Seelöwe - let's discuss barges sunk by bombers

Discussions on WW2 in Western Europe & the Atlantic.
RichTO90
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#76

Post by RichTO90 » 16 May 2007, 21:33

leandros wrote:Exactly. You have to excuse Rich.
That is both rude and tiresome. You ask an off-topic question. I then answer it. You then bitch and moan that "I" have strayed away from the topic. That is the conduct of a twelve-year old (there, that is my estimate of your emotional age). In future, stick to the topic then if you want someone to answer your questions for you.
Regarding bomber force crews the RAF doesn't seem to have had an abundance Fall '40. If my quote from Churchill is correct.
You are referred to an number of sources to answer the question you are asking....and you reply by ignoring the other poster and simply reafirming your poorly substantiated conclusion. :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll:

RichTO90
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#77

Post by RichTO90 » 16 May 2007, 21:36

I didn't write I didn't have a methodology. I asked: Why would I have one? You see the difference? You might understand me better if you go back on the reason for my response.... :) .....While your definitions look very nice I am not sure if I follow your conclusion. I am not a very learned person. Only interested in history.

Talking about methodology.....should we get back on the subject.
Yes, I do see, since you just affirmed you have no methodology. So then I think we can all take it as read that we may dismiss any further posts from you as being the wandering of a sadly addled brain? :P


Eugen Pinak
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#78

Post by Eugen Pinak » 18 May 2007, 17:04

leandros wrote:
Eugen Pinak wrote:
leandros wrote:Would you know if there were any difference in parameters between the RAF and LW as to who qualified as "einsatzbereit"...? They could hardly be exactly similar.....
Unlike other categories, they had to be exactly similar - after all, pilot either ready to fly the plane or not.
And another point to note - unlike British, German pilots were not rotated to more quiet sectors and thus were more tried.
Or more experienced..... :)
Or more dead.

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Bronsky
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#79

Post by Bronsky » 19 May 2007, 18:45

leandros wrote:Regarding bomber force crews the RAF doesn't seem to have had an abundance Fall '40. If my quote from Churchill is correct.
Which part of "neither the RAF nor the Luftwaffe could cope with the losses they were taking, though the Luftwaffe was even worse off in terms of pilots than its opponent" do you not understand?

Other people seem to grasp the meaning of it on the first try.

If you want to argue that the RAF didn't have enough bombers to make an impact on German amphibious shipping, then please provide something more concrete than a vaguely remembered quote from Churchill to the effect that the British didn't have quite as many bomber crews as Winston would have liked (a situation, if I may add, that lasted until the end of the war).

michammer
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#80

Post by michammer » 20 May 2007, 04:23

As for the number of pilots per RAF bomber aircraft, I can input the following:

Blenheims - 1
Hampdens - 1
Whitley's -1
Wellingtons - 1
Battles - 1

However, there were some exceptions. Some of the Hampdens, at least, flew with 2 pilots - but one of these flew as the navigator/bomb aimer. In "Enemy Coast Ahead", Guy Gibson expresses his disappointment when his "navigator" was given his own aircraft and crew.

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fredleander
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#81

Post by fredleander » 22 May 2007, 11:51

Would a comparison with the losses incurred by the RAF in the French ports in September be a good indication as to what could have been achieved against the departed invasion fleet....?

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LWD
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#82

Post by LWD » 22 May 2007, 13:27

NO

RichTO90
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#83

Post by RichTO90 » 22 May 2007, 15:31

leandros wrote:Would a comparison with the losses incurred by the RAF in the French ports in September be a good indication as to what could have been achieved against the departed invasion fleet....?
Your question doesn't make much sense. What would losses of RAF aircraft have to do with losses of the vessels of an invasion fleet? What correlation are you trying to make?

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Ostkatze
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#84

Post by Ostkatze » 23 May 2007, 04:16

As "English" type readers we take " losses incurred by the RAF " as their own losses. I think leandros meant " losses caused by the RAF ". As in "incurred" upon us, the good guys in the piece. Go Wolves! np27.

RichTO90
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#85

Post by RichTO90 » 23 May 2007, 05:02

Ostkatze wrote:As "English" type readers we take " losses incurred by the RAF " as their own losses. I think leandros meant " losses caused by the RAF ". As in "incurred" upon us, the good guys in the piece. Go Wolves! np27.
Thank God he has a translator. I was going cross-eyed trying to figure that out.

