Seelöwe - let's discuss German naval escorts

[Andreas]

The operations during Barbarossa may not have required full and worked up crews. The text below indicates that only a guard was left from August 1940:

Im August 1940 geriet die alte Dame “Schleswig-Holstein” erneut in eine Krise. Das Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine (OKM) plante das Schiff erneut außer Dienst stellen zu lassen. Nur auf Initiative Admiral Raeders war es zu verdanken, daß die “Schleswig-Holstein” in die Reserve gesetzt wurde. An Bord blieb nur noch ein Wachkommando. Doch bereits im November erhielt “Schleswig-Holstein” neue Befehle. SX verlegte mit Wachkommando und Ersatzbesatzung nach Kiel in die Bauwerft.

The link below indicates that the same happened to Schlesien, and that lack of personnel was one of the reasons for retiring the two ships:

08.1940 - 01.1941 Wachkomanndo
ab 02. August.1940 Stillegung aus Personalmangel.

and:

Bei der Unternehmung "Weserübung« im April 1940 wurde Schlesien zur Deckung von Minensuchstreitkräften im Kleinen Belt herangezogen, um dann wieder Ausbildungszwecken zu dienen. (Die Mittelartillerie war Anfang des Krieges ausgebaut worden, da sie zur Ausrüstung der Hilfskreuzer benötigt wurde.) Personalmangel erzwang am 2. 8. 1940 die Stillegung des Schiffes. Nur ein Wachkommando blieb an Bord. Eisverhältnisse erforderten im Januar 1941 ein Auffüllen der Besatzung. Als die Tätigkeit als Eisbrecher beendet war, wurde Schlesien am 31. 3. in Gotenhafen als Ausbildungshulk mit reduzierter Stammbesatzung stillgelegt.

Da die Skl mit der Möglichkeit rechnete, daß im Verlaufe des Rußlandfeldzuges russische Kriegsschiffe versuchen könnten, nach England durchzubrechen, füllte Schlesien am 30.4.1941 die Besatzung auf. Sie wurde zusammen mit Schleswig-Holstein und der 6. S-Flottille als Rückhalt für die Minensperren in die Ostseeausgänge verlegt. Russische Ausbruchversuche wurden jedoch nicht unternommen, so daß Schlesien im Oktober ihren Liegeplatz im Belt verlassen konnte und in Gotenhafen wieder als Ausbildungshulk die Besatzung reduzierte. Erneut wurde sie zum Eisnotdienst in der westlichen und östlichen Ostsee von Januar bis April 1942 herangezogen.

All the best

Andreas

[LWD]

This came up before but not yet on this thread. Does anyone know what sort of ASW equipment was on the various German sufrace vessels? Also it looks like in a number of cases the smaller vessels can carry mines, or depth charges, or some other equipment. any feel for how this would have been distributed?

[Christian W.]

Perhaps, but the crews were still likely around.

[RichTO90]

Regarding Scheer I tend to agree - had the invasion been ordered, she would have been sent to protect it. I also think that had they been in active service, the Schlesien and Schleswig-Holstein would be sent, but I am not sure what their conversion in July meant for their ability to participate in the task.

My goodness, is the desperation virus bred in Fantasyland™ spreading?

Scheer had completed her reconstruction and began her sea trials on 31 July. She was occupied in that and was not commited to operations until 23 October. Simply assuming that she was operational because she was out of the dockyards hands is a stretch and does not follow the evidence, one could make the same assumption on that basis that Bismarck was 'operational' on 14 September because that was when she began her sea trials. It is really quite as bad as assuming that a ships commissioning date is the same date she is operational.

Worse of course is the evident assumption that because 'we' would use them - since they were available and wargamers (which I do include myself as) always use everything available - means that they would have been used too. But of course they actually do not figure the Seelöwe 'plan' at all, any more than do the light cruisers of Bremse. Given that, it seems much more likely that if Hipper or Scheer could have somehow been made magically operational, they more likely would have been used as diversions to try to draw away the strength of the Home Fleet. Placing them in the invasion fleet as escorts simply because that is what 'we' would do or what we judge to be a 'desperate' OKM would do, when we know they had no such plans, especially after the results of Weserübung, is just silly.

Schleisen could have been used :roll: , I mean the only thing that was done to her was to put her alongside a dock and disperse her crew to fill casualties and provide crew for other ships. Of course all they needed to do was sweep up a crew for her from Gotenhafen and send them out to sea on her. Oh, and of course she still had all four of her 28cm, but the rest of her armament had been reduced to two 8.8cm SK although four 3.7cm and two 2cm Flak at least had been added. She would have been dangerous to MTB.

And of course Schleswig Holstein was in the same condition. Which makes them about as valuable as the foreign 'support ships' that I Iisted. In other words they may have had some utility in supporting the actual landings with gunfire but would have been close to useless in combat with a modern warship.

