Seelöwe - let's discuss German naval escorts

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Tim Smith
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#31

Post by Tim Smith » 26 Apr 2007, 10:51

RichTO90 wrote: The simple facts, which you may chose to ignore if you wish, was that the capitol units of the KM only figured in Seelöwe as diversions.
I'm not ignoring or disputing that. Nowhere have I claimed that Hipper and Scheer would be directly escorting the invasion fleet.

I am claiming Hipper and Scheer would be sent out on diversions. A diversion is 'protecting the troops'. Indirectly protecting them.

You are claiming (if I understand you correctly) that Hipper and Scheer would be stuck in port or cruising the Baltic on trials, contributing nothing whatsoever to the operation, while the invasion was underway.

I do dispute that, because while Hipper and Scheer could not be described as fully combat ready, they weren't totally unservicable either. They were servicable enough to make it to the North Sea and make a contribution. I simply can't understand how the OKM could have justified holding them back in so critical a situation - and I'd be amazed if that was Raeder's actual intention.

The Americans sent USS Yorktown to Midway after a very hasty repair, because she was needed. The Japanese sent Yamato on a one-way suicide mission to Okinawa in 1945. Suggesting Hipper and Scheer could be sent out to support Operation Seelöwe while being in a relatively poor condition is no more radical than that.

Andreas
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#32

Post by Andreas » 26 Apr 2007, 11:07

I think there has been some confusion here regarding the terminology, and the tactical and operational level. The original post in this thread implied that capital units would be used for close escort (otherwise, how could they contribute to aerial defense of convoys?). This is what Rich is rightly taking issue with. This leaves us with them being sent on diversions - but diversions are not escorts, and this thread is really discussing escorts on the tactical level, not whatever else the KM maybe getting up to in the operational environment to protect Seelöwe.

Let's stay focused please. Hipper, Scheer, and the four available CL would not have been used as escorts. Their role in the diversion and whether they would have been rushed into this, or would have made it or not are therefore irrelevant to the discussion here.

All the best

Andreas


Jon G.
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#33

Post by Jon G. » 26 Apr 2007, 11:09

RichTO90 wrote:...
Support Vessels
To provide fire support for the landings the Germans planned on using a number of ancient, captured vessels. They were:...
Denmark – Niels Juel (1918, 10 15 cm and 15.9 kts)) and Peder Skram (1910, 2 24cm and 4 15cm)...
Actually Peder Skram dated from 1908. Niels Juel was built by my great-grandfather (OK, not single-handedly I later learned). Neither ship was state of the art as far as outdated coastal artillery ships go.

More relevantly, neither Niels Juel nor Peder Skram were German operated at the time - they were operated by reduced Danish skeleton crews. The Germans could have seized them if they wanted to, of course, but when they tried to do that in 1943 the ships were scuttled by their crews. Both ships were then raised by the Germans and used as Flak ships. Strictly speaking I wouldn't automatically add these ships to one of the many KM OOBs floating around on this forum.

Personally I would see the planned diversionary raid as more of a political move by Raeder than a military operation with any sound basis. I think the diversionary raid was simply Raeder's way of telling Hitler and the OKH that the job of fighting off the Royal Navy during Seelöwe was beyond the Kriegsmarine's means.

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#34

Post by Andreas » 26 Apr 2007, 11:11

It was also the only way to ensure that he would have some operational capital ships left regardless of the outcome of Seelöwe. :-)

All the best

Andreas

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#35

Post by thejester » 26 Apr 2007, 11:28

Andreas wrote:The diversionary raids were probably the only way how the capital units could be used without a guarantee of losing them. Trying to operate them in the Channel would have been a suicide mission.
*shrug* I guess that shows how serious the KM was about Seelowe and it's chances of success.