So the answer is that the invasion fleet at sea would probably have made a poor target overall, especially against level bombers. However, the specialized night-attack Swordfish probably could have had some fairly easy successes versus the larger transports. I expect the bombers would have been committed at medium to low level with maximum loads of small bombs against the beaches themselves? That probably would have been as close to the port situation as you would get.

From various sources we find:

The raid of 8/9 September by a handful of bombers badly damaged S-36 and lightly damaged S-33 and S-37.

The raid of about 100 aircraft on the night of 14/15 September on Antwerp resulted in the transports Telde (2978 BRT), Ceuta (2719 BRT), Rolandseck (1845 BRT), Palermo (1461 BRT) and Hans Leonhardt (4174 BRT) and at least 2 other freighters (AD 23, AD 24) being damaged.

The raid of 17/18 September when about 140 aircraft bombed Cherbourg, sinking the transport Johann Blumenthal and badly damaging the minelayer Schiff 23/Stier and T-11.

The raid of 20/21 September by about 100 aircraft on Boulogne and Dunkirk were perhaps the most destructive, 9 transports, 51 Prähme and 1 tug were destroyed.

BTW, I found the operational strengths by type for 29 September 1940 in AIR 22/33. They were:

Bomber Command
85 Battles
223 Bleinheims
119 Wellingtons
68 Whitleys
88 Hampdens

HQ No. 22 Group (Army Co-operation)
113 Lysanders

HQ RAF
25 Battles
16 Lysanders

Coastal Command
58 Ansons
47 Bleinheim F
28 Bleinheim GR
46 Hudsons
4 Stranraers
16 Sunderlands
12 Whitleys
14 Beauforts
10 Bothas

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fredleander
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#86

Post by fredleander » 23 May 2007, 10:40

Ostkatze wrote:As "English" type readers we take " losses incurred by the RAF " as their own losses. I think leandros meant " losses caused by the RAF ". As in "incurred" upon us, the good guys in the piece. Go Wolves! np27.
Sorry about that. You are correct in your assumption about my lack of knowledge of the English language. I might have been misunderstood many times, you know...... :)

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Bronsky
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#87

Post by Bronsky » 23 May 2007, 11:15

Quite a bit of this stuff has been discussed before, and the information should therefore be available to those who have started the thread and/or have contributed to it since the beginning :? (hint, hint...) but there are a few differences between port attacks and attacking shipping at sea.

#1 difference is Flak. In 1941, the heaviest Flak concentrations in the Reich were over the Channel & Atlantic ports (like Brest) which Bomber Command kept attacking in a not particularly effective attempt to hit the Kriegsmarine surface raiders. A lot of the AA was in heavy mounts that simply couldn't go on a ship (or rather, that couldn't fire from one): see all the troubles that the USN and particularly the RN had coming up with a decent fire director for their on-board heavy AA.

So much has been written about it that I'm sure lots is available on this forum to anyone willing to search it.

#2 difference is concentration: attacking the convoys will be partly a matter of luck, depending on being at the right place at the right time. This applies to German escorts: if the Luftwaffe wants to provide decent cover to the convoys, it's going to have to commit a lot of fighters to that task, and these planes won't be doing anything else. The RAF did exactly that in 1941-42. At the assault beaches, however, there will be a nice concentration of shipping, not quite as good as in the departure ports but good enough and this is more than offset by the other advantages (see above and below)

#3 difference is mission profile: from the point of view of the RAF, attacking an amphibious assault site is a short-range mission, no cross-Channel flight to the target and back. This means a more difficult interception solution for the Luftwaffe, even if the Germans manage to provide a standing CAP over the beaches the odds are that it will be overwhelmed. Damaged British planes have a much easier time making it back safely, or belly-landing in friendly territory.

#4 difference is protection: ports are designed to protect ships, this means no torpedo attacks (Taranto & Pearl Harbor were harbors, the Channel ports were the Germans were concentrating their barges are much smaller) no easy low-level approach, only level bombing will work and it can't be low-altitude because of the Flak. All of these restrictions are removed at the invasion beaches, also no breakwater, seawalls, locks, forts and coastal batteries to shelter the target.

#5 difference is that Bomber Command can go all out on these attacks.

All of these amount IMO to making RAF air attacks on German invasion shipping potentially more murderous than the historical attacks on Channel ports.