As for the Flottenbeglieter,

F1 was disarmed in 1939 and acted as a fleet tender in 1940.
F2 was used for torpedo exercise recovery with 25. U-Flotille in the Baltic in 1940.
F3 was used as a Räumboots tender in the Baltic.
F4 was being used as a torpedo test ship in the Baltic.
F5 was being used for torpedo exercise recovery with 23. and 25. U-Flotille.
F6 was renamed as Königin Louise and used as a tender with the 4. Räumbootsflottile....I thought I counted her as that but possibly not.
F7 was used for torpedo exercise recovery with 25. U-Flotille in the Baltic in 1940.
F8 was used for torpedo exercise recovery with 25. U-Flotille in the Baltic in 1940.
F9 was sunk 14 December 1939.
F10 was used for torpedo exercise recovery in the Baltic.

None were used as designed because they were incapable of sustained operations. Again, waving a magic wand and wishing really, really, really, hard doesn't make these operational naval escorts.

[RichTO90]

The crews were obviously still around, as both ships took part in military operations during Operation Barbarossa.

Not quite, the crews were dispersed to provide personnel for the rest of the fleet (all of those 'motorboot' required crews too). All that was left was an anchor watch. So the crews were not 'around' and any new operational crew would require training.

Schleisen was used as an icebreaker with a basic engineering crew only, in the Baltic supporting the U-Boot Schule, from January-March 1941. Schleswig Holstein remained a dormitory.receiving ship until September 1944, except for the period May-October 1941 when she supported minelaying operations in the Baltic along with Schleisen. She was used intermittantly as a training ship and over four years managed to average about 4 nautical miles sailed per day.

Just something temporary I'd say.

The critical thing is the crew and of course the not so minor matter that they weren't really any more useful than the other aging foreign ships already included in the planning.

[RichTO90]

Perhaps, but the crews were still likely around.

Sure, by stripping them out of the vessels they had been assigned to, such as the huge numbers of light craft mobilized for Seelöwe, where they were in critically short supply. There simply is no free lunch in this case, reducing the two to receiving ships put about 1,400 trained officers and crew into the fleet, enough to crew 100 or more of the light vessels.

[Andreas]

My goodness, is the desperation virus bred in Fantasyland™ spreading?

Touché. Honestly, I am trying to see things as positively as realistically possible, but not having the detailed knowledge you have, I tend to err on the side of optimism.

F6 was renamed as Königin Louise and used as a tender with the 4. Räumbootsflottile....I thought I counted her as that but possibly not.

F6 seems to have been a tender at the time, according to the link I provided before, confirming what you wrote:

F 6 gehörte zunächst als Führerboot zur 1.Geleitflottille (Kiel)

03.11.38 - 21.09.39 Umbau bei der Schichau-Werft Königsberg zum Flottentender
15.04.39 Umbenennung in Königin Luise (Benannt nach dem Hilfsminenleger aus dem I.Weltkrieg)

20.9.39 als Führerboot des Führers der Minensuchboote in Dienst gestellt
Nach Probefahrten stieg am 7.10. der F.d.M. Ost, Kommodore Ruge, ein, der später F.d.M. West wurde.

09.04.40 Teilnahme an der Operation Weserübung im Rahmen der Kriegsschiffgruppe 10 (Esbjerg, Nordby/Dänemark)
25.04.40 Rückkehr nach Cuxhaven

bis zum 2.9.40 Werftüberholung, dann Verlegung nach Rotterdam (Operation Seelöwe) und schließlich ab dem 22.12.40 an die französische Atlantikküste.
01.02.41 Königin Luise wird Führerboot der 4.Sicherungsdivision unter FKpt.d.R. Lautenschlager.

Thanks a lot for all the corrections, and in particular for the reality check on large unit availability.

All the best

Andreas

[LWD]

As to heavy units according to:
http://www.axishistory.com/index.php?id=1145

The Kriegsmarine did not plan to employ its few remaining heavy surface units in the coastal waters of the main invasion area. Instead, they would be used for diversions to draw British naval forces away from the English Channel and tie down British troops away from the landing zones.

Two days prior to the actual landings, the light cruisers Emden (Kapitän zur See Hans Mirow), Nürnberg (Kapitän zur See Leo Kreisch with Vizeadmiral Hubert Schmundt, the Commander of Cruisers, aboard) and Köln (Kapitän zur See Ernst Kratzenberg), the gunnery training ship Bremse and other light naval forces would escort the liners Europa, Bremen, Gneisenau and Potsdam, with 11 transport steamers, on Operation “Herbstreise” (Autumn Journey), a feint simulating a landing against the English east coast between Aberdeen and Newcastle.*** After turning about, the force would attempt the diversion again on the next day if necessary. (Most of the troops allocated to the diversion would actually board the ships, but disembark before the naval force sortied.)

