Bronsky wrote:Quite a bit of this stuff has been discussed before, and the information should therefore be available to those who have started the thread and/or have contributed to it since the beginning
(hint, hint...) but there are a few differences between port attacks and attacking shipping at sea.
Yep, part of my frustration is in endlessly having to repeat myself, frequently across threads, about items that have already been discussed, in some detail. But I suspect that some have retention problems?
#1 difference is Flak. In 1941, the heaviest Flak concentrations in the Reich were over the Channel & Atlantic ports (like Brest) which Bomber Command kept attacking in a not particularly effective attempt to hit the Kriegsmarine surface raiders. A lot of the AA was in heavy mounts that simply couldn't go on a ship (or rather, that couldn't fire from one): see all the troubles that the USN and particularly the RN had coming up with a decent fire director for their on-board heavy AA.
Not quite. The US high-angle directors going into the war were quite good and were linked to a highly successful gun, the 5-inch/38. But they suffered initially from having a relatively unreliable light gun, the 1.1-inch (28mm)/75, which could be murderously effective at medium to short ranges (maximum AA range of 19,000 feet (5,791 meters) and a maximum slant range of 7,400 yards (6,767 meters). But it was a complex mount and was prone to failures. Which meant the USN systems were quite effective versus medium to high-altitude level bombers and approaching dive bombers, but were hit or miss against torpedo bombers and dive bombers in a dive (the director system could track all targets very well and give a firing solution, but the weapons in the system weren't always up to the task).
At the other extreme the RN director system was barely capable of engaging level bombers effectively and had no capability in tracking low-level or dive bombers and their medium/short range weapons were less up to the task than the contemporary US one (the 2-pdr Mark VIII 'quad' and 'octuple' mounts were even less effective than the 1.1-inch, the guns designed for the low-velocity round had a maximum AA ceiling of just 10,000 feet, while the non-interchangeable high-velocity round was little better, plus there was no tracer round available until 1942, and the gun itself was usually crank-operated, only the single and octuple mounts were ever supplied with an electric driven mechanism).
But the Allies eventually solved their problems more or less, the British bodged at their High Angle director until it sort of worked and vastly improved their light armament....plus of course they denied the airspace over the seas to the Luftwaffe. The US improved the Mark 38 director system, adding steadily improving radar elements to it, and improved their light AA until their air defense became hideously effective (it required the Kamikaze to have a chance to get through it, an element that wasn't thought of in its development).
The Germans were somewhat in between. THeir director system was somewhat better than the British and employed better optics, but their initial light armament was a mixed bag, the 3.7cm as we have seen was perhaps the worst weapon in its class of the three. The 2cm gun was good, but really only a point defense weapon. It wasn't until 1943/44 with the deployment of the new 3.7cm based on the Heeres design that things improved.
What this means is that the RN did have problems with dive bombing attacks, virtually all their warship losses to air attack by the Luftwaffe 1939-1942 were to those. And that isn't something that would be solved in the timeframe of Seelöwe. But the Stuka were very much a finite resource and were vulnerable themselves to interception, as was seen in August.
The Germans OTOH have little real effective AA to call upon other than their point defense. Their 'escorts' either have a 15cm gun ineffective as a high-angle defense or a 10.5cm gun that had limited dual-purpose capability. The 8.8cm gun is a good AA gun, but except for a few are not director controled so would be limited to firing :by guess and by God". The 3.7cm is nearly useless, which leaves the 2cm. Those would be ineffective as well against night torpedo-bomber attacks, and well nigh useless against medium and high altitude level bombing attacks.
So much has been written about it that I'm sure lots is available on this forum to anyone willing to search it.
Yup.
(snip complete agreement)
#3 difference is mission profile: from the point of view of the RAF, attacking an amphibious assault site is a short-range mission, no cross-Channel flight to the target and back. This means a more difficult interception solution for the Luftwaffe, even if the Germans manage to provide a standing CAP over the beaches the odds are that it will be overwhelmed. Damaged British planes have a much easier time making it back safely, or belly-landing in friendly territory.
Yes, the main problem for the Luftwaffe is they are still limited by their circa 75-minute endurance in the Bf-109. Their 'standing patrols' will need to rotate about every 20 to 30 minutes...at the least. Which means that during a day continuous air cover will have to change over some 28 times, which will severely limit the number of aircraft they can have up at any one time (plus they need allocations for escorts of bombers). Fundamentally you can assume a maximum of three sorties per ready pilot (676 as of 28 September, let's call it 700), so circa 2,100, divided by 28....with overlaps probably the best that could be maintained would be around 100-150 fighters. Fighter Command however can essentially pick and choose when to sortie and would no longer be required to attack with a height disadvantage as they were so often in the BoB. They could in fact employ 'Big Wings' and attack in groups of 30 to 40 aircraft, and masses of 100s of sorties.
(snip complete agreement)