Although that does bring up the question of how suicidal the operation of capital ships in the Channel would have been. I've seen a lot of people suggest that the committment of capital units on either side would equal certain death; I'm not so sure, though I would say at the least it runs a very high risk.
How does this compare against the forces available to the RN in:

a) immediate vicinity
b) available on 24 hours notice (to intercept the first wave)
c) available on 48 hours (to intercept the second wave)
The Oxford History of the Royal Navy:
'by early September 1940, Admiral Sir Reginald Plunkett-Ernle-Erle-Drax's [yes, that is the man's full name] Nore Command had 38 destroyers and 7 'Kingfisher/'Shearwater' - class coastal escorts based at Immingham, Harwich and Sheerness...these were backed up by the cruisers Manchester, Birmingham and Southampton at Immingham, and Galatea and Aurora at Sheerness. On the other flank of the invasion, Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth deployed another nine destroyers and five Free-French torpedo boats backed up by the old cruiser Cardiff and battleship Revenge. Now fewer than 700 smaller craft were also deployed, with 200-300 at sea at all times from the Wash to Sussex to provide early warning.' (p 354)'
Now, 'early September' obviously gives some room for movement but nonetheless you see the level of force the RN had concentrated in the Channel alone. The Home Fleet is about a day's steaming away - though personally I doubt whether they'll have much to do after 45 destroyers and 5 CLs have ripped through them, nevermind the possibilty of Revenge making an appearance.

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Tim Smith
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#36

Post by Tim Smith » 26 Apr 2007, 11:41

Andreas wrote: Let's stay focused please. Hipper, Scheer, and the four available CL would not have been used as escorts. Their role in the diversion and whether they would have been rushed into this, or would have made it or not are therefore irrelevant to the discussion here.

All the best

Andreas
OK, that's clear now. Thanks.

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#37

Post by Gooner1 » 26 Apr 2007, 11:54

RichTO90 wrote:
Z8 – Available
Z8 - May 40: Entered dock for refit. Nov 40: Began working up after refit, but still suffered numerous machinery problems

http://www.feldgrau.com/z8.html
:)

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#38

Post by RichTO90 » 26 Apr 2007, 15:35

Jon G. wrote:More relevantly, neither Niels Juel nor Peder Skram were German operated at the time - they were operated by reduced Danish skeleton crews. The Germans could have seized them if they wanted to, of course, but when they tried to do that in 1943 the ships were scuttled by their crews. Both ships were then raised by the Germans and used as Flak ships. Strictly speaking I wouldn't automatically add these ships to one of the many KM OOBs floating around on this forum.
Thanks for the additional details Jon. Again though, I was talking about what the Germans were planning to do as part of Seelöwe. You are talking about the likely oycome if they had attempted to do so. And that in fact was what I was talking about with regards to Hipper and Scheer. In the real world Hipper had unsurmountable engine problems that put her out of action from early September to late October. Our 'what if' is asking what would have happened if the Germans had gone ahead with Seelöwe and evidently some believe that would have led to miraculous engine repairs for Hipper? In the case of Scheer it is more problematic, but given the numbers of problems the Germans historically had with shipbuilding, repairs, refits, and conversions, I think it very unlikely that she would have been ready for sea (for one thing, since the major work was to her bridge a contol failure in the middle of operations would have been as interesting as Hipper losing her engines in mid-Atlantic....which is also a possibility).

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#39

Post by RichTO90 » 26 Apr 2007, 15:42

Gooner1 wrote:
RichTO90 wrote:
Z8 – Available
Z8 - May 40: Entered dock for refit. Nov 40: Began working up after refit, but still suffered numerous machinery problems

http://www.feldgrau.com/z8.html
:)
Thanks, I missed that in her operational history, I'll add it to the information hopper. :D

And of course that goes back to a central problem for the KM, a lot of their ships simply had a lot of problems staying operational. The machinery in all their major units, from the Torpedoboot up, were tempermental. AFAIK only the diesels in the pocket battleships were really reliable, the Flottenbegleiter were so bad most were never used for their intended purpose, the destroyers were continually braking down, Hipper had numerous problems and all the other cruisers IIRC also had some. Heck, Bismarck may have had problems if she had stayed afloat much longer. :D

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LWD
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#40

Post by LWD » 26 Apr 2007, 18:50

The German plan is obviously very dependent on mine sweepers and layers. In regards to their availability consider the following quotes from:
http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/afhra/numb ... 468155.pdf
Page 242
“ … Naval Operations Staff reported that … mine-sweeping and mine lalying operations were still not possible in the Channel, and that this polaced the deadline for Operation Sea Lion in jeopardy…”

Page 243
“…the Naval Operations Staff on 30 August 1941 (typo??) stated that, because of …British air operations, and because of the inadequate protection afforded the German surface craft by the Luftwaffe against air attack, the deadline set for 15 September could not be met. The report further stated that the objectives … were not such that a quick achievement … could be expected.”

