
Happy "Sedan Day" Neil.

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#51

Post by fredleander » 15 May 2007, 11:58

Ostkatze wrote:At the risk of adding to leandros' bunker mentality, which I would guess is his main joy in here - my point was not the ability to get hits on the invasion fleet or the incoming bombers. It was leandros' bringing up of bomber squadrons' losses causing a " had to be withdrawn " situation. Which leandros sidestepped / ignored / ridiculed, as usual.

Also noticed leandros' defense of his continual habit of re-spewing the prior posting in full; that he has been jumped upon for quoting out of context. Amusing - in that it was leandros who recently accused me of quoting a 2yr old statement of his " a little bit out of context ". A statement on RAF strafing by leandros which I had typed in as a full sentence.
Happy "Sedan Day" Neil.
Maybe you could contribute with something about the actual subject...... :)

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#52

Post by RichTO90 » 15 May 2007, 19:25

leandros wrote:
RichTO90 wrote:And yes, they had crews, the crew shortage problem was in Fighter Command at this time, there are no indications of manpower problems otherwise.
I seem to remember that Churchill made a point of this in his memoirs from this period - in particular quoting the Bomber Command...... :)
As a follow-up to this, I finally got around to looking up the crew status in the Luftwaffe as of 29 September 1940, the middle of the period now in question (see Michael Holms excellent site at http://www.ww2.dk/).

On that date the Jagdwaffe had a pilot Soll of 1,132, and Ist of 917 and an Einsatzbereit of 676. Those figures may be compared to 29 June, when they were respectively 1,171, 1,126, and 906.

Exactly who was having problems maintaining crew strengths? :D

Sadly he hasn't posted the later "Übersicht über Soll, Istbestand, Einsatzbereitschaft, Verluste und Reserven der fliegenden Verbänden" or those for the Kampfgeschwader and Stukageschwader, and I forgot to copy AIR 40/1207 (the British copy) the last time I was at Kew, I haven't been able to get to Maxwell, and I can't find the microfilm copy at NARA. :x

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#53

Post by Eugen Pinak » 15 May 2007, 20:03

RichTO90 wrote:On that date the Jagdwaffe had a pilot Soll of 1,132, and Ist of 917 and an Einsatzbereit of 676. Those figures may be compared to 29 June, when they were respectively 1,171, 1,126, and 906
Just my 5 cents to add.
According to J.Ellis "Brute Force" (p.543) British Fighter Command had ("lst"-?):
6 July 1940 -1259 pilots (per 644 serviceable fighters)
24 August 1940 - 1377 pilots (per 758 serviceable fighters)
28 September 1940 - 1581 (per 732 serviceable fighters)
5 October 1940 - 1703 (per 734 serviceable fighters)

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#54

Post by fredleander » 15 May 2007, 22:31

Since this is about British bombers bombing German barges how was the situation for the Bomber and Coastal Command? Was Coastal Command part of the RAF or RN? Or none of them...?

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#55

Post by fredleander » 15 May 2007, 22:36

Eugen Pinak wrote:
RichTO90 wrote:On that date the Jagdwaffe had a pilot Soll of 1,132, and Ist of 917 and an Einsatzbereit of 676. Those figures may be compared to 29 June, when they were respectively 1,171, 1,126, and 906
Just my 5 cents to add.
According to J.Ellis "Brute Force" (p.543) British Fighter Command had ("lst"-?):
6 July 1940 -1259 pilots (per 644 serviceable fighters)
24 August 1940 - 1377 pilots (per 758 serviceable fighters)
28 September 1940 - 1581 (per 732 serviceable fighters)
5 October 1940 - 1703 (per 734 serviceable fighters)
Would you know if there were any difference in parameters between the RAF and LW as to who qualified as "einsatzbereit"...? They could hardly be exactly similar.....

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#56

Post by RichTO90 » 15 May 2007, 22:42

leandros wrote:Since this is about British bombers bombing German barges how was the situation for the Bomber and Coastal Command? Was Coastal Command part of the RAF or RN? Or none of them...?
Still want everybody to do your work for you eh? And you have no idea why this is so tiresome I suppose? :roll:

Fighter Command, Bomber Command, and Coastal Command, as well as the Army Air Corps and Fleet Air Arm, were all part of the RAF and under RAF 'command'. But the Fleet Air Army units assigned to RN carriers were 'under command' of the carrier and thus the fleet for operations. And in a similar wat the AAC was 'under command' of the Army operationally. But in both those cases the command relationship could vary from unit to unit, for example during the BoB some FAA squadrons were assigned to support Fighter Command and so were in effect under their command, others such as the night strike Swordfish squadrons were temprarily assigned to CC as well for anti0invasion duties. Coastal Command had a number of roles and so also had different command relationships. CC squadrons did coastal and maritime reconnaissance and strike, ASR, and ASW missions. In other words exactly the same command relationship as in the Luftwaffe. :D

Somewhere I already posted CC strengths for this time, IIRC it was about 500 aircraft all told, but only about 34 at this time were LRR Sunderlands, although I believe some Catalinas had been purchased and delivered by this time.

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#57

Post by RichTO90 » 15 May 2007, 22:46

leandros wrote:Would you know if there were any difference in parameters between the RAF and LW as to who qualified as "einsatzbereit"...? They could hardly be exactly similar.....
Huh? They were very similar.

Soll = War Establishment (US Authorized or Tabke of Organization & Equipment Strength)
Ist = On Hand (US Assigned or On Hand)
Einsatzbereit = Operational (US Operational - equipment or Present-for-Duty - personnel)

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#58

Post by JonS » 15 May 2007, 23:59

RichTO90 wrote:Army Air Corps
"Army Cooperation Command"

AAC were soldiers who flew - or jumped out of - RAF planes for other soldiers (eg the GPR, the Paras, the SAS, and the AOP pilots, and currently crews for helos). ACC were RAF pilots who flew RAF planes for the Army.

Fun factoid: the standing joke was that ACC had more staff officers than it had aircraft, and most of those a/c were Lysanders :D Nevertheless, it was ACC that produced the Wann-Woodall report in late 1940.

I thought the FAA managed to achieve organisational seperation in the 1930's?

Edit: my bad, ACC was only formed in Dec 1940.

Edit2: Then again, the AAC apparently wasn't formed till 1942?

Edit3: Ah, ACC was formed by expanding and redesignating No.22 (Army Co-Operation) Group (part of Fighter Command), so I think ACC is 'more' accurate than AAC.

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#59

Post by RichTO90 » 16 May 2007, 02:03

JonS wrote:
RichTO90 wrote:Army Air Corps
"Army Cooperation Command"Edit3: Ah, ACC was formed by expanding and redesignating No.22 (Army Co-Operation) Group (part of Fighter Command), so I think ACC is 'more' accurate than AAC.
Ooops, my bad. Yes, they are listed as just "Army Co-Operation"....no number or 'group'....in AIR 20/1950.

And the eytomology of the FAA is simply too Byzantine for me to wrap my poor leandros-deadened head around. So I will take it as written that you are correct. :D

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#60

Post by JonS » 16 May 2007, 02:20

RichTO90 wrote:And the eytomology of the FAA is simply too Byzantine ... so I will take it as written that you are correct.
Gawd - don't do that! :D

I know at various times the FAA and RAF integrated their units and operations to a greater or lesser extent, but I was/am of the understanding that was as peers co-operating, rather than the RAF commanding FAA resources.

Dunno. Like the ACC/AAC thing, it's a very minor point in the context of this discussion.

Regards
Jon

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