Shortly before the commencement of “Sea Lion,” the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper (Kapitän zur See Wilhelm Meisel), on standby at Kiel from 13 September 1940, would carry out a diversionary sortie in the vicinity of Iceland and the Faroes.

The heavy cruiser Admiral Scheer (Kapitän zur See Theodor Krancke) would carry out another diversionary mission by raiding merchant shipping in the Atlantic. (It is doubtful this ship would have been available in time for the operation as she was undergoing extensive trials and crew training in the Baltic Sea following a major shipyard refit.)

The remaining German heavy surface units, the battlecruisers Scharnhorst (Kapitän zur See Kurt Caesar Hoffmann) and Gneisenau (Kapitän zur See Otto Fein), the heavy cruiser Lützow (Kapitänleutnant Heller – caretaker commander) and the light cruiser Leipzig (decommissioned) were all undergoing repairs for varying degrees of battle damage and were thus not available for Operation “Sea Lion.”

In August 1940, the Kriegsmarine considered employing the pre-dreadnought battleships Schleswig-Holstein and Schlesien to provide artillery support for the landings, but ultimately rejected the idea.

Given her problems Hipper doesn't provide much of a distraction. Sheer has to make it into the Atlantic to have any hope of doing so. Trying the same diversion twice in a row all prior to the invasion may have an effect the first day or so or may not. If the U-boats are going to protect the flank of the fleet they've got to be withdrawn from the Atlantic several days in advance as well.

[Andreas]

Perhaps, but the crews were still likely around.

Sure, by stripping them out of the vessels they had been assigned to, such as the huge numbers of light craft mobilized for Seelöwe, where they were in critically short supply. There simply is no free lunch in this case, reducing the two to receiving ships put about 1,400 trained officers and crew into the fleet, enough to crew 100 or more of the light vessels.

Hi Rich

That is a very important point I had not considered before. I thought that maybe the men and officers were needed to crew captured ships in Norway and Denmark, as well as commissioning ships.

Thanks for that.

All the best

Andreas

[Tim Smith]

Regarding Scheer I tend to agree - had the invasion been ordered, she would have been sent to protect it. I also think that had they been in active service, the Schlesien and Schleswig-Holstein would be sent, but I am not sure what their conversion in July meant for their ability to participate in the task.

My goodness, is the desperation virus bred in Fantasyland™ spreading?

Scheer had completed her reconstruction and began her sea trials on 31 July. She was occupied in that and was not commited to operations until 23 October. Simply assuming that she was operational because she was out of the dockyards hands is a stretch and does not follow the evidence, one could make the same assumption on that basis that Bismarck was 'operational' on 14 September because that was when she began her sea trials. It is really quite as bad as assuming that a ships commissioning date is the same date she is operational.

I disagree. Your analogy isn't really a good one IMO.

The difference between Scheer's trials in Aug-Sep 1940 and Bismarck's trials in Oct-Dec 1940 is that Admiral Scheer had been a fully operational ship before. Bismarck hadn't. Bismarck was brand new.

Scheer's trials were 'retrials' to test the integrity of the modifications done to a previously operational, and previously fully tested, ship. And these trials were done with an experienced crew familiar with the ship. Not everything would need to be tested exhaustively, as with a new ship.

Bismarck's trials were to test absolutely everything from the main armament down to the bilge pumps, with an inexperienced crew completely unfamiliar with the ship.

The two cases are not the same.

I am of the view that Scheer's trials could have been cut short if the invasion went ahead. No, it wouldn't be a smart idea, no it wouldn't be safe to do so, in fact it would be downright dangerous and could even lead to the loss of the ship, but it could be done in an emergency situation.

And Operation Seelöwe counts as an emergency! Because if the ships aren't out there doing their job, 30,000+ German troops could end up drowning in the English Channel. It's worth losing every ship in the whole damn Kriegsmarine to prevent that!

[RichTO90]

And Operation Seelöwe counts as an emergency! Because if the ships aren't out there doing their job, 30,000+ German troops could end up drowning in the English Channel. It's worth losing every ship in the whole damn Kriegsmarine to prevent that!

How is Scheer on a diversionary raiding mission going to save 30,000+ German troops? And where does 30,000+ come from? How would losing every ship in the Kriegsmarine prevent that?

And just where in the plan does the concept of losing every ship enter in? What makes Seelöwe an "emergency"? It was a calculated risk, with part of the equation being the assumption that the heavier ships were better used as diversions. But of course the final and universal calculation was that it wasn't worth the risk, so it was dropped. Now you seem to be trying to say that the risk was worth any sacrifice - including the annihilation of the KM? How then is the second wave gotten ashore? Or do 40,000 infantrymen conquer England alone?