This has a number of implications. If Sea Lion is a go the KM may have to proceed with the required operation inspite of the danger. The result is likely to be a number of damaged and lost mine sweepers and possibly other light forces. There also is a good chance that they will not have completely cleared the mine fields and that the Germans will have a number of craft sunk or damaged by mines. As they tend to range around the convoys the escorts may suffer a disporportunate number of mine strikes.

It could also be the KM starting a CYA program early with the LW as the designated fall guy. The two are not mutually exclusive.

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#41

Post by RichTO90 » 26 Apr 2007, 19:49

LWD wrote:The German plan is obviously very dependent on mine sweepers and layers.
Yep. :D And the story, as best I cn make out, is:

The Mine Barrier (Minesperren) Plan

West Group –
From Cherbourg: Tannenberg (383-480 mines), Cobra, Togo (225 mines?), Schwerin (converted liner, probably carried a load similar to Tannenberg) , and Schiff 23 (later known as Stier, an auxiliary cruiser)
From Le Havre: Stralsund (World War I reparation to France, re-commissioned by the KM, 120 mines) and Skaggerak (?)
Total capacity was probably about 1,200 mines. They were responsible for laying 8 barriers of various lengths, two off Plymouth, two of Portsmouth, and 4 off Brighton.

East Group –
From Ostende: Grille (120-228 mines), Roland (converted liner, probably carried a load similar to Tannenberg), Preußen (a pre-World War I Baltic ferry and auxiliary minelayer, 400 mines), and Königin Luise (sunk in World War I she was raised and rebuilt, 200 mines)
From Antwerp: Hansestadt Danzig (converted liner, probably carried a load similar to Tannenberg), Kaiser (World War I auxiliary minelayer, 180 mines), and Brummer (280 mines)
Total capacity was probably about 1,900 mines. They were responsible for laying 18 barriers of various lengths off Dover.

Evaluation of the Mine Barrier Plan by Jürgen Rohwer in “Chronik des Seekriegs”:

“The effect of this loss [of two British destroyers in a minefield on 31 August, a third was damaged] on the British side was hardly to be underestimated. However not just in terms of demoralization. The British units also had orders to place mines in order to disturb the approach of the invasion fleet. It may be assumed that with the beginning of Seelöwe operations the landing area would have been mined within the shortest time by English side, and that German mine search and clearing units would have been as helpless
.
Contrary to the other armed services [i.e., OKH and OKL] the OKM evaluation of the value of the mine barriers was extremely critically. They objected that the barriers would only remain effective, if the British could be prevented from clearing them. To do that required the strengthening of the Kriegsmarine covering forces for a long period. In hindsight it has to be stated that they [i.e., OKH and OKL] did not make any allowance for the clearing of the mine barriers by the British as they did for the Germans.”

Known German Minefields Actually Laid in September and their results:
Night of 1/2 September – 600 by Tannenberg, Roland, and Cobra.
Night of 6/7 September – 405 by Togo and Kaiser
Night of 8/9 September – unknown number by T5, T6, T7, and T8 off Dover
Night of 15/16 September – unknown number by T5, T6, T7, and T8 off Dover
Night of 28/29 September – unknown number by Hans Lody, Karl Galster, Erich Steinbrinck, Friedrich Ihn, Paul Jacobi off Falmouth. The field sinks: 30 Sep – one yacht (387 BRT), 3 Oct – one steamer (166 BRT), 6 Oct – one steamer (910 BRT), 6 Nov – one trawler (253 BRT), and 8 Nov – one trawler (221 BRT).
Night of 30 September/1 October – unknown number by TB Greif, Kondor, Falke and Seeadler off Dover.
Month of September – 184 by 9. Flieger Division, resulting in two MMS (Motor Minesweepers), one trawler (346 BRT), and one oiler (2,444 BRT) sunk.

Note that by a quick count, in June Nore Command alone had 19 fleet minesweepers and 148 minesweeping trawlers and Portsmouth Command had another 21 minesweeping trawlers. Plus about a 100 minesweeping drifters, yachts, and tugs.

And of course, the RN was also quite expert at mine warfare and had their own fast minelayers, 8 at Portsmouth and 2 at Dover, and were quite ready to mine the approaches of an invasion fleet.

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#42

Post by John T » 26 Apr 2007, 20:07

RichTO90 wrote:
Seriously, I was in part referring to the fact that the German forces in opposition in June 1944 were little different than those in 1940 and that the RN forces were also similar.

1 June 1944, schematic strngth of MGK-West was:

Admiral Kanalküste - 5 TB, 39 S-Boote, 163 MS/RB, 57 VP
Admiral Atlantikküste - 5 Z, 1 TB, 146 MS/RB, 59 VP

Total 11 Z/TB, 39 S-Boote, 309 MS/RB, 116 VP.

And what happened? :D
Hi RichTO90
Nice to have you here,
(Thought you was more into tracked things painted green)

On this one I think you have to add the air dimension,
similar naval forces but 1940 and close to parity in the air,
1944 Allied Air power in the general direction of 10000:1 over the channel.

I'll dig up mine capacity on those ships you need in the other post
Alway nice to add info rather than explain the basics of naval operations..

Cheers
/John T.

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#43

Post by John T » 26 Apr 2007, 20:35

RichTO90 wrote:
LWD wrote:The German plan is obviously very dependent on mine sweepers and layers.
Yep. :D And the story, as best I cn make out, is:

The Mine Barrier (Minesperren) Plan

West Group –
From Cherbourg: Tannenberg (383-480 mines), Cobra, Togo (225 mines?), Schwerin (converted liner, probably carried a load similar to Tannenberg) , and Schiff 23 (later known as Stier, an auxiliary cruiser)
From Le Havre: Stralsund (World War I reparation to France, re-commissioned by the KM, 120 mines) and Skaggerak (?)
Total capacity was probably about 1,200 mines. They were responsible for laying 8 barriers of various lengths, two off Plymouth, two of Portsmouth, and 4 off Brighton.

East Group –
From Ostende: Grille (120-228 mines), Roland (converted liner, probably carried a load similar to Tannenberg), Preußen (a pre-World War I Baltic ferry and auxiliary minelayer, 400 mines), and Königin Luise (sunk in World War I she was raised and rebuilt, 200 mines)
From Antwerp: Hansestadt Danzig (converted liner, probably carried a load similar to Tannenberg), Kaiser (World War I auxiliary minelayer, 180 mines), and Brummer (280 mines)
Total capacity was probably about 1,900 mines. They were responsible for laying 18 barriers of various lengths off Dover.
From Minenschiffe 1939-45: ( v. Kutzleben, Schroeder, Brennecke)

Tannenberg 460
Cobra -180
Togo No value
Schwerin (ex Preussen) 280
Schiff 23 No value

Stralsund - 420
Skagerakk - 180

Grille 280
Brummer (ex norwegian) 280

Then comes a bunch of small passenger ships "Seebädershiffe"-

Roland 400
Preußen 400
Hansestadt Danzig 360
Königin Luise 240
Kaiser 200

RichTO90 wrote: “The effect of this loss [of two British destroyers in a minefield on 31 August, a third was damaged] on the British side was hardly to be underestimated. However not just in terms of demoralization. The British units also had orders to place mines in order to disturb the approach of the invasion fleet. It may be assumed that with the beginning of Seelöwe operations the landing area would have been mined within the shortest time by English side, and that German mine search and clearing units would have been as helpless
Probably the best use of Hampdens, use em as mine layers.
(but thats another thread)
RichTO90 wrote: Contrary to the other armed services [i.e., OKH and OKL] the OKM evaluation of the value of the mine barriers was extremely critically.
Wasn't KM critical in most respects ;)


Cheers
/John T

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#44

Post by RichTO90 » 26 Apr 2007, 20:51

John T wrote:Hi RichTO90
Nice to have you here,
(Thought you was more into tracked things painted green)

On this one I think you have to add the air dimension,
similar naval forces but 1940 and close to parity in the air,
1944 Allied Air power in the general direction of 10000:1 over the channel.