RichTO90
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#88

Post by RichTO90 » 23 May 2007, 16:26

Bronsky wrote:Quite a bit of this stuff has been discussed before, and the information should therefore be available to those who have started the thread and/or have contributed to it since the beginning :? (hint, hint...) but there are a few differences between port attacks and attacking shipping at sea.
Yep, part of my frustration is in endlessly having to repeat myself, frequently across threads, about items that have already been discussed, in some detail. But I suspect that some have retention problems?
#1 difference is Flak. In 1941, the heaviest Flak concentrations in the Reich were over the Channel & Atlantic ports (like Brest) which Bomber Command kept attacking in a not particularly effective attempt to hit the Kriegsmarine surface raiders. A lot of the AA was in heavy mounts that simply couldn't go on a ship (or rather, that couldn't fire from one): see all the troubles that the USN and particularly the RN had coming up with a decent fire director for their on-board heavy AA.
Not quite. The US high-angle directors going into the war were quite good and were linked to a highly successful gun, the 5-inch/38. But they suffered initially from having a relatively unreliable light gun, the 1.1-inch (28mm)/75, which could be murderously effective at medium to short ranges (maximum AA range of 19,000 feet (5,791 meters) and a maximum slant range of 7,400 yards (6,767 meters). But it was a complex mount and was prone to failures. Which meant the USN systems were quite effective versus medium to high-altitude level bombers and approaching dive bombers, but were hit or miss against torpedo bombers and dive bombers in a dive (the director system could track all targets very well and give a firing solution, but the weapons in the system weren't always up to the task).

At the other extreme the RN director system was barely capable of engaging level bombers effectively and had no capability in tracking low-level or dive bombers and their medium/short range weapons were less up to the task than the contemporary US one (the 2-pdr Mark VIII 'quad' and 'octuple' mounts were even less effective than the 1.1-inch, the guns designed for the low-velocity round had a maximum AA ceiling of just 10,000 feet, while the non-interchangeable high-velocity round was little better, plus there was no tracer round available until 1942, and the gun itself was usually crank-operated, only the single and octuple mounts were ever supplied with an electric driven mechanism).

But the Allies eventually solved their problems more or less, the British bodged at their High Angle director until it sort of worked and vastly improved their light armament....plus of course they denied the airspace over the seas to the Luftwaffe. The US improved the Mark 38 director system, adding steadily improving radar elements to it, and improved their light AA until their air defense became hideously effective (it required the Kamikaze to have a chance to get through it, an element that wasn't thought of in its development).

The Germans were somewhat in between. THeir director system was somewhat better than the British and employed better optics, but their initial light armament was a mixed bag, the 3.7cm as we have seen was perhaps the worst weapon in its class of the three. The 2cm gun was good, but really only a point defense weapon. It wasn't until 1943/44 with the deployment of the new 3.7cm based on the Heeres design that things improved.

What this means is that the RN did have problems with dive bombing attacks, virtually all their warship losses to air attack by the Luftwaffe 1939-1942 were to those. And that isn't something that would be solved in the timeframe of Seelöwe. But the Stuka were very much a finite resource and were vulnerable themselves to interception, as was seen in August.

The Germans OTOH have little real effective AA to call upon other than their point defense. Their 'escorts' either have a 15cm gun ineffective as a high-angle defense or a 10.5cm gun that had limited dual-purpose capability. The 8.8cm gun is a good AA gun, but except for a few are not director controled so would be limited to firing :by guess and by God". The 3.7cm is nearly useless, which leaves the 2cm. Those would be ineffective as well against night torpedo-bomber attacks, and well nigh useless against medium and high altitude level bombing attacks.
So much has been written about it that I'm sure lots is available on this forum to anyone willing to search it.
Yup.

(snip complete agreement)
#3 difference is mission profile: from the point of view of the RAF, attacking an amphibious assault site is a short-range mission, no cross-Channel flight to the target and back. This means a more difficult interception solution for the Luftwaffe, even if the Germans manage to provide a standing CAP over the beaches the odds are that it will be overwhelmed. Damaged British planes have a much easier time making it back safely, or belly-landing in friendly territory.
Yes, the main problem for the Luftwaffe is they are still limited by their circa 75-minute endurance in the Bf-109. Their 'standing patrols' will need to rotate about every 20 to 30 minutes...at the least. Which means that during a day continuous air cover will have to change over some 28 times, which will severely limit the number of aircraft they can have up at any one time (plus they need allocations for escorts of bombers). Fundamentally you can assume a maximum of three sorties per ready pilot (676 as of 28 September, let's call it 700), so circa 2,100, divided by 28....with overlaps probably the best that could be maintained would be around 100-150 fighters. Fighter Command however can essentially pick and choose when to sortie and would no longer be required to attack with a height disadvantage as they were so often in the BoB. They could in fact employ 'Big Wings' and attack in groups of 30 to 40 aircraft, and masses of 100s of sorties.

(snip complete agreement)

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