One of us is becoming horribly confused.

About the only even contest in this naval affair is between the E-Boot and the MTB, there are about equal numbers on each side. Otherwise just the ships stationed at the western end of the Channel can easily defeat everything the Germans can throw in, including the putative two heavy and four light cruisers.

[Tim Smith]

Don't misunderstand me, Rich.

I'm not suggesting that Operation Seelowe is in any way a good, or even a feasible, idea. It isn't.

All I'm saying is, once Hitler decides to go ahead with it, then the Kriegsmarine has to make an ABSOLUTELY MAXIMUM effort. Nothing held back. No more 'fleet in being' policies. No more 'conserving of resources'. No more 'protecting the big ships'.

Because that's what the German Army expects and deserves. A maximum effort by the Kriegsmarine to protect the troops. Absolute maximum!

That way, if the invasion fails (as it almost certainly will) the Kriegsmarine can say with justification that it wasn't their fault - they did the absolute maximum possible with the resources they had!

But the Kriegsmarine would be completely dishonoured in the eyes of the German nation if the Royal Navy slaughters the invasion fleet 'because' a major Kriegsmarine war vessel was held back for 'trials'.

Imagine that you are Großadmiral Raeder, the invasion fleet has been slaughtered, thousands of Germans soldiers are dead, the generals are blaming the Kriegsmarine, Göring is calling for your execution, and you have to explain to a furious, screaming Hitler why you DIDN'T send the Admiral Scheer out on operations to divert the British fleet. What are you going to say to him that will appease his wrath and save you from a court martial and summary execution?

That's why I think Raeder would send the Admiral Scheer. Because he knew he could end up being put up against a wall and shot if he didn't!

As for losing the entire Kriegsmarine, I only mentioned that because such a loss is justified if, and only if, Britain is conquered and surrenders.

A British surrender is worth almost any price the Kriegsmarine can pay. Because a British surrender means that Germany has won the war.

[RichTO90]

All I'm saying is, once Hitler decides to go ahead with it, then the Kriegsmarine has to make an ABSOLUTELY MAXIMUM effort. Nothing held back. No more 'fleet in being' policies. No more 'conserving of resources'. No more 'protecting the big ships'.

Because that's what the German Army expects and deserves. A maximum effort by the Kriegsmarine to protect the troops. Absolute maximum!

I'm sorry Tim, there is some true confusion on your part about what the reality was and no amount of capitalization or exclamation marks on your part will change what that reality was.

You are apparently expressing your feelings, because quite simply nothing of the sort was ever contemplated by OKM, Raeder, or Hitler.

The simple facts, which you may chose to ignore if you wish, was that the capitol units of the KM only figured in Seelöwe as diversions.

Hipper, if she could have gotten to sea without breaking down, would have been sent on a diversion. She would not have attempted to "protect the troops", she would have been hundreds of miles away from the invasion fleet.

Scheer, if she could have completed her shakedown in time, would have been sent on a diversion. She would not have attempted to "protect the troops", she would have been hundreds of miles away from the invasion fleet.

Those operations, like the operations of the light cruisers, are known elements of the plan. Saying that they were something else is pure fantasy. Next I rather think you will be claiming that Bismarck, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau will be thrown into the fray, towed into the Channel if need be. And probably followed by the partly completed Tirpitz, all to fulfill the "ABSOLUTELY MAXIMUM effort"?

I am afraid I am more than somewhat bewildered at this point by your tone, which has become bizarrely heated to say the least. At this point I think I will excuse myself from further conversation with you until you return to rationality.

[thejester]

About the only even contest in this naval affair is between the E-Boot and the MTB, there are about equal numbers on each side. Otherwise just the ships stationed at the western end of the Channel can easily defeat everything the Germans can throw in, including the putative two heavy and four light cruisers.

These diversionary raids are genuinely bizarre. They're obviously directed at the Home Fleet - but that raises the question of the RN ships in Channel. Did the KM genuinely think minefields, U-Boats and S-Boats could protect the invasion fleet, or were they putting more faith in the Luftwaffe then was necessary?

[Andreas]

The diversionary raids were probably the only way how the capital units could be used without a guarantee of losing them. Trying to operate them in the Channel would have been a suicide mission.

Under the hull classification on Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hull_classification_symbol) we'll arrive at the following list for tactical escorts, based on Rich's earlier post:

10 DD
12 DE
29 MS
31 PB
19 SS
178 auxiliaries of all types.

Roughly this would mean one escort for every ten ships/barges in the convoys.

How would these escorts have been organises? Would there have been a distant and a close escort system? Would there have been an assignment to east and west of the convoy path?

How does this compare against the forces available to the RN in:

a) immediate vicinity
b) available on 24 hours notice (to intercept the first wave)
c) available on 48 hours (to intercept the second wave)

All the best

Andreas