I'll dig up mine capacity on those ships you need in the other post
Alway nice to add info rather than explain the basics of naval operations..

Cheers
/John T.
Naw, I just like to argue, doesn't have to have tracks or be painted green. :D

And I'm afraid I was pretty much ignoring the air dimension on purpose, since it essentially would have been useless. :P

1). The German assault convoy approach was at night, with the landings scheduled to begin at circa 0630 hours IIRC. How does the Luftwaffe, find and strike RN vessels at night? It's likely the Royal Navy will be amongst the convoys and their escorts before daylight when the Luftwaffe arrives amid the considerable confusion....do I need to define "fratricide" for anyone? :D

2). Luftwaffe antiship capabilities were extremely poor at this time. Their aerial torpedos literally did not work (those used in the spring of 1941 and later against shipping were initially borrowed and then copied from Regia Aeronautica designs that did work). Their bombs worked....sort of. Unfortunately though again at that time only against unarmored or lightly armored vessels. Most of the German bomb inventory were SC (General Purpose) and SD (Semi-armor Piercing) types with poor antiarmor capability (essentially Revenge and any other vessel with a 3-inch armor deck or turret/conning tower roof were more or less impervious to penetrations, which leaves blast effects that would likely not have much result against a battleship and might not be serious versus a cruiser. And worse, none of the Luftwaffe units were trained in antiship operations - they were good against stationary anchored targets (the destoyers lost at Dunkirk were either stopped or moving slowly and not maneuvering because of the shallows), but woefully incapable against moving targets, especially small fast ones like DD and cruisers (total losses of moving vessels in the Channel to Stukas during the whole of August was four armed trawlers and a netlayer IIRC). Essentially the only specialized antiship assets they had at he time were the Küstenflieger and Bordeflieger and they were all either inappropriate or fully occupied in naval reconnaissance operations, and there were only about three dozen of them anyway, so a very finite asset.

It wasn't until 1941 and the arrival of numbers of PC (AP) bombs, Italian torpedos, and a lot of additional practice that they got good at antiship operations, and even then it was hit or miss, their actually performance against an unprotected, target rich environment at Crete wasn't really all that great. The heyday, such as it was, of KG 40 out of Bordeaux was 1941-1942, they just didn't have the capability in 1940.

3) The result would have been losses to the RN, of course, but the notion that they had the capability to actually halt a determined Royal Navy attack on the invasion convoys is simply untenable. To take Crete as an example again, four RN cruisers and 8 destroyers were lost directly or indirectly to Luftwaffe attacks. Except they were lost over six different days over a ten-day period of operations where there the Luftwaffe had complete air superiority and well-nigh air supremacy. And the worse loss was 22 May when three cruisers and a destroyer were sunk....except that York was lost in Suda Bay to cumulative damage that had occured over the last days.

So our baseline really has to be that the maximum expected damage done by the Luftwaffe would be two or three cruisers/destroyers on the day of the invasion. You could argue for doubling that to account for the quicker turnaround time flying from France to England versus from Greece to Crete, but then I could counter with the full force of Fighter Command (only about 60 percent of which was ever committed at one time to the Battle of Britain). And that is a true pinprick when the initial size of the force committed would have been on the order of 1 BB, 5 CL, 47 DD, and 12 sloops and torpedo boats, plus literally hundreds of smaller warships and auxiliaries.

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#45

Post by Andreas » 26 Apr 2007, 21:13

I have split out the discussion on capital ships in the Channel. I think it is quite interesting in its own right, no need to bury it in here:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=119802

All the best

Andreas

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