taylorjohn wrote:Andreas, it is not an 'If'' - if the Germans control both coastlines along the Straits of Dover laying mines over that area is going to be easier.
And if they had taken London immediately it would have been even less of a problem. The "If" that has no place here is the assumption that they take control of the other side of the channel. If you want to base any argument on that assumption, kindly take it to the What-If section of the forum, there is a thread open for it.
taylorjohn wrote:I agree that Luftwaffe coverage during the day depends on the weather, but attempting to mine sweep over hostile waters at night in 1940 would be very difficult (also, I imagine, quite dangerous!)
Why? More specifically, why are the waters in mid-channel suddenly 'hostile' at night to the RN? I would think it would be quite difficult, not to say dangerous, to lay mines in hostile waters at night. Unless you assume that all shipping channels up to the British coast were controlled by the Germans in 1940, by day and night. That would be news to me.
taylorjohn wrote:Schenk doesn't specifically mention relaying mine barriers but (and this is a guess) aerial reconnaissance by the Luftwaffe and surveillance by the KM's u-boats/patrol ships of the RN's movements would give the Germans an idea as to whether their mine barriers were holding up.
What were the arrangements for covering the minefields then? Would not the same ships that are supposed to cover the mine fields (e.g. Vorpostenboote) be busy preparing for the invasion, where they have escort and transport duties?
taylorjohn wrote:According to Schenk, there were more than enough mines for the proposed mine barriers and these included EMC and EMD moored mines, UMA anti-sub mines, plus mines airdropped by the 9th Fliegerdivision.
I very seriously doubt that any air-dropped mines would have been part of the mine lanes. They would have been used to mine harbour entrances and likely approach routes far away from the channel, due to precision issues.
taylorjohn wrote:Again according to Schenk there was enough mine laying capacity (including torpedo boats, destroyers etc) to get the mines laid within the time constraints of the plan.
Assuming good weather throughout?
taylorjohn wrote:Not sure about sufficient escorts available to screen the minelayers but is there any evidence that the British were successful at disrupting the KM's mine laying activities in 1940.
That is a non-argument. They did not try to lay mines close to the English shores either. Whether the RN would have interfered had they tried to do so is an open question.
taylorjohn wrote:Regards the effectiveness of the mine barriers Schenk points out that 2 RN destroyers were sunk and 1 was severely damaged during anti-invasion mine laying operations in Autumn 1940!!
If that is indeed what Schenk points out, it appears he is talking nonsense, and it would make me doubt his qualification to talk on the subject of mining, unless the British managed to lose two and damage one twice in 1940. The three destroyers I know off ran on a German offensive minefield off Texel on 1 September, during summer. The minefield had been laid on 7/8 August. It was not anti-invasion anything. That mines can damage and sink ships is also not a point of contention here, that's what they were there for. Unless you can show that SW1 had similar mine densities to those barriers planned for the invasion, I fail to see the relevance.
Die 20. brit. Zerstörerflottille läuft mit Ivanhoe, Intrepid, Icarus, Esk und Express aus, um nordwest. von Texel die Minensperre CBX.5 auszubringen. Nach Luftaufklärundsmeldungen werden die Zerstörer Jupiter (Capt. Lord Louis Mountbatten), Jackal, Kelvin und Vortigern zur Verstärkung befohlen. Bei dem Versuch, deutsche Schiffe abzufangen, läuft Express auf eine Mine der kürzlich ausgelegten dt. Sperre »SW 1« (siehe 7./8.8.), anschließend auch die zur Hilfe eilenden Esk und Ivanhoe. Die Esk sinkt. Während Vortigern am Ausgang D der brit. Minenfelder wartet, suchen Jupiter und Kelvin nach den zwei beschädigten Zerstörern. Kelvin nimmt Express bis zum Eintreffen von Schleppern an den Haken. Der Zerstörer Garth findet die Ivanhoe, die zusätzlich von einem dt. Wasserflugzeug angegriffen und beschädigt wird. Da Abschleppversuche der beschädigten Ivanhoe zu gefährlich sind, versenkt Kelvin den Zerstörer mit einem Torpedo.
taylorjohn wrote:Schenks book 'Invasion of England 1940' covers the above in quite some detail see pp328-333.